Takfir

With this work, Justyna Nedza presents the rst comprehensive analysis of the theologically charged legal practice of "declaring someone an unbeliever" (tak r) in militant Sala st thought. Her investigation zooms in on the role of tak r in the formal legitimization of militant jihad against government institutions. Investigating both the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian case, Nedza demonstrates the importance of the regional context in shaping consistent legal arguments for the legitimacy of tak r of collectives. The careful analysis of the arguments of four selected militant Sala st authors brings out that this contextuality plays also a decisive role for the respective textual references, as well as shaping the conclusions drawn by the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian authors, respectively. In dieser Arbeit präsentiert Justyna Nedza die erste umfassende Analyse der theologisch aufgeladenen Rechtspraxis des "Apostasievorwurfs" (takfīr) im Milieu des militanten "Sala smus". Dabei liegt ein besonderer Fokus auf der rechtlichen Begründung von gewaltsamen Widerstand (ǧihād) gegen staatliche Organe in muslimischen Mehrheitsgesellschaften, sowie die hiermit verbundene Ausweitung dieses Rechtsmittels vom Individuum auf Kollektive. Anhand der komparatistischen Untersuchung der Schriften von vier ausgewählten Autoren aus Ägypten und Saudi-Arabien zeigt Nedza, dass deren divergenter nationaler Kontext eine entscheidende Rolle sowohl für ihre jeweiligen textlichen Referenzrahmen als auch ihre entsprechenden Schlussfolgerungen spielt. Damit wird die bisher weithin akzeptierte These vom "Sala smus" als global einheitlichem Phänomen auf den Prüfstand gehoben.

While the studies on al-Ghazālī’s thought are abundant, its unusual approach to the issue of khatm al-nubuwwa has not received the attention of researchers. Yet, in his Iqtiṣād, he seeks to answer this tricky issue: Is it possible to consider as an infidel a Muslim who does not believe in the sealing of prophethood? In this article, we will analyze al-Ghazālī’s response. Our aim will be to put his response into its historical context, taking into account the philosophical and religious attitude of the author. To this end, we will analyse, firstly, the context in which he tackles this issue in his Iqtiṣād. Secondly, we will examine how his opinion differs from the commonly accepted doctrine and then analyse how it provides a solid refutation of the idea that ijmā‘ and tawātur can be used as a conclusive proofs of a doctrine.

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Si les études sur la pensée d’al-Ghazālī sont abondantes, son approche singulière de la question du khatm al-nubuwwa n’a pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. Or dans son Iqtiṣād, il s’attache à répondre à cette question épineuse : peut-on qualifier d’infidèle un musulman qui ne croit pas en la clôture de la prophétie ? Dans le présent article, nous analyserons la réponse d’al-Ghazālī. Notre objectif sera de replacer celle-ci dans son contexte historique, en tenant compte de l’attitude philosophico-religieuse de l’auteur. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons, en premier lieu, le contexte dans lequel il traite cette question dans son Iqtiṣād. En second lieu, nous examinerons comment son opinion diffère de la doctrine communément admise et, ensuite, en quoi celle-ci constitue une réfutation solide de l’idée que l’ijmā‘ et le tawātur puissent servir de preuves décisives en matière de doctrine.

The chapter offers a conceptualization of the Qāḍīzādeli movement through the prism of belief (īmān) vis-а-vis unbelief (kufr). In so doing, it first introduces the concept of takfīr, including some of its classical foundations relevant to the debates in the Ottoman age, as a means for distinguishing belief and unbelief. I shall then go on to the Qāḍīzādelis themselves, suggesting a framework for inquiry into their role in the spread of heightened awareness of unbelief in the Ottoman age. I thus argue that, among other things, the Qāḍīzādeli orthodoxy staged in the Ottoman religious scene was distinguished by a strong emphasis on the struggle against unbelief that was embodied in the proliferation of “heretical innovations” (bidaʿ), not all of which were to be subsumed under the rubric of takfīr, with its strict legal consequences. Finally, I deal with cases that delineate some traceable lines of continuity between the Qāḍīzādelis, their inspiration, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Birgiwī, known also as Birgili Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1573),6 and other Ottoman and Arab-Islamic revivalist scholars and religious groups.

A Booklet on a range of issues related to tawhid; its nullifiers; its categories; its conditions; its foundations; kufr bit-taghut; al-wala wal-bara; the subject of labels of the shari‘ah; Islam and shirk; the clear and hidden matters; the application of the rulings and labels and (establishing) the hujjah concerning it; and he ended it with the topic of dar al-Islam.

