Rosa Ritunnano
University of Birmingham, Institute of Mental Health, Department Member
- University of Melbourne, Centre for youth mental health, Graduate StudentUniversity of Warwick, Division of Mental Health and Wellbeing, Department Memberadd
- I am a Priestley PhD Scholar based at Birmingham University’s Institute for Mental Health and the University of Melbo... moreI am a Priestley PhD Scholar based at Birmingham University’s Institute for Mental Health and the University of Melbourne. I am interested in the practical applications of phenomenology in mental health research, and its potential to centre the expertise of lived experience to improve mental health care. My current research adopts a strongly cross- and inter-disciplinary approach (including methods from phenomenology, linguistics and cognitive neuropsychology) to the investigation of delusional experiences and meanings in early psychosisedit
- Prof. Matthew Broome, Prof. Lisa Bortolotti, Prof. Barnaby Nelson, Dr. Clara Humpstonedit
Background and Hypothesis: Cognitive remediation (CR) benefits cognition and functioning in psychosis but we do not know the optimal level of therapist contact, so we evaluated the potential benefits of different CR modes. Study Design: A... more
Background and Hypothesis: Cognitive remediation (CR)
benefits cognition and functioning in psychosis but we do
not know the optimal level of therapist contact, so we
evaluated the potential benefits of different CR modes.
Study Design: A multi-arm, multi-center, single-blinded,
adaptive trial of therapist-supported CR. Participants
from 11 NHS early intervention psychosis services were
independently randomized to Independent, Group, One-toOne, or Treatment-as-usual (TAU). The primary outcome
was functional recovery (Goal Attainment Scale [GAS]) at
15-weeks post randomization. Independent and TAU arms
were closed after an interim analysis, and three informative contrasts tested (Group vs One-to-One, Independent
vs TAU, Group + One-to-One vs TAU). Health economic
analyses considered the cost per Quality Adjusted Life
Year (QALY). All analyses used intention-to-treat principles. Study Results: We analyzed 377 participants (65
Independent, 134 Group, 112 One-to-One, 66 TAU). GAS
did not differ for Group vs One-to-One: Cohen’s d: 0.07,
−0.25 to 0.40 95% CI, P = .655; Independent vs TAU:
Cohen’s d: 0.07, −0.41 to 0.55 95% CI, P = .777. GAS
and the cognitive score improved for Group + One-to-One
vs TAU favoring CR (GAS: Cohen’s d: 0.57, 0.19–0.96
95% CI, P = .003; Cognitive score: Cohens d: 0.28, 0.07–
0.48 95% CI, P = .008). The QALY costs were £4306
for Group vs TAU and £3170 for One-to-One vs TAU.
Adverse events did not differ between treatment methods
and no serious adverse events were related to treatment.
Conclusions: Both active therapist methods provided
cost-effective treatment benefiting functional recovery
in early psychosis and should be adopted within services.
Some individuals benefited more than others so needs further investigation. Trial registration: ISRCTN14678860
https://doi.org/10.1186/ISRCTN14678860 Now closed.
benefits cognition and functioning in psychosis but we do
not know the optimal level of therapist contact, so we
evaluated the potential benefits of different CR modes.
Study Design: A multi-arm, multi-center, single-blinded,
adaptive trial of therapist-supported CR. Participants
from 11 NHS early intervention psychosis services were
independently randomized to Independent, Group, One-toOne, or Treatment-as-usual (TAU). The primary outcome
was functional recovery (Goal Attainment Scale [GAS]) at
15-weeks post randomization. Independent and TAU arms
were closed after an interim analysis, and three informative contrasts tested (Group vs One-to-One, Independent
vs TAU, Group + One-to-One vs TAU). Health economic
analyses considered the cost per Quality Adjusted Life
Year (QALY). All analyses used intention-to-treat principles. Study Results: We analyzed 377 participants (65
Independent, 134 Group, 112 One-to-One, 66 TAU). GAS
did not differ for Group vs One-to-One: Cohen’s d: 0.07,
−0.25 to 0.40 95% CI, P = .655; Independent vs TAU:
Cohen’s d: 0.07, −0.41 to 0.55 95% CI, P = .777. GAS
and the cognitive score improved for Group + One-to-One
vs TAU favoring CR (GAS: Cohen’s d: 0.57, 0.19–0.96
95% CI, P = .003; Cognitive score: Cohens d: 0.28, 0.07–
0.48 95% CI, P = .008). The QALY costs were £4306
for Group vs TAU and £3170 for One-to-One vs TAU.
