- University of Ljubljana, Cognitive Science (MEi:CogSci), Department MemberUniversity of Ljubljana, Center for Cognitive Science, Faculty of Education, Faculty Memberadd
- Cognitive Science, Neurophenomenology, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Radical Constructivism, Epistemology, and 21 moreEmbodied and Enactive Cognition, Philosophy of Science, Critical Neuroscience, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Mood Disorders (Psychology), Philosophy of Psychopathology, Intersubjectivity, Introspection, Phenomenology of the body, Narrative Psychology, Narrative and Identity, Reflection, Tacit Knowledge, Enactivism, Philosophy of Mind, Autopoiesis, Consciousness, Constructivism, Embodied knowledge, Reflexivity, and Self and Identityedit
- Ema is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies and Cognition and Philosophy Lab at ... moreEma is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies and Cognition and Philosophy Lab at Monash University. Coming from an interdisciplinary background, she is interested in the study of lived experience in the context of cognitive science. Ema’s PhD project is a neurophenomenological investigation of meta-awareness in dreaming. / https://www.monash.edu/arts/cognition-and-philosophy-lab/people/ema-demsar/edit
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In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an... more
In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an objectivist frame of reference, without reconsidering the practices and standards involved in the process of research and the interpretation and validation of the results. This has given rise to a number of issues that reveal inconsistencies in the understanding and treatment of some crucial aspects of first-person research. In this article, we will outline a research direction aiming at contributing to the establishment of a framework for the study of experience that addresses these inconsistencies. Specifically, we will identify some challenges facing the study of experience—in particular those linked to the understanding of memory, expression and description, and intersubjectivity in exploring experience—and propose to reframe them under the epistemologica...
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Upshot: We begin our response by restating and clarifying the principal argument of the target article. We go on to focus on four main themes addressed by the commentators: (a) the question of the …
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In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-…
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Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical... more
Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called objectless awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labeled as “nothingness phase” since it described what participants took to be an experience of “nothingness.” This common phase was characterized by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being “somewhere”—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded.
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Context • The enactive approach to cognition affirms the relevance of the study of lived experience within cognitive science. > Problem • Taking experience as the phenomenon of investigation, while at the same time recognizing it as a... more
Context • The enactive approach to cognition affirms the relevance of the study of lived experience within cognitive science. > Problem • Taking experience as the phenomenon of investigation, while at the same time recognizing it as a necessary medium of any scientific activity implies theoretical, epistemological, and methodological challenges that have to be addressed in order to undertake the scientific study of experience. At the same time, it calls for a development of an alternative, non-objectivist and non-representationalist framework for and by addressing those challenges. > Method • After presenting the development of the idea of cognition as enaction and pointing to its consequences for the understanding of science, we situate the scientific study of experience within the enactive approach, presenting neurophenomenology as the methodological implementation of the enactive framework that motivated the development of first-person methods. We distinguish the micro-phenomenological interview and descriptive experience sampling as examples of such methods, reviewing their distinctive features. > Results • Understanding first-person research against the background of the enactive approach is shown to be crucial for bringing about the radical epistemological shift that an enactive position entails. > Implications • The examination of the relationship between first-person research and enaction makes it possible to clarify the ground from which to address the specific challenges that arise in studying lived experience. Investigating these challenges is necessary for developing a coherent research program for the enactive scientific study of experience. >
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Examining a number of recently developed methods for acquiring first-person data on consciousness, we detect a lack of sensitivity for distinguishing the experiential moments in which the experiencing person was reflectively attending to... more
Examining a number of recently developed methods for acquiring first-person data on consciousness, we detect a lack of sensitivity for distinguishing the experiential moments in which the experiencing person was reflectively attending to her ongoing experience. In order to address this gap, we introduce a novel research format for obtaining data on lived experience, combining random sampling of experience with a subsequent retrospective examination of acquired samples in the form of dialogical phenomenological inquiry. The proposed approach aims at the examination of reflectively observed experiential moments and is based on researchers' iterative cultivation of the phenomenological attitude. Drawing upon results from a longitudinal study of the potential of meditation as a tool for examining consciousness, we address the epistemological and methodological challenges of the proposed approach, discuss its applicability and research potential, as well as examine the characteristics and validity of phenomenal data thus acquired.
