This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our ex... more This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect—all varieties of pleasure and pain—and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an “enrichment approach” that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This enrichment approach draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.
Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, 2016
In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein warned that “the method of reducing the expl... more In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein warned that “the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws…leads…into complete darkness” (1958, p. 18). At the time, few philosophers and even fewer scientists were prepared to heed his warning. A half-century later, however, the reductive method of science—the method famously defined by Descartes, brilliantly exemplified by Newtonian physics, and long upheld as the gold standard of scientific explanation—seems to have finally lost its luster. While reduction is still widely defended, in the last decades alternative views have gained credibility, to the extent that a “non-reductive science” is no longer dismissed as an oxymoron.
Enactive theory seems to be reaching a critical juncture in its evolution, as it expands beyond c... more Enactive theory seems to be reaching a critical juncture in its evolution, as it expands beyond cognitive science to include a project that Shaun Gallagher has called "new naturalism": a "phenomenologized" reconstruction of nature, directed by a distinctive view of experience that is itself a product of "naturalized phenomenology." This article aims to contribute to conversations about how to move forward with this project by highlighting important parallels between the trajectory of enactive theory and the early history of pragmatism. Pragmatism was first developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey out of a distinctive view of experience that strongly resembles that of enactive theory. Then, during the first third of the twentieth century, pragmatism evolved into a philosophy of nature and played a leading role in a reconstructive project much like the "new naturalism" proposed by Gallagher and others. Around midcentury, however, this project was largely abandoned as philosophers turned to problems of more limited scope. This history raises crucial questions for proponents of enactive "new naturalism": Why did the pragmatist version of this project fail to achieve its aims? And how will it be different this time?
In this paper I explore the possibility that the creation of art involves a version of the coordi... more In this paper I explore the possibility that the creation of art involves a version of the coordination problem that lies at the center of the ecological approach to movement. Both movement and art require finely coordinated adjustments to a large number of interrelated components, and in most cases the complexity of this task is such that the solution-the specific coordination that is sought-cannot be formulated beforehand. In addition, I propose that in both movement and art the process of coordination is guided by a single property, such that the maximization of this property leads to a maximally effective coordination.
The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current ... more The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current explanatory framework of cosmology, which presumes a timeless background of unchanging physical laws, should be replaced by a thoroughly relational framework in which time is fundamental and all laws are subject to change. Within this alternative framework, however, Unger and Smolin find themselves confronted by a dilemma: either the laws of nature evolve according to some higher set of “meta-laws,” which reinstates a timeless background at a higher level, or the laws of nature evolve randomly and the path of inquiry is blocked. In response to this dilemma, we propose a theory of causal events as singular, freely chosen, and self-determined optimalities constrained only by their intrinsic relations to all other events.
A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “... more A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “E cognition” is to reconceive the end-directed character of cognitive activity in naturally emergent but also experientially adequate terms. In short, it is necessary to show how cognitive activity is motivated. In this article, I present a preliminary analysis of the nature of motivation and the challenge that it presents to cognitive science. I make the case that a theory of motivation is a critical desideratum for dynamical theories of cognition, especially insofar as they understand cognition as a self-organized and “soft assembled” process. Finally, I propose that a branch of ecological psychology that conceives of cognition as a special variety of “dissipative adaptation” offers a promising framework for confronting this challenge.
This paper explores the question of how religious symbolism functions to provide a more meaningfu... more This paper explores the question of how religious symbolism functions to provide a more meaningful or enriched experience of life. It examines a common and highly influential view, referred to here as the “source model”, for which this function requires the addition to experience of transcendent meanings generated by rituals and other specially adapted kinds of symbolic activity. Using Robert Bellah’s Religion in Human Evolution and Clifford Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System” as representative examples, I critique a key premise of the source model, namely that the meaning-making function of religious symbolism evolved in response to a universal experience of life as problematic. I argue that the experience of life as problematic is a product of symbolism, not a precondition. Moreover, with respect to this experience, I propose that symbolism functions not to add meaning but to enhance meanings that are vaguely discerned in everyday life. I close with the suggestion that an enhanced experience of life as problematic is itself a kind of enriched meaning and an important source of the affective power of religious practice.
When examined closely, our experience of affect presents a special challenge: it seems that there... more When examined closely, our experience of affect presents a special challenge: it seems that there is no common quality that marks the pleasantness of conscious states and feelings. The implications of this finding have been debated by philosophers and psychologists for more than a century, and yet the peculiar phenomenology of affect is rarely discussed within consciousness studies. The purpose of this article is to call attention to the problem of affect and to examine the most likely reasons for its neglect. These include the assumption that affect is a special quality, the externalist view of affect as an intentional attitude and, perhaps most importantly, the assumption that pleasures and pains can be circumscribed as a special class of feelings. If none of these reasons hold up to scrutiny, facing up to the problem of affect may require that we revise our concept of consciousness.
