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China occupies a unique position geographically and commercially in its relations with North Korea. With minor adjustments and proper management, China can use this relationship to improve its relationship with the United States and South Korea, and can create build its capacity to provide technical assistance and training to the DPRK in energy and ecological rehabilitation and remediation. Since North Korea’s economic condition and environmental condition are intimately related, as China improves North Korea’s environmental conditions, it also increases economic opportunity in China in general, and in China’s Northeastern Provinces in particular, while creating a framework to address some of the DPRK’s enduring ecological problems
2012 •
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signals to regional actors using its brinkmanship technique not because it is incompetent, but because it is a rational actor with an astute understanding of how, given its circumstances, it can best pursue its ultimate goal: regime survival. Specifically, it raises regional tensions in order to protect itself from the United States of America and its allies while at the same time pushing China for concessions. The events of 2010 and 2011 show that North Korea continues to pursue concessions from other regional actors, employing the very same methods as it has used previously.
This essay analyzes competing visions among leftist intellectuals of “the Chongqing model,” an economic and political approach to municipal governance in China associated with the southwestern city of Chongqing and its former leader, Bo Xilai, between 2009 and 2012. Based on this analysis, I posit the existence of a center-left/left split within the Chinese political spectrum distinct from the traditional “new left”/”old left” split described in most English-language literature on the Chinese left. I describe a “core” Chongqing model based upon the features of its development strategy most acclaimed among Chongqing supporters: its economic policies, its “mass line initiative,” and its crackdown on corruption and crime. In contrast, I show how Chongqing’s famous “red culture” campaign, often treated as one of the model’s distinguishing features, met with opposition among Chongqing’s center-left backers. Similarly, I show how the center-left and the left split in relation to two other topics that feature in leftist discussion of Chongqing: first, China-West antagonisms, and second, social stability and Party legitimacy.
A Draft version of a paper written about how Sino-North Korean relations have traditionally been strained due to divergent interests and, in fact, self-interest.
In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture, nor reformed its economy. Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reduce dependence on China.
The evolution of the nuclear program (technical progress, doctrine etc.) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has made the coerced nuclear disarmament of the country unfeasible and dangerous. New motivating factors within DPRK and the arms race in Northeast Asia (NEA) are diminishing the chances of voluntary disarmament. It has become clear that sanctions and pressure against DPRK do not solve the problem, but only lead to a dead end. Under certain conditions, this approach can even lead to the outbreak of conflict or nuclear proliferation. Thus, it is necessary to look for new ways to address the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. For this purpose, the international community must move away from old approaches and towards new initiatives. One of the most promising ideas at the moment is the creation of a NEA Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ). This initiative implies a fundamentally new approach to DPRK that cannot be underestimated by its leadership. With flexibility and due consideration of the interests of all NEA countries, the implementation of NEA NWFZ initiative could really contribute to the peaceful solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past year, the tensions in Northeast Asia increased and the crisis on the Korean Peninsula escalated significantly. The nuclear and missile programs of DPRK accelerated drastically since the beginning of 2016; joint US-ROK exercises in the region have become even more provocative, taking into account the presence of nuclear weapons and the simulation by the United States of America (USA) and Republic of Korea (ROK) of a " decapitation strike " , designed to take out the top leadership of the DPRK. USA and ROK have agreed on the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems 1 on the Korean Peninsula and countries whose interests are threatened by these systems have already undertaken military-technical countermeasures. Russia and China are improving their strategic capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons to overcome US missile defense 2 and their expert communities 1 THAAD is a system designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. A THAAD battery consists of launcher vehicles equipped with missiles, with two mobile tactical operations centers (TOCs) and the AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar (GBR) which is capable of detecting not only ballistic targets (missiles), but also aerodynamic ones (aircraft).
Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Six Parties, Six Perspectives
The Six-Party Talks: The United States - From Dogmatism to Pragmatism2008 •
International Relations of the Asia Pacific
"How North Korea threatens China's interests: understanding Chinese 'duplicity' on the North Korean nuclear issue"2008 •