Recent empirical work attempts to investigate how implicit biases target those facing intersectio... more Recent empirical work attempts to investigate how implicit biases target those facing intersectional oppression. This is welcome, since early work on implicit biases focused on single axes of discrimination, such as race, gender, or age. However, the success of such empirical work on how biases target those facing intersectional oppressions depends on adequate conceptualizations of intersectionality and empirical measures that are responsive to these conceptualizations. Surveying prominent recent empirical work, we identify failures in conceptualizations of intersectionality that inform the design of empirical measures. These failures generate unsupported conclusions about the kinds of biases that those experiencing multiple oppressions face, and render proposed interventions to combat biases useless at best, harmful at worst. We also diagnose unwarranted assumptions about how stereotypes combine in complex concepts: first, that when “simple” social concepts combine the complex concepts inherit the associated stereotypes of their simpler constituent concepts; second that studies which focus on cognition about single social categories are investigating “simple” social concepts (cf. Goff and Khan 2013). We tease out recommendations to guide future investigations into biases that target those who experience multiple oppressions.
Feminist Philosophical Quarterly, special issue on Revolutionising Responsibility (ed. M. Ciurria), 2024
Practice-dependent approaches to moral responsibility appeal to our practices of moral responsibi... more Practice-dependent approaches to moral responsibility appeal to our practices of moral responsibility in order to identify and justify the conditions for holding each other responsible. Yet, our practices are shaped by oppressive norms. For example, attributions of praise can be shaped by ableist norms, antifat norms,and norms of toxic positivity. I argue that such cases pose methodological and justificatory challenges for practice-dependent approaches of various stripes. In considering what resources these approaches might have to confront these challenges, I formulate some supplementary norms for theorizing about our practices of moral responsibility and for structuring those practices themselves. This paper makes the following novel contributions: First, it advances examples that show that reactive attitudes can be oppressive irrespective of patterns of comparative distribution. Second, it articulates the implications of oppressive reactive attitudes for a range of post-Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility. Third, it more fully articulates the norms that ought to shape our responsibility practices and locates them in relation to two recently proposed approaches to moral responsibility, from Shoemaker and Ciurria
What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist vi... more What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist views of praise are emerging, but I here argue that by foregrounding cases in which expressions of praise are rejected by their direct target, we see that praise has a wider, and largely overlooked, social function. I introduce cases in which praise is rejected, and develop a functionalist account of praise that is well placed to make sense of the contours of these cases. My claim is that praise functions to affirm and entrench values, exerting pressure in praise's audiences to affirm the values expressed. I show how my account overcomes some of the limitations of recently developed accounts of praise. What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist views of praise are emerging, but I here argue that by foregrounding cases in which expressions of praise are rejected by their direct target, we see that praise has a wider, and largely overlooked, social function. In section 1 I introduce cases in which praise is rejected. In section 2, I develop a functionalist account of praise. My claim is that praise functions to affirm and entrench values, exerting pressure in praise's audiences to affirm the values expressed. In section 3, I show how my account overcomes some of the limitations of recently developed accounts of praise. In contrast to these accounts, my functionalist account is responsive to, and places at the foreground of our analysis, the possibility that praise can be used for bad and oppressive ends.
Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness... more Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness of the problems related to implicit biases, and of how to safeguard against discrimination that may result. However, as Atewologun et al. (2018) have noted, there is very little systematicity in IBT, and there are many unknowns about what constitutes good IBT. One important issue concerns the tone of information provided regarding implicit bias. This paper engages this question, focusing in particular on the observation that much bias training is delivered in exculpatory tone, emphasising that individuals are not to blame for possessing implicit biases. Normative guidance around IBT exhorts practitioners to adopt this strategy (Moss-Racusin et al. 2014). However, existing evidence about the effects of moralized feedback about implicit bias is equivocal (Legault et al. 2011; Czopp et al. 2006). Through a series of studies, culminating in an experiment with a pre-registered analysis plan,...
Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow s... more Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. Articulating what is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about it.
Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic pract... more Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterise better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism.
C. Dahlman, A. Stein, G. Tuzet (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, 2021
In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deploy... more In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualising and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the state authority to condemn and punish. We raise a series of challenges that need answering before integrity can perform these roles. Our aim is not to show that integrity is useless in normative theorising about the admissibility of evidence, and about the criminal process in general. Rather, it is to give guidance for the elaboration of a theory of integrity that is cogent, coherent, and has useful implications for the process of proof.
