- www.carycoglianese.net
www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese
www.pennreg.org
www.theregreview.org
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=45817
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania, School of Law, Faculty Member
- Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Penns... moreCary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he currently serves as the founding director of the Penn Program on Regulation and has served as the law school’s Deputy Dean for Academic Affairs. He founded and serves as the faculty advisor to The Regulatory Review. Follow him at www.CaryCoglianese.net.edit
President Obama has trumpeted transparency as a major part of his agenda, promising “unprecedented ” openness throughout the federal government. Although Obama benefits politically from the contrast with his predecessor’s reputation for... more
President Obama has trumpeted transparency as a major part of his agenda, promising “unprecedented ” openness throughout the federal government. Although Obama benefits politically from the contrast with his predecessor’s reputation for secrecy, in the long run an excessive emphasis on fishbowl governance can raise unrealistic expectations and ultimately backfire. After all, at some point transparency has its costs, such as when disclosure dampens internal deliberation or undermines privacy. The real issue, then, is how much transparency and what type. Despite its rhetoric, the Obama Administration has placed limits on transparency and will likely continue to do so. Yet members of the public and open government activists are unlikely to appreciate the need for such limits, leading to disappointment and charges of hypocrisy. It remains unclear whether Barack Obama will earn the mantle of the “transparency president”—or whether the hopes he has raised will, when unfulfilled, only rein...
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This paper is one of a series of works in progress sponsored by the Belfer Center for Science and
Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major... more
Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward the people’s representatives in Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress’s most significant initiatives during this period — its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act and its successful efforts to repeal fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review Act — exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation. These repeal efforts reveal how the REINS Act would counterintuitively undermine key democratic elements of the current regulatory pro...
Research Interests: Law, Constitutional Law, American Politics, Political Theory, Accountability, and 15 moreLaw and Politics, Regulation, Health Law, Democracy, Administrative Law, Delegation, Oversight, Deliberation, Legislation, Health Law and Policy, Aca, Affordable Care Act, Public Policy, regulatory process, and Congressional Review Act
In the future, administrative agencies will rely increasingly on digital automation powered by machine learning algorithms. Can U.S. administrative law accommodate such a future? Not only might a highly automated state readily meet... more
In the future, administrative agencies will rely increasingly on digital automation powered by machine learning algorithms. Can U.S. administrative law accommodate such a future? Not only might a highly automated state readily meet long-standing administrative law principles, but the responsible use of machine learning algorithms might perform even better than the status quo in terms of fulfilling administrative law's core values of expert decision-making and democratic accountability. Algorithmic governance clearly promises more accurate, data-driven decisions. Moreover, due to their mathematical properties, algorithms might well prove to be more faithful agents of democratic institutions. Yet even if an automated state were smarter and more accountable, it might risk being less empathic. Although the degree of empathy in existing human-driven bureaucracies should not be overstated, a large-scale shift to government by algorithm will pose a new challenge for administrative law:...
Research Interests: Artificial Intelligence, Anthropology, Computer Engineering, Decision Making, Accountability, and 15 moreCorporate Governance, E Government, Bias, AI, Administrative Law, Digital government, Automation, Big Data, Autonomous Systems, Accuracy, Daedalus, Computer Law, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Algorithmic Governance, and Computer Sciences
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Machine-learning algorithms are transforming large segments of the economy as they fuel innovation in search engines, self-driving cars, product marketing, and medical imaging, among many other technologies. As machine learning’s use... more
Machine-learning algorithms are transforming large segments of the economy as they fuel innovation in search engines, self-driving cars, product marketing, and medical imaging, among many other technologies. As machine learning’s use expands across all facets of society, anxiety has emerged about the intrusion of algorithmic machines into facets of life previously dependent on human judgment. Alarm bells sounding over the diffusion of artificial intelligence throughout the private sector only portend greater anxiety about digital robots replacing humans in the governmental sphere. A few administrative agencies have already begun to adopt this technology, while others have clear potential in the near term to use algorithms to shape official decisions over both rulemaking and adjudication. It is no longer fanciful to envision a future in which government agencies could effectively make law by robot, a prospect that understandably conjures up dystopian images of individuals surrenderin...
