Burden of Proof

The 1961 Criminal Procedure Code has been in operation for so long with its significant gaps and vagueness. The lack of properly enshrined guiding principles both in the law and the practice made the fairness of the criminal justice administration doubtful. The 2019 Draft Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code is intended to make positive changes to the rules of procedure in order to ensure fairness of the process. Such changes are guided by fundamental principles, the presumption of innocence being the first principle, provided for in the section covering fundamental principles in the criminal procedure.
Both the substantive and procedural aspects of the principle of presumption of innocence are incorporated into the Draft Code. Thus, while there are express rules requiring the public prosecutor to prove the facts of his case, there are also rules that require the accused (and the suspect) to be treated with dignity and respect befitting a person presumed innocent. Those subjects specifically discussed here are the right to liberty, burden and standard of proof.

Who should prove the existence or nonexistence of some fact in a judicial proceeding? Should the Claimant help the Defendant to prove asserts of truth of particular facts or vice versa? Is there a new rule within all the rules governing the presentation of facts and proof in proceedings before courts? Those are issues of a great importance studied by scholars and courts in the last years relating to the law of evidence and this essay which provides a framework for further research gives a particularly and critic point of view influenced by a vision of the process as an instrument of freedom or as a right that point to protect freedoms.

This article addresses two subjects that are relevant to the finding of facts in international arbitration, namely, the burden of proof and the power of the arbitral tribunal to draw adverse inferences. Regarding the burden of proof, it shows that despite the existence of a general rule stating that the party making the allegation carries the burden to prove it, there are other factors-such as the applicable law to the merits or to the procedure-that may play a role in defining it. In circumstances where the party carrying the burden of proof is not able to discharge it without evidence that the opposing party possesses, the tribunal has the power to order the opposing party to produce said evidence. Non-compliance with the tribunal's order calls for the drawing of an adverse inference, which is not a reversal of the burden of proof nor a lowering of the standard of evidence, but rather the filling of the gap left by the missing (non-produced) evidence by a complex gap-filler. This article explains the elements within such gap-filler and presents an original methodology (a step-by-step approach) for the drawing of adverse inferences, represented in an Inference Chart.

The EU has slowly but surely developed a solid body of equality law that prohibits different facets of discrimination. While the Union had initially developed anti-discrimination norms that served only the commercial rationale of the common market, focusing on nationality (of a Member State) and gender as protected grounds, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) supplied five additional prohibited grounds of discrimination to the EU legislative palette, in line with a much broader egalitarian rationale. In 2000, two EU Equality Directives followed, one focusing on race and ethnic origin, the other covering the remaining four grounds introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, namely religion, sexual orientation, disabilities and age. Eighteen years after the adoption of the watershed Equality Directives, it seems timely to dedicate a book to their limits and prospects, to look at the progress made, and to revisit the rise of EU anti-discrimination law beyond gender. This volume sets out to capture the striking developments and shortcomings that have taken place in the interpretation of relevant EU secondary law. Firstly, the book unfolds an up-to-date systematic reappraisal of the five 'newer' grounds of discrimination, which have so far received mostly fragmented coverage. Secondly, and more generally, the volume captures how and to what extent the Equality Directives have enabled or, at times, prevented the Court of Justice of the European Union from developing even broader and more refined anti-discrimination jurisprudence. Thus, the book offers a glimpse into the past, present and – it is hoped – future of EU anti-discrimination law as, despite all the flaws in the Union's 'Garden of Earthly Delights', it offers one of the highest standards of protection in comparative anti-discrimination law.

Là một phần trong nghiên cứu về chứng minh trong tố tụng dân sự của tác giả, bài viết làm rõ khái niệm chứng minh từ chủ thể, cấp độ đến giới hạn chứng minh từ góc độ tổng quát nhất. Trên cơ sở đó, tác giả bình luật và đề xuất những nội dung liên quan đến nghĩa vụ chứng minh trong cả 3 loại tố tụng hiện hành ở Việt Nam.