The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an indi... more The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an individual may use defensive force if her beliefs that a threat is imminent and that force is required are beliefs that a reasonable person would have. In English law, it is sufficient that beliefs in imminence and necessity are genuinely held; but the reasonableness of so believing is given an evidential role in establishing the genuineness of the beliefs. There is, of course, much contention over how to spell out when, and in virtue of what, such beliefs are reasonable. In this chapter, we identify some distinctive issues that arise when we consider that implicit racial bias might be implicated in the beliefs in imminence and necessity. Considering two prominent interpretations of the reasonable person standard, we argue that neither is acceptable. On one interpretation, we risk unfairness to the defendant-who may non-culpably harbour bias. On another, the standard embeds racist stereotypes. Whilst there are formulations of the defence that may serve to mitigate these problems, we argue that they cannot be avoided in the presence of racist social structures.
Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit bia... more Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes-they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously'-we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to control, considerable work is required to prevent their influence. We here focus on the implications of these findings for epistemology. We first look at ways in which implicit biases thwart our knowledge seeking practices (sections 1 & 2). Then we set out putative epistemic benefits of implicit bias, before considering ways in which epistemic practices might be improved (section 3). Finally, we consider the distinctive challenges that the findings about implicit bias pose to us as philosophers, in the context of feminist philosophy in particular (section 4).
This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency, each of which is locate... more This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency, each of which is located within a broader understanding of moral responsibility as constituted by our social practices. The first view at issue is Vargas's circumstantialism (2013, 2015) – the view that responsible agency is a function of the agent and her circumstances, and so is highly context sensitive. The second view is McGeer's scaffolded-responsiveness view (2015, McGeer & Pettit 2015), according to which responsible agency is constituted by our capacity for responsiveness both to reasons directly, and indirectly, via sensitivity to the expectations of our audience (whose sensitivity may be more developed than our own). I illustrate the key differences between these views by applying each to two test cases in which responsible agency is at issue: action involving implicit bias, and involving moral ignorance. In so doing, I develop and defend a version of the scaffolded-responsiveness view, and tease out two broader thoughts: first, that moral responsibility should not be tied too closely to liability to praise or blame. It is at issue in cases where a broader range of moral responses are engaged. Secondly, rather than revising our existing concept of responsibility, we would do better to ask what we want the concept of responsibility for, and what analysis serves those purposes.
Implicit biases are, roughly speaking, automatic cognitive tendencies to evaluate or stereotype. ... more Implicit biases are, roughly speaking, automatic cognitive tendencies to evaluate or stereotype. They are particularly problematic when they target social identities, and have been hypothesised to have a role in sustaining patterns of discrimination and inequality. Research on implicit biases raises a whole host of philosophical questions, such as: what are implicit biases? What wrongs or harms are implicit biases implicated in? Are people responsible, individually or collectively, for having implicit biases and acting on them? How relevant are implicit biases to an adequate understanding of injustice and responses to it? What sort of responses should we take? This entry examines these questions and points to other areas of philosophy where implicit bias research has import.
Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit im... more Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self‐report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being measured ; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices.
Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two
decades have revealed implicit biases... more Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus non-revisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias.
The claim that policing practice in the UK is institutionally racist was widely accepted after th... more The claim that policing practice in the UK is institutionally racist was widely accepted after the Macpherson Report at the end of last century. The report included the idea that there may be widespread ‘unwitting prejudice' that lead to racially discriminatory practice. The recent findings of empirical psychology, about implicit racial biases, provide a framework for better understanding this part of institutional racism. Understanding the workings of implicit racial bias helps us to see the implications for the kinds of steps needed to combat racial discrimination in policing and in the criminal justice system more broadly.
In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases ... more In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases and suggest that, when considered in light of them, some recent models of implicit cognition fail to satisfy these desiderata. The test cases also bring to light an important class of cases that have been almost completely ignored in philosophical discussions of implicit cognition and implicit bias. These cases have important work to do in helping us understand both the role of implicit cognition in action, and our attempts to combat implicit biases.
Recent empirical work attempts to investigate how implicit biases target those facing intersectio... more Recent empirical work attempts to investigate how implicit biases target those facing intersectional oppression. This is welcome, since early work on implicit biases focused on single axes of discrimination, such as race, gender, or age. However, the success of such empirical work on how biases target those facing intersectional oppressions depends on adequate conceptualizations of intersectionality and empirical measures that are responsive to these conceptualizations. Surveying prominent recent empirical work, we identify failures in conceptualizations of intersectionality that inform the design of empirical measures. These failures generate unsupported conclusions about the kinds of biases that those experiencing multiple oppressions face, and render proposed interventions to combat biases useless at best, harmful at worst. We also diagnose unwarranted assumptions about how stereotypes combine in complex concepts: first, that when “simple” social concepts combine the complex concepts inherit the associated stereotypes of their simpler constituent concepts; second that studies which focus on cognition about single social categories are investigating “simple” social concepts (cf. Goff and Khan 2013). We tease out recommendations to guide future investigations into biases that target those who experience multiple oppressions.
