Aleš Oblak

Working memory is typically measured with specifically designed psychological tasks. When evaluating the validity of working memory tasks, we commonly focus on the reliability of the outcome measurements. Only rarely do we focus on how participants experience these tasks. Accounting for lived experience of working memory task may help us better understand variability in working memory performance and conscious experience in general. We replicated recently established protocols for the phenomenological investigation of working memory using the visual span task. We collected subjective reports from eighteen healthy participants (10 women) aged 21 to 35 years. We observed that working memory can be phenomenologically characterized at three different time scales: background feelings, strategies, and tactics. On the level of tactics, we identified transmodality (i.e., how one modality of lived experience can be transformed into another one) as the central phenomenological dynamic at play during working memory task performance.

Synaesthesia is a condition defined by additional perceptual experiences, which are automatically and consistently triggered by specific inducing stimuli. The associative nature of synaesthesia has motivated attempts to induce synaesthesia by means of associative learning. Two recent studies of this kind highlighted the potential for perceptual plasticity even in adulthood, by demonstrating that extensive associative training can generate not only behavioural and neurophysiological markers of synaesthesia, but also synaesthesia-like phenomenology. However, while the results of these studies provided tantalising evidence that a learning component may be involved in the development of synesthetic phenomenology, they only provided superficial descriptions regarding the training-related changes in induced synaesthesia-like (Induced) experience. Therefore, it was not possible to assess how closely the phenomenology of Induced and naturally occurring grapheme-colour synaesthesia (Lifelong) overlap. Here, we addressed this question by providing a new qualitative analysis, using grounded theory, of the phenomenological changes associated with learning new perceptual phenomenology (Induced group) and comparing the descriptive similarities in colour experience to equivalent qualitative data acquired from a new group of Lifelong participants. Using this approach, we were able to directly compare associated colour experiences between the Induced and Lifelong group to assess how closely these two types of novel perceptual experience align. Our results reveal that induced and synaesthetic experience are remarkably similar, displaying a high degree of phenomenological overlap across multiple experiential categories, including: stability of experience, location of colour experience, shape of co-occurring colour experience, relative strength of colour experience and automaticity of colour experience. Our results exemplify the benefits of qualitative methods by providing new evidence that intensive training of letter-colour associations can alter conscious perceptual experiences in non-synaesthetes, and that such alterations produce synaesthesia-like phenomenology, which substantially resembles experiences described in natural grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Our results have implications for the plasticity of visual perception and the role of learning and development in establishing perceptual traits.

Polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) is an endocrine and metabolic disorder affecting women of reproductive age. Research has shown that epigenetic alterations such as DNA methylation may play a role in the development and progression of abnormal ovarian function and metabolic disorders in PCOS. Studies have identified specific genes (related with insulin signaling and steroid hormone metabolism) that are methylated in women with PCOS. DNA methylation appears to respond to various interventions aimed at altering health and lifestyle factors. We tested the efficacy of a mindfulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR) in PCOS patients. We examined its effects on anthropometric measurements, mental health and wellbeing, and alterations in DNA methylation in peripheral blood. MBSR was associated with a reduction in body mass index, waist circumference and blood glucose level, an improvement in subjectively perceived general health, emotional role limitation, and levels of pain, as well as...

In experimental cognitive psychology, objects of inquiry are typically operationalized with psychological tasks. When interpreting results from such tasks, we focus primarily on behavioral measures such as reaction times and accuracy rather than experiences – i.e., phenomenology – associated with the task, and posit that the tasks elicit the desired cognitive phenomenon. Evaluating whether the tasks indeed elicit the desired phenomenon can be facilitated by understanding the experience during task performance. In this paper we explore the breadth of experiences that are elicited by and accompany task performance using in-depth phenomenological and qualitative methodology to gather subjective reports during the performance of a visuo-spatial change detection task. Thirty-one participants (18 females) were asked to remember either colors, orientations or positions of the presented stimuli and recall them after a short delay. Qualitative reports revealed rich experiential landscapes associated with the task-performance, suggesting a distinction between two broad classes of experience: phenomena at the front of consciousness and background feelings. The former includes cognitive strategies and aspects of metacognition, whereas the latter include more difficult-to-detect aspects of experience that comprise the overall sense of experience (e.g., bodily feelings, emotional atmosphere, mood). We focus primarily on the background feelings, since strategies of task-performance to a large extent map onto previously identified cognitive processes and discuss the methodological implications of our findings.