Adverse events did not differ between treatment methods
and no serious adverse events were related to treatment.
Conclusions: Both active therapist methods provided
cost-effective treatment benefiting functional recovery
in early psychosis and should be adopted within services.
Some individuals benefited more than others so needs further investigation. Trial registration: ISRCTN14678860
https://doi.org/10.1186/ISRCTN14678860 Now closed.
Research Interests:
This editorial reflects on current methodological trends in translational research in mental health. It aims to build a bridge between two fields that are frequently siloed off from each other: interventional research and... more
This editorial reflects on current methodological trends in translational research in mental health. It aims to build a bridge between two fields that are frequently siloed off from each other: interventional research and phenomenologically informed research. Recent years have witnessed a revival of phenomenological approaches in mental health, often – but not only – as a means of connecting the subjective character of experience with neurobiological explanatory accounts of illness. Rich phenomenological knowledge accrued in schizophrenia, and wider psychosis research, has opened up new opportunities for improving prediction, early detection, diagnosis, prognostic stratification, treatment and ethics of care. Novel qualitative studies of delusions and hallucinations have challenged longstanding assumptions about their nature and meaning, uncovering highly complex subjective dimensions that are not adequately captured by quantitative methodologies. Interdisciplinary and participatory research efforts, informed by phenomenological insights, have prompted revisions of pre-established narratives of mental disorder dominated by a dysfunction framework and by researcher-centric outcome measures. Despite these recent advances, there has been relatively little effort to integrate and translate phenomenological insights across applied clinical research, with the goal of producing more meaningful, patient-valued results. It is our contention that phenomenological psychopathology – as the basic science of psychiatry – represents an important methodology for advancing evidence-based practices in mental health, and ultimately improving real-world outcomes. Setting this project into motion requires a greater emphasis on subjectivity and the structures of experience, more attention to the quality and patient-centredness of outcome measures, and the identification of treatment targets that matter most to patients.
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The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may... more
The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can be addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility.
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Can delusions, in the context of psychosis, enhance a person’s sense of meaningfulness? The case described here suggests that, in some circumstances, they can. This prompts further questions into the complexities of delusion as a lived... more
Can delusions, in the context of psychosis, enhance a person’s sense of meaningfulness? The case described here suggests that, in some circumstances, they can. This prompts further questions into the complexities of delusion as a lived phenomenon, with important implications for the clinical encounter. While assumptions of meaninglessness are often associated with concepts of ‘disorder’, ‘harm’ and ‘dysfunction’, we suggest that meaning can nonetheless be found within what is commonly taken to be incomprehensible or even meaningless. A phenomenological and value-based approach appears indispensable for clinicians facing the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of harmfulness and meaningfulness.
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Letter to the Editor
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Synopsis: In the context of psychiatry research and practice, the investigation of delusion formation has largely focused on identifying higher-order cognitive abnormalities (such as reasoning biases) that could explain the irrational and... more
Synopsis: In the context of psychiatry research and practice, the investigation of delusion formation has largely focused on identifying higher-order cognitive abnormalities (such as reasoning biases) that could explain the irrational and incomprehensible content of psychotic thinking-in keeping with an internalist (brain-based) framework. Constrained by an inflexible disconnect between thought, perception, action and motivation, this framework of understanding often adopts notions of "deficient reality testing" or "lack of insight" as the final explanation for most instances of incomprehensibility. In contrast, phenomenologists have long been concerned with the experiential underpinnings of delusional phenomena, arguing that higher-order cognitive processes are not the proper locus of investigation for understanding and explaining delusions. Rather, more attention should be payed to the delusional experience itself (in its non-derivative immediacy). Despite the rich phenomenological tradition and revived contemporary discussion in the area of phenomenological psychopathology, so far there has been relatively little cross-disciplinary effort into understanding the experiential and meaning dimensions of delusions. In this talk, I sketch a pluralist, multi-layered conceptual framework for understanding delusions that makes room for meaning and purpose within what is most commonly considered either meaningless, in its strongest interpretation, or relatively unimportant in a more charitable interpretation. [...]
