ECJ

Das Verhältnis zwischen dem Europäischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) und den Verfassungsgerichten der EU-Mitgliedstaaten (1) ist ein wechselhaftes. Bisweilen wird dem EuGH Aktivismus vorgeworfen, er würde allzu politisch und expansionistisch agieren. (2) Dabei wird jedoch übersehen, dass sowohl der EuGH als auch die nationalen Verfassungsgerichte ihre eigenen Wahrheiten nach der ihren Rechtssystemen inhärenten Logik erarbeiten. Aus Sicht der EU hat das EU-Recht Vorrang vor den nationalen Rechtsvorschriften zu haben, um einen effektiven Rahmen für die europäische Integration bieten zu können. Aus Sicht der Mitgliedstaaten gilt das EU-Recht nur vorbehaltlich ihrer nationalen Verfassungsprinzipien. Diese unterschiedlichen Auffassungen werden in diesem Artikel anhand dreier Konversationen der jüngeren Vergangenheit, in denen die Gerichte ihre Irritationen übereinander zu klären versuchen, beleuchtet.

This paper, which is a contribution to the EUI EUDO citizenship debate on Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann [2010] launched by Prof. Jo Shaw, critiques this remarkable judgement of the Court of Justice, suggesting possible ways forward in the development of the concept of EU citizenship in the future. How is Rottmann important? Could the ECJ decide differently? What are the consequences of the restrictive approach chosen by the Court? It is suggested that Rottmann is just one of the first steps in the paradigmatic shift in the understanding of the legal meaning of citizenship which will be shaping EU law in the years to come.

1. Introduction
In what is undoubtedly the most high-profile antitrust case of this moment, tech giant Google has been hit with a string of allegations with regard to its business practices. These allegations led Europe’s highest competition authority, the European Commission (hereafter: Commission), towards initiating formal proceedings against Google. The Google saga has been keeping legal practitioners, academia, competition authorities and courts busy since 2010. In November of that year, the first allegations were made with regard to Google’s online search services. The allegations accused Google of systematically favouring its own online search services (including its comparison shopping service ‘Google Shopping’) to the detriment of that of its rival providers by treating its competitors’ services unfavourably in Google’s search results. In April 2015, a second investigation was launched into Google with regard to its mobile operating system, Android, and its applications suite, Google Apps. While these cases are still pending, it seems that Google’s legal woes are far from over. The latest news suggests that the Commission is taking steps towards a third investigation against Google, this time over its ‘AdWords’ advertising service. What all three investigations have in common is that the submitted allegations revolve around Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter: TFEU), which prohibits undertakings from abusing their dominant market position. The focus of this bachelor thesis shall be Google Android case, as this is not only the most recent still pending case, it also raises several thought-provoking and far-reaching questions that lie at the core of EU competition law. These legal questions shall therefore be carefully assessed from an EU competition law perspective. While doing so, the particular challenges of the application of Article 102 TFEU by the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter: CJEU) shall be highlighted. Special attention shall be given to the wider (EU) digital sector and its significance in the field of EU competition law. The thesis shall be concluded by evaluating whether the Google Android case is a wake-up call for a different approach by the Commission and the CJEU.

La distinction du fait et du droit est une problématique centrale dans l'organisation des voies de droit. Elle exerce en effet, au-delà d'une variété de formes et de significations, une influence décisive sur l'office du juge ainsi que sur la fonction des autorités soumises à son contrôle. Pour appréhender pleinement la portée qu'elle revêt dans l'équilibre des pouvoirs établi par la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, il est nécessaire de se défaire de toute préconception de la distinction du fait et du droit (notamment au regard des pratiques observées en droit interne), afin de comprendre comment le juge de l'Union européenne exerce un pouvoir de détermination à son égard, que ce soit dans le contrôle de validité des actes juridiques ou dans les voies de recours dirigées contre des actes juridictionnels. Dans cette opération, elle reste toutefois soucieuse d'assurer l'acceptabilité de ses décisions, et prend donc en considération certaines contraintes juridiques qui se présentent à elle dans son office. Autorité normatrice et ordonnatrice, la Cour de justice en tant qu'interprète authentique utilise en réalité la distinction du fait et du droit comme un instrument de répartition des compétences entre les différents acteurs concernés par la réalisation du droit de l'Union européenne. Elle définit ainsi, à travers la détermination de la distinction du fait et du droit dans chacune de ses manifestations, l'habilitation que leur confère le système juridique. En ce sens, elle apparaît comme la juridiction suprême de cet espace normatif.

