Articles by Alberto G Urquidez
Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming), 2024
Sally Haslanger’s notion of “pure structural oppression” is the idea of an institution or structu... more Sally Haslanger’s notion of “pure structural oppression” is the idea of an institution or structure (1) that is politically unjust independent of any and all agential wrongdoing, and (2) for which no agent is liable. The idea of “racism without racists” is the rough equivalent of “pure structural oppression” in the racial domain. Haslanger argues that pure structural oppression is possible, but she does not defend it as a viable reality in the actual world. My aim in this paper is to clarify and assess two major arguments for the viability of the racial equivalent of Haslanger’s idea (Haslanger’s and Joshua Glasgow’s arguments). That is, I evaluate the racism without racists hypothesis, which asserts that racism without racists is not just logically possible but probable under some set of viable circumstances. I argue that the hypothesis is implausible, and demonstrate the theoretical value of this claim for the theory of racism.
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Ergo, 2024
This paper argues that institutional racism does not presuppose the idea of racist ideology, alth... more This paper argues that institutional racism does not presuppose the idea of racist ideology, although it does presuppose the idea of race (hence, "racial ideology"). My position is incompatible with Tommie Shelby's Marxist definition of racism as a form of ideology. The Marxist notion of ideology, on Shelby's interpretation, is pejorative in that it entails cognitive distortion. Hence, a Marxist conception of racism--"Racism is racist ideology"--requires cognitive distortion. Against this view, I argue that it is possible to imagine a form of institutional racism that involves racial cognition but no cognitive distortion, hence no ideology in the pejorative sense. The theoretical portion of my paper (section 3) analyzes Shelby's analysis of race and sheds light on a significant theoretical problem (that I call "Shelby's dilemma") plaguing Shelby's conception of racism.
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Radical Philosophy Review , 2022
The narrow-the-scope proposal posits that narrow definitions of racism are preferable to wide def... more The narrow-the-scope proposal posits that narrow definitions of racism are preferable to wide definitions because they are more useful for facilitating interracial dialogue between whites and nonwhites. The most important critiques of the narrow-the-scope proposal have so far focused on the content of narrow definitions. This paper argues that it is important to critique the use of narrow definitions, as well. By looking at white usage of “racism,” I argue that narrow definitions tend to be synonymous with individualist definitions, which are ideal for white co-optation. For this reason, I argue that philosophers interested in theorizing racism for social justice purposes ought to privilege wide definitions of racism, ought to frame racism in historical terms, and ought to do so against a naturalistic, non-ideal background. [PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED DRAFT.]
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Journal of Social Philosophy, 2020
Many theories of racism presuppose that ordinary usage of the term “racism” should be preserved. ... more Many theories of racism presuppose that ordinary usage of the term “racism” should be preserved. Rarely is this presupposition—the presumption of conservatism—defended. This paper discusses the work of Lawrence Blum, Joshua Glasgow, Jorge Garcia, Tommie Shelby, and others, in order to develop a critique of the presumption of conservatism. Against this presumption, I defend the following desideratum: If ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties that can be averted by revising ordinary usage, then this counts as a mark against the normative status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising it. The significance of this argument is that it clears the way for a more rigorous defense of revisionism. My paper provides a prima facie case for revisionism, built on two practical criticisms of ordinary usage of “racism.” First, ordinary usage reflects incompatible norms that promote conceptual confusion and misunderstanding. Second, ordinary usage reflects an individualistic conception of racism that serves the interests of whites. By championing ordinary usage in our philosophical theories, we (unwittingly) promote the interests of whites over nonwhites.
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Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018
The published version is available here: http://rdcu.be/I4XB.
Winner of the American Philosophi... more The published version is available here: http://rdcu.be/I4XB.
Winner of the American Philosophical Association 2017 Journal of Value Inquiry Prize.
In "Racism as Disrespect," Joshua Glasgow articulates his disagreement with Lawrence Blum about whether a particular case is an instance of racism. This paper appraises this dispute in order to shed light on the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to racism. My main contention is that Glasgow's approach to conceptual analysis is not descriptive as he claims, but prescriptive, and that this misunderstanding has substantial ramifications for his critique of Blum. I conclude by discussing the ramifications of my argument, which includes a taxonomy of approaches to conceptual analysis.