In this reply to the commentaries of Lyon and Swenson, I clarify the arguments of my article, “On... more In this reply to the commentaries of Lyon and Swenson, I clarify the arguments of my article, “On the nature and origins of cognition as a form of motivated activity.” In particular, I focus on the nature of self-preserving behavior, considered not only as a basic and universal form of cognitive behavior but also as a key example of cognition as form of motivated activity. I clarify that my approach affirms the importance of self-preserving behavior but questions the widespread assumption that this and other varieties of motivated behavior can be explained as the product of homeostatic mechanisms. I suggest that extremal properties can not only do a better job of explaining homeostasis-like behaviors, but they can also be extended to other kinds of motivated behavior that are not homeostasis-like. Finally, I emphasize the explanatory promise of extremal properties with respect to fundamental questions about the emergence of order in living and nonliving systems.
To understand the evolution of imaginative culture, we need to understand its unique affective po... more To understand the evolution of imaginative culture, we need to understand its unique affective power. The purpose of this article is to explain our enjoyment of imaginative culture from the standpoint of a distinctive theoretical approach to understanding affect in terms of the dynamic and energetic features of consciousness. This approach builds upon John Dewey's view of enjoyment as the enrichment of experience, adding perspectives from studies of the dynamics of consciousness and from ecological psychology. Its main thesis is that positive affect is determined by the causal enrichment of experience, which is defined as the differentiated-ness of conscious states. This approach suggests that the affective power of imaginative culture lies in the way it affords experiences of enriched meaning, as exemplified by our enjoyment of highly nuanced emotion in music.
We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomeno... more We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of ‘relational nature’ described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose.
I agree with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s main argument that living beings are autopoietic bodie... more I agree with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s main argument that living beings are autopoietic bodies. I suggest, however, that if we apply this definition of life to a consideration of living beings as dissipative systems, we find opportunities for further refinement. I propose that living bodies are autopoietic bodies that maintain themselves by using their boundaries to control their constituent processes of dissipative adaptation.
A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “... more A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “E cognition” is to reconceive the end-directed character of cognitive activity in naturally emergent but also experientially adequate terms. In short, it is necessary to show how cognitive activity is motivated. In this article, I present a preliminary analysis of the nature of motivation and the challenge that it presents to cognitive science. I make the case that a theory of motivation is a critical desideratum for dynamical theories of cognition, especially insofar as they understand cognition as a self-organized and “soft assembled” process. Finally, I propose that a branch of ecological psychology that conceives of cognition as a special variety of “dissipative adaptation” offers a promising framework for confronting this challenge.
Please follow this link to a collection of short essays published by the journal "Material Religi... more Please follow this link to a collection of short essays published by the journal "Material Religion." The essays deal with various aspects of religious ritual from the perspective of enactive theory and embodied cognitive science:
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showAxaArticles?journalCode=rfmr20
The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current ... more The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current explanatory framework of cosmology, which presumes a timeless background of unchanging physical laws, should be replaced by a thoroughly relational framework in which time is fundamental and all laws are subject to change. Within this alternative framework, however, Unger and Smolin find themselves confronted by a dilemma: either the laws of nature evolve according to some higher set of “meta-laws,” which reinstates a timeless background at a higher level, or the laws of nature evolve randomly and the path of inquiry is blocked. In response to this dilemma, we propose a theory of causal events as singular, freely chosen, and self-determined optimalities constrained only by their intrinsic relations to all other events.
We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be
enjoyable in itself. This possibili... more We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced emotion.
This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our ex... more This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect—all varieties of pleasure and pain—and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an “enrichment approach” that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This enrichment approach draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.
Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, 2016
In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein warned that “the method of reducing the expl... more In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein warned that “the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws…leads…into complete darkness” (1958, p. 18). At the time, few philosophers and even fewer scientists were prepared to heed his warning. A half-century later, however, the reductive method of science—the method famously defined by Descartes, brilliantly exemplified by Newtonian physics, and long upheld as the gold standard of scientific explanation—seems to have finally lost its luster. While reduction is still widely defended, in the last decades alternative views have gained credibility, to the extent that a “non-reductive science” is no longer dismissed as an oxymoron.