Research Interests: Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Information Technology, Law, Constitutional Law, and 15 morePublic Administration, Machine Learning, Law and Society, Law and Economics, E Government, Adjudication, AI, Artificial Intelligence and Law, Administrative Law, Digital government, Automation, Multi Agent Systems, Autonomous Systems, Computer Law, and Agent Based Models
Research Interests: Law, American Politics, Comparative Politics, Public Administration, Environmental Law, and 15 moreLaw and Society, Political Science, Politics, Nationalism, Law and Politics, Populism, International Humanitarian Law, Authoritarianism, Administrative Law, Legislation, Othering, Political Movements, Comparative Law and Politics, Law Politics, and Brexit
The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal of 2015 not only pushed that company’s stock and retail sales into freefall, but also raised serious questions about the efficacy of existing regulatory controls. The same furtive actions taken by... more
The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal of 2015 not only pushed that company’s stock and retail sales into freefall, but also raised serious questions about the efficacy of existing regulatory controls. The same furtive actions taken by Volkswagen had been taken nearly twenty years earlier by other firms in the diesel industry. In that previous scandal, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that diesel truck engine manufacturers had, like Volkswagen would later do, programmed on-board computers to calibrate their engines one way to satisfy the required emissions test. Those manufacturers had also programmed the on-board computers to re-calibrate the engines automatically to achieve better fuel economy and responsiveness when the trucks were on the road, even though doing so increased emissions above the mandated level. This paper provides an in-depth retrospective study of the federal government’s efforts to regulate diesel emissions. In particular, it chronicles...
Research Interests: Business, Law, Economics, Environmental Law, Law and Society, and 13 moreLaw and Politics, Law and Economics, Public Policy Analysis, Administrative Law, Social Science Research Network, Business and Government Policy, Empirical Research, Diesel Fuel, Regulatory Agencies, Truck, Environmental Law and Policy, regulatory design, and Transportation Law
Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of... more
Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of procedures for decision making by these administrative bodies, including rules about transparency and public participation. It also encompasses oversight practices provided by legislatures, courts, and elected executives. The way that administrative law affects the behavior of government officials holds important implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles as well as effective governance in society. This paper highlights salient political theory and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative state but with relevance to the design and application of administrative law in any jurisdiction.
Research Interests: Law, Public Administration, Political Theory, Government, Courts, and 15 moreCorporate Governance, Political Science, Governance, Law and Politics, Judicial review, Jurisdiction, Democracy, Administrative Law, Delegation, Oversight, Public Law, Legislation, Benefit Cost Analysis, Administrative Process, and Procedure
The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s... more
The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. Yet as this Foreword shows, both criticisms draw on a mistaken understanding of Chevron. Despite the conventional view that Chevron analysis has only two steps, the reality is that it has always comprised a series of steps constituting a veritable Chevron staircase. If a statute is unclear at Step 1, a cou...
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The heads of administrative agencies exercise authority delegated directly to them through legislation. To what extent, then, may presidents lawfully direct these agency heads to carry out presidential priorities? A prevailing view in... more
The heads of administrative agencies exercise authority delegated directly to them through legislation. To what extent, then, may presidents lawfully direct these agency heads to carry out presidential priorities? A prevailing view in administrative law holds that, although presidents may seek to shape and oversee the work of agency officials, they cannot make decisions for those officials. Yet this approach of imposing a decisional limit on presidential control of the administrative state in reality fails to provide any meaningful constraint on presidential power and actually risks exacerbating the politicization of constitutional law. A decisional limit presents these problems because the concept of a decision in the governmental setting lacks precision, failing to provide a coherent line between permissible oversight and impermissible decisionmaking. A decisional limit also cannot in practice be enforced against either presidents or agencies. Presidents have available to them fou...