Comment un musulman perçoit-il son rapport au monde ? Peut-on, en tant que musulman, s’adapter et trouver une harmonie dans notre rapport à la configuration sociétale moderne, caractérisée par une sécularisation croissante et un pluralisme grandissant ? Bien malin qui prétendrait apporter une réponse univoque car le texte coranique, à l’instar des autres textes religieux diront certains, révélé dans un contexte politique, culturel et social spécifique, est l’objet de plusieurs interprétations. Au delà des grands fondements qui définissent l’islam, concentrés dans les six piliers de la croyance et les cinq piliers de la pratique religieuse, deux paradigmes opposés conditionnent la vision et le rapport qu’entretiennent les musulmans à leur environnement, ce sont ce que j’appelle, personnellement : le paradigme du conflit, qui puise à la source coranique l’ensemble des passages liés au combat armé pour dresser un univers basé sur la soumission ou la suppression du mauvais musulman et du kâfir (litt. Celui qui a renié Dieu, pour désigner le mécréant), et le paradigme de la cohésion, celui-ci posant comme principe que la vie sociale doit être construite sur base d’une recherche d’un équilibre entre les différentes sensibilités humaines, à partir d’un dialogue et d’une mise en commun. Et ces deux paradigmes tirent leur légitimité du Coran et de la Sounnah...

This study examines the intra-Salafī disputes in the 1990s over the legitimacy of present-day rulers in the Muslim world and their status as Muslims. While these issues are theological in their essence, they are intertwined with the political milieu of the Middle East. Fundamentally, these intra-Salafī disputes pivot around the central question of the impact of implementing manmade law systems (instead of sharīʿah) on the legitimacy of the ruler. This study tackles this question and related issues that form the themes addressed in this study.
It begins by providing a minimal definition of Salafism which identifies its main characteristics that distinguishes its adherents from other Muslim denominations. Chapter two and three discuss the disputes over whether present-day rulers meet the required qualification to qualify as legitimate rulers in Islam and hence what position Muslims should take towards them. Chapter four digs deeper into the theological aspect of these debates in order to ascertain the different views on what acts can and cannot strip a Muslim from his/her status as a Muslim. It begins by highlighting the importance laid on creed in Salafism and providing the general principles on belief and unbelief upon which all Salafī proponents agree. After that, it examines the disagreements amongst contemporary Salafīs over which criteria should be considered to determine that an act of omission or commission is sinful enough to cause unbelief. Chapter five investigates the accusations levelled against the prominent Salafī scholar al-Albānī in regards to deviancy from the teachings of Salafism on belief and unbelief as an example of the importance of this debate.
This study demonstrates how intra-Salafī disputes evolved from a mere disagreement over the legitimacy of political opposition to the state to become an intense complex quarrel on the nature of the Islamic faith. It argues that political affiliations alone fail to explain intra-Salafī disagreements over politics and violence and only through accurate analyses of the underpinning doctrinal differences one can understand their divergent reactions to contemporary political issues. This research aims to contribute to the study of the Islamic governance genre as well as to the studies on Salafism which despite its rapid spread worldwide, remains a scarcely studied subject.

From the beginning of the first periods of Islamic theology, the concept of kufr is the most important amongst other terminology related to the judgement of murtakib al-kabīra (cardinal sinner) in this world and Hereafter. The purpose of this article is to focus on the problems in the use of takfīr (excommunication), which is the final judgement of murtakib al-kabīra representing the very extremism itself, against other views of other theological readings within kalām methodology. Ibn Ḥaẓm is another major scholar who investigates the judgement of murtakib al-kabīra within the scope of faith in itself. Examining the understanding of takfīr in different kalam schools, Ibn Ḥaẓm also evaluates the use of this judgement in intellectual disputes. The relationship of īmān and 'amal (faith and deed) in the debates of kalam schools, some concepts such as īmān, kufr, fisq, shirk, nifāq and al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, some mentioned in the Qur'ān and some not, are in constant use. It is observed that some of these discussions were institutionalized and transformed into a school in the process. Thus, takfīr was not only a matter of only cardinal sins in later periods, but was also utilized for differences of opinions due to the different readings and interpretations arising from social and political factors. Thus, takfīr has been the issue for both religious and political purposes, which are two separate areas. Therefore, takfīr has been studied relying on its political disputes in a theological paradigm and its major feature, being weaponized to silence and overpower the opponent, has been emphasized in this work.

