Jeremy Kleidosty

In the spirit of comparative political theory, this thesis analyzes the ideas that have shaped Western and Islamic constitutional discourse and assesses the extent to which they intersect at key historical and philosophical points. This goal is placed within a larger debate of whether Islam and constitutionalism are mutually exclusive. The thesis begins by positioning itself against Samuel Huntington and Elie Kedourie, who argues that Islam is inherently incompatible with constitutional governance. It then addresses the idea of constitutionalism as described by Western thinkers on three constitutional concepts: the rule of law, reflection of national character, and placing boundaries on government power. These are examined through the lens of a particular canonical text or thinker, Cicero, Montesquieu, and The Federalist Papers, respectively. This is followed by an examination of Muhammad's "The Constitution
of Medina." Islamic corollaries to the constitutional ideas discussed earlier are then examined. Al-Farabi's On the Perfect State, ibn Khaldun's asabiyya (group feeling)
in the Muqaddimah, and the redefinition of the state in the 19th century Ottoman
Tanzimat reforms are discussed. Following this, the thesis looks at a moment in
history where these two traditions intersected in 19th century Tunisia in the work of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, undertaking a detailed analysis of the introductory section of his book The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries.The abstract philosophical questions that motivated this inquiry suddenly have unquestioned practical implications. In recognition of this, the conclusion of the thesis summarizes the findings of this work to look at how theorists might address the pressing constitutional concerns of various states and peoples.

Written both in response to the “Clash of Civilizations” argument, and with an eye to filling a vacuum in the literature of Political Islam and Constitutionalism, this book argues that Western and Muslim societies share a variety of common norms and values, including fundamental constitutional values. It addresses the idea of constitutionalism as described by three constitutional concepts: the rule of law, reflection of national character, and defining the scope of government power. These are examined through engagement with present literature and through the lens of a particular canonical text or thinker. For the Western tradition, this includes Cicero, Montesquieu, and The Federalist Papers. This is followed by a comparison of the Magna Carta and Muhammad’s “The Constitution of Medina.” Islamic corollaries to the constitutional ideas are then examined in Al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State, ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya (group feeling) in the Muqaddimah, and the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms. Following this, the intersection of these traditions in 19th century Tunisia in the work of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi is detailed in an analysis of his book The Surest Path. To conclude, these ideas will be applied and seen in action via Arab Spring and ongoing constitutional efforts underway in Egypt and Tunisia.

The Turks of Tunis, confronted with a more stable and more firmly based civilisation, gradually became absorbed into the Tunisian population… the Turks nevertheless failed to impart any fresh impetus to the age-old Maghrib. In one as in the other, Berber inertia won the day, so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the entire Maghrib was living… in accordance with standards that had held for thousands of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its modern form. This narrative of Tunisian history aligns nicely with conceptions of North Africa, or the Maghreb, as backward, intransigent, and immune to progress that have been espoused by various thinkers, including Charles Julien, quoted above. However, Tunisia has produced highly original and dynamic thinkers like Ibn Khaldun, so how could it be that these thinkers developed in a cultural vacuum of “Berber inertia?” The simple answer is that this view says more about the prejudices of the times and places in which it was advanced than it does about North Africa. Indeed, similar conventional wisdom persists, as the widespread shock at the Arab Spring illustrates. In order to understand the Tunisian piece of the Arab Spring, it is vital to look at the Tunisian constitutional movements of the 19th century, and specifically at the work of their progenitor Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi. As a group of newly elected constitution writers are preparing to draft a new Tunisian constitution, this is a timely opportunity to look at the historical legacy they inherit as they seek to derive a new framework for organizing their society in accordance with what Montesquieu might call the “spirit” of their laws. After giving a brief historical sketch and biography of Khayr al-Din, this paper will provide a summary and constitutional analysis of his sole work of political theory, the introduction to his book The Surest Path. In particular, it will examine his arguments in favor of reforming and modernizing the state in order to make it more independent and less vulnerable to Western encroachment. Amongst these are his contention the Islamic history has a long tradition of borrowing the best ideas from other cultures, and that this tradition in large part explains the early successes of the Muslim empire. Next, his reformulation of various Islamic terms will be assessed for their meaning in the context of constitutional governance. These include a dramatic expansion of the idea of shura, or consultation, which can be interpreted largely along liberal democratic lines, and also his attempt to reconcile the need to adhere to a timeless shari‘a while still allowing for the state to keep pace with new political and economic developments in the wider world. This argument by a practicing statesman against ossification and in favor of a dynamic Islamic state is one with relevance and resonance that demand it receives the careful scholarly attention it deserves.

