Legal Dissenting Opinions

Arsyetimi i vendimeve gjyqësore, është konsideruar si një nga elementet më të rendësishëm të vendimmarrjes gjyqësore. Madje ligjvënësi kushtetues e ka ngritur këtë standard në nivel kushtetues.  Arsyet e një kërkesë të tillë lidhen me mundësinë e palëve për t’u njohur me argumentat se përse gjykata pranoi apo rrëzoi kërkimet e palëve në proces, si edhe t’u japë atyre mundësinë që të përgatisinin ankimin dhe t’i drejtohen gjykatave më të larta. Nga ana tjetër arsyetimi i vendimeve gjyqësore shërben për të treguar seriozitetin në vendimmarrjen e gjykatave si edhe shërben si burim transparence në veprimtarinë e tyre. Megjithëse nuk parashikohet në dispozitat kushtetuese që trajtojnë të drejtat dhe liritë themelore, Gjykata Kushtetuese këtë element e ka konsideruar si pjesë të pandarë të procesit të rregullt ligjor.  Për këto arsye dhe rëndësisë që paraqet arsyetimi i vendimeve gjyqësore doktrina i ka kushtuar një rëndësi të veçantë trajtimit teorik të këtij fenomeni.
Por, shpesh herë, si pjesë e vendimeve gjyqësore janë edhe qendrimet e gjyqtarëve të cilët, duke mbajtur një qendrim të ndryshëm nga kolegët e tjerë, paraqesin argumentat e tyre më anë të së cilës kundërshtojnë arsyetimin dhe rezultatin e arritur nga shumica e trupës gjyqësore. Në përgjithësi, ky qendrim i kundërt emërtohet si “mendim pakice”. Referuar përvojave të ndryshme të huaja por edhe praktikës në vendin tonë, pakica (dhe mendimi i tyre) mund të shfaqet në disa forma. Forma e parë është kur së bashku me vendimin përfundimtar njoftohet edhe mënyra e ndarjes së votave të trupës gjyqësore, por pa dhënë asnjë informacion në lidhje me përkatësinë e këtyre votave. Forma e dytë është kur tregohet identiteti i gjyqtarëve që janë në “shumicë” dhe në “pakicë”. Forma e tretë është kur gjyqtarët në pakicë i bashkëlidhin me shkrim, vendimit të gjykatës edhe arsyet apo argumentat e tyre se përse nuk pajtohen me zgjidhjen e dhënë nga shumica e trupës gjyqësore. Për këtë arsye këtij fenomeni në këtë punim do ti referohemi si “qendrim në pakicë” pasi përmbledh në mënyrë më të plotë të treja format e shfaqjes së tij, kurse “mendimi në pakicë” më shumë i përket formës së fundit (tretë), atë të publikimit të arsyeve të qendrimit në pakicë.
Nëse i referohemi doktrinës shqiptare, rezulton se qendrimit në pakicë dhe formave të shfaqjes së tij nuk i është kushtuar rëndësi. Shpesh herë në tekstet juridike ky moment vetëm citohet pa i’u bërë një analizë e mirëfilltë teorike dhe praktike, mbi arsyet e publikimit të një qendrimi të tillë si dhe dobishmërinë e tij. Për këtë shkak në këtë punim do të përpiqemi të bëjmë një analizë të këtyre elementëve.

This book is a legal and political intervention into a contemporary debate concerning the appropriateness of sexual offence prosecutions brought against young gender non-conforming people for so-called ‘gender identity fraud.’ It comes down squarely against prosecution. To that end, it offers a series of principled objections based both on liberal principles, and arguments derived from queer and feminist theories.

Thus prosecution will be challenged as criminal law overeach and as a spectacular example of legal inconsistency, but also as indicative of a failure to grasp the complexity of sexual desire and its disavowal. In particular, the book will think through the concepts of consent, harm and deception and their legal application to these specific forms of intimacy. In doing so, it will reveal how cisnormativity frames legal interpretation of each and how this serves to preclude more marginal perspectives.

Beyond law, the book takes up the challenge of ethical characterisation of non-disclosure of gender history. Rather than dwelling on this omission, it argues that we ought to focus on a cisgender demand to know as the proper object of ethical inquiry. Finally, and as an act of legal and ethical re-imagination, the book offers a queer counter-judgment to R v McNally, the only case involving a gender non-conforming defendant, so far, to have come before the Court of Appeal.

La actual generación de tratados internacionales de naturaleza comercial presenta, con cada vez más frecuencia, disposiciones que regulan distintos aspectos de los procedimientos arbitrales ad hoc a través de la aplicación de medidas coactivas de índole económica, la actuación de los órganos institucionales creados por el acuerdo, la intervención de “terceros interesados”, aspectos de transparencia documental y procesal, además de la creciente participación de los amicus curiae y también la actuación de quienes deben decidir las controversias mediante un detallado “código de conducta” a ser observado.
En el presente trabajo analizaremos algunos de los principales aspectos que se discuten actualmente, con el objeto de presentar una reflexión crítica respecto de cada caso y valorar, finalmente, la importancia que puede contener su eventual utilización.