Enactive theory seems to be reaching a critical juncture in its evolution, as it expands beyond c... more Enactive theory seems to be reaching a critical juncture in its evolution, as it expands beyond cognitive science to include a project that Shaun Gallagher has called "new naturalism": a "phenomenologized" reconstruction of nature, directed by a distinctive view of experience that is itself a product of "naturalized phenomenology." This article aims to contribute to conversations about how to move forward with this project by highlighting important parallels between the trajectory of enactive theory and the early history of pragmatism. Pragmatism was first developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey out of a distinctive view of experience that strongly resembles that of enactive theory. Then, during the first third of the twentieth century, pragmatism evolved into a philosophy of nature and played a leading role in a reconstructive project much like the "new naturalism" proposed by Gallagher and others. Around midcentury, however, this project was largely abandoned as philosophers turned to problems of more limited scope. This history raises crucial questions for proponents of enactive "new naturalism": Why did the pragmatist version of this project fail to achieve its aims? And how will it be different this time?
In this paper I explore the possibility that the creation of art involves a version of the coordi... more In this paper I explore the possibility that the creation of art involves a version of the coordination problem that lies at the center of the ecological approach to movement. Both movement and art require finely coordinated adjustments to a large number of interrelated components, and in most cases the complexity of this task is such that the solution-the specific coordination that is sought-cannot be formulated beforehand. In addition, I propose that in both movement and art the process of coordination is guided by a single property, such that the maximization of this property leads to a maximally effective coordination.
The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current ... more The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current explanatory framework of cosmology, which presumes a timeless background of unchanging physical laws, should be replaced by a thoroughly relational framework in which time is fundamental and all laws are subject to change. Within this alternative framework, however, Unger and Smolin find themselves confronted by a dilemma: either the laws of nature evolve according to some higher set of “meta-laws,” which reinstates a timeless background at a higher level, or the laws of nature evolve randomly and the path of inquiry is blocked. In response to this dilemma, we propose a theory of causal events as singular, freely chosen, and self-determined optimalities constrained only by their intrinsic relations to all other events.
A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “... more A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “E cognition” is to reconceive the end-directed character of cognitive activity in naturally emergent but also experientially adequate terms. In short, it is necessary to show how cognitive activity is motivated. In this article, I present a preliminary analysis of the nature of motivation and the challenge that it presents to cognitive science. I make the case that a theory of motivation is a critical desideratum for dynamical theories of cognition, especially insofar as they understand cognition as a self-organized and “soft assembled” process. Finally, I propose that a branch of ecological psychology that conceives of cognition as a special variety of “dissipative adaptation” offers a promising framework for confronting this challenge.
This paper explores the question of how religious symbolism functions to provide a more meaningfu... more This paper explores the question of how religious symbolism functions to provide a more meaningful or enriched experience of life. It examines a common and highly influential view, referred to here as the “source model”, for which this function requires the addition to experience of transcendent meanings generated by rituals and other specially adapted kinds of symbolic activity. Using Robert Bellah’s Religion in Human Evolution and Clifford Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System” as representative examples, I critique a key premise of the source model, namely that the meaning-making function of religious symbolism evolved in response to a universal experience of life as problematic. I argue that the experience of life as problematic is a product of symbolism, not a precondition. Moreover, with respect to this experience, I propose that symbolism functions not to add meaning but to enhance meanings that are vaguely discerned in everyday life. I close with the suggestion that an enhanced experience of life as problematic is itself a kind of enriched meaning and an important source of the affective power of religious practice.
When examined closely, our experience of affect presents a special challenge: it seems that there... more When examined closely, our experience of affect presents a special challenge: it seems that there is no common quality that marks the pleasantness of conscious states and feelings. The implications of this finding have been debated by philosophers and psychologists for more than a century, and yet the peculiar phenomenology of affect is rarely discussed within consciousness studies. The purpose of this article is to call attention to the problem of affect and to examine the most likely reasons for its neglect. These include the assumption that affect is a special quality, the externalist view of affect as an intentional attitude and, perhaps most importantly, the assumption that pleasures and pains can be circumscribed as a special class of feelings. If none of these reasons hold up to scrutiny, facing up to the problem of affect may require that we revise our concept of consciousness.
In this reply to the commentaries of Lyon and Swenson, I clarify the arguments of my article, “On... more In this reply to the commentaries of Lyon and Swenson, I clarify the arguments of my article, “On the nature and origins of cognition as a form of motivated activity.” In particular, I focus on the nature of self-preserving behavior, considered not only as a basic and universal form of cognitive behavior but also as a key example of cognition as form of motivated activity. I clarify that my approach affirms the importance of self-preserving behavior but questions the widespread assumption that this and other varieties of motivated behavior can be explained as the product of homeostatic mechanisms. I suggest that extremal properties can not only do a better job of explaining homeostasis-like behaviors, but they can also be extended to other kinds of motivated behavior that are not homeostasis-like. Finally, I emphasize the explanatory promise of extremal properties with respect to fundamental questions about the emergence of order in living and nonliving systems.