En esta contribución examinaremos cómo la libertad de expresión se ha convertido en un derecho esencial de las sociedades modernas (II), tanto en su caracterización general (II.A) como, en particular, por parte de los medios de comunicación (II.B). Pero veremos también cómo ese derecho encuentra un límite infranqueable en el llamado discurso de odio (III), cuya conceptualización no es siempre una tarea sencilla (III.A). Nos detendre- mos, concretamente, en la labor protectora que en esta materia han desarrollado el Con- sejo de Europa, con el relevante papel del Tribunal de Estrasburgo (III.B), para pasar posteriormente a analizar la actividad en el mismo campo de la Unión Europea (III.C), con el mucho más limitado rol del Tribunal de Luxemburgo. Finalizaremos esta comuni- cación con unas breves reflexiones motivadas por las consideraciones analizadas (IV).

The European Union suffers from an empty formalistic reading of the principle of equality when dealing with situations where different legal orders legitimately compete, aspiring to regulate the condition of the same persons in the same circumstances. Consequently, equality before the law is not safeguarded in the Union, and a radical reform of the procedural reading of the principle of equality is required. Most importantly, to live up to being a true principle of EU law, equality in the EU needs to acquire a substantive component which is entirely missing at the moment. This paper looks at the procedural vistas informing the ECJ’s attempts to address the EU’s fundamental problems through the redefinition of the scope ratione materiae of EU law following the introduction of Union citizenship, only to find the outcomes of such efforts inadequate and potentially dangerous for the rule of law in Europe. It is suggested that a substantive approach to equality could be employed instead, and that the idea of respect, lying just as equality itself, at the core of the notion of citizenship – and the law as such – could supply the missing core of the equality principle, providing the much-needed cure for some crucial deficiencies of EU law as it currently stands.

This Article explores a novel cross-national phenomenon: the emergence of a new judicial review model that merges procedural judicial review with substantive judicial review. While this model is not yet fully defined, it has already spurred much controversy. The Article explicates this emerging model, which it terms "semiprocedural review," and provides a theoretical exploration of both its justifications and its objectionable aspects. It concludes by evaluating semiprocedural review's overall justifiability and suggesting guiding principles for a more legitimate model of semiprocedural review. The Article pursues these goals through the unique perspective of juxtaposing semiprocedural review with "pure procedural judicial review" and "pure substantive judicial review."

[EN] This article aims to analyze the doctrine that resulted as a reaction to the arrival of Opinion 2/13 from the European Court of Justice, by which it considered that the European Union cannot accede to the system established by the European Convention on Human Rights. The prospect of a limitation to its own interpretative monopoly on European law, as well as the fear that the autonomy and the specificity of the European Union system would be irreversibly affected through accession, at least as it was envisioned in the Draft Accession Agreement, determined the " Supreme Court of the European Union " to reject another proposal for accession. Of course, the opinion sparked a new series of debates on the main reasons for rejection, and doctrine soon appeared on this topic. Through this article, I would like to relay some of the most controversial points contained by the opinion, doctrinal views referring to them, as well as my own comments.