Bu tebliğ, I. Uluslararası Antalya Güvenlik Sempozyumu’nda (02-04 Aralık 2016, Belek, Antalya) sunulmuştur.

Basılı olarak: [Radikalleşme Şiddet ve Terörizm, ed. Salih Zeki Haklı, Ankara, 2018] içinde, s.138-150.

ÖZET:
Başlığımızdaki " aşırıcılık " , Selefiyye kaynaklı tekfir ve tedhişi ifade etmektedir. Bildirimiz, tekfir yoluyla dışladıkları kesimlerin can ve mal emniyetlerini ihlal etmek suretiyle onları din referanslı siyasal şiddetin hedefi haline getiren yahut dinin cevaz vermediği yöntemleri uygulayarak gayrimüslim dahi olsalar masum insanları terörize eden Selefi örgütlenmelerin insan kaynağını konu etmektedir. Bu insan kaynağı hangi saikler ile ve hangi şartlarda bu yapılar ile irtibat ve iltisak kurmaktadır? Selefi aşırıcılığı üreten dini, ideolojik, sosyal, siyasi ve psikolojik faktörler nelerdir? Bu sorulara genel hatlarıyla cevap vermek ve ardından bazı tedbirleri gündeme getirerek tekliflerde bulunmak bu çalışmanın amacını oluşturmaktadır.

This article seeks to identify the driving factors, features, and significance of the transformation of Salafism in contemporary Muslim societies, a development labeled ‘post-Salafism’. Throughout the 20th century, Salafism grew into a global religious movement, with distinctive local characteristics. Its post-Salafi transformations have likewise been diverse and reflect local conditions. ‘Post-Salafism’ is a term employed congruently to point at the fragmentation of Salafi religious authority; the emergence of Salafi alliances with other Muslim groups, which challenge Salafi conceptions of doctrinal superiority; in Salafi softening of sectarian rhetoric as a way of distancing from militant groups; in Salafi “indigenization”; and in social and political transformations that overlap with post-Islamism. Post-Salafism refers additionally to debates within Salafi circles, reflective of emerging internal doctrinal contradictions. Since the founding of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the kingdom ha...

Diyanet (Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs) under the chairmanship of Dr. Mehmet Görmez, published a report on Fethullah Gülen titled "Feton in His Own Words: Organized Abuse of Religion" in 2017. Then, on 8 December 2020 Dr. Görmez in an interview with him, emphasized very seriously that it is wrong to break a person's words from the integrity, to change and dedicate him. In this study, Görmez's discourse was compared with the method he followed in his report on Gülen.

Alright people hold your horses! I know you can already tell from the title that this is a highly controversial subject, but please bear with me for the moment… Tujuan dari artikel bukanlah untuk menebarkan fitnah ataupun mencemari pergerakan dakwah manapun melainkan hanya untuk mengedukasi masyarakat dengan fakta tertulis yang otentik mengenai sejarah Syaikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (MIAW) rahimahullah dan kemunculan negara Saudi yang pertama dari awal hingga akhir, setelah ditumpasnya negara Saudi pertama oleh Muhammad Ali Pasha. Dikarenakan saya melihat banyak sekali informasi-informasi bias (and red herring if I may say) yang disebarkan oleh pihak pro dakwah Najdi kepada kalangan masyarakat ketika berbicara soal biografi Syaikh MIAW dan dakwahnya. Dalam artikel ini kita akan melihat langsung dari kitab-kitab yang ditulis oleh sejarawan-sejarawan dakwah Najdi di masa Syaikh MIAW yang dituliskan atas perintah langsung Syaikh MIAW sendiri. So remember : We are taking these pieces of information from their own primary sources Sehingga setelah membaca artikel ini saya berharap para pembaca (khususnya bagi teman-teman saya yang terlibat aktif dalam dakwah ini) dapat memahami mengapa dakwah Syaikh MIAW pada masa itu dianggap sebagai dakwah yang kontroversial oleh ulama-ulama semasanya, mengapa dakwah Najdiyah dinilai sangat mudah mengkafirkan, dan terlebih lagi, mengapa dakwah tersebut selalu dianggap erat kaitanya dengan kelompok-kelompok ekstrimis sepertis ISIS dan Boko Haram. Kita akan melihat bahwa faktor pendorong dakwah Najdi saat itu adalah faktor politik untuk dapat memperluas daerah kekuasaan Ibn Saud. Dan saya ingin mempertegaskan di awal bahwa artikel ini bukanlah kritikkan terhadap isi dari dakwah tawhid Syaikh MIAW (not yet anyway, that part comes later Insha Allah) melainkan hanyalah fakta sejarah atas pernyataan dan aksi Syaikh MIAW dan dakwah Najdi terhadap kaum muslimin pada masa itu. Saya sengaja menggunakan istilah "Dakwah Najdiyah" dan bukan Wahhabi ataupun Salafi karena pertama: Istilah Wahhabi dinilai sebagai istilah yang derogatory (merendahkan) dan umumnya mereka (pro Najdi) akan mengatakan bahwa istilah Wahhabi merujuk kepada Abdul Wahhab bin Rustum, seorang khawarij pada abad kedua Hijriah, bukan merujuk kepada Syaikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (MIAW). (They were so desperate defending the Shaykh up to the point they have to result in such poor mental gymnastics of genetic fallacy. Just because A happened to have a similar name or history with B, it doesn't mean someone must be referring to A when in fact they know exactly who are they referring to, its B! But for the sake of argument we'll use the term "Najdi" instead)

