Roger Cavazos 金大建

In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture, nor reformed its economy. Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reduce dependence on China.

FROM ASIAN SURVEY, Volume 55, Issue 1 2015 North Korea in 2014.  In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture nor reformed its economy.  Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan and Russia to reduce dependence on China.

In this report Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos lay out a possible roadmap for North Korea’s nuclear
operational force. The authors state: “The laws of physics that determine how nuclear weapons and
delivery systems perform are the same in North Korea as anywhere else, in spite of North Korean
voluntarist thinking and improvised practice found in all domains of North Korean life. Conversely,
North Korean ideology will inflect how strategic options are shaped and deployed within these
physical parameters, possibly in ways alien to western strategic thinking. Finally, North Korea has
stated its intentions and demonstrated its capabilities in observable ways, providing a limited but
substantial empirical basis for analysis and interpretation of this threat which will only continue to
grow.”

This scoping paper identifies key issues associated with rapid relief and reconstruction for the provision of energy services that could arise in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This situation could occur in three ways: a) partial energy system failure with ensuing complex humanitarian emergency; b) collapse of the DPRK state with an even greater complex humanitarian emergency due in part to failure to deliver essential energy services; and c) war resulting in uncontested occupation of the DPRK by US-ROK and UNC forces. The authors emphasize that these latter two scenarios are not probable in the near- or even longer-term. The first scenario, however, is certainly possible at any time due to the parlous state of the DPRK energy system, especially in the winter. Indeed, the already-complex context of the DPRK nuclear weapons issue is rendered even more uncertain by the possibility that the DPRK may experience pervasive, energy system-wide shocks—the complete failure of the electricity grid, for example—that would demand a massive humanitarian energy relief operation at a time of high tension but not actual war. The strategies developed to rapidly deliver energy relief and to commence energy reconstruction also need to be robust in a range of security circumstances, so that politically plausible and physically realistic policy options exist for decision-makers if and when they are confronted by such an imperative.

China occupies a unique position geographically and commercially in its relations with North Korea.  With minor adjustments and proper management, China can use this relationship to improve its relationship with the United States and South Korea, and can create build its capacity to provide technical assistance and training to the DPRK in energy and ecological rehabilitation and remediation. Since North Korea’s economic condition and environmental condition are intimately related, as China improves North Korea’s environmental conditions, it also increases economic opportunity in China in general, and in China’s Northeastern Provinces in particular, while creating a framework to address some of the DPRK’s enduring ecological problems

how do nuclear energy fuel cycle and nuclear
materials management choices affect the
vulnerability, resilience of nuclear facilities to
radiation release due to accident or attack?”
--How can the risk of radiation release be reduced in
individual facilities (includes issues like “reciprocal
risk” where spent fuel storage and reactor facilities
are located together/share key systems)?
--How can risks of radiation release be reduced in the
nuclear energy system/energy sector overall?

This workshop was convened to define a complement to containment, the default position of US policy towards the DPRK, via a comprehensive regional security settlement that enables states to accede, and then to commit in appropriate groupings to resolve those security issues that are salient given history, their capacity, and their interest.  Thus, a wide range of states were present, including Canada, Mongolia, and the EU.

Is the growing security relationship between Japan and Australia sustainable and appropriate? Long closely tied through trade and investment, economic interdependence is now complemented by Australia-Japan military ties that are far deeper and more compelling than is usually realised in either country—as symbolized by the 2007 Joint Security Declaration.  Both countries rely on US extended nuclear deterrence, yet in 2008 they established the joint International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

"The East Asia Security Workshop addressed the robustness of proposals to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Northeast Asia region.


Specialists from Japan, Korea, China, Australia, and the United States explored in depth the current status of nuclear extended deterrence in East Asia, the plausibility of substituting conventional for nuclear extended deterrence in US alliance relationships, the cooperative security relationships that are needed to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone, and the thorny issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the Taiwan Straits conflict.

The proposal for a Northeast Asian nuclear weapons-free zone was compared with existing and other proposed zones (such as in the Middle East).  Lessons were drawn from these zones as to how to handle North Korea’s challenge in a Northeast Asian zone, and the necessary institutional and monitoring and verification requirements to implement a zone."

Chapter Co-Author w/ Peter Hayes: Complexity and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Northeast Asia
Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos in the book "Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia".

"Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia" offers the latest understanding of complex global problems in the region, including nuclear weapons, urban insecurity, energy, and climate change. Detailed case studies of China, North and South Korea, and Japan demonstrate the importance of civil society and ‘civic diplomacy’ in reaching shared solutions to these problems in East Asia and beyond.

Each chapter describes regional civil society initiatives that tackle complex challenges to East Asia’s security. In doing so, the book identifies key pressure points at which civil society can push for constructive changes¯especially ones that reduce the North Korean threat to its neighbors.

Unusually, this book is both theoretical and practical. Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia presents strategies that can be led by civil society and negotiated by its diplomats to realize peace, security, and sustainability worldwide. It shows that networked civic diplomacy offers solutions to these urgent issues that official ‘complex diplomacy’ cannot.

By providing a new theoretical framework based on empirical observation, this volume is a must read for diplomats, scholars, students, journalists, activists, and individual readers seeking insight into how to solve the crucial issues of our time.

The Cairo Declaration represented the consensus view of a post-World War II framework for a world order all the Allied Powers considered to be in their best interest.  That China was “present at birth” established China as a world leader again.  The Cairo Declaration and a correct understanding of history will always be important.  For 203 words to define the basic relationships among the world’s 7 billion people 70 years after being committed to paper demonstrates the power of certain timeless principles and the importance of a commonly accepted basic framework for ordering relationships between nations in a way that is predictable yet strongly respects national sovereignty.  Many of the principles found in the Cairo Declaration should be considered when forming new type great power relationships.