Psychopathic Personality Disorder

The main aim of the article is to describe the role of traumatic experiences in early childhood in individuals with dissocial/psychopathic personality structure based on the results of research devoted to this problem. The study was conducted on a group of 30 men who received psychiatric and psychological diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder. Is the assessment of the severity of psychopathy The Psychopathy Checklist-Revision (PCL-R) was used, whereas the experiences of childhood were measured with The Lifetime Trauma and Victimization History – LTVH, The Scale of Retrospective Assessment of Traumatic Experience of People with Psychopathic Personality Structure and The Stressful Life Events Screening Questionnaire – SLESQ. The results support the thesis about the existence of links between traumatic experiences from childhood and psychopathy among offenders. These results are consistent with those obtained earlier by other researchers and can be interpreted both in the light of attachment theory and of the social learning theory.

This enlightening article talks about the enormous suffering of narcissistic and co-dependent children and views their unfortunate fate during childhood and adulthood from the perspective that they have been damned to unhappiness during their stay on planet Earth and for all eternity.

The term psychopathy refers to a personality disorder associated with callous personality traits and antisocial behaviors. Throughout its research history, psychopathy has frequently been described as a peculiar form of moral blindness, engendering a narrative about a patient stereotype incapable of taking a genuine moral perspective, similar to a blind person who is deprived of proper visual perceptions. However, recent empirical research has shown that clinically diagnosed psychopaths are morally more fit than initially thought, and the blindness-analogy now comes across as largely misleading. In this contribution, the moral-blindness analogy is explored in an attempt to qualify anew its relevance in psychopathy theory and research. It is demonstrated that there are indeed theoretically relevant parallels to be drawn between blindness and psychopathy, parallels that are especially illuminating when accounting for the potential symptomatology, dimensionality, and etiological nature of the disorder.

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.

Since psychopaths have no limitations on what they can or will do to get to the top, all hierarchies inevitably become top-heavy with psychopaths. Ignorant, we stand by like grazing sheep while psychopaths throw armies of our innocent sons and daughters against fabricated enemies as a way of generating trillions in profits, vying against each other for a calculated hegemony. Behind the apparent insanity of contemporary history is the actual insanity of psychopaths, fighting to preserve their disproportionate power. A psychopath lacks a genetic sense of remorse or empathy with others, and this deficit shows up in brain scans! Distinguishing between human and psychopathic qualities begins the foundation of responsibility upon which we can create sustainable culture.

How is it that we have concluded that certain traits in clinical psychopaths actually have a genetic source and not simply the product of environmental influence? One of the key factors is what we call "Exact Duplication" (E.D.). Now, what that refers to is factual evidence in the nature of certain traits themselves and the fact that these are the same traits in virtually all clinical psychopaths. In science, we observe and make notes upon what we observe. We are diligent and our work is exacting. And one of the most basic things when it comes to scientific work is that those conducting it must be objective in order to end up with the correct conclusions. That is, we cannot allow bias to enter into what are are thinking and doing when working upon what we need real and accurate answers for. So, when it comes to finding answers our goal is to be a) exact and b) correct. To do that, we have various processes that we use in order to make comparisons and in which to make determinations regarding the factors involved in our work. We often look for indications that what we are doing is actually correct or whether or not we are on the right track. We are always in a process of confirmation. That is so that we know that as we go, were are not making mistakes or doing something incorrectly. Something that has been used in the past and is used at present by scientists to help measure whether or not something is a) on the right track, and/or b) if the item/s being observed 'fit' or have some actual connection to what it is or may be peripheral to (i.e., the subject matter), is 'Probability'. Probability is also known as either mathematical probability, or simply 'Likelihood' (from which, Likelihood Ratios are developed). In an instance such as we are dealing with when it comes to the traits that are known of and found in all clinical psychopaths we can generally define those which each individual meeting the definition of 'clinical psychopath' has and displays, as a 'universal' – meaning that these traits are the same that are found in all clinical psychopaths without exception. When we, as scientists or as individuals using the scientific method (or methodology) find a 'universal' or universals we view this in terms of whether or not or to what degree the chances of probability enter into the equation. When we have established without a doubt that we indeed have factual and provable information such as with universals, that tells us that there is some " common source " or source commonality (S.C.). And if one hypothetical source commonality or explanation is lacking (such as with an environmental source for clinical psychopathy), then we must look for or examine another which does account for this phenomenon. And when we have weighed the facts and made the proper considerations, we find that an environmental source or cause for a percentage of the factors or traits involved in clinical psychopathy just cannot explain the core of the universals involved. In my examinations, I have thus concluded that what has been observed by those who have and are still presently observing individuals with the full array of traits that we see expressed or displayed by those we term psychopaths, is actually a mix of two different main types. And thus, the mistake of thinking that there is solely an environmental cause for psychopathy. Having two categories or types instead of the one, allows us to account for those traits which fall outside of the universal. What I have done then, as a result of my own findings from observations that have taken over 20 years and painstaking firsthand experience, is to categorize these two main types; the Primary Type and the Secondary Type. Basically, the Primary Type refers to the genetic psychopath only. And it is the genetic psychopath that has been my primary concern in terms of my own research.

Psychopathy is a serious personality disorder characterized by a range of affective and behavioral adaptation deficits. Behavioral adaptation and individual as well as social functioning require monitoring of one’s behavior, i.e., performance monitoring. Performance monitoring has been associated with specific neurophysiological processes, for instance, an astoundingly uniform sequence in the human EEG. In this review, I will present evidence for altered and likely deficient performance monitoring processes in psychopathy, which can explain a range of behavioral deficits. Previous research, however, is also characterized by inconsistent findings and possible reasons will be discussed. Among some proposals for advancement of the field, applying a multidimensional and not unitary construct perspective of psychopathy may allow detection of unique or differential effects of psychopathic traits and therefore represents a particularly useful approach for future research. Neural responses related to performance monitoring are well-validated units of measurement, and recent research also highlights their value as targets and tools of intervention.

Cognitive Science began with the assumption sometimes called Cartesian Materialism-- that the brain is an autonomous machine that can be studied as a closed system. The challenges of solving the puzzles presupposed by that assumption led to a recognition that mind is both embodied and embedded i. e. it cannot be separated from either the rest of the organism or from the organism’s symbiotic relationship with its environment. The unavoidable (but often ignored) implication of this conclusion is that if our environment includes other minds, our minds must also be embodied by other minds. This means that we are irreducibly social, for the same reasons that we are irreducibly embodied and embedded in an environment.

This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones.  Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.