Feminist Philosophical Quarterly, special issue on Revolutionising Responsibility (ed. M. Ciurria), 2024
Practice-dependent approaches to moral responsibility appeal to our practices of moral responsibi... more Practice-dependent approaches to moral responsibility appeal to our practices of moral responsibility in order to identify and justify the conditions for holding each other responsible. Yet, our practices are shaped by oppressive norms. For example, attributions of praise can be shaped by ableist norms, antifat norms,and norms of toxic positivity. I argue that such cases pose methodological and justificatory challenges for practice-dependent approaches of various stripes. In considering what resources these approaches might have to confront these challenges, I formulate some supplementary norms for theorizing about our practices of moral responsibility and for structuring those practices themselves. This paper makes the following novel contributions: First, it advances examples that show that reactive attitudes can be oppressive irrespective of patterns of comparative distribution. Second, it articulates the implications of oppressive reactive attitudes for a range of post-Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility. Third, it more fully articulates the norms that ought to shape our responsibility practices and locates them in relation to two recently proposed approaches to moral responsibility, from Shoemaker and Ciurria
What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist vi... more What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist views of praise are emerging, but I here argue that by foregrounding cases in which expressions of praise are rejected by their direct target, we see that praise has a wider, and largely overlooked, social function. I introduce cases in which praise is rejected, and develop a functionalist account of praise that is well placed to make sense of the contours of these cases. My claim is that praise functions to affirm and entrench values, exerting pressure in praise's audiences to affirm the values expressed. I show how my account overcomes some of the limitations of recently developed accounts of praise. What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist views of praise are emerging, but I here argue that by foregrounding cases in which expressions of praise are rejected by their direct target, we see that praise has a wider, and largely overlooked, social function. In section 1 I introduce cases in which praise is rejected. In section 2, I develop a functionalist account of praise. My claim is that praise functions to affirm and entrench values, exerting pressure in praise's audiences to affirm the values expressed. In section 3, I show how my account overcomes some of the limitations of recently developed accounts of praise. In contrast to these accounts, my functionalist account is responsive to, and places at the foreground of our analysis, the possibility that praise can be used for bad and oppressive ends.
Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness... more Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness of the problems related to implicit biases, and of how to safeguard against discrimination that may result. However, as Atewologun et al. (2018) have noted, there is very little systematicity in IBT, and there are many unknowns about what constitutes good IBT. One important issue concerns the tone of information provided regarding implicit bias. This paper engages this question, focusing in particular on the observation that much bias training is delivered in exculpatory tone, emphasising that individuals are not to blame for possessing implicit biases. Normative guidance around IBT exhorts practitioners to adopt this strategy (Moss-Racusin et al. 2014). However, existing evidence about the effects of moralized feedback about implicit bias is equivocal (Legault et al. 2011; Czopp et al. 2006). Through a series of studies, culminating in an experiment with a pre-registered analysis plan,...
Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow s... more Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. Articulating what is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about it.
Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic pract... more Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterise better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism.
C. Dahlman, A. Stein, G. Tuzet (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, 2021
In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deploy... more In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualising and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the state authority to condemn and punish. We raise a series of challenges that need answering before integrity can perform these roles. Our aim is not to show that integrity is useless in normative theorising about the admissibility of evidence, and about the criminal process in general. Rather, it is to give guidance for the elaboration of a theory of integrity that is cogent, coherent, and has useful implications for the process of proof.
The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an indi... more The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an individual may use defensive force if her beliefs that a threat is imminent and that force is required are beliefs that a reasonable person would have. In English law, it is sufficient that beliefs in imminence and necessity are genuinely held; but the reasonableness of so believing is given an evidential role in establishing the genuineness of the beliefs. There is, of course, much contention over how to spell out when, and in virtue of what, such beliefs are reasonable. In this chapter, we identify some distinctive issues that arise when we consider that implicit racial bias might be implicated in the beliefs in imminence and necessity. Considering two prominent interpretations of the reasonable person standard, we argue that neither is acceptable. On one interpretation, we risk unfairness to the defendant-who may non-culpably harbour bias. On another, the standard embeds racist stereotypes. Whilst there are formulations of the defence that may serve to mitigate these problems, we argue that they cannot be avoided in the presence of racist social structures.
Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit bia... more Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes-they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously'-we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to control, considerable work is required to prevent their influence. We here focus on the implications of these findings for epistemology. We first look at ways in which implicit biases thwart our knowledge seeking practices (sections 1 & 2). Then we set out putative epistemic benefits of implicit bias, before considering ways in which epistemic practices might be improved (section 3). Finally, we consider the distinctive challenges that the findings about implicit bias pose to us as philosophers, in the context of feminist philosophy in particular (section 4).