Research Interests: Law, Constitutional Law, Public Administration, Philosophy of Agency, Political Science, and 11 moreLaw and Economics, Legitimacy, Rule of Law, Administrative Law, Delegation, Oversight, Unitary Executive, Social Science Research Network, Separation of Powers, Presidential System, and executive branch
Interest group influence in the policy process is often assumed to occur through a mechanism of exchange, persuasion, or subsidy. Here, we explore how business groups may also exert influence by intimidating policymakers—a form of... more
Interest group influence in the policy process is often assumed to occur through a mechanism of exchange, persuasion, or subsidy. Here, we explore how business groups may also exert influence by intimidating policymakers—a form of persuasion, but one based not on the provision of policy information but of political information. We develop a theory where a business firm lobbies a regulator to communicate political information about its capacity to commit to future influence-seeking activities that would sanction the regulator. The regulator assesses the credibility of this message by evaluating the firm’s commitment to lobbying. Guided by our theory, we present evidence consistent with expectations that intimidation can shape regulatory outcomes to the advantage of certain firms, both through a chilling effect, where lobbying derails nascent regulatory plans, as well as a retreating effect, where opposition to published proposals leads to their withdrawal.
Research Interests: Engineering, Game Theory, American Politics, Anthropometry, Breast Cancer, and 15 moreApplied Economics, Animal Production, Administrative Law, Biological Sciences, Diabetes mellitus, Bureaucracy, Credibility, Body Mass Index, Empirical legal studies, Food Sciences, Clinical Infectious Diseases, Confidence Interval, Glycated hemoglobin, Dipeptide, and Government Regulation
Another distinctive procedural process that encourages regulatory excellence in the U.S. was established by executive order. It requires the White House Office of Management and Budget to review an economic analysis of any rule deemed... more
Another distinctive procedural process that encourages regulatory excellence in the U.S. was established by executive order. It requires the White House Office of Management and Budget to review an economic analysis of any rule deemed significant. A rule is considered significant if it is expected to have an economic impact of $100M or more per year or presents a novel policy issue. Furthermore, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) also requires that agencies conduct an economic analysis of rules that may result in expenditures of $100M or more in any one year. Both UMRA and the executive order apply only to executive branch agencies.
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The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s... more
The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. Yet as this Foreword shows, both criticisms draw on a mistaken understanding of Chevron. Despite the conventional view that Chevron analysis has only two steps, the reality is that it has always comprised a series of steps constituting a veritable Chevron staircase. If a statute is unclear at Step 1, a cou...
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Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how... more
Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how officials make regulatory decisions – process choice – remains in relative infancy. Notwithstanding the emphasis legal scholars and political economists have placed on administrative procedures, surprisingly little research has investigated why regulators choose among different process options or what value they and the public receive from different choices. In their book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak make a significant contribution by empirically and normatively examining regulators’ choices between notice-and-comment rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and what they call 'regulation by litigation.' This review considers three central questions about regulation by litigation. First, how if at all...
Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but... more
Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of agency agenda-setting by offering concepts and frameworks that emerged from a Penn Program on Regulation workshop we organized at which more than two dozen leading scholars, practitioners, and government official discussed the relatively hidden world of agency agendas. Addressing the concept of agenda-setting itself, ...
Research Interests: Law, American Politics, Public Administration, Courts, Law and Society, and 15 morePolitical Science, Law and Politics, Regulation, Reform, Administrative Law, Federal Courts, Agenda Setting, Bureaucracy, Interest Groups, Congress, Government Agencies, Discretion, Public Policy, Research challenges, and regulatory process
President Donald Trump and his supporters like to point to the positive economic trends the United States experienced prior to the COVID pandemic. They argue that these positive conditions stemmed from the President’s policies, especially... more
President Donald Trump and his supporters like to point to the positive economic trends the United States experienced prior to the COVID pandemic. They argue that these positive conditions stemmed from the President’s policies, especially his emphasis on deregulation. But what has the Trump Administration really accomplished when it comes to deregulation? The answer is much less than the Administration has claimed—and much less than probably most members of the public would surmise. We compare the claims the Administration has made about its deregulatory accomplishments with what the evidence can sustain. Drawing on an original compilation of data on federal regulation from over the last four years, we find three new completed actions appear in agencies’ regulatory agendas for every one that is labeled deregulatory. When we look at just economically significant actions, even on assumptions favorable to the Administration, we find only one deregulatory action for every one action lab...