[RO] Articolul de față își propune să analizeze doctrina ce a rezultat ca reacție la apariția Avizului 2/13 al Curții de Justiție a Uniunii Europene, prin care aceasta a considerat că Uniunea Europeană nu poate adera la sistemul Convenției Europene a Drepturilor Omului. Prospectul unei limitări a propriului său monopol interpretativ asupra dreptului european, precum și teama că autonomia și specificul sistemului unional ar fi afectate în mod ireversibil prin aderare, cel puțin așa cum a fost ea imaginată în cadrul Proiectului de Acord, au determinat " Curtea Supremă a Uniunii Europene " să respingă încă o propunere de aderare. Evident, avizul a aprins o nouă serie de dezbateri pe motivele principale ale respingerii, iar doctrina nu a întârziat să apară. Prin acest articol, aș dori să transpun câteva dintre cele mai controversate puncte conținute de aviz, opiniile critice ale doctrinei referitoare la acestea, precum și propriile mele comentarii.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa-2. La direttiva 2005/29/CE e il diritto europeo delle pratiche commer-ciali. La questione e il suo contesto-3. Il significato della locuzione «in caso di contrasto» di cui all'art. 3, para 4, della direttiva 2005/29/CE (art. 19, comma 3°, cod. cons.) e il criterio di specialità. Una prima interpretazione e i primi orientamenti dei Giudici amministrativi italiani-4. La procedura di infrazione n. 2013/2169 e il nuovo comma 1° bis dell'art. 27 cod. cons. Le sentenze "gemelle" dell'Adunanza plenaria nn. 3-4/2016 e la rimessione della questione alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione Europea-5. La sentenza del 13 settembre 2018 della Corte di Giustizia (cause C-54/17 e C-55/17)-6. Considerazioni critiche. La coerenza del diritto europeo delle pratiche commerciali sleali ABSTRACT. Lo scritto indaga la controversa questione del coordinamento tra la disciplina generale delle pratiche commerciali scorrette e quella relativa a particolari settori merceologici. L'occasione nasce da una pronuncia della CGUE relativa all'attivazione di servizi non richiesti da parte di alcuni operatori della telefonia mobile italiana (CGUE, 13 settembre 2018, C-5417 e C-55/17). The paper investigates the issue of coordination between the general discipline of unfair commercial practices and that concerning particular commodity sectors. It moves from a ruling by the CJEU concerning the activation of unsolicited services by some operators of Italian mobile teleph-ony (CGUE, 13 September 2018, C-5417 and C-55/17).

The distinction between public and private entities is central to French administrative law. The line between the two categories has, however, been blurred by the case law of the European Court of Justice, and its definition of public authorities in particular. In its decisions in Portgás (12 December 2013) and Fish Legal (19 December 2013), the ECJ handed down a definition of public authorities that encompasses those entities that French law would rather categorise as private entities entrusted with a public service mission.

The consequences for French law are far from trivial. The Portgás decision means that the French State may invoke Directives against private entities entrusted with a public service mission. Pursuant to the Fish Legal decision, some private entities entrusted with a public service mission may be legally bound to furnish documents to any person requesting the same.

"U radu je prikazana presuda Europskog suda ECJ C-101/08 Audiolux, gdje je Sud, povodom zahtjeva za prethodno tumačenje, trebao odrediti postoji li u pravu EU opće načelo koje pruža zaštitu manjinskim dioničarima, tako što nameće obvezu većinskom da pri stjecanju nadzora nad društvom ponudi otkup preostalih dionica po cijeni po kojoj je stekao dionice koje su mu omogućile nadzor nad društvom. Sud je ustanovio kako opće načelo opisanog sadržaja ne postoji.
Analizirajući odluku Suda, koju meritorno smatra ispravnom, autorica upozorava na opasnost od zadiranja Suda u zakonodavnu sferu. Naime, Europski sud nije ovlašten utvrđivati nova opća pravna načela, već samo može potvrditi kako u pravu EU već postoji određeno opće načelo u nepisanom obliku. Stoga, ukoliko bi Sud ustanovio da određeno načelo postoji, iako ustvari ne postoji, konstituirao bi novu normu te na sebe preuzeo zakonodavne ovlasti. Autorica smatra da bi mogućnost zadiranja Suda u zakonodavnu sferu bila bitno smanjena kada bi se diskrecijsko odlučivanje Suda od slučaja do slučaja, zamijenilo objektivno zadanim i unaprijed poznatim uvjetima koje bi Sud morao ispitivati pri svakom odlučivanju o tome postoji li u pravu EU
određeno opće načelo ili ne."

The present Insight compares the decisions of two chambers of the Polish Supreme Court regarding the domestic enforcement, under the terms laid down in the Polish Constitution, of a judgment of the Court of Justice, the independence of the judicial branch and the consequences of a judicial appointment. The starting point for the analysis is an overview of recent reforms of judiciary in Poland and the judgment of the Court of Justice in A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême) [GC] (judgement of 19 November 2019, joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18). The first discussed ruling of the Supreme Court aimed to fully enforce that judgment of the Court of Justice, whereas the second sought to limit its actual impact.

This paper discusses the effect of the constitutionalisation of the EU’s legal framework on European integration. The first section deals with the evolution of the Treaties as a pathway towards increasing legal integration. The second section discusses the EU’s evolving constitutional doctrine. The remaining sections provide supportive evidence to back up the previously introduced arguments, drawing on a number of important issues such as division of competences and human rights, leaving an input for further research on the impact of Brexit on the matter.

