Rok Zupancic

Introduction According to the theory of small states in international relations, small states do not have as many means to achieve their foreign policy goals as larger states have (Morgenthau, 1948/2004: 97; Keohane, 1969; Benwell, 2011). However, there are certain niches that can be filled up by small states, since they have certain comparative advantages to larger states (see for example Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen, 2006; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). Due to certain rules and procedures in modern international relations, an important foreign policy task can be assigned to a small state. On one side, an important role can arise from the state's own ambitions to 'become' an important and credible actor in the international community (e.g. with candidature for a presidency of certain international organization), or on the other hand, such a role may arise from unexpected events in the international community (e. g. when an armed conflict breaks out in vicinity of the state, certain actors in the international community may ask the state to take certain measures regarding the conflict). Slovenia, a country which by most of the definitions falls in the category of small states (Grizold and Vegic, 2001; Bucar and Sterbenc, 2002; Sabic, 2002; Brglez, 2005; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2007), took over the presidency of the EU Council on the 1st January 2008, as the first new member state of the EU. Within this period it has been assigned an important role of chairing the work of all the configurations of the EU Council and representing the institution in the international community. Slovenia, which has in its brief history as an independent nation already performed some demanding foreign policy tasks (UN Security Council presidency in 1998/99; OSCE chairmanship in 2005), faced not only the challenge of the EU presidency per se, but also one of the major (geo)political challenges of that time--when Slovenia took over the presidency, Kosovo was in final preparations to declare independence from Serbia. Planned proclamation of independence triggered harsh responses in Serbia and according to some analysts (Krstic, 2007; Janjic, 2007; Matic, 2007; Sesternina, 2007) and media reports (B92, 2007; HINA, 2007), there was a substantial chance that the declaration of independence may renew armed conflict between Kosovars and Serbs. The worst case scenario was that a renewal of armed conflict in Kosovo would eventually cause a spill-over effect, which could lead into violence in the wider region (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania). Acknowledging that the EU perceives countries of the Western Balkans as natural parts of the EU, and consequently sees them as potential members of the EU in the near future (see for example EurActiv, 2009; Barroso, 2011), avoiding possible instabilities was necessary and it was clear that Slovenia, as the presiding member of the EU Council, was entitled to take appropriate measures to mitigate the tense situation in the neighbourhood. Regardless of later developments, we argue that Slovenia, as a small state, was in the most crucial period, a coherent and honest broker between both sides in the Kosovo conflict. Slovenia was, because of its past ties with the region and its knowledge of national character particularities (Raskovic and Svetlicic 2011; Udovic 2011), able to conduct a stable and unbiased policy towards both nations involved in the Kosovo conflict. Its power of 'balance' sprang from its (positive) reputation in the region; firstly it was the first state from the region to join the EU, secondly it was the presiding member state of the EU, and thirdly, its role and behaviour during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the wars that followed was relatively untarnished (Prebilic and Gustin, 2011). Both facts gave it a higher manoeuvre place, because on the one hand it was able to cope with particularities of national character of negotiators from Kosovo and Serbia, while on the other hand it remained calm and was not a priori in favour of anyone, retaining good relations with both countries. …

Various factors influence the (trans)formation of security, foreign, and defense policies of countries. One of them is normative power, a concept that has gained significance in academic debates in the last decade. However, normative power as an emerging though theoretically disputed concept remains a relatively under-researched area in academia. With the exception of research by mostly European scholars, this particularly holds true for case studies of Asian countries. This article contributes to the body of knowledge on normative power by analyzing the case study of Japan, from the standpoint of a country that has increased and then applied its normative power as an important means through which traditional (interest-based) foreign, security and defense goals can be pursued. In the analysis of Japan's aspirations to become recognized as a global normative power advocate, we analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War on the country's perception of its strategic environment, and subsequent efforts to redefine its role in promoting a new norms-based framework. We also identify three areas in which Japan has been able to strengthen its hard security while simultaneously reinforcing its normative power: its security alliance with the United States, its multi- and bilateral (military) cooperation with other states, and its ability to bolster both its hard and its normative power in an emerging multipolar international system.

This paper explores what does the "Brussels Dialogue", one of the cornerstones of current EU peacebuilding activities in Kosovo, mean for the Serbs in the North of Kosovo. As argued by many, the EU-brokered dialogue, which led to the signing of the Brussels agreement (2013), is to be regarded as a "success" of EU peacebuilding. However, such positive assessments usually overlook the consequences for the locals and their perception of "success". By linking the theory on the EU as a normative power with the academic literature on the local aspects of peacebuilding, this paper argues that despite the supposed success, these concrete EU peacebuilding efforts had, among others, certain negative social psychological implications for the Serbs in the North of Kosovo and contributed to the worsening of intra-ethnic relations within this community. These processes, in turn, question the EU peacebuilding' success and the overall perception of the EU as a normative power in the north of Kosovo.