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for work, many political leaders have identified regulation as a substantial impediment to economic recovery. Each year, federal regulatory agencies issue approximately 4,000 rules that collectively impose tens of billions of dollars in... more
for work, many political leaders have identified regulation as a substantial impediment to economic recovery. Each year, federal regulatory agencies issue approximately 4,000 rules that collectively impose tens of billions of dollars in costs on industry. In addition, the recently adopted Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act call upon federal agencies to adopt hundreds of additional regulations which will impose new burdens on the economy. Although Republican politicians have been the most strident in characterizing regulations as “job-killers” and in urging the relaxation of certain regulatory controls on industry, even Democratic President Obama has spoken of the economic “chilling effect” of regulations and has taken steps to encourage regulators to consider effects on employment when making decisions. Yet despite how clearly regulation and employment have become linked in the minds of many political leaders, what we know empirically about the relationship between jobs and regu...
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Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major... more
Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward the people’s representatives in Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress’s most significant initiatives during this period — its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act and its successful efforts to repeal fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review Act — exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation. These repeal efforts reveal how the REINS Act would counterintuitively undermine key democratic elements of the current regulatory pro...
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In this special edition of Case in Point, Professor Cary Coglianese and Gabriel Scheffler highlight findings from their recent study, “What Congress’s Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us About Regulatory Reform.
Research Interests: Law and Political Science
For many observers, the Paris Agreement signaled a historic breakthrough in addressing the problem of global warming. In its basic design, however, the Agreement is far from novel. Its dependence on each nation’s self-determined pledge to... more
For many observers, the Paris Agreement signaled a historic breakthrough in addressing the problem of global warming. In its basic design, however, the Agreement is far from novel. Its dependence on each nation’s self-determined pledge to reduce greenhouse gases mirrors the domestic policy strategy called management-based regulation—a flexible regulatory approach that has been used to address problems as varied as food safety and toxic air pollution. In this article, I connect insights from research on management-based regulation to the international governance of climate change. Unfortunately, management-based regulation’s track-record at the domestic level gives little reason to expect that the Paris Agreement will lead to major long-term behavioral change needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although a management-based regulatory strategy may have been the best option available for securing a widespread global climate agreement, this strategy seems to offer little assurance...
Research Interests: Law, International Relations, Environmental Law, International Law, Global Governance, and 15 moreCorporate Governance, Political Science, Politics, Law and Politics, Populism, Law and Economics, Self Regulation, Public Policy Analysis, Global Warming, Populist Movements, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas, International Agreements, Pledge, and Meta Regulation
Research Interests: Law, Economics, Environmental Law, Environmental policy, Commons, and 15 moreEnvironmental Studies, Collective Action, Energy Policy, Law and Economics, Economic policy, Equity, Administrative Law, Disclosure, Fairness, Externalities, Efficiency, Feasibility, Incentives, Environmental social science, and Conceptualization
Ethical issues surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) take on an added salience when courts, administrative agencies, and other governmental bodies use AI. But governments often must rely on private contractors to help build their AI... more
Ethical issues surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) take on an added salience when courts, administrative agencies, and other governmental bodies use AI. But governments often must rely on private contractors to help build their AI systems, which presents both a challenge and an opportunity related to AI governance. In defending themselves against public criticism or lawsuits, government officials need to put forward adequate information about the design and operation of their algorithms, but they can be hampered in what they can disclose because they often rely on private contractors who claim trade secret protection over their work. The solution to that challenge lies in the procurement process: governments need to plan ahead when contracting for AI-related products and services to ensure that contractors will be bound to make information available for oversight. This solution also points to an opportunity for procurement to serve as a form of AI “soft law” governance by promoting compliance with ethical norms. When procurement standards call for transparency and ethical AI, not only will companies that provide products and services to governments need to adapt to these AI-related procurement standards but their actions could also inspire a broader diffusion of best practices throughout the industry.
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Administrative agencies issue many guidance documents each year in an effort to provide clarity and direction to the public about important programs, policies, and rules. But these guidance documents are only helpful to the public if they... more
Administrative agencies issue many guidance documents each year in an effort to provide clarity and direction to the public about important programs, policies, and rules. But these guidance documents are only helpful to the public if they can be readily found by those who they will benefit. Unfortunately, too many agency guidance documents are inaccessible, reaching the point where some observers even worry that guidance has become a form of regulatory “dark matter.” This article identifies a series of measures for agencies to take to bring their guidance documents better into the light. It begins by explaining why, unlike the disclosure requirements for binding agency rules, existing legal requirements have failed to make guidance documents more accessible. The basic problem is that the law on guidance disclosure is not self-enforcing. As a result, guidance availability is ultimately a managerial challenge for agencies—dependent on the adoption of internal disclosure practices—as m...