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Social Theory and Practice, 2017
Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method” analyzes multiple uses of language across contexts of use, wi... more Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method” analyzes multiple uses of language across contexts of use, with the aim of identifying differences and dissolving conceptual confusion. This paper uses Wittgenstein’s method to undermine Jorge L. A. Garcia’s volitional account of racism. Garcia claims that his theory accommodates the ordinary use of terms like “racist belief.” However, he did not consider whether such terms might have multiple uses/meanings. My paper identifies three uses of “racist belief” that escape Garcia’s analysis. Consequently, philosophers should take Wittgenstein’s advice to heart: do not assume that target-terms have a single use, but “look and see” whether they do.
The article is available here: https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2017_0999_2_8_3
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Chapters by Alberto G Urquidez
Springer eBooks, 2023
This chapter argues that Tommy Curry’s “anti-ethics” is best understood as a naturalistic ethical... more This chapter argues that Tommy Curry’s “anti-ethics” is best understood as a naturalistic ethical theory, one that is helpfully elucidated in terms of Harrisian insurrectionist ethics. Close analysis reveals that the term “ethics” in Curry’s “anti-ethics” does not refer to ethics per se, but to an idealist approach to ethics, which Curry rejects both for its unfounded, unacknowledged commitments (such as its commitment to whites as virtuous and to projecting white humanity into the future) and for characteristically eschewing naturalistic-empirical methodologies in favor of methodologies that seek to justify universal rules of concrete ethical conduct. I argue that insurrectionist ethics provides an instructive and complementary window into the normative dimensions of Curry’s approach to ethics.
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Monograph & Replies by Alberto G Urquidez
Palgrave Macmillan, 2020
African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora
Read a full description of the book here:... more African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora
Read a full description of the book here: http://aurquidez.com/monograph
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021
View-only access link: https://rdcu.be/cm5ZS
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first compre... more View-only access link: https://rdcu.be/cm5ZS
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: (1) my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation (explaining why racism is bad) over social explanation (explaining the causes of racism); (2) the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist Framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; (3) my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, (4) my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.”
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Online Papers by Alberto G Urquidez
Syndicate (open access publication), 2024
Read online: https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/anti-colonial-solidarity/#symposium-in... more Read online: https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/anti-colonial-solidarity/#symposium-intro
George Fourlas’ "Anti-Colonial Solidarity: Race, Reconciliation, and MENA Liberation" is impressive in its many contributions across a range of subfields of philosophy. The contribution I focus on in this essay is from the first couple of chapters, and corresponds to my own area, the philosophy of race and racism. In this essay, I aim to clarify some aspects of Fourlas’ formulation of the problem of the fraught use of the terms “racism” and “racist,” contrast his analysis with Lawrence Blum’s influential account of fraught use, and argue for the superiority of Fourlas’ understanding. In making my case, I seek to extend my analysis from previous work on what I herein call “the politics of inflation.” I close by raising a tension in Fourlas’ analysis which I offer in the spirit of encouraging further dialogue.
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Read here: https://infidels.org/library/modern/in-defense-of-a-subjective-condition-on-proving-re... more Read here: https://infidels.org/library/modern/in-defense-of-a-subjective-condition-on-proving-religious-miracles/
My aim in this essay is to argue that belief in God does not follow from belief that God exists. My premise is that belief in God requires a subjective ascription of (strong) religious significance. Without a personal ascription of religious significance, it is impossible to justify the inference from “God exists” to “God ought to be believed in.” A truly religious miracle is one that not only commands rational assent to certain religious propositions, but one that obligates religious conversion. Arguments in favor of religious conversion, however, are normative in nature. Since arguments from miracles are descriptive (rather than normative) in nature, they are insufficient to obligate religious conversion.
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Dissertation by Alberto G Urquidez
Urquidez, Alberto G. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Racism and Conceptual Analysis: A Def... more Urquidez, Alberto G. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Racism and Conceptual Analysis: A Defense of the Wittgensteinian Approach. Major Professor: Leonard Harris. This dissertation defends Ludwig Wittgenstein’s grammatical approach to philosophy in the context of contemporary theories of racism. Grammatical analysis does not aim at theory-construction, but at conceptual clarity that is free from conceptual confusion. My aim is to dissolve conceptual confusion in contemporary theories of racism. I clarify ordinary uses of ‘racism’ and its cognates, and key analytical terms (e.g., ‘description,’ ‘correct use,’ ‘definition,’ ‘disagreement,’ and so on). Whereas contemporary ‘descriptive approaches’ are explanatory on the model of hypotheticodeductive theories in the natural sciences, the grammatical method is purely descriptive on the model of clarifying the rules of a legal code or game. Currently, there are few defenses of Wittgenstein’s grammatical approach in the normative doma...