Carrier’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel has been one of the most fundamental principles in maritime law and hereby a core element of every contract of carriage of goods by sea throughout maritime history. Notwithstanding the duty was initially appraised to be absolute obligation under common law, it has been then boiled down to whether exercising due diligence by the carrier as a result of several attempts to find the balance between the commercial interests of carriers and shippers. The obligation of exercising due diligence was introduced in the Harter Act for the first time though, it has, in essence, gained international recognition through the Hague Rules. This paper hereby will comparatively scrutinise how the obligation of seaworthiness has been interpreted by courts, and whether there is a remarkable difference amongst the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules in the sense of the nature of the carrier’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.

Análisis crítico sobre el modo en que el Anteproyecto de Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Provincia de Buenos Aires recepta esta doctrina. En particular se cuestiona su incorporación en el texto como una regla de inversión de la carga de probar en sentido estricto, por más que se lo haga de modo excepcional y parcial. Según se explica a continuación, la iniciativa analizada debería haberse limitado a modular los imperativos de las partes en materia probatoria, exigiéndoles efectiva colaboración en el esclarecimiento de los hechos y sancionando con indicios serios el incumplimiento de dicho estándar de conducta, pero sin modificar la regla de juicio en caso de incertidumbre.

This writing analyzes, from a diachronic point of view, medical malpractice and how it has been impacted by the Italian law 8 March 2017, n. 24. The study shows that recognizing doctors directly liable in tort (art. 7) introduces a separation between form and substance. This separation arises problems of constitutionality in “intramoenia” cases and of juridical qualification regarding the relationship between doctors and healthcare facilities. There are also some critical issues about compulsory professional insurance rule (art. 10); some of them would have been avoided by providing an equivalent obligation for insurance companies. Finally, hospitals’ and insurance companies’ right of redress (art. 9) seems inconsistent, because it presupposes a discretionary power to doctors, which has been denied, in general, by the law.

In this topic I wanted to leave my contribution to the introduction of the use of seismographs in the mining activities of small, medium and large mining; I am sure that the knowledge and then apply the appropriate techniques in blasting in open pit or underground mines, will give excellent results if accompanied with measurements of seismic parameters, typical of mining at the level of productivity and low production costs.
I give permission for every university to use the information published here for the benefit of the learning of future civil engineers in mines

Il saggio prende le mosse da un orientamento della Suprema Corte, in corso di consolidamento, che ritiene il nesso di causalità nella responsabilità professionale del medico oggetto di prova distinta rispetto all'inadempimento o alla colpa, addossandone l'onere al creditore. In tal modo, le due specie della responsabilità civile, contrattuale e aquiliana, non divergerebbero sul versante del requisito della causalità ed e ` questo un esito sistematico di cui si può fondatamente dubitare. A un esame approfondito, l'intero impianto dell'orientamento si rivela piuttosto fragile per una pluralità di ragioni che però sono tutte riconducibili all'errore di fondo di trascurare le specificità della responsabilità contrattuale. E tuttavia queste recenti pronunzie offrono l'occasione di approfondire la riflessione sul funzionamento del giudizio di responsabilità contrattuale sotto il profilo, abbastanza negletto in dottrina, del ruolo della causalità e del problema della ripartizione della relativa prova, con particolare riguardo al rischio della c.d. causa ignota.

Who should prove the existence or nonexistence of some fact in a judicial proceeding? Should the Claimant help the Defendant to prove asserts of truth of particular facts or vice versa? Is there a new rule within all the rules governing the presentation of facts and proof in proceedings before courts? Those are issues of a great importance studied by scholars and courts in the last years relating to the law
of evidence and this essay which provides a framework for further research gives a particularly and critic point of view influenced by a vision of the process as an instrument of freedom or as a right that point to protect freedoms.

In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely-used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the " beyond a reasonable doubt " standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified—at least in large part—by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this paper I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof. ________ 1. The Standard of Proof The state sometimes performs actions against the wishes or interests of individual citizens. They might stop and search an individual, charge him with a crime, incarcerate him, impose a restraining order or curfew, remove child custody rights, or order him to pay costs or fees, such as child support. Standards of proof are levels of confidence required to perform these actions legitimately. Before the state may perform these actions they must determine, to that confidence level, certain facts to be the case. 1 Employing public, clearly understood standards of proof serves a range of functions, including bolstering citizens' trust in the system and protecting individuals from undue loss of liberty. There are several standards of proof in use across the world. They vary in demandingness according to the seriousness of the state's action—weaker standards are employed for less severe actions—and the consequences risked by not acting. Formal standards include the " reasonable suspicion " standard in the US, which is required for a brief stop and search. 2 To satisfy this standard the police officer must have a specific, articulable, and individualised suspicion that crime is afoot before they conduct a brief search of an individual. The " preponderance of evidence " standard—usually understood as requiring that the claim is more likely than not—is operative in many Western democracies for most civil and family court cases. 3 The " clear and convincing evidence " standard is even more demanding. It is