Research Interests: Business, Law, Public Administration, Digital Technology, Law and Society, and 15 morePublic Relations, E Government, Regulation, Access To Information, Rule of Law, Administrative Law, Open Government, Transparency, Disclosure, Legislation, Clarity, Documents, Access to Legal Information, Internet, and Government Regulation
Research Interests: Business, Law, Constitutional Law, American Politics, Public Administration, and 14 morePhilosophy of Agency, Political Science, Law and Politics, Banking and Finance law, Administrative Law, Legislative Oversight, Social Science Research Network, Legislation, Social and Behavioral Sciences, Statutory Interpretation, Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statute, and Rulemaking
Research Interests: Business, Law, Public Administration, Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental policy, and 15 moreLaw and Society, Corporate Governance, Law and Politics, Law and Economics, Evaluation, Self Regulation, Public Policy Analysis, Administrative Law, Turnover, Incentives, Iso, Environmental Law and Policy, Private Regulation, Voluntary Environmental Programs, and Innovation
Research Interests: Business, Law, Economics, American Politics, Political Economy, and 15 moreEnvironmental Law, Climate change policy, Energy Policy, Law and Politics, Law and Economics, Air pollution, Administrative Law, Natural resources law, Law Economics, Coal Industry, Empirical Analysis, Electric Power Industry, Clean Air Act, Clean Power Plan, and market behavior
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Research Interests: Law, Public Administration, Political Science, Law and Economics, Judicial review, and 13 moreAutonomy, Administrative Law, Social Science Research Network, Social and Behavioral Sciences, White Paper, Benefit Cost Analysis, Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Pra, Executive Orders, Public Policy, Rulemaking, and Government Regulation
In a series of recent disputes arising under the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body has interpreted Article 2.1 to provide that discriminatory and trade-distortive regulation could be permissible if based upon a ‘legitimate regulatory... more
In a series of recent disputes arising under the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body has interpreted Article 2.1 to provide that discriminatory and trade-distortive regulation could be permissible if based upon a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’. In its recent compliance decision in the US–Tuna II dispute, the AB reaffirmed its view that regulatory distinctions embedded in the US dolphin-safe tuna-labeling regime were not legitimate because they were not sufficiently calibrated to the risks to dolphins associated with different tuna fishing conditions. This paper analyzes the AB's application of the notion of risk-based regulation in the US–Tuna II dispute and finds the AB's reasoning lacking in coherence. Although risk analysis and calibration can in principle play useful roles in TBT cases, the AB needs to provide more explicit and careful guidance to WTO members and to panels to avoid the kind of ad hoc decision-making exhibited throughout the US–Tuna II dispute.
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This chapter discusses George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” a stinging analysis of regulation from a political economy perspective. Published in 1971, Stigler’s paper challenged the idea that regulation is designed and... more
This chapter discusses George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” a stinging analysis of regulation from a political economy perspective. Published in 1971, Stigler’s paper challenged the idea that regulation is designed and operated primarily for the benefit of business, rather than solely to advance the overall public interest by correcting market failures. By offering a serious take on regulatory capture, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” changed the way economists analyze government regulation while exerting tremendous influence on a variety of disciplines such as public policy. Stigler’s chapter also sparked extensive research on business–government relations across a wide range of industries, from airlines and mining to banking and manufacturing.
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For nearly a decade, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considered its National Environmental Performance Track to be its “flagship” voluntary program—even a model for transforming the conventional system of... more
For nearly a decade, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considered its National Environmental Performance Track to be its “flagship” voluntary program—even a model for transforming the conventional system of environmental regulation. Since Performance Track’s founding during the Clinton Administration, EPA officials repeatedly claimed that the program’s rewards attracted hundreds of the nation’s “top” environmental performers and induced these businesses to make significant environmental gains beyond legal requirements. Although EPA eventually disbanded Performance Track early in the Obama Administration, the program has been subsequently emulated by a variety of state and federal regulatory authorities. To discern lessons useful for similar voluntary programs, we report here the findings from a multi-pronged, multi-year research effort assessing business participation in Performance Track. We find no evidence to support the sweeping assertions EPA made about ...