Written both in response to the “Clash of Civilizations” argument, and with an eye to filling a vacuum in the literature of Political Islam and Constitutionalism, this book argues that Western and Muslim societies share a variety of common norms and values, including fundamental constitutional values. It addresses the idea of constitutionalism as described by three constitutional concepts: the rule of law, reflection of national character, and defining the scope of government power. These are examined through engagement with present literature and through the lens of a particular canonical text or thinker. For the Western tradition, this includes Cicero, Montesquieu, and The Federalist Papers. This is followed by a comparison of the Magna Carta and Muhammad’s “The Constitution of Medina.” Islamic corollaries to the constitutional ideas are then examined in Al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State, ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya (group feeling) in the Muqaddimah, and the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms. Following this, the intersection of these traditions in 19th century Tunisia in the work of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi is detailed in an analysis of his book The Surest Path. To conclude, these ideas will be applied and seen in action via Arab Spring and ongoing constitutional efforts underway in Egypt and Tunisia.

The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics. - Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order … dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated. - Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism A great deal of debate and controversy has been generated by the idea of a “clash of civilizations” between the Western and Islamic worlds. The outcome of this debate, in real terms, is one which has taken on a particular urgency after the Arab Spring. If citizens of majority Muslim states are calling for a new rule of law, including rule of “the law” or the shari‘a, alongside demanding democratic and institutional representation of their values and identities, what does this mean for universal notions of equality, fairness, and human rights? How can minority rights be protected? Is it right to force states writing new constitutions to ensure their conformity with supposedly universal values which are admittedly Western in origin? Rather than seeing an inevitable clash in these competing values, Fred Dallmayr’s approach is one in which the bounds of the civilizations themselves are not taken for granted as having any real and clear definition, but rather they are evolving entities which, much like individuals in relationships, “risk themselves” in the process of interacting openly in the “transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are constantly renegotiated.” It is this attempt to examine pre-defined boundaries, reassess them, and to create a discursive space between and beyond these boundaries which this paper seeks to undertake in an effort to derive a pluralist framework for understanding normative and political discourses in multi-civilizational, but particularly Western and Islamic contexts. In terms of political representation, this means that democratization is not privileged above other goals and is just one amongst many other paths for deriving a legitimate constitutional regime that can be a fully participating member of international society. Instead, this approach looks at core political/constitutional values like the Rule of Law, Representation of National Character, and Restriction of State Power which are extremely fluid and flexible in regards to particular normative content. Ultimately, this paper argues that using Dallmayr’s hermeneutically based approach it is possible to create a level playing field on which the contest of ideas can occur. Specifically, it is the process of using foundational political texts to assess the origin of core political values, to examine how they have evolved historically, and to imagine how they may be usefully employed in the future, which this paper argues can provide a way forward in the intransigent debates between advocates of universal values and ardent adherents of local cultural and political traditions.

Identifying an Islamic constitutional tradition can be controversial due to orthodox Muslim understandings of God’s sovereignty and agency. Further complicating such discussions are arguments surrounding the compatibility of Muslim traditions with international norms alternately referred to as ‘Western’ or ‘universal’, depending upon one’s political preferences. This comparative examination of Muhammad’s ‘Constitution of Medina’ and the Magna Carta argues that where there is assent and accountability, there is also agency. Just as the relatively spare discussion of rights in the Magna Carta laid the foundations of what would become a far more expansive constitutional tradition in the West, the very existence of Muhammad’s covenant along with the fact that this covenant details specific tribal duties with corresponding rights to societal goods and a vision of the rule of law, indicates that Islamic states can indeed codify and negotiate the challenges of governing, even within the fr...

