Teed Rockwell
My thesis defends a radical version of what is now called the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending on the goals and projects of the person who has the mind. The Mind is thus best described as a behavioral field that fluctuates within the Brain/Body/World Nexus. Was revised and expanded to become my MIT press book "Neither Brain nor Ghost"
Supervisors: Paul Churchland, James Garson, and Elizabeth Minnich
Supervisors: Paul Churchland, James Garson, and Elizabeth Minnich
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(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones. Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.
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In this paper, I examine some of the modern debates between pragmatism and so-called “realism”, especially those between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.
realized in a connectionist network embodied in a brain/body and embedded in a world. It would not require logical reasoning as such, but rather a form of skilled coping very different from anything else considered by ethical theory. Once we realize that ethical judgments are based on prototypes and stories, rather than rules and justice, we can rethink how best to empower the revolutionary changes that are now taking place in our concepts of ethics and courtesy.
concept of a unilaterally declared original acquisition, which supposedly supplies the foundation for all other property rights, is incoherent and unjust. A more moderate form of libertarianism would require institutions that strive to create approximate equality of opportunity. Those who took advantage of those opportunities would have a right to keep most of the wealth they created, and an obligation to create similar opportunities for others
Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MIT 2005) is a welcome addition to the mind-body literature. Along with the philosophical contributions discussed below, Rockwell provides a valuable survey of recent developments in the relevant sciences, including a beautifully simple explanation of competing AI (artificial intelligence)strategies and techniques. If nothing else, the first three chapters summarizing recent developments in the sciences are worth reviewing for anybody working in the field, and the explanation of neural nets in the final chapter would be useful for any class addressing mentality. But the primary burden of the work is philosophical, and it is here that Rockwell makes his most interesting contributions. First, Rockwell makes a plausible case for the claim that assumptions of Cartesian materialism have contaminated much of the scientific and philosophical work in the area over the last fifty years (or longer). Second, in making this case, he also lays the groundwork for renewed attention to the “zombie problem” so derisively dismissed by Daniel Dennett (2005 and elsewhere) and others, for ignoring some of those irritating “brain in a vat” counter-examples, for abandoning or inverting the traditional understanding of the relationship between sentience and cognition, and for revitalizing the neglected pragmatist account of mind and the world.
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
(RECS) and even comes to some similar conclusions, but it is precisely where he misunderstands Chemero that we find an opportunity to clarify what it is that RECS is all about. Rockwell presents his view as a slightly tempered endorsement of RECS that agrees that “minds and worlds are blended in a constantly shifting dynamic relationship, and that perception does not function by creating representations inside the brain,” but he expresses misgivings about some of Chemero's more radical claims and offers some correctives (Rockwell, p. 220). The problem is that both his misgivings and his suggested correctives betray a misunderstanding of some of the key features that make RECS a departure from traditional cognitive science – most importantly, the claim that nonmechanistic, dynamical explanations of perception, action, and cognition are genuine explanations. Among the many things we share with Rockwell is a fondness for Gilbert Ryle. When Rockwell named his book
Neither Brain Nor Ghost
, he was referring to Ryle’s famous “ghost in the machine”. Of course, we agree with Rockwell that cognitive science should not in the business of studying ghosts. What Rockwell fails to realize, though, is that according to RECS, cognitive science should not therefore be condemned to studying machines. Before explaining what this means, we will look at a few of the more important issues where it seems that Rockwell and Chemero disagree,