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Current psychiatric approaches to investigating and treating delusions in the context of psychosis operate on the assumption that delusions are the source of the problem. On this view, due to a dysfunction of the mind or brain, the... more
Current psychiatric approaches to investigating and treating delusions in the context of psychosis operate on the assumption that delusions are the source of the problem. On this view, due to a dysfunction of the mind or brain, the person’s ability to provide an accurate narrative of their world or self-identity is impaired and results in meaningless utterances. While delusions might contain errors of fact, in this talk I argue that they can nonetheless have and give meaning. Drawing on ongoing empirical research, I suggest that delusions can, in some cases, provide a sense of coherence, purpose and meaning in life. A case is made for investigating delusions within a “madness-as-strategy” rather than a “madness-as-dysfunction” paradigm.
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Abstract accepted for presentation at the Too Mad to Be True Conference 2021 https://www.psychiatrieenfilosofie.nl/too-mad-to-be-true
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Presented at the annual workshop organized by the Phenomenology and Mental Health Network, The Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Health and Social Care,St. Catherine’s College, Oxford & Philosophy of Mental Health Unit,... more
Presented at the annual workshop organized by the Phenomenology and Mental Health Network, The Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Health and Social Care,St. Catherine’s College, Oxford & Philosophy of Mental Health Unit, Department of Social Sciences and the Humanities Poznan University of Medical Sciences
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Abstract presented at the British Society for Phenomenology Annual Conference 2020 Online, Friday 4th September 2020
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Abstract presented at the Third International Conference on Philosophy and Meaning in Life 2020. University of Birmingham, 22nd July 2020 (online due to COVID-19)
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Rosa Ritunnano would usually be the one posing the questions, but it was my turn when we met at Birmingham University’s leafy campus. Ritunnano is part of a movement championing the relevance of phenomenology for psychiatry.... more
Rosa Ritunnano would usually be the one posing the questions, but it was my turn when we met at Birmingham University’s leafy campus. Ritunnano is part of a movement championing the relevance of phenomenology for psychiatry. “Phenomenology can offer psychiatry a conceptual toolbox that can allow us to co-construct meaning and create a channel of dialogue between clinicians and patients, because when we use very medicalised language that neglects the experience, then that doesn’t really reflect what the person is living, so there’s a dissonance that gets in the way of the therapeutic process”, she explains. Ritunnano is a consultant psychiatrist in early intervention in psychosis services, and her research interweaves psychiatry, philosophy, psychology, and linguistics from her base at the University of Birmingham’s Institute for Mental Health in the UK and also Orygen Youth Health at the University of Melbourne, Australia.
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Delusions are one of the most elusive psychopathological phenomena. They are central to the conceptualisation, definition and identification of schizophrenia, among other psychotic disorders. Compared to hearing voices, delusions have... more
Delusions are one of the most elusive psychopathological phenomena. They are central to the conceptualisation, definition and identification of schizophrenia, among other psychotic disorders. Compared to hearing voices, delusions have received far less interdisciplinary attention, despite their high prevalence across clinical and non-clinical populations, and their potential to cause distress. Within the field of phenomenological psychopathology, and more broadly within psychiatry, their investigation is often decontextualised (e.g., from the person's life context, lived world and testimonial encounters) and commonly adopts a dysfunction framework. In addition, methodological innovation in this area has been limited, and constrained by the use of questionnaires that reduce delusions to mere and static assertions. The aim of this workshop is to move beyond the traditional conceptualisation of delusion as 'dysfunctional belief' and open up a new trans-and inter-disciplinary space for methodological development and theoretical cross-pollination. We are particularly interested to hear from scholars, practitioners and lived-experience researchers who are/have been involved in exploring delusional phenomena from a multiplicity of perspectives and methods from the psy-sciences, phenomenology, linguistics, social sciences, theology, anthropology, among other disciplines. The sandpit will also lay the groundwork to establish and international network for phenomenological and interdisciplinary approaches to delusion research.