Il contributo intende analizzare gli effetti delle disposizioni contenute nel Regolamento 2020/2092 sulle relazioni tra Istituzioni UE e Stati membri, alla luce del vincolo (condizionalità) del rispetto dei principi dello Stato di diritto ai fini dell'accesso alle risorse finanziarie europee. In particolare, riconoscendo la conformità ai Trattati delle disposizioni contenute nel Regolamento 2020/2092, le pronunce della CGUE C-156/21 e C-157/21 hanno contributo al rafforzamento dei principi strutturali delineati dal Regolamento, alimentando il dibattito sulla pervasività del ruolo dell'Unione nella vita degli Stati membri, con specifico segno al controverso tema del processo federativo europeo.

The essay aims at analysing the effects of the provisions contained in Regulation 2020/2092 on the relationship between EU Institutions and Member States, in the light of the constraint (conditionality) of compliance with the principles of the Rule of Law for the purposes of accessing European financial resources. Particularly, recognising the compliance with the Treaties of the provisions contained in Regulation 2020/2092, the ECJ’s judgments C-156/21 e C-157/21 have contributed to the strengthening of the structural principles outlined by the Regulation, encouraging the debate on the pervasiveness of the European Union’s role in the life of the Member States, especially with reference to the controversial issue of the European federalizing process.

In this contribution, which embraces a dialogical understanding of the Rule of Law, I focus on the ‘other’ side of the Rule of Law coin in Europe, as opposed to the story of the fight for the values of Article 2 TEU: the deployment of the principle of the Rule of Law by the Court of Justice to pre-empt the necessary dialogue and to disqualify substantive arguments of principle originating in other legal orders. The Rule of Law, on this count and as used by the Court, emerges as a dangerous trump card making impossible the dialogue on which the Rule of Law directly depends. Such use of the principle is both dangerous and directly opposed to the very essence of European constitutionalism, I argue. This work, which has been presented at the Central European University in Budapest in January 2020 and at the University of the Basque Country in San Sebastián in July 2020 further develops the ideas first expressed in ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law’, YEL, 2015.

In Adam Bodnar and Jakub Urbanik (eds), Περιμένοντας τους Bαρβάρους. Law in the days of Constitutional Crisis. Studies offered to Mirosław Wyrzykowski, Munich/Baden Baden: C.H. Beck/Nomos, 2021 (in press).

Brexit is scheduled to happen on October 31, 2019, and researchers have previously studied the impact of Brexit on relationships in the EU’s political institutions. This paper studies how Brexit might affect Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and, more specifically, when they seek to influence the Court by submitting observations. The Untied Kingdom has consistently been a comparatively active Member State, submitting many observations. The paper introduces and employs a novel approach, studying what we call "mentions" in CJEU decisions, to measure position similarity in Member States' observations and to identify the UK's "allies" before the CJEU. The paper concludes the loss of the UK will be felt in particular in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and in the Nordic countries.

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case-law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court’s reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. EU citizenship and the rights associated therewith is now entrusted a fundamental role in establishing the confines of the scope ratione materiae of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.

It seemed that Court of Justice of the European Union wanted to make it short and sweet: It took the Grand Chamber in its Achmea Decision less than fifteen pages to conclude that Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), as we know it, shall belong to the past, at least in an intra-EU context. Finito della musica? Not quite!

Consultar Revista íntegra: https://studylib.es/doc/7737907

Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. Asunto C-544/10 (Deutsches Weintor eG / Land Rheinland-Pfalz) de 6 de septiembre de 2012
Procedimiento prejudicial – Aproximación de las legislaciones – Salud pública – Información y protección de los consumidores – Etiquetado y presentación de los productos alimenticios – Conceptos de «declaraciones nutricionales» y de «salud de los alimentos» – Reglamento (CE) nº 1924/2006 – Calificación de un vino como «de fácil digestión» – Indicación de un grado de acidez reducido – Bebidas que rotulan más de un 1,2 % en volumen de alcohol – Prohibición de declaraciones de propiedades saludables – Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea – Artículo 15, apartado 1 – Libertad profesional – Artículo 16 – Libertad de empresa – Compatibilidad
En el asunto C 544/10, que tiene por objeto una petición de decisión prejudicial, planteada con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 267 TFUE por el Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Alemania), mediante resolución de 23 de septiembre de 2010, recibida en el Tribunal de Justicia el 23 de noviembre de 2010, en el procedimiento entre Deutsches Weintor eG y Land Rheinland-Pfalz

Sentencia
ECLI:EU:C:2012:526 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0544&from=es

Conclusiones
ECLI:EU:C:2012:189 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CC0544&from=es

Nos complace reproducir a continuación un interesante artículo sobre la Sentencia “Queso Comté” pues la jurisprudencia que en ella consagra el TJUE no es sólo de actualidad, sino que constituye uno de los elementos fundamentales en los que se basa la protección de las DOP.