In the spirit of comparative political theory, this thesis analyzes the ideas that have shaped Western and Islamic constitutional discourse and assesses the extent to which they intersect at key historical and philosophical points. This goal is placed within a larger debate of whether Islam and constitutionalism are mutually exclusive. The thesis begins by positioning itself against Samuel Huntington and Elie Kedourie, who argues that Islam is inherently incompatible with constitutional governance. It then addresses the idea of constitutionalism as described by Western thinkers on three constitutional concepts: the rule of law, reflection of national character, and placing boundaries on government power. These are examined through the lens of a particular canonical text or thinker, Cicero, Montesquieu, and The Federalist Papers, respectively. This is followed by an examination of Muhammad’s “The Constitution of Medina.” Islamic corollaries to the constitutional ideas discussed earli...

The Turks of Tunis, confronted with a more stable and more firmly based civilisation, gradually became absorbed into the Tunisian population… the Turks nevertheless failed to impart any fresh impetus to the age-old Maghrib. In one as in the other, Berber inertia won the day, so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the entire Maghrib was living… in accordance with standards that had held for thousands of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its modern form. This narrative of Tunisian history aligns nicely with conceptions of North Africa, or the Maghreb, as backward, intransigent, and immune to progress that have been espoused by various thinkers, including Charles Julien, quoted above. However, Tunisia has produced highly original and dynamic thinkers like Ibn Khaldun, so how could it be that these thinkers developed in a cultural vacuum of “Berber inertia?” The simple answer is that this view says more about the prejudices of the...

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The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics. - Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order … dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated. - Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orien...

"The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics. - Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order … dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated. - Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism A great deal of debate and controversy has been generated by the idea of a “clash of civilizations” between the Western and Islamic worlds. The outcome of this debate, in real terms, is one which has taken on a particular urgency after the Arab Spring. If citizens of majority Muslim states are calling for a new rule of law, including rule of “the law” or the shari‘a, alongside demanding democratic and institutional representation of their values and identities, what does this mean for universal notions of equality, fairness, and human rights? How can minority rights be protected? Is it right to force states writing new constitutions to ensure their conformity with supposedly universal values which are admittedly Western in origin? Rather than seeing an inevitable clash in these competing values, Fred Dallmayr’s approach is one in which the bounds of the civilizations themselves are not taken for granted as having any real and clear definition, but rather they are evolving entities which, much like individuals in relationships, “risk themselves” in the process of interacting openly in the “transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are constantly renegotiated.” It is this attempt to examine pre-defined boundaries, reassess them, and to create a discursive space between and beyond these boundaries which this paper seeks to undertake in an effort to derive a pluralist framework for understanding normative and political discourses in multi-civilizational, but particularly Western and Islamic contexts. In terms of political representation, this means that democratization is not privileged above other goals and is just one amongst many other paths for deriving a legitimate constitutional regime that can be a fully participating member of international society. Instead, this approach looks at core political/constitutional values like the Rule of Law, Representation of National Character, and Restriction of State Power which are extremely fluid and flexible in regards to particular normative content. Ultimately, this paper argues that using Dallmayr’s hermeneutically based approach it is possible to create a level playing field on which the contest of ideas can occur. Specifically, it is the process of using foundational political texts to assess the origin of core political values, to examine how they have evolved historically, and to imagine how they may be usefully employed in the future, which this paper argues can provide a way forward in the intransigent debates between advocates of universal values and ardent adherents of local cultural and political traditions."

This paper interrogates the cyclical, and somewhat fatalistic, nature of Ibn Khaldun's understanding of political history as written in his famous Muqaddima. Rather than engaging these ideas from the perspective of a literalist reading, it proposes that Khaldun's observations are more useful as critiques of elite decadence and breakdowns in social cohesion. Following a discussion of Ibn Khaldun's conception of state decline, the paper examines the writing of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, especially in the muqaddima to his work The Surest Path, to compare his own diagnoses of the ills plaguing Tunisia in the second half of the 19th century as it faced British and French intervention, Ottoman decline, and internal corruption. It then analyses his reform program based on the Ottoman Tanzimat to show that his approach of carving a space for Tunisian autonomy takes the Khaldunian critiques seriously and explicitly aims to mitigate elite corruption and foreign incursions into the economic and social fabric. Simultaneously, he creates a positive Tunisian identity and nationalism that uses constitutional constraints and norms to harness asabiyya as a positive force for progress and ongoing independence.