The prevention of armed conflicts is stated as the priority policy of various international organizations, among which the EU and the OSCE. Based on the semi-structured interviews with high bureaucrats and civilian experts, who areengaged in conflict prevention policies within the two international organizations, the article compares the development and implementation of EU and OSCE strategies to prevent armed conflicts. With the support of the secondmethod, the analysis of primary and secondary sources regarding the prevention of armed conflicts (legal acts, e. g. declarations, resolutions, action-plans and other documents the EU and the OSCE have adopted), the authortries to answer the research questions through three domains: (1) what are the connecting points between the conflict prevention policies led by the EU and those led by the OSCE; (2) what are the differences among them; and (3)what are the lessons learned/good practices and what could be done in orderto make the EU and the OSCE (as well as other subjects of international relations) more effective in preventive action. The analysis has shown both international organizations rely mostly on "structural" (long-term) prevention, meanwhile they lack the capacities to enforce hard(er) power . However , each of them has a set of comparative advantages that can be maximized only if the coordination and cooperation among them (and other subjects of international relations) improve. The major obstacle for more effective prevention is the lack of political will, and not the lack of capacities/resources. Therefore, the only way forward is to promote the concept of conflict prevention on all levels of international relations, aiming towards turning it into a norm in international relations and not "a noble idea" of lonely Don-Quixotes only, as it is today

Introduction The decision-making process of a modern state is usually perceived as being based on the rational choices of its political leadership, summoned upon to decide what is best for the state. This sort of self-attributed wisdom implies that the policymaking process is something abstract and underhanded, prudently done within inner circles, untenable to the outsider. In modern and democratic states, this philosophy of abstractness--if not secrecy--has been overcome in recent years to some extent, bringing more openness and transparency (democratic supervision) to the realms of foreign and security policy (Grizold, 1994; Edmunds, 2000; Haltiner, 2000). Despite the prevailing image of international relations still dominated by violence and mistrust, as illustrated by the security dilemma construct, there are some facts that speak in favour of a possibility for positive change: the rise of multilateralism in dealing with transnational problems, increased ecological awareness, attempts to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals, global advocacy of human rights and international humanitarian law, and the formation of new regional orders that may foster stability in volatile regions, to mention only a few (Malesic, 1998; Vuga, 2010; Prebilic and Gustin, 2010; Bojinovic Fenko, 2012; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2012). These positive and negative aspects of the 'Janus-faced international relations' are evident in East Asia, too. This is particularly valid for Japan, which is, on the one hand, tempted to play a pivotal role as an honest broker in the international community, with its due contribution to "the global good" (thereby striving to be recognized as 'an international force of good' or, paraphrasing Manners (2002), as 'normative power Japan'). On the other hand, Japan also experiences severe difficulties in achieving that, due to a combination of internal and external circumstances--such as its lack of resources and the aggressive behaviour of certain states in the region (Katada et al., 2004; Hook et al., 2001). Quite substantial scientific research has been done on the foreign and security policy of Japan and the factors influencing it (for example, Inoguchi and Jain (2000), Green (2001), Kawashima (2005), Samuels (2007), Shuichi (2010), Sunohara (2010), Howe (2010), Soeya et al. 2011, lokibe (2011)). In this regard, there is an evident increase in scholarship analysing the concept of normative power. At the same time, it should be noted that the bulk of it was written by authors, either analysing the EU's quest for normative power and its limitations (Manners, 2002 and 2006; Diez, 2004 and 2013; Balducci, 2010; Kavalski, 2013), attempts of particular countries to become recognized as 'forces of good' (Brommerson, 2010; Crawford 2010; Zupancic and Udovic, 2011; Kavalski, 2013) or the concept of state normative power in general (Koivisto, 2012). Since Japan has strived to be perceived as 'a source of good' in the world for most of the post-1945 period--and therefore developed a deliberate policy in that respect--it comes as a surprise that the analyses of ethical and normative aspects of its foreign and security policy are rare. (3) This article attempts to fill this void to some extent. The central research question of this paper is: how has Japan been trying to reinforce its normative power in such a way that the strategic interests of other influential actors in international community are not directly challenged? The paper will identify how the activities contributing to the image of Japan as a normative power have been streamlined through fields, which could be traditionally categorized within the so called security-related domains: peace-building (and peace-brokering), promotion of the concept of human security, and relying on regional initiatives (the case of anti-piracy initiative in Asia ReCAAP will be analysed in more detail). The paper argues that Japan, although struggling with economic and financial crisis, continues investing a significant amount of resources in building up its normative power. …