Luis González Vaqué

La Corte di Giustizia afferma l’ammissibilità del soccorso istruttorio a pagamento (ora abrogato nel nostro ordinamento), purché la
sanzione prevista sia ispirata a un criterio di proporzionalità e precisa che, in ogni caso, le integrazioni in corso di gara non devono
condurre alla presentazione di una nuova offerta. La sentenza costituisce l’occasione per fare il punto su un istituto ampiamente
dibattuto nel nostro ordinamento, sottoposto a una fibrillazione normativa e giurisprudenziale continua che determina, a sua volta,
incertezze e rallentamenti nelle gare pubbliche. L’attuale stato di cose imporrebbe una più netta presa di posizione da parte della
Corte di Giustizia o, in alternativa, un intervento normativo chiarificatore da parte del legislatore europeo.

1. Introduction; 2. ECJ ruling 362/14 - 6.10.2015; 2.1. Legal questions under enquiry; 2.1.1. The powers of the national supervisory authorities within the meaning of Article 28 of Directive 95/46/CE, when the Commission has adopted a decision pursuant to Article 25(6) of that Directive; 2.1.2. The validity of Decision 2000/520; 3. Commentary; 3.1. Procedural issue - powers of national data protection authorities; 3.2. Substantive issue - validity of Decision 2000/520; 3.2.1. Legal consequences for personal data transfers from the European Union in general; 3.2.2. Legal consequences for personal data transfers from the European Union to the United States; 4. Conclusions

The current development of the EU citizenship concept is incompatible with some of the terms of enlargement, namely the policy of transition periods, outlined in the Act of Accession. While the ECJ has tried to interpret EU citizenship as a 'fundamental status', the 2003 Act of Accession introduces limitations on the freedom of movement - a core citizenship right - thus undermining the European citizenship concept and the idea of equality for all Europeans. Unfortunately, this situation is made possible by the wording of Article 18 EC itself, which allows for conditions, thus opening the door for the creation of 'second class' citizens. This paper argues that the most recent enlargement offered an opportunity to bring about a new understanding of equality at the European level and give real meaning to the European citizenship concept, completing rather than undermining the achievements of the ECJ, and taking into account the lessons of previous enlargements. In light of this, the Articles of Accession represent a missed opportunity

SUMMARY
Motivation

2. Methodology
Multilevel constitutionalism as theoretical perspective and EU law prevalence

3. Prevalence of EU law and autonomy of National Law

4. Procedural Autonomy of National Law in relation to Consumer Protection Status

5. EU Consumer Procedural Status

This paper discusses the effect of the constitutionalisation of the EU’s legal framework on European integration. The first section deals with the evolution of the Treaties as a pathway towards increasing legal integration. The second section discusses the EU’s evolving constitutional doctrine. The remaining sections provide supportive evidence to back up the previously introduced arguments, drawing on a number of important issues such as division of competences and human rights, leaving an input for further research on the impact of Brexit on the matter.

Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (Gran Sala) de 9 de noviembre de 2010.
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG contra "Österreich"-Zeitungsverlag GmbH.
Petición de decisión prejudicial: Oberster Gerichtshof - Austria.
Directiva 2005/29/CE - Prácticas comerciales desleales - Normativa nacional que establece una prohibición por principio de las prácticas comerciales que supeditan la oferta de primas a los consumidores a la adquisición de bienes o la contratación de servicios.
Asunto C-540/08: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=79165&pageIndex=0&doclang=ES&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1707072

📝 ARTICLE - Available et EC Library BXL Library and e-Resources BXL – FONDS (RX 143 Y2000)
La jurisprudencia relativa al artículo 28 CE (antiguo artículo 30 TCE) sobre la libre circulación de mercancías después de "Keck y Mithouard"
González Vaqué, Luis.
2000
GACETA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y DE LA COMPETENCIA Madrid. No. 206. Marzo-abril 2000. p. 24-38.