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The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each... more
The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr's philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry.
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It is increasingly recognized that phenomenological investigation of consciousness requires participants who are interested and skilled in examining their own experiential landscape. What would it mean to ground the study of consciousness... more
It is increasingly recognized that phenomenological investigation of consciousness requires participants who are interested and skilled in examining their own experiential landscape. What would it mean to ground the study of consciousness on the person whose experience is being investigated as the central measuring instrument-and how could that be achieved? This article explores an approach to researching experience in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, whose long-term goal is to examine the potential of meditation as a methodological tool for the study of consciousness, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data consisting of journal entries, interview transcripts, and participatory analysis sessions set the ground for three lines of inquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In the present article, we primarily focus on the third question. We offer a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. The report presents the distribution of experiential modalities, describes what meditators tried to do when meditating, and what they actually ended up doing. The paper also outlines the difficulties we encountered and potential solutions. We consider a thorough account of a pursuit of meditation-based examination of experience to be the most suitable first step towards developing a contemplative, non-naturalized, and existentially meaningful study of consciousness.
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We report on an exploratory empirical phenomenological study investigating the so-called dissolution experiences (DEs), characterized by the subject experiencing a) a dissolution of her psychological or sensory boundaries and/or a fading... more
We report on an exploratory empirical phenomenological study investigating the so-called dissolution experiences (DEs), characterized by the subject experiencing a) a dissolution of her psychological or sensory boundaries and/or a fading of the sense of the self as a separate entity, and/or b) a feeling of unity or identification with (elements of) the surrounding environment. We conducted nine phenomenological interviews investigating seven DEs. The qualitative analysis of collected descriptions of experience elucidated the temporal unfolding of each DE episode, identified typical experiential elements characterizing (specific phases of) DEs, and inquired into the differences and similarities of DEs across different contexts. This study is considered a pilot for a more extensive investigation of DEs. Our findings provide grounds for making the first step towards the phenomenological and conceptual clarification of DEs, which have recently become an object of growing interest in the scientific community, consequently enabling further research.
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We present the shortened version of the codebook used to analyze the acquired samples of experience. See Figure 3 for an overview of categories at different levels of coding, and Figure 4 for an example of an original, uncut codebook... more
We present the shortened version of the codebook used to analyze the acquired samples of experience. See Figure 3 for an overview of categories at different levels of coding, and Figure 4 for an example of an original, uncut codebook entry (for the II-order category Processing content). Due to the spatial limitations, the categories are presented in a brief and eclectic manner: some of them only with the definition, others only with examples, and some whose names are self-explanatory enough even without any additional explanation. The orders of coding are indicated by Roman numerals next to the category names for orders III and IV; the names of II-order categories are italicized.
> Context • Philosophical and – more recently – empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research into lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with... more
> Context • Philosophical and – more recently – empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research into lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called "excavation fallacy" has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. > Problem • What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? > Method • Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. > Results • We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines – rather than distorts – its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation "fallacy" is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context-and subject-specific horizon of expectations. > Implications • Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. > Constructivist content • We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment. >
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V prispevku raziščem odnos med nevroznanstvenimi pojmovanji človekove duševnosti, njihovo predstavitvijo v javnosti in načini, na katere se vpletajo v samorazumevanje ter konkretni vsakdan posameznikov v sodobni družbi. Po kratki omembi... more
V prispevku raziščem odnos med nevroznanstvenimi pojmovanji človekove duševnosti, njihovo predstavitvijo v javnosti in načini, na katere se vpletajo v samorazumevanje ter konkretni vsakdan posameznikov v sodobni družbi. Po kratki omembi teoretske delitve na znanstveno in manifestno podobo človeka ponudim pregled izbranih empiričnih raziskav s področja širjenja nevroznanstvenih idej v medijih in njihove integracije v vsakdanjem (samo)razumevanju posameznikov. S pomočjo koncepta zankanja človeških vrst pokažem na kompleksnost odnosa med opisovanjem duševnih pojavov v nevroznanosti in tem, kako se ti pojavi kažejo v sodobnem življenjskem svetu. Izpostavim, da se v vsakdanje pojmovanje duševnosti ne vključijo nujno tisti nevroznanstveni koncepti, ki so najbolje podprti z raziskavami, ampak tisti, ki jih je mogoče najbolj uspešno integrirati z obstoječimi družbeno-kulturnimi okvirji prepričanj in motivacij.