Virtual Reality (VR) is increasingly used for visiting historic places. Research on VR experiences in dark tourism (that focuses on mortality) focuses almost exclusively on adults. No studies were found that used virtual tours to engage children with their own country’s conflicts. The present study addresses this gap by designing and developing virtual tours in four cities of Europe with a troubled past. Virtual tours engage children and youth in historical conflicts using multi-perspective storytelling. The aim of this pre-test post-test comparative case study is to examine the change on students’ perceptions of their country’s troubled past after their interaction with a virtual tour of their capital. A secondary aim is to document students’ evaluation of the virtual tour. A questionnaire examining students’ perceptions was completed before and after students’ individual interaction with a virtual tour. Participants included 360 students (212 from Cyprus, 42 from Germany, 63 from ...

This study describes the design of a serious game for social change (“Fact Finders”) that presents intergroup conflicts through historical inquiry and multiperspectivity. A pre-test post-test experimental design examined the game’s effect on undergraduates’ perceptions of conflicts in history. Participants included 97 Greek Cypriots (direct parties of the conflict) and 79 Slovenians (third parties of the conflict) who interacted with and evaluated the game online. Data sources included a 17-item questionnaire on perceptions of conflicts in history and gameplay learning analytics data. Findings indicated that both groups’ perceptions for historical source evaluation and understanding multiperspectivity changed significantly after the game. The game significantly changed perceptions about the constructedness of history and the ability to overcome their country’s troubled past only for direct parties of the conflict. The study provides empirical evidence demonstrating the potential val...

ABSTRACT In this paper, we test a widely accepted assumption in literature, namely, that due to its universal(istic) and humanistic character aiming to transcend ethnic boundaries, art is an effective tool for overcoming inter-ethnic divisions, and further, that people consider art effective to this specific purpose. To test this assumption, we ran a socio-psychological experiment at different universities in Bosnia–Herzegovina. Students were asked to assess the aesthetic value of the selected art installation, but were given different names, surnames and city of the artist, since names and places tend to indicate ethnicity in Bosnia–Herzegovina. We hypothesized that the students would attach greater value to the work of an artist perceived to belong to their ethnic group than that of one thought to belong to another group. The results revealed that the artist’s perceived ethnicity did not play a role in evaluating the value of the work presented. The findings demonstrate that the ‘the other’ in Bosnia–Herzegovina is not always perceived through an ethno-political lens as the literature often suggests. Furthermore, it found that art per se is not necessarily perceived as an effective tool for bridging inter-ethnic divides.

The role of small states in international relations, aspiring to enter into international society as a credible actor, is often measured through their contribution to international security. Slovenia, as a small state, has presumed its ‘well-deserved place’ in the international community could be reached by becoming a trustworthy member of NATO. Among other things, this has meant aligning state policies with those of the political-military organization and so becoming a ‘like-minded’ member of the prestigious club. One of the steps Slovenia has done in this regard was the deployment of its civilian experts to the NATO-led missions to Kosovo and Afghanistan; they were integrated into the contingents of the Slovenian Armed Forces. With this, Slovenian civil-military cooperation in conflict and post-conflict areas has begun, following NATO’s request to contribute not only armed forces but also civilian experts. This article analyzes the development of civil-military cooperation in Slovenia and explores how has it evolved from relatively poorly planned and unorganized attempts to a more structured and better coordinated ‘business’ of a small state in fragile societies. The relationship between the Slovenian military and Slovenian civilian experts from the perspective of ‘being forced to work together’ within the stabilization efforts in Kosovo and Afghanistan is the main focus of this article. The article’s findings, built on interviewing and surveying of Slovenian military commanders and civilian experts, are relevant for a better understanding of small states’ behavior in international relations and military sociology in conflict and post-conflict zones.

The article discusses the theories of the concept of conflict prevention. Kosovo political elites should, if they really want to stabilize the new country, take findings and recommendations of the theory of conflict prevention into consideration, and then find their own way (practice) how to address the problems, related to conflict prevention arising from political, social, economic and cultural sphere. Afterwards, the decisionmakers and high officials have to model their own specific strategies and policies of conflict prevention in order to reduce possibilities of new escalation of violence. The article discusses some historical and modern explanations of origins of violence and the relation between them and conflict prevention. The article also explains the development of the concept of modern conflict prevention, beginning in the framework of the United Nations in 1960’s and culminating in comprehensive approach of conflict prevention in the European Union and some other intern...