In several fields of both positive-, as well as of negative-integration, EU law (including the CJEU) refer to science, which addresses the question, whether this import of non-legal concepts should take place in an absolute or in a relative way. In line with what I have argued elsewhere for the integration of concepts of ethics and morality into EU law, a relative approach has to be taken. While we find clear statements e.g. of the CJEU with regard to the international state-of-the-art, still major questions remain left open. The second part of this presentation puts a special emphasis on the precautionary principle, as defined (especially) by the CJEU in its case-law. This part focuses on the fields where is applied, the actors that can rely on it, the different stages of identification, risk assessment and risk management (although not always clearly separable), etc.

The European integration project has shaped a legal reality where the importance of particular Member State nationalities is dwarfed in relation to that of EU citizenship. Currently the Member States’ nationalities, short of being abolished in the legal sense, mostly serve as access points to the status of EU citizenship, which has also come to influence the rules for the acquisition of the Member States' nationalities. Six Member States already provide for different naturalization procedures for the acquisition of nationality for those already in possession of the EU citizenship status. The majority of the assumptions regarding Member State nationalities stand to be profoundly questioned today. EU citizenship is no longer a merely derivative status, leading to the need for re-conceptualization of its relationship with the nationalities of the Member States, if not opening a new chapter in the process of European integration.

La CGUE ha confermato che, sia un poster di carta, sia il trasferimento su tela contenente l'immagine di un'opera artistica protetta sono copie dell'opera. L'articolo 4 (1) della Direttiva 2001/29/CE riconosce il diritto esclusivo degli autori, relativamente alla vendita dell'originale o copie delle loro opere, di autorizzare o vietare qualsiasi forma di distribuzione al pubblico, attraverso la vendita o altri modi di diffusione.
Questo diritto di "distribuzione" non si esaurisce nel caso della vendita dell'originale o di copie del prodotto artistico, a meno che, la prima vendita o il primo trasferimento di proprietà dell'opera all'interno della UE sia effettuato dal titolare del diritto ovvero con il suo consenso.
La CGUE ha osservato che il legislatore ha voluto consentire agli autori il controllo della prima immissione sul mercato UE di ogni tipo di "supporto tangibile" che incorpora la creazione intellettuale. La Corte ha quindi concluso che il consenso del titolare del diritto d'autore non copre la distribuzione di un supporto che incorpora la sua opera, ove tale supporto venga modificato - successivamente alla sua prima immissione sul mercato - in modo tale da costituire una nuova riproduzione della medesima opera. In tal caso, il diritto di distribuzione si esaurisce esclusivamente dopo la prima vendita o trasferimento di proprietà del nuovo supporto con il consenso del titolare del diritto.

The book forcefully demonstrates the impact that judicial co-operation has on the development of the European and English legal orders, while pointing at the same time to weaknesses, where the legitimacy and effectiveness of the judicial discourse in Europe could be improved. Its focus is not limited to the role of the courts, but deals extensively with the role of the other actors involved, in particular applicants and public interest organizations. The study of underlying interests and policy-driven actions of the involved parties in their respective areas allows for an insight beyond the actual case law. It provides us with a contextual understanding of legal proceedings.

The book is divided into five chapters: besides the introductory and concluding chapters, it contains one on each of the three case studies. This reader-friendly division allows direct access to the reader's area of interest. First, the author analyses litigation for the right to trade on Sundays, both in UK courts and before the ECJ. Secondly, he explores the broad scope of equal treatment litigation, including women's and gay rights, at both a national and European level. And, thirdly, Miclditz analyses consumer rights with particular emphasis on the principle of good faith.

The ECJ has always been outspoken about the essence of the EC as a Rule of Law Community. The notion of the Rule of Law entered the texts of the Treaty and arguably plays a crucial role in the Community legal order, serving as one of the fundamentals of 'integration through law'. Yet, the analysis of numerous studies of the Rule of Law in Community context reveals that the understanding on the Rule of Law as a Community legal construct, as opposed to a notion borrowed from the legal systems of the Member States, is not receiving enough attention. Confusion persists between the Rule of Law as understood in the national contexts of the Member States and the Community concept, which presumably should be governed by EC law alone. This paper aims to bridge the gap between the obvious importance of the Community Rule of Law in the EC legal order and the country-specific vision, ascribed to the Rule of Law in each Member State, which results in a vague and even contradictory understanding of Community Rule of Law in different Member States, threatening to undermine the effectiveness and uniform application of Community Law throughout the entire territory of the Community. A substantive vision of Community Rule of Law is offered as a possible tool to be employed to this effect.