In general agreement with the target article, I relate Vörös and Bitbol’s elucidation of Varelian philosophical roots of enaction to a discussion of enaction put forward by Varela’s co-authors Rosch and Thompson in their introductions to... more
In general agreement with the target article, I relate Vörös and Bitbol’s elucidation of Varelian philosophical roots of enaction to a discussion of enaction put forward by Varela’s co-authors Rosch and Thompson in their introductions to the revised edition of The Embodied Mind. I align Vörös and Bitbol’s multi-layered understanding of enaction to Rosch’s distinction between its “phase 1” and “phase 2” accounts. I consider the implications of the relationship between the pseudo-subject and the meta-subject of the enactive account of mind for the general enactivist conception of science and scientific knowledge.
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In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in relation to... more
In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric
view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in relation to predictive processing accounts in particular) and constructivist ideas originating from the tradition of second-order cybernetics, demonstrating the potential for a productive dialogue between contemporary cognitive science and constructivist theory. Further elaborating Gallagher’s proposal, we suggest an alternative, autopoiesis-based metaphor of the mind.
view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in relation to predictive processing accounts in particular) and constructivist ideas originating from the tradition of second-order cybernetics, demonstrating the potential for a productive dialogue between contemporary cognitive science and constructivist theory. Further elaborating Gallagher’s proposal, we suggest an alternative, autopoiesis-based metaphor of the mind.
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The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived... more
The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived perspective, through which the mind is experienced and understood in the context of everyday life. In articulating this apparent duality of views I draw upon two influential philosophical accounts: Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigation of the life-world and the world of science and Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of the human being in relation to the world. The presentation and juxtaposition of the two analyses opens a way to an exploration of the interdependence of science and the life-world. It also sets the stage for a critique of naturalism in mind sciences. Following Husserl, I show that the naturalistic attitude stems from forgetting that the idea of the objective scientific reality is but an abstraction from the concrete life-world of experience, value, and meaning. Surveying the conceptual space of philosophy of mind, I further challenge the naturalistic attitude by demonstrating the untenability of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. As I argue, naturalism amounts to a particularly inconsistent stance in studying human epistemic processes, where it must paradoxically presuppose the very aspects of the world that it set out to disclose. Concluding that cognitive science lacks absolute metaphysical or epistemological foundations, I suggest that studying the mind needs to recognize the importance of the lived perspective of being a mind. I explore the multifaceted ways in which the scientific perspective on the mind is both rooted in the life-world and shapes it in turn. I conceptualize two dimensions of this interrelatedness through the presentation of Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive approach to cognitive science and Ian Hacking’s (1995) theory of the looping of human kinds. I conclude by proposing that consistent study of mind which acknowledges the impossibility of separating the cognizing subject from her cognized world is bound to remain open to revision of its own foundations. Cognitive science is thus imbued with a demand for reflexivity towards its own theory and practice which would recognize the historical, experiential and socio-political embeddedness of its concepts as well as the role which cognitive science itself plays in shaping societal conceptions of the mind and the way in which the mind is concretely understood, experienced, lived, and acted upon in the context of everyday life.