In this introduction, or Muqaddimah, to his The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries (hereafter referred to as The Surest Path)  the statesman, theorist, and composer of Tunisia’s 1861 written constitution,  Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi sets out a discourse one might expect to see in any 19th-century European reformist. Namely, that improved governance is essential to the well-being of a people and that this improvement can be achieved by studying what are now called best practices from other states and emulating them. Of course, what makes this text notable is not the originality of its content, but the originality of its context. This father of modern Islamic constitutionalism whose influence remains palpable in Tunisian politics today is not a North American or European reformer, but a Maghrebi governmental official who rose through the ranks of power from mamluk clerk to Prime Minister of Tunisia and eventually Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Taking what might colloquially be called a “if you can’t beat them, join them” approach, he asserts that the only way for Tunisia to escape this colonial straightjacket is to develop its own national consciousness, institutions, and economy in a manner that is compatible with both European norms and Islamic law. In this way his work can also be said to assert a dual quietism as concerns foreign policy while simultaneously rejecting quietism, at least in its most despotism-friendly forms, in terms of domestic politics and development. This chapter will use an exegetical reading of his primary political theory work, The Surest Path, to analyze the extent to which his redefinition of the meaning and proper sphere of quietism reshaped the Tunisian, and perhaps Ottoman, understanding of the relationship of Islam and the state. Subsequently, it will overview his personal history and role in developing the modern Tunisian state and its constitutional traditions to illuminate the way in which he turned this theory into practice. Finally, the chapter will turn to implications for constitutionalist discourses of the present and to how they might likewise grapple with the effects of religious piety, colonialism (albeit from a post-colonial rather than a soon to be colonized perspective), and a need to create stability and genuine representation in contexts which are pluralist, inherently volatile, and demand adherence to international customs and local mores.

While the Iranian context offers a number of clear parallels to ancient Greek philosophical, specifically Platonic, considerations on government, as shall be discussed later, this appreciation and incorporation of ancient Greek philosophy is deeply embedded in a wide range of Islamic reflections on the state from Wahhabi discourses calling for a conflation of mosque and state, to moderate visions of Islamic states which maintain an element of pluralism, to secularized liberal versions of states which are compatible with Islamic practice and belief but which nonetheless consign them to primarily private roles. This chapter will offer some brief reflections on a range of understandings of the phrase “Islamic Constitutionalism” before proceeding to a more detailed reflection of the modes of transmission by which ancient Greek thought has permeated Islamic discussions of the state, and how these in turn have worked in practice in modern constitutional concepts and norms in various Islamic regimes.

Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is well known for its political philosophy based on a mechanistic account of human beings that offers the pain/pleasure response (or the peace/fear response) as a basis on which to make political choices. Although it has been subjected to countless treatments over the centuries, its account of civil religion in Part 3 “Of a Christian Commonwealth,” based on a highly original reading of the Bible, is deserving of further review. Following an overview of a long line of pagan, and later monotheistic Christian and Muslim thinkers who advance the position that religion is a way of civilizing or uniting the masses, including Thucydides, Cicero, Augustine, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Pomponazzi, amongst others, I argue that Hobbes turns this notion on its head by arguing that religion can be a source of de-civilizing the masses, and indeed can foment civil war, leading him to the solution of separating belief from practise, with the former a solely private matter and the latter the exclusive purview of the state. In its Hobbesian schema, this great divorce of belief and practice, rather than a call for tolerance or pluralism, is the necessary sacrifice to create the religious homogeneity required to sustain the body politic in the form of the great Leviathan.

This paper argues that in states that promote secularism as a unifying force, particularly in contexts that are multi-ethnic or religiously pluralistic, the constitution serves the function of civic religion. Comparing the world’s oldest constitutional regime, that of the United States, with one of its newest, Tunisia, this paper hopes to highlight how these societies use constitutionalism to create a historical narrative and vision for the state that transcends ethnic and sectarian divisions.
First, it argues that the writers of the US Constitution created a providential view of American history in order to claim God’s mandate and blessing for the state, but in a way that did not institutionalize any particular sect. Although clearly derived from Christianity, this document with its companion The Federalist Papers, together provide a civic religion, which offers a type of social salvation through the effective preservation of individual liberty, the skillful bounding of power, and the effective use of institutions to manage political opposition. Its intentionally open-ended language lends itself to a variety of interpretations that give it the unifying status of a political scripture for many Americans.
Following on, the paper addresses constitutionalism in Tunisia as a project stretching back to at least 1861 with its adoption of the first written constitution of any Muslim-majority state. This document and its successors, along with Tunisian’s various governments, have all felt compelled to call themselves “constitutional.” The centrality of these values to Tunisian political identity, along with their transformative role in the Arab Spring and its aftermath, are clearly evident in its newest constitution. The power of constitutionalism is thus demonstrated in its flexibility, translatability, and mode of understanding/harnessing national history to create a unifying vision for the state and its future.