The usage of excommunication goes back to the early history of Islam for the extreme Kharijite sect declared for the first time all other Muslims who did not agree with them as apostates and killed them brutally in the 7th century. The extreme mentality of the Kharijites has been witnessed in various extreme sects throughout Islamic history. More recently, Justice and Development Party (the AKP), the political Islamists of Turkey, has been using the concept of takfir (excommunication) against its opponents. In this essay, we will examine the concepts of faith (īmān) and disbelief (kufr) and then attempt to analyze the ruling AKP " s usage of excommunication (takfīr) on the basis of primary Islamic sources. The essay will seek the relation between the takfir and extremism as well as its connection with violence and terrorism by examining the ideology of the ruling AKP in Turkey.

Öz Tekfir başlangıçta, Hz. Peygamberin vefatından sonra baş gösteren olayla-rın tetiklediği süreçte politik bir enstrüman olarak kullanılmıştır. Sonraları muarızları susturmadaki pratik faydası keşfedildiğinde, entelektüel dünyaya hâkim olmuş ve İslam dininin ruhuna aykırı bir hoşgörüsüzlük ve taham-mülsüzlük örneği haline gelmiştir. İlerleyen süreçte "elfâz-ı küfür" kitaplarıy-la kurumsallaşmış, normal ve meşru bir uygulama haline gelmiştir. Aslında tekfir basit bir ötekileştirme aracı değildir. Dinî, hukukî ve iktisâdî sonuçları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda ağır yaptırımlar içeren bir uygulamadır. İslam kendisini hak din olarak deklare etmesine rağmen başka din mensup-larının inanç ve fikir hürriyetini koruma altına almış ve saygı duyulmasını emretmiştir. Müslüman olmayanlara bile bu hakkı tanıyan İslam'ın men-supları ise ilk nesilden itibaren gerek fikrî gerekse fiilî düzeyde entelektüel şiddetin dozunu artırmış ve tekfir mezheplerin teşekkülünden itibaren hız kazanmıştır. Teolojik ve epistemolojik bir problem olarak değerlendirdiği-miz tekfir, dinî tolerans ve çoğulculuğa aykırıdır. Tekfirin siyasal, toplumsal,

The article sheds light on programs and measures against Islamist-extremist messages both by governmental and non-governmental institutions in Germany. The “German way” for the most part is characterized through its renouncement of counter-terrorist narration through campaigns. Instead, decentralized, horizontal and “value-based” forms of strategic communication are being established. Therefore, German governmental as well as non-governmental institutions are currently developing educational programs in order to not only debunk extremist myths but rather to enable youngsters to critically reflect on mechanisms of ideologically charged communication. Although the field of practices is multi-branched and diverse, we will make an effort to concisely map areas of action, structures of sponsorship and (educational) measures concerning Islamism in Germany. The educational material ‘Salam Online’ which was developed and produced by staff and students of the religious education department o...

Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb embeds in his Mukhtaṣar sīrat al-rasūl the biography of Muḥammad in an overarching vision of history that begins with Adam and ends in the Mongol period. In this cyclical concept the promulgation of Islam is followed by a relapse into shirk due to misdirected piety. But whereas until the time of Muḥammad God himself reinstalled Islam with the help of prophets and miracles, the true Muslims are obliged to fight aberrations. The paradigmatic example for this is the defeat of the ridda, the event which is dealt with most extensively. The author makes clear what he considers as the two main aberrations of his time: sufi practices which he equates with pagan practices by the choice of suggestive vocabulary and the – as he sees it – excessive veneration of Muḥammad. Therefore Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb plays down all aspects which could lead to an ascription of a different ontological status to him and following Ibn Taymiyya he even affirms the historicity of the story of the cranes, implying that ʿiṣma does not mean total infallibility. By stressing both the human character of Muḥammad and his military activities the author intends to demonstrate that all his actions which are not related to revelation, in particular the defeat of paganism, can and have to be repeated.

HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET Tiedekunta/Osasto Fakultet/Sektion Teologinen tiedekunta Laitos Institution - TekijäFörfattare Malika-Aisha El Bardi Työn nimi Arbetets titel Jihadin käsite ja jihadistiset liikkeet. Länsimaisia käsityksiä jihadista ja uskonsodista. Oppiaine Läroämne Työn laji Arbetets art Maisterintutkielma Aika Datum 15.9.2019— Sivumäärä Sidoantal 73 Tiivistelmä Referat Tutkielmassani käsittelen jihadin erilaisia teorioita, joita länsimaiset akateemiset tutkijat ovat siitä esittäneet. Pyrin vastaamaan kysymykseen, mitä käsite jihad merkitsee, ja tarkastelemaan, miten jihad on kronologisesti ja historiallisesti muotoutunut ja kehittynyt, sekä millaisia jihadistisia liikkeitä on syntynyt. Käsittelen myös jihadin ja terrorismin välistä suhdetta. Tutkielma painottuu erityisesti sunnalaiseen jihadiin, koska valtaosa säilyneistä teksteistä on sunnalaisilta kirjoittajilta, mutta myös suufilaisia ja shiialaisia jihadin metodeja käsitellään. Tutkimuksen kärki on ...

Résumé (Français)

Responsable de Frères musulmans dans l’ordre des avocats égyptiens, Khirbâwî a croisé d’importantes personnalités intégristes et défendu plusieurs d’entre elles. Il livre dans deux ouvrages à succès, non traduits en français, des évènements vécus et des témoignages de première main. Ses écrits issus d’un demi-siècle d’activisme, autorisent de sérieux recoupements. Il dévoile la réalité de cette association, en principe consacrée à la diffusion du mes¬sage coranique (Da‘wa). Au fil du récit, apparaissent les objectifs que sa direction cèle aux simples membres, mais que trahissent les armoiries de l’Association. Derrière une apparence irénique, fondée sur le respect des cinq obligations rituelles, l’entraide et l’encadrement social, pointe un projet de guerre sainte (djihad). Cette entreprise s’appuie sur une hiérarchie qui soumet aveuglément les Ikhwan à ses ordres et dissimule (taqiyyat) ses buts. Ses dirigeants jugent le monde présent impie. Ils le rejettent et l’ana¬thé¬misent (takfîr) et souhaitent le remplacer par un islam littéraliste et radical.


Abstract (English)

Khirbâwî has met several important people belonging to fundamentalist movements in the exercise of his role as interlocutor for the Muslim Brotherhood on behalf of the order of Egyptian lawyers. His two successful books, not yet translated into French, recount personally experienced events and provide us with firsthand testaments. Thanks to his half a century worth of activist writings, one finds abundant material for cross-checking facts in a well-founded manner. He unveils for us the reality of this group, the purpose of which, allegedly, is to spread the Koranic message (da‘wa). As this story unfolds, its true objectives, kept hidden from simple members by its leaders - already given in the Brotherhood’s coat of arms – become apparent. Behind an irenic façade resting upon five ritual obligations to be observed, mutual assistance and social support, a Holy War (djihad) is in the works. This enterprise is based on a hierarchy forcing blind obedience to the Ikhwan whilst concealing its intentions (taqiyyat). Its leaders consider the modern world for impious. They renounce and condemn it (takfîr), as they want to replace it with a radical, literal version of Islam.