This study employed hierarchical linear regression techniques to study the relationship between GPA and the extent to which high-achieving black collegians’ feel pressure to prove their intellectual ability using survey data from participants at a predominantly white institution. Findings suggest that approximately 88% of high-achieving black collegians report feeling pressure to prove their intellectual ability, despite prior achievements and participation in a university scholarship program. Regression results were not statistically significant for the tie between GPA and the degree of psychological burden reported; however other variables account for 27% of the variance in GPA and hold promise for future practice and research on high-achieving blacks.

The burden and standard of proof can be regarded as mechanisms for allocating the risk of the tribunal arriving at an erroneous decision. In the criminal context, however, the rhetoric of protecting the innocent from conviction is undermined by the haphazard imposition of the legal burden of proof on the accused, especially since the incorporation of the Human Rights Act 1998

Il presente lavoro analizza la tecnica normativa impiegata dal legislatore italiano nell’art. 533 c.p.p., al fine di verificarne la compatibilità con i suggerimenti emersi nel recente dibattito filosofico sul tema degli standard probatori. Assunta una prospettiva “baconiana” della bard rule, si sostiene una relazione quantitativa fra le soglie decisorie operanti nelle varie fasi del procedimento penale e nei rapporti fra quest’ultimo e il processo civile. Una relazione fondata sul diverso grado di conferma probatoria richiesto dal legislatore per la prova di determinati fatti e in vista della preferenza accordata a determinati interessi.

This paper studies the logical modelling of presumptions and their effects on the burden of proof. Presumptions are modelled as default rules and their effect on the burden of proof is defined in terms of a distinction between the burden of production, the burden of persuasion and the tactical burden of proof. These notions are logically characterised in such a

... Norman Eliaser, Steven Fix, Ian Gotlib, Julie Johnson, Julie Levin, Cara Nicol, Rachel Felice, Nick Kane], Julie Moore, Amy ... Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed toLance J. Rips, Psychology Department, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road ...

The number of research misconduct cases faced by institutions has
increased substantially over recent years. The proffered explanations for
this increase range from greater pressure on scientists to publish quickly to  there simply being more emphasis in identifying research misconduct.

“Research misconduct”  is broadly defined to mean fabrication,
falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research,  or in reporting research results. For purposes of that definition: (a) “fabrication” is making up data or results and recording or reporting them; (b)  “falsification”  is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record;
and (c) “plagiarism” is the appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit. Research misconduct does not include honest error or differences of opinion.

This article discusses the administrative process in research misconduct cases pursuant to regulations adopted by the Department of Health and  Human Services (HHS) and by the National Science Foundation (NSF). It also analyzes key legal terms and discusses the burden of proof applied in research misconduct cases with a focus on those instances where HHS or NSF seek to debar the researcher from future government contracts or grants.

On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the "burden of proof"), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications.

Three studies explored the hypothesis that implicit measures of prejudice can tap negative, yet egalitarian associations. In Study 1, automatically associating African Americans with oppression predicted greater automatic prejudice. In Studies 2 and 3, classically condi- tioning associations between the novel group NoYans and words like oppressed, maltreated, and victimized led to greater automatic prej- udice against NoYans. Results suggest

Litigation is about recognising where the burden lies and to what certain degree(requirements), standard of proof that is needed in order to prove a case or refute such allegation(s) or claim(s). This paper deals with that but limiting its scope to criminal litigation. Aspects such as unexplained wealth, forensic evidence, customary criminal law,  will be fully discussed. in order to gain perspective adultery cases, election petition matters will be briefly analysed.