Originally conceived in the aftermath of the Fascist threats of World War II and the rise of utopian and totalitarian Communism in the Cold War, Eric Voegelin's New Science of Politics offers the idea of political Gnosticism as a tool for understanding political movements and actions which defy conventional understandings of self-interested rational actor theory. This paper examines his theory from the perspective of the earliest Gnostic movements following the advent of Christianity and how it can be utilized along with Voegelin's text to better understand the thinking of various religiously-inspired fundamentalist groups as an alternative to standard "War on Terror" discourses.

Despite their apparently contradictory views on the role of religion in statecraft, and despite being separated by 500 years of history and thousands of miles of geography, Al-Mawardi (972-1058 CE) and Machiavelli (1469-1527 CE) approach the question of political power in an unapologetically direct fashion. This paper will interrogate their respective philosophies and the way in which their highly unstable social settings and their rather more stable religious traditions were woven into their thought as seen in two of their key texts, The Ordinances of Government and The Prince, respectively.
Contrary to common notions, these texts demonstrate that from a fairly early date, the Muslim tradition had recourse to a theory of impersonal institutional governance. Alternatively, Western writers had clearly not entirely moved away from personified visions of power even 500 years later, as seen in the highly individualist account of state power in Machiavelli’s The Prince.

The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.

- Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

… dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated.

- Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism

A great deal of debate and controversy has been generated by the idea of a “clash of civilizations” between the Western and Islamic worlds. The outcome of this debate, in real terms, is one which has taken on a particular urgency after the Arab Spring. If citizens of majority Muslim states are calling for a new rule of law, including rule of “the law” or the shari‘a, alongside demanding democratic and institutional representation of their values and identities, what does this mean for universal notions of equality, fairness, and human rights? How can minority rights be protected? Is it right to force states writing new constitutions to ensure their conformity with supposedly universal values which are admittedly Western in origin?

Rather than seeing an inevitable clash in these competing values, Fred Dallmayr’s approach is one in which the bounds of the civilizations themselves are not taken for granted as having any real and clear definition, but rather they are evolving entities which, much like individuals in relationships, “risk themselves” in the process of interacting openly in the “transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are constantly renegotiated.” It is this attempt to examine pre-defined boundaries, reassess them, and to create a discursive space between and beyond these boundaries which this paper seeks to undertake in an effort to derive a pluralist framework for understanding normative and political discourses in multi-civilizational, but particularly Western and Islamic contexts.

In terms of political representation, this means that democratization is not privileged above other goals and is just one amongst many other paths for deriving a legitimate constitutional regime that can be a fully participating member of international society. Instead, this approach looks at core political/constitutional values like the Rule of Law, Representation of National Character, and Restriction of State Power which are extremely fluid and flexible in regards to particular normative content. Ultimately, this paper argues that using Dallmayr’s hermeneutically based approach it is possible to create a level playing field on which the contest of ideas can occur. Specifically, it is the process of using foundational political texts to assess the origin of core political values, to examine how they have evolved historically, and to imagine how they may be usefully employed in the future, which this paper argues can provide a way forward in the intransigent debates between advocates of universal values and ardent adherents of local cultural and political traditions.