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Articles by Alberto G Urquidez
Winner of the American Philosophical Association 2017 Journal of Value Inquiry Prize.
In "Racism as Disrespect," Joshua Glasgow articulates his disagreement with Lawrence Blum about whether a particular case is an instance of racism. This paper appraises this dispute in order to shed light on the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to racism. My main contention is that Glasgow's approach to conceptual analysis is not descriptive as he claims, but prescriptive, and that this misunderstanding has substantial ramifications for his critique of Blum. I conclude by discussing the ramifications of my argument, which includes a taxonomy of approaches to conceptual analysis.
The article is available here: https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2017_0999_2_8_3
Chapters by Alberto G Urquidez
Monograph & Replies by Alberto G Urquidez
Read a full description of the book here: http://aurquidez.com/monograph
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: (1) my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation (explaining why racism is bad) over social explanation (explaining the causes of racism); (2) the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist Framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; (3) my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, (4) my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.”
Online Papers by Alberto G Urquidez
George Fourlas’ "Anti-Colonial Solidarity: Race, Reconciliation, and MENA Liberation" is impressive in its many contributions across a range of subfields of philosophy. The contribution I focus on in this essay is from the first couple of chapters, and corresponds to my own area, the philosophy of race and racism. In this essay, I aim to clarify some aspects of Fourlas’ formulation of the problem of the fraught use of the terms “racism” and “racist,” contrast his analysis with Lawrence Blum’s influential account of fraught use, and argue for the superiority of Fourlas’ understanding. In making my case, I seek to extend my analysis from previous work on what I herein call “the politics of inflation.” I close by raising a tension in Fourlas’ analysis which I offer in the spirit of encouraging further dialogue.
My aim in this essay is to argue that belief in God does not follow from belief that God exists. My premise is that belief in God requires a subjective ascription of (strong) religious significance. Without a personal ascription of religious significance, it is impossible to justify the inference from “God exists” to “God ought to be believed in.” A truly religious miracle is one that not only commands rational assent to certain religious propositions, but one that obligates religious conversion. Arguments in favor of religious conversion, however, are normative in nature. Since arguments from miracles are descriptive (rather than normative) in nature, they are insufficient to obligate religious conversion.
Dissertation by Alberto G Urquidez
Winner of the American Philosophical Association 2017 Journal of Value Inquiry Prize.
In "Racism as Disrespect," Joshua Glasgow articulates his disagreement with Lawrence Blum about whether a particular case is an instance of racism. This paper appraises this dispute in order to shed light on the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to racism. My main contention is that Glasgow's approach to conceptual analysis is not descriptive as he claims, but prescriptive, and that this misunderstanding has substantial ramifications for his critique of Blum. I conclude by discussing the ramifications of my argument, which includes a taxonomy of approaches to conceptual analysis.
The article is available here: https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2017_0999_2_8_3
Read a full description of the book here: http://aurquidez.com/monograph
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: (1) my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation (explaining why racism is bad) over social explanation (explaining the causes of racism); (2) the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist Framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; (3) my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, (4) my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.”
George Fourlas’ "Anti-Colonial Solidarity: Race, Reconciliation, and MENA Liberation" is impressive in its many contributions across a range of subfields of philosophy. The contribution I focus on in this essay is from the first couple of chapters, and corresponds to my own area, the philosophy of race and racism. In this essay, I aim to clarify some aspects of Fourlas’ formulation of the problem of the fraught use of the terms “racism” and “racist,” contrast his analysis with Lawrence Blum’s influential account of fraught use, and argue for the superiority of Fourlas’ understanding. In making my case, I seek to extend my analysis from previous work on what I herein call “the politics of inflation.” I close by raising a tension in Fourlas’ analysis which I offer in the spirit of encouraging further dialogue.
My aim in this essay is to argue that belief in God does not follow from belief that God exists. My premise is that belief in God requires a subjective ascription of (strong) religious significance. Without a personal ascription of religious significance, it is impossible to justify the inference from “God exists” to “God ought to be believed in.” A truly religious miracle is one that not only commands rational assent to certain religious propositions, but one that obligates religious conversion. Arguments in favor of religious conversion, however, are normative in nature. Since arguments from miracles are descriptive (rather than normative) in nature, they are insufficient to obligate religious conversion.