Research Interests: Law, Environmental Economics, American Politics, Political Economy, Philosophy of Agency, and 15 moreEnvironmental Law, Corporate Social Responsibility, Political Science, Public Policy Analysis, Administrative Law, Social Science Research Network, Turnover, Empirical legal studies, Outreach, Environmental Law and Policy, Osha, EPA, Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Star, and Public Policy
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Preface Chapter 1. The Jobs and Regulation Debate -Cary Coglianese and Christopher Carrigan EVIDENCE Chapter 2. Analyzing the Employment Impacts of Regulation -Richard D. Morgenstern Chapter 3. Do the Job Effects of Regulation Differ with... more
Preface Chapter 1. The Jobs and Regulation Debate -Cary Coglianese and Christopher Carrigan EVIDENCE Chapter 2. Analyzing the Employment Impacts of Regulation -Richard D. Morgenstern Chapter 3. Do the Job Effects of Regulation Differ with the Competitive Environment? -Wayne B. Gray and Ronald J. Shadbegian Chapter 4. The Employment and Competitiveness Impacts of Power-Sector Regulations -Joseph E. Aldy and William A. Pizer Chapter 5. Environmental Regulatory Rigidity and Employment in the Electric Power Sector -Rolf Fare, Shawna Grosskopf, Carl A. Pasurka, Jr., and Ronald J. Shadbegian ANALYTICS Chapter 6. Toward Best Practices: Assessing the Effects of Regulation on Employment -Lisa A. Robinson Chapter 7. Emitting More Light than Heat: Lessons from Risk Assessment Controversies for the "Job-Killing Regulations" Debate -Adam M. Finkel Chapter 8. Happiness, Health, and Leisure: Valuing the Nonconsumption Impacts of Unemployment -Matthew D. Adler Chapter 9. A Research Agenda for Improving the Treatment of Employment Impacts in Regulatory Impact Analysis -Ann Ferris and Al McGartland Chapter 10. Employment and Human Welfare: Why Does Benefit-Cost Analysis Seem Blind to Job Impacts? -Brian F. Mannix REFORM Chapter 11. Unemployment and Regulatory Policy -Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner Chapter 12. Reforming the Regulatory Process to Consider Employment and Other Macroeconomic Factors -Stuart Shapiro Chapter 13. Analysis to Inform Public Discourse on Jobs and Regulation Michael A. Livermore and Jason A. Schwartz Chapter 14. Rationing Analysis of Job Losses and Gains: An Exercise in Domestic Comparative Law -E. Donald Elliott Contributors Index Acknowledgments
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Dimensões da delegação ABSTRACTHow can the nondelegation doctrine still exist when the Supreme Court over decades has approved so many pieces of legislation that contain unintelligible principles? The answer to this puzzle emerges from... more
Dimensões da delegação ABSTRACTHow can the nondelegation doctrine still exist when the Supreme Court over decades has approved so many pieces of legislation that contain unintelligible principles? The answer to this puzzle emerges from recognition that the intelligibility of any principle dictating the basis for lawmaking is but one characteristic defining that authority. The Court has acknowledged five other characteristics that, taken together with the principle articulating the basis for executive decision-making, constitute the full dimensionality of any grant of lawmaking authority and hold the key to a more coherent rendering of the Court’s application of the nondelegation doctrine. When understood in dimensional terms, the nondelegation doctrine remains alive, and is more manageable and coherent than alternatives recently suggested by Justice Gorsuch in his dissent in Gundy v. United States, even if the Court has almost never invoked the doctrine to strike down legislation au...
This paper may be cited as: Borck, Jonathan, Cary Coglianese, and Jennifer Nash. 2008. Evaluating the Social Effects of Performance-Based Environmental Programs. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 48.... more
This paper may be cited as: Borck, Jonathan, Cary Coglianese, and Jennifer Nash. 2008. Evaluating the Social Effects of Performance-Based Environmental Programs. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 48. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, ...
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5 Weak Democracy, Strong Information: The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process Cary Coglianese Government regulation has a significant impact on society and the economy, affect-ing the operation of such vital... more
5 Weak Democracy, Strong Information: The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process Cary Coglianese Government regulation has a significant impact on society and the economy, affect-ing the operation of such vital institutions as banks, airlines, utilities, ...