To understand the evolution of imaginative culture, we need to understand its unique affective po... more To understand the evolution of imaginative culture, we need to understand its unique affective power. The purpose of this article is to explain our enjoyment of imaginative culture from the standpoint of a distinctive theoretical approach to understanding affect in terms of the dynamic and energetic features of consciousness. This approach builds upon John Dewey's view of enjoyment as the enrichment of experience, adding perspectives from studies of the dynamics of consciousness and from ecological psychology. Its main thesis is that positive affect is determined by the causal enrichment of experience, which is defined as the differentiated-ness of conscious states. This approach suggests that the affective power of imaginative culture lies in the way it affords experiences of enriched meaning, as exemplified by our enjoyment of highly nuanced emotion in music.
We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomeno... more We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of ‘relational nature’ described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose.
I agree with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s main argument that living beings are autopoietic bodie... more I agree with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s main argument that living beings are autopoietic bodies. I suggest, however, that if we apply this definition of life to a consideration of living beings as dissipative systems, we find opportunities for further refinement. I propose that living bodies are autopoietic bodies that maintain themselves by using their boundaries to control their constituent processes of dissipative adaptation.
A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “... more A fundamental challenge for enactive theory and other radical varieties of non-representational “E cognition” is to reconceive the end-directed character of cognitive activity in naturally emergent but also experientially adequate terms. In short, it is necessary to show how cognitive activity is motivated. In this article, I present a preliminary analysis of the nature of motivation and the challenge that it presents to cognitive science. I make the case that a theory of motivation is a critical desideratum for dynamical theories of cognition, especially insofar as they understand cognition as a self-organized and “soft assembled” process. Finally, I propose that a branch of ecological psychology that conceives of cognition as a special variety of “dissipative adaptation” offers a promising framework for confronting this challenge.
Please follow this link to a collection of short essays published by the journal "Material Religi... more Please follow this link to a collection of short essays published by the journal "Material Religion." The essays deal with various aspects of religious ritual from the perspective of enactive theory and embodied cognitive science:
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showAxaArticles?journalCode=rfmr20
The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current ... more The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current explanatory framework of cosmology, which presumes a timeless background of unchanging physical laws, should be replaced by a thoroughly relational framework in which time is fundamental and all laws are subject to change. Within this alternative framework, however, Unger and Smolin find themselves confronted by a dilemma: either the laws of nature evolve according to some higher set of “meta-laws,” which reinstates a timeless background at a higher level, or the laws of nature evolve randomly and the path of inquiry is blocked. In response to this dilemma, we propose a theory of causal events as singular, freely chosen, and self-determined optimalities constrained only by their intrinsic relations to all other events.
We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be
enjoyable in itself. This possibili... more We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced emotion.
In their effort to emphasize the positive role of nature in our lives, environmental thinkers exi... more In their effort to emphasize the positive role of nature in our lives, environmental thinkers existential shame— shame to the experience of values such as community, meaning, beauty, and the sacred and, through these experiences, to inscribe them into conscience.
Within disciplines of religious studies, discussions of religious experience tend to revolve arou... more Within disciplines of religious studies, discussions of religious experience tend to revolve around the most rare and extraordinary cases, while neglecting much more common varieties of " ordinary religious experience " —that is, experiences of regular practitioners in the midst of normal religious activities such as worship or prayer. This comment will, first, call attention to this essential aspect of religious life, and, second, will suggest ways in which it can be made more accessible to investigation. This article suggests that researchers focus on the variability of engagement in religious practice and the processes of learning and adaptation by which regular practitioners enhance their experience of religious practice. It also suggests that ethnographic studies be extended by carefully selected theories of perception and cognition that address the role of material conditions in ordinary religious experience.
There are many approaches in cognitive science that invoke embodiment. Clearly, however, the word... more There are many approaches in cognitive science that invoke embodiment. Clearly, however, the word “embodiment” is used in many senses on different occasions. One way to use “embodiment” is to emphasize the role of the particular properties of the body in shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give a rather trite example, it could be argued that having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a basis in the body. Clearly, such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a ...
Uploads
properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of ‘relational nature’ described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose.
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showAxaArticles?journalCode=rfmr20
enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a
musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced
emotion.
properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of ‘relational nature’ described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose.
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showAxaArticles?journalCode=rfmr20
enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a
musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the “hedonic flip” of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced
emotion.