As a new member state of the European Union (EU) since 2004, Slovenia has aimed to present itself as a benevolent and devoted “European” country. In order to be seen as ‘a normative power contributor’ in a wider framework of the EU’s normative power, Slovenia has predominantly relied on the means of normative power, which it has sought to apply, in particular, in the Western Balkans – the region where Slovenia claims to have comparative advantages (common history, culture, “understanding” of the region, geographical proximity, etc.). The aim of the present article is to analyse the role of a small country with regard to normative power in a wider context of the EU, which claims to be an institution of normative power. Though Slovenia seeks to obtain credibility both in the Western Balkans and in the EU, and has an aspiration to become ‘the normative power bridge’ between them (by adequately applying some measures of normative power), its chances of success are questionable due to so...

Avtorja v članku preučujeta stališča prebivalcev občin Kostel in Osilnica ob slovensko-hrvaški meji do ljudi na poti. Na tem območju skušajo migranti množično prečkati mejo, zato je posrednih ali neposrednih stikov med lokalnim prebivalstvom in migranti več kot drugod po državi. Zanimalo ju je, ali so stališča tamkajšnjega prebivalstva v primerjavi s stališči celotnega prebivalstva Slovenije o vprašanjih, povezanih z migranti, drugačna, in ali so povezana z nekaterimi demografskimi dejavniki (s spolom, starostjo, z izobrazbo, veroizpovedjo). Pričujočo mikroštudijo, ki temelji na terenski anketi, leta 2020 izvedeni v Kostelu in Osilnici, postavljata tudi v kontekst raziskav Slovensko javno mnenje.

Preliminary data from field work based on somatic approaches in societies affected by large-scale natural disasters and in Rwanda post-genocide. Making the case for the inclusion of somatic approaches in both the theory and practice of peacebuilding.

Introduction The decision-making process of a modern state is usually perceived as being based on the rational choices of its political leadership, summoned upon to decide what is best for the state. This sort of self-attributed wisdom implies that the policymaking process is something abstract and underhanded, prudently done within inner circles, untenable to the outsider. In modern and democratic states, this philosophy of abstractness--if not secrecy--has been overcome in recent years to some extent, bringing more openness and transparency (democratic supervision) to the realms of foreign and security policy (Grizold, 1994; Edmunds, 2000; Haltiner, 2000). Despite the prevailing image of international relations still dominated by violence and mistrust, as illustrated by the security dilemma construct, there are some facts that speak in favour of a possibility for positive change: the rise of multilateralism in dealing with transnational problems, increased ecological awareness, attempts to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals, global advocacy of human rights and international humanitarian law, and the formation of new regional orders that may foster stability in volatile regions, to mention only a few (Malesic, 1998; Vuga, 2010; Prebilic and Gustin, 2010; Bojinovic Fenko, 2012; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2012). These positive and negative aspects of the 'Janus-faced international relations' are evident in East Asia, too. This is particularly valid for Japan, which is, on the one hand, tempted to play a pivotal role as an honest broker in the international community, with its due contribution to "the global good" (thereby striving to be recognized as 'an international force of good' or, paraphrasing Manners (2002), as 'normative power Japan'). On the other hand, Japan also experiences severe difficulties in achieving that, due to a combination of internal and external circumstances--such as its lack of resources and the aggressive behaviour of certain states in the region (Katada et al., 2004; Hook et al., 2001). Quite substantial scientific research has been done on the foreign and security policy of Japan and the factors influencing it (for example, Inoguchi and Jain (2000), Green (2001), Kawashima (2005), Samuels (2007), Shuichi (2010), Sunohara (2010), Howe (2010), Soeya et al. 2011, lokibe (2011)). In this regard, there is an evident increase in scholarship analysing the concept of normative power. At the same time, it should be noted that the bulk of it was written by authors, either analysing the EU's quest for normative power and its limitations (Manners, 2002 and 2006; Diez, 2004 and 2013; Balducci, 2010; Kavalski, 2013), attempts of particular countries to become recognized as 'forces of good' (Brommerson, 2010; Crawford 2010; Zupancic and Udovic, 2011; Kavalski, 2013) or the concept of state normative power in general (Koivisto, 2012). Since Japan has strived to be perceived as 'a source of good' in the world for most of the post-1945 period--and therefore developed a deliberate policy in that respect--it comes as a surprise that the analyses of ethical and normative aspects of its foreign and security policy are rare. (3) This article attempts to fill this void to some extent. The central research question of this paper is: how has Japan been trying to reinforce its normative power in such a way that the strategic interests of other influential actors in international community are not directly challenged? The paper will identify how the activities contributing to the image of Japan as a normative power have been streamlined through fields, which could be traditionally categorized within the so called security-related domains: peace-building (and peace-brokering), promotion of the concept of human security, and relying on regional initiatives (the case of anti-piracy initiative in Asia ReCAAP will be analysed in more detail). The paper argues that Japan, although struggling with economic and financial crisis, continues investing a significant amount of resources in building up its normative power. …