Visto como ponto central e um dos assuntos mais relevante e debatidos do direito processual civil, o tema do ônus probatório é visto pela maioria absoluta dos doutrinadores como a espinha dorsal para solução do litígio submetido à jurisdição estatal.
Ao longo dos anos, ademais, passou a ganhar importância a problemática atinente à inversão do ônus da prova, em especial com a aplicação da teoria da carga dinâmica, na qual o magistrado pode, sempre fundamentadamente, impor ao outro litigante a obrigação de provar o fato constitutivo, modificativo ou extintivo do direito que, a princípio, caberia ao seu adversário.
O tema ganhou ainda mais destaque com a edição do novo Código de Processo Civil, em 2015, que forneceu mais espaço para a autonomia privada influir e, em certa parte, modificar procedimentos relativos ao processo, por meio de convenções que, desde que validamente celebradas, vinculam o Poder Judiciário.
Nesse sentido, os negócios jurídicos, antes de ampla e comum utilização no campo do direito material, passaram a ter maior espaço e aplicação do campo do direito processual, contando com previsões de espécies típicas e de uma cláusula geral que permite a celebração de negócios atípicos, consoante o interesse e, em certa parte, criatividade dos operadores do direito.
A presente monografia, assim, tem por finalidade justamente analisar o contexto – admissibilidade e limites legais – que as partes devem observar para poderem celebrar convenções processuais ou pré-processuais que versem sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova.

This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the better. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption without providing any justification. Although this topic raises critical issues for practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. I conclude that the profile of vanishing cogency of the scheme may be unique and is determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing conditions.
Resumen: Este trabajo considera si universalmente –para todos los seres raciona-les– un esquema o patrón argumentativo puede cambiar de ser cogente (bien razona-do) a falaz. Esta pregunta ha recibido poca atención anteriormente, a pesar de la cen-tralidad de los conceptos de fuerza lógica, esquema y falacia. Sostengo que la cogencia ha desaparecido de esta manera para el siguiente esquema, un tipo común de razona-miento impersonal de medios-fines: se necesita X como una necesidad básica o pro-tección de la vida humana, por lo tanto, X debe ser asegurado si es posible. Tal como está (sin más elaboración), este esquema se compromete con la suposición de que cu-anto mayor sea el número de vidas humanas, mejor es el caso. Aunque este supuesto puede haber sido indiscutible anteriormente, es claramente discutible ahora. Es un error o incongruencia hacer de una suposición algo que es claramente discutible, sin dar ninguna justificación. A pesar de que este tema plantea cuestiones críticas para prácticamente todas las disciplinas, mi objetivo principal radica en el problema lógico (en oposición a problemas empíricos o éticos), y en las implicaciones para la lógica práctica y teórica. Llego a la conclusión de que el perfil de la desaparición de la cogen-cia del esquema puede ser único y está determinado por una combinación peculiar de la contingente universalidad y las condiciones cambiantes.

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem, (ii) petitio principii, and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialoque, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue.

Supreme Court observed that explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 expands the meaning of `culpable mental state` provides that `culpable mental state` includes intention, knowledge of a fact and believing or reason to believe a fact. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 provides that for the purpose of Section 35, a fact is said to be proved only when the Court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of the probability. Once the possession of the contraband by the accused has been established, it is for the accused to discharge the onus of proof that he was not in conscious possession. Burden of proof cast on the accused Under Section 35 of the NDPS Act can be discharged through different modes. One of such modes is that the accused can rely on the materials available in the prosecution case raising doubts about the prosecution case. The accused may also adduce other evidence when he is called upon to enter on his defence. If the circumstances appearing in the prosecution case give reasonable assurance to the Court that the accused could not have had the knowledge of the required intention, the burden cast on him Under Section 35 of the NDPS Act would stand discharged even if the accused had not adduced any other evidence of his own when he is called upon to enter on his defence. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.167 OF 2006 BALDEV SINGH ...Appellant Versus STATE OF HARYANA ...Respondent Dated;November 4, 2015 -

This paper introduces a subjective logic based argumentation framework primarily targeted at evidential reasoning. The framework explicitly caters for argument schemes, accrual of arguments, and burden of proof; these concepts appear in many types of argument, and are particularly useful in dialogues revolving around evidential reasoning. The concept of a sensor is also useful in this domain, representing a source of evidence, and is incorporated in our framework. We show how the framework copes with a number of problems that ...