This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency, each of which is locate... more This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency, each of which is located within a broader understanding of moral responsibility as constituted by our social practices. The first view at issue is Vargas's circumstantialism (2013, 2015) – the view that responsible agency is a function of the agent and her circumstances, and so is highly context sensitive. The second view is McGeer's scaffolded-responsiveness view (2015, McGeer & Pettit 2015), according to which responsible agency is constituted by our capacity for responsiveness both to reasons directly, and indirectly, via sensitivity to the expectations of our audience (whose sensitivity may be more developed than our own). I illustrate the key differences between these views by applying each to two test cases in which responsible agency is at issue: action involving implicit bias, and involving moral ignorance. In so doing, I develop and defend a version of the scaffolded-responsiveness view, and tease out two broader thoughts: first, that moral responsibility should not be tied too closely to liability to praise or blame. It is at issue in cases where a broader range of moral responses are engaged. Secondly, rather than revising our existing concept of responsibility, we would do better to ask what we want the concept of responsibility for, and what analysis serves those purposes.
Implicit biases are, roughly speaking, automatic cognitive tendencies to evaluate or stereotype. ... more Implicit biases are, roughly speaking, automatic cognitive tendencies to evaluate or stereotype. They are particularly problematic when they target social identities, and have been hypothesised to have a role in sustaining patterns of discrimination and inequality. Research on implicit biases raises a whole host of philosophical questions, such as: what are implicit biases? What wrongs or harms are implicit biases implicated in? Are people responsible, individually or collectively, for having implicit biases and acting on them? How relevant are implicit biases to an adequate understanding of injustice and responses to it? What sort of responses should we take? This entry examines these questions and points to other areas of philosophy where implicit bias research has import.
Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit im... more Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self‐report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being measured ; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices.
Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two
decades have revealed implicit biases... more Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus non-revisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias.
The claim that policing practice in the UK is institutionally racist was widely accepted after th... more The claim that policing practice in the UK is institutionally racist was widely accepted after the Macpherson Report at the end of last century. The report included the idea that there may be widespread ‘unwitting prejudice' that lead to racially discriminatory practice. The recent findings of empirical psychology, about implicit racial biases, provide a framework for better understanding this part of institutional racism. Understanding the workings of implicit racial bias helps us to see the implications for the kinds of steps needed to combat racial discrimination in policing and in the criminal justice system more broadly.
In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases ... more In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases and suggest that, when considered in light of them, some recent models of implicit cognition fail to satisfy these desiderata. The test cases also bring to light an important class of cases that have been almost completely ignored in philosophical discussions of implicit cognition and implicit bias. These cases have important work to do in helping us understand both the role of implicit cognition in action, and our attempts to combat implicit biases.
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Papers by Jules Holroyd
target those facing intersectional oppressions depends on adequate conceptualizations of intersectionality and empirical measures that are responsive to these conceptualizations.
Surveying prominent recent empirical work, we identify failures in conceptualizations of intersectionality that inform the design of empirical measures. These failures generate unsupported conclusions about the kinds of biases that those experiencing multiple oppressions face, and render proposed interventions to combat biases useless at best, harmful
at worst. We also diagnose unwarranted assumptions about how stereotypes combine in complex concepts: first, that when “simple” social concepts combine the complex concepts inherit the associated stereotypes of their simpler constituent concepts; second that studies which focus on
cognition about single social categories are investigating “simple” social concepts (cf. Goff and Khan 2013). We tease out recommendations to guide future investigations into biases that target those who experience multiple
oppressions.
decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes
are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms
of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding
stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite
intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory
behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong
and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be
addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and
the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative
and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions
of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of
recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at
issue; (b) revisionist versus non-revisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and
collective responsibility for implicit bias.
target those facing intersectional oppressions depends on adequate conceptualizations of intersectionality and empirical measures that are responsive to these conceptualizations.
Surveying prominent recent empirical work, we identify failures in conceptualizations of intersectionality that inform the design of empirical measures. These failures generate unsupported conclusions about the kinds of biases that those experiencing multiple oppressions face, and render proposed interventions to combat biases useless at best, harmful
at worst. We also diagnose unwarranted assumptions about how stereotypes combine in complex concepts: first, that when “simple” social concepts combine the complex concepts inherit the associated stereotypes of their simpler constituent concepts; second that studies which focus on
cognition about single social categories are investigating “simple” social concepts (cf. Goff and Khan 2013). We tease out recommendations to guide future investigations into biases that target those who experience multiple
oppressions.
decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes
are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms
of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding
stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite
intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory
behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong
and unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be
addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and
the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative
and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions
of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of
recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at
issue; (b) revisionist versus non-revisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and
collective responsibility for implicit bias.