Introduction According to the theory of small states in international relations, small states do not have as many means to achieve their foreign policy goals as larger states have (Morgenthau, 1948/2004: 97; Keohane, 1969; Benwell, 2011). However, there are certain niches that can be filled up by small states, since they have certain comparative advantages to larger states (see for example Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; Ingebritsen, 2006; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). Due to certain rules and procedures in modern international relations, an important foreign policy task can be assigned to a small state. On one side, an important role can arise from the state's own ambitions to 'become' an important and credible actor in the international community (e.g. with candidature for a presidency of certain international organization), or on the other hand, such a role may arise from unexpected events in the international community (e. g. when an armed conflict breaks out in vicinity of the state, certain actors in the international community may ask the state to take certain measures regarding the conflict). Slovenia, a country which by most of the definitions falls in the category of small states (Grizold and Vegic, 2001; Bucar and Sterbenc, 2002; Sabic, 2002; Brglez, 2005; Udovic and Svetlicic, 2007), took over the presidency of the EU Council on the 1st January 2008, as the first new member state of the EU. Within this period it has been assigned an important role of chairing the work of all the configurations of the EU Council and representing the institution in the international community. Slovenia, which has in its brief history as an independent nation already performed some demanding foreign policy tasks (UN Security Council presidency in 1998/99; OSCE chairmanship in 2005), faced not only the challenge of the EU presidency per se, but also one of the major (geo)political challenges of that time--when Slovenia took over the presidency, Kosovo was in final preparations to declare independence from Serbia. Planned proclamation of independence triggered harsh responses in Serbia and according to some analysts (Krstic, 2007; Janjic, 2007; Matic, 2007; Sesternina, 2007) and media reports (B92, 2007; HINA, 2007), there was a substantial chance that the declaration of independence may renew armed conflict between Kosovars and Serbs. The worst case scenario was that a renewal of armed conflict in Kosovo would eventually cause a spill-over effect, which could lead into violence in the wider region (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania). Acknowledging that the EU perceives countries of the Western Balkans as natural parts of the EU, and consequently sees them as potential members of the EU in the near future (see for example EurActiv, 2009; Barroso, 2011), avoiding possible instabilities was necessary and it was clear that Slovenia, as the presiding member of the EU Council, was entitled to take appropriate measures to mitigate the tense situation in the neighbourhood. Regardless of later developments, we argue that Slovenia, as a small state, was in the most crucial period, a coherent and honest broker between both sides in the Kosovo conflict. Slovenia was, because of its past ties with the region and its knowledge of national character particularities (Raskovic and Svetlicic 2011; Udovic 2011), able to conduct a stable and unbiased policy towards both nations involved in the Kosovo conflict. Its power of 'balance' sprang from its (positive) reputation in the region; firstly it was the first state from the region to join the EU, secondly it was the presiding member state of the EU, and thirdly, its role and behaviour during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the wars that followed was relatively untarnished (Prebilic and Gustin, 2011). Both facts gave it a higher manoeuvre place, because on the one hand it was able to cope with particularities of national character of negotiators from Kosovo and Serbia, while on the other hand it remained calm and was not a priori in favour of anyone, retaining good relations with both countries. …

Various factors influence the (trans)formation of security, foreign, and defense policies of countries. One of them is normative power, a concept that has gained significance in academic debates in the last decade. However, normative power as an emerging though theoretically disputed concept remains a relatively under-researched area in academia. With the exception of research by mostly European scholars, this particularly holds true for case studies of Asian countries. This article contributes to the body of knowledge on normative power by analyzing the case study of Japan, from the standpoint of a country that has increased and then applied its normative power as an important means through which traditional (interest-based) foreign, security and defense goals can be pursued. In the analysis of Japan's aspirations to become recognized as a global normative power advocate, we analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War on the country's perception of its strategic environment, and subsequent efforts to redefine its role in promoting a new norms-based framework. We also identify three areas in which Japan has been able to strengthen its hard security while simultaneously reinforcing its normative power: its security alliance with the United States, its multi- and bilateral (military) cooperation with other states, and its ability to bolster both its hard and its normative power in an emerging multipolar international system.