The reasoning of judicial sentences is considered as the most important element of judicial decision-taking. Constitutional law-maker has raised this standard in a constitutional level.  Reasons of such a request are related with the opportunity of parties to know the arguments on why the court accepted or refused the parties’ claims in process, giving them the opportunity to prepare the appeal and to go to higher courts. On the other side, the reasoning of judicial sentences serves to show seriousness in the decision-taking of courts and serves as source of transparence in their activity. Although, not anticipated in constitutional provisions which treat fundamental rights and freedoms, the Constitutional Court has considered this element as an independent part of the correct legal process.  For these reasons and for the importance that the reasoning of judicial decisions represents, the doctrine has paid a special importance to the theoretical treatment of this phenomenon.
Frequently, as part of judicial sentences are even the attitudes of judges who, keeping a different attitude from that of other colleagues, present their arguments through which oppose the reasoning and result achieved from the majority of the judicial troop. In general this opposing attitude is nominated as “dissenting opinion”. Referring to different foreign experiences but also to the practice in our country, the minority (and its opinion) appears in some forms. The first form is when along with the final sentence is notified also the manner of the division of votes of the judicial troop, without giving any information on the correspondness of these votes. The second form is when is demonstrated the identity of judges who are in “majority” and in “minority”. The third is when judges in minority attach, in the written form, to the sentence of the court even the reasons or their arguments on why do not agree with the solution given from the majority of the judicial troop. That is why to this phenomenon in this writing we are going to refer to as “a dissenting attitude” since it includes more completely the three forms of its appearance, while “dissenting opinion” mostly belongs to the last (third) form, that of the publication of the reasoned dissenting opinion.
If we refer to the Albanian doctrine, it results that no importance is paid to the standing in dissent and to the forms of its appearance. Frequently in judicial texts this moment is simply cited, without doing a serious theoretical and practical analysis on the reasons of the publication of such an attitude and of its utility. This is why in this writing we are going to make an analysis of these elements.

This paper addresses the long-standing international debate over whether the publication of dissenting opinions should be permitted in constitutional courts of last resort. It argues in response to this debate that a conclusion of general application is futile. Courts are not identical: their jurisdictions have unique legal histories, traditions, and cultures; they serve different functions and speak to different audiences; and, they are composed of members with fundamentally dissimilar training and backgrounds. This paper contributes to the debate by setting out a context-specific analysis for assessing the value of dissent in constitutional adjudication. It considers several contextual factors including: the jurisdiction's tradition, legal history, and culture; the credibility, function, and procedure of its court; and the background and training of its court's members. Applying this contextual analysis to Canada, this paper concludes that presently the publication of dissenting opinions is a valuable component of constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court of Canada.

Dissenting opinions and many concurring opinions include nonbinding statements, rationales, and explanations. What compels judges to add their losing arguments to the vast deposit of rejected legal propositions? This essay argues that such opinions, although lacking in compulsory application and effect, contribute to our fund of knowledge, diversify our perspectives, and shape the trajectory of the law as it is embedded in a textual network of cases. Judges are dialogic, discursive actors who, by framing and molding legal precedents, participate in the transmission of cultural postulates and practical solutions to future generations with unforeseen conflicts. Judges are in this sense the conduits through which pass selectively retained principles and gradual modifications in the rules that govern society. Understanding why judges author concurring or dissenting opinions that do not obtain as law requires some historical mapping; thus, the essay begins by supplying a brief account of the opinion practices of the United States Supreme Court.  It then discusses why nonbinding opinions such as concurrences or dissents are constructive. The success of these writings, some of which have been vindicated over time, owes to their ability to shape the character and facilitate the development of American constitutional law. The essay concludes by discussing how such opinions reflect and enact the common-law theories on which the American legal system has flourished, and finally by celebrating concurring and dissenting opinions as an intricate and important form of judicial service to the legal profession.

Plurality decisions on the Supreme Court represent extreme dissensus where no clear major- ity is formed for any one controlling rationale for the final disposition. Studying these deci- sions is important because they erode the Court’s credibility and authority as a source of legal leadership, and because they provide broader lessons about judicial decision making. This article presents the first systematic analysis of plurality decisions. We test three possible expla- nations for plurality decisions—a lack of social consensus, “hard” cases, and strategic inter- actions during opinion writing. We find splintering increases when the Court reviews politi- cally salient and constitutional issues, and when there was dissensus on the lower court, while it decreases when the chief assigns the opinion and when the Court is ideologically heteroge- neous.