Abstract    (Deutsch)
In seiner Funktion als Verantwortlicher der Muslimbruderschaft in der ägyp-tischen Rechtsanwaltskammer traf Ḫirbāwī auf einflussreiche Persön¬lichkeiten, von denen er bereits mehrere gerichtlich vertreten hatte. In zwei erfolgreichen Büchern, die bislang noch nicht in die französische Sprache übersetzt wurden, schildert er persönlich erlebte Ereignisse und vermittelt aus erster Hand anvertraute Zeugnisse.
      Seine Schriften enthalten Berichte über Aktivitäten während eines hal¬ben Jahrhunderts und geben Einblick in ernsthafte Ungereimtheiten. Er enthüllt das eigentliche Wesen dieser Organisation, die sich im Prinzip der Verbreitung der koranischen Botschaft (Da‘wa) verschrieben hat. Während die Geschichte sich entfaltet, werden die Ziele erkennbar, die die Direktion vor den einfachen Mitgliedern verbirgt, die jedoch die Glaubensinhalte der Vereinigung verletzen. Hinter einem friedlichen Erscheinen, das sich auf die Erfüllung der fünf rituellen Gebote des Islam beruft, auf gegenseitige Hilfe und soziale Eingliederung, kommt das Projekt des Heiligen Krieges (Ǧihād) zum Vorschein. Dieses Unternehmen stützt sich auf eine hierar¬chische Macht, die die Iḫwān blindlings ihren Befehlen unterwirft und ihre wirklichen Ziele verbirgt (Taqīya). Ihre Führer bezeichnen die heutige Welt als unrein. Sie lehnen sie ab, ächten sie (Takfīr) und möchten sie durch einen schriftgetreuen und radikalen Islam ersetzen.

The last decade has marked social media’s influential role in challenging the established centers of knowledge at a global level. Particularly within oppressive political systems, the question arises whether democratised digital mediation, in its creation of platforms for self-expression and the disruption of regimes in times of p olitical turmoil, has backfired. Videos of all sorts continue to invade the digital sphere, offering an opportunity for the assertion and representation of the self to different audiences. However, with the rise of ‘digital freedom’ came the rise of ‘digital extremism’ in forms of anonymous, and orchestrated, online religious encounters.

Günümüzde Müslümanların yaşadığı siyasi ve ekonomik istikrarsızlığın nedenlerinden biri de dini ve itikadi bölünmelerdir. Hz. Peygamber’in vefatından kısa bir süre sonra başlayan ihtilaflar farklı fırka ve mezheplerin doğmasıyla sonuçlanmış, bu fırka ve mezheplerin birbirini tekfir etmesiyle de Müslümanlar arasında iç çatışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Genel olarak Müslüman toplumlarda farklı düşünce ve inanç sahipleri ya tekfir edilmek suretiyle dinin dışına, ya da sapıklıkla ve bidʻatçi olmakla itham edilerek Ehli Sünnet ve’l-Cemaat dairesinin dışına itilmiş; böylece farklı düşünce grupları dışlanmaya ve ötekileştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. İslam tarihinde ilk kez Haricilerle başlayan tekfir meselesi Müslümanlar arasındaki dini ve siyasi bölünmeleri derinleştiren ve etkileri bugün bile devam etmekte olan bir problemdir. Kendisi de bazı görüşlerinden dolayı tekfir edilen Gazzâlî (ö. 505/111) bu konuda bir risale kaleme alarak kendi mezhebi dışında kalan herkesi tekfir edenlere bu yolu kapatmıştır. Böylece o, İslam
toplumlarında farklı mezhep ve cemaatlerin birlikte yaşamasını mümkün kılacak bir çerçeve oluşturmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gazzâlî, tekfir, te’vil, tolerans, birlikte yaşama.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF GAZZALI TO SOCIAL PEACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TAKFIR AND TA’WIL THEORIES

Abstract
One One of the reasons for the political and economic instability of Muslims today is the religious and the ideological divisions. The disputes that started shortly after the death of the Prophet, resulted in the emergence of different sects and internal conflicts between Muslims when these sects were mutually accused of disbelief (takfir). Generally, different thinkers and believers have been pushed out of religion
by being accused of unbeliever or they have been pushed out of the room of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah by accusing them of heresy; so it seems that different groups of thought have been tried to be excluded and alienated in Muslim societies. Beginning with the Khawarij for the first time in Islamic history the takfir issue is a problem which deepens the religious and political divisions among Muslims and which effects continue even today. Gazzâlî (d. 505/111), which has been alienated because of some of his views has written an article in this subject and closed this path to whom that accused everybody outside their own sect of being unbeliever. Thus, he has established a framework to enable different denominations and communities to live together in Islamic societies.
Key words: Gazzâlî, takfir, ta'wil, tolerance, coexistence.