This article proposes a method for consensually validating phenomenal data. Such a method is necessary due to underreporting of explicit validation procedures in empirical phenomenological literature. The article argues that descriptive sciencesexemplified by phenomenology and natural historyrely on nominalization for construction of intersubjectively accessible knowledge. To this effect, epistemologies of phenomenology and natural history are compared. The two epistemological frameworks differ in terms of their attitudes towards the interpretation of texts and visual epistemology, however, they both rely on eidetic intuition of experts for knowledge construction. In developing the method of consensual validation, I started out with the prismatic approach, a method for researching embodied social dynamics. I then used debriefings on the experience of consensual validation to further refine the method. The article suggests that for a nominalization of experiential world to be intersubjectively accessible, such a vocabulary must be independently constructed by the entire group of co-researchers. I therefore propose that during consensual validation, co-researchers be presented with composite descriptions of experiential categories, compare them with their experience, attempt to falsify them, and finally jointly name them. This approach does not yield a single vocabulary for description of experience, but several commensurable vocabularies, contingent on a specific research setting.

Phenomenological investigations of participants with grapheme-color synesthesia—a condition wherein an inducer consistently and automatically triggers an additional concurrent perceptual experience—have revealed an apparent paradox. Namely, they describe the automaticity of their synesthetic experiences as being both willed and automatic. Here, we apply in-depth interviews and signal-contingent experience sampling to investigate the lived experience of a single case (HR) of synesthesia to address this paradox. Our results suggest that for HR an inducer elicits a non-visual, spatially-localized, immediate, and intuitive knowledge about the concurrent. Critically, HR reports that in order to experience the concurrent visually, she must perform a specific mental gesture. We suggest that reporting on the former yields descriptions of concurrent experience as being automatic, and reporting on the latter yields descriptions of concurrent experience as being willful. Our findings demonstrate the need for detailed phenomenological investigations of the experience of synesthesia, in order to develop more accurate descriptions of this experience

> Context • In sciences of the mind, cognitive phenomena are typically investigated with the use of psychological tasks. These usually represent highly constrained environments that isolate and make phenomena under investigation measurable. However, it is poorly understood how psychological tasks constrain one's cognition and, to a certain extent, construct their own object of inquiry. > Problem • I address the question of how visual-spatial working memory is constrained differently in a naturalistic setting, as compared to when measured with psychological tasks. Specifically, can we observe principled and empirical support for the claim that psychological tasks to a certain extent construct the phenomena they purportedly measure? > Method • I employ an empirical phenomenological approach that combines the methodological and analytical framework of constructivist grounded theory with contemporary approaches to the scientific study of experience, to gather phenomenal data on visual working memory in a naturalistic setting-a drawing task. > Results • The drawing task elicits visual-spatial working memory as a type of visual-motor behavior with rare instances of mnemonic representations taking the form of language. Importantly, my empirical findings show that investigating cognitive phenomena in naturalistic settings yields constructs that are different from phenomena elicited in a laboratory setting. > Implications • The findings suggest that investigating the mind solely with psychological tasks provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena under investigation. > Constructivist content • I outline empirical data that points to how, under different constraints from the environment , not only do we conceptualize cognitive phenomena according to different theoretical constructs, but our cognitive system deploys different strategies to solve the task at hand.

I offer a critical reading of Petri and Gromadzki's target article, suggesting that it constructs a strawman neurophenomenology. I argue that the article is an exemplar of an overabundance of publications that hyper-focus on conceptual questions about neurophenomenology, which ultimately serve to detract from conducting neurophenomenological studies. Rather than introducing novel first-person methods in the form of somatic practices, I suggest that formal theory construction might be a better route towards iterative improvement of neurophenomenology.

The paradigm of embodied cognition has productively addressed several problems in linguistics. Assuming that embodiment and experience constitute separate levels of description, it may be that Druzhinin’s notion of the experiential field challenges solutions to linguistic problems proposed by embodied cognition. I conclude by raising questions about how the relationship between values, lived experience, and choice of words can be integrated into the framework of the experiential field.

> Abstract • Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment , it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. Recently, novel approaches (such as the phenomenological control) suggest that it is possible to construct stable phenomenological traits. Questions are raised as to whether there are first-person reports suggesting the nature of stable phenomeno-logical traits in the context of mood disorders.

Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators , I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints). I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.

Psychological tasks are one of the main instruments used in experimental sciences of the mind. Recent meta-psychological discussions have shed light on the phenomenology, research design structure, and generalizability of psychological tasks. However, it remains unclear how psychological task performance modifies consciousness. Subjective reports on the experience of psychological task performance were gathered. A constructivist grounded theory approach was employed for analysis. A number of patterns of mental behavior and experiential states associated with psychological task performance are discussed.

A talk outlining a grounded theory (i.e., a theory grounded in qualitative data) preseted at the DGAP Workshop: The Manifold Senses of Presence at the University of Heidelberg on the 19th October 2021.

The document includes powerpoint slides and script of the talk.

Tradicionalno raziskovalke v kognitivni znanosti smatrajo medosebno  variabilnost (tj. razlike med posameznicami, ki opravljajo enako psihološko nalogo) kot  šum v podatkih. Sodobni pristopi pa kličejo po tem, da bi medosebno variabilnost razumeli kot svoj vir podatkov, ki jih moramo razumeti, ne pa le odpraviti. Tovrstni pristopi v medosebni  variabilnosti odkrivajo predvsem različne kognitivne strategije ter kognitivne sloge. V  pričujočem magistrskem delu naslavljamo možnost, da je vsaj del medosebne variabilnosti povezan z razlikami v doživljanju med izvedbo naloge. Da bi preverili to možnost, smo izvedli  nevrofenomenološko študijo. Soraziskovalke, ki so reševale nalogo prepoznave spremembe, smo ob  naključnem trenutku pozvali k poročanju o svojem doživljanju. To poročilo je zavzemalo  obliko podrobnega empiričnofenomenološkega intervjuja. Zbrane kvalitativne podatke smo analizirali skladno s pristopom konstruktivistične poskusne teorije. Ugotovili smo, ne le, da  posameznice za izvedbo iste naloge delovnega spomina uporabljajo različne strategije, temveč da psihološko nalogo spremlja bogastvo raznolikih stranskih ter odzadnjih občutkov. Sklepamo, da obstaja možnost, da so celostni opisi odnosov ter naravnanosti do naloge, ki so na nivoju doživljanja prisotni v obliki odzadnjih občutkov, pojav, ki bi ga bilo smiselno raziskovati v  nadaljnjih nevroslikovnih raziskavah delovnega spomina.

Slides from 2020 lecture in visual processing for the course Introduction to Cognitive Science II, at the Middle European Interdisciplinary Master's Program in Cognitive Science. Lectures available at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfJjJtTpIwpiOc0q7PEW40poSd-yx7Qoj

In Enactive Psychiatry, de Haan puts forward an enactive solution
for the integration problem in psychiatry. I compare her enactive solution to constructivist approaches to psychopathology. I identify a blind spot in the proposed enactive framework for psychiatry and potential for future research in the role of extended cognition.