Identifying an Islamic constitutional tradition can be controversial due to orthodox Muslim understandings of God’s sovereignty and agency. Further complicating such discussions are arguments surrounding the compatibility of Muslim traditions with international norms alternately referred to as ‘Western’ or ‘universal’, depending upon one’s political preferences. This comparative examination of Muhammad’s ‘Constitution of Medina’ and the Magna Carta argues that where there is assent and accountability, there is also agency. Just as the relatively spare discussion of rights in the Magna Carta laid the foundations of what would become a far more expansive constitutional tradition in the West, the very existence of Muhammad’s covenant along with the fact that this covenant details specific tribal duties with corresponding rights to societal goods and a vision of the rule of law, indicates that Islamic states can indeed codify and negotiate the challenges of governing, even within the framework of a transcendent law (sharīʿa). Assessing the unique constitutional characteristics of the ‘Constitution of Medina’ and the Magna Carta will reveal that each of these documents, while not properly constitutions, are concerned with fundamental constitutional issues that have surprising resonance in the aftermath of the Arab Revolutions of 2011 and in other redistributions of international power.

The Turks of Tunis, confronted with a more stable and more firmly based civilisation, gradually became absorbed into the Tunisian population… the Turks nevertheless failed to impart any fresh impetus to the age-old Maghrib. In one as in the other, Berber inertia won the day, so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the entire Maghrib was living… in accordance with standards that had held for thousands of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its modern form.

This narrative of Tunisian history aligns nicely with conceptions of North Africa, or the Maghreb, as backward, intransigent, and immune to progress that have been espoused by various thinkers, including Charles Julien, quoted above. However, Tunisia has produced highly original and dynamic thinkers like Ibn Khaldun, so how could it be that these thinkers developed in a cultural vacuum of “Berber inertia?” The simple answer is that this view says more about the prejudices of the times and places in which it was advanced than it does about North Africa. Indeed, similar conventional wisdom persists, as the widespread shock at the Arab Spring illustrates. In order to understand the Tunisian piece of the Arab Spring, it is vital to look at the Tunisian constitutional movements of the 19th century, and specifically at the work of their progenitor Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi. As a group of newly elected constitution writers are preparing to draft a new Tunisian constitution, this is a timely opportunity to look at the historical legacy they inherit as they seek to derive a new framework for organizing their society in accordance with what Montesquieu might call the “spirit” of their laws.

After giving a brief historical sketch and biography of Khayr al-Din, this paper will provide a summary and constitutional analysis of his sole work of political theory, the introduction to his book The Surest Path. In particular, it will examine his arguments in favor of reforming and modernizing the state in order to make it more independent and less vulnerable to Western encroachment. Amongst these are his contention the Islamic history has a long tradition of borrowing the best ideas from other cultures, and that this tradition in large part explains the early successes of the Muslim empire. Next, his reformulation of various Islamic terms will be assessed for their meaning in the context of constitutional governance. These include a dramatic expansion of the idea of shura, or consultation, which can be interpreted largely along liberal democratic lines, and also his attempt to reconcile the need to adhere to a timeless shari‘a while still allowing for the state to keep pace with new political and economic developments in the wider world. This argument by a practicing statesman against ossification and in favor of a dynamic Islamic state is one with relevance and resonance that demand it receives the careful scholarly attention it deserves.

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This 3-credit course focuses on the content and process of U.S. foreign policy with emphasis on developing well-informed, articulate, and critical consumers of the international behavior of the United States. This courses examines how US foreign policy has been made, implemented, and received in the international community in recent history. It also equips students to critically engage with current US foreign policy aims, actions, and statements. Understanding domestic political obligations, US treaty obligations, trade/commerce factors, and US roles in international organizations is key to a fuller understanding of the seeming contradictions and anomalies in US policy abroad. COURSE PURPOSE: This course approaches US foreign policy from a number of theoretical perspectives and applied lenses. As it engages with a wide variety of media, analyses, and outputs, it is suitable for a broad knowledge base and skills development for a wide range of future careers and civic pursuits. Required Text US Foreign Policy in Action, 2nd Edition, Jeffrey S ELantis and Patrick Homan, Routledge, 2022.

This course examines how major world religions like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism are used within a variety of political systems. Specifically, we will look at how their ethical and social concerns influence perceptions of rule of law, representation, the good life, and individual/group rights. Understanding the religious concepts that inform political discussion, rights, duties, and institutions is essential if we are to ever understand why the cohabitation of politics and religion is so ubiquitous and enduring.

This course gives students a chronologically-based overview of the development of Western political philosophy. The first half of the course covers ancient thinkers from Greece and Rome and the various philosophical schools associated with them. The second half discusses philosophy from the Middle Ages to the 20th century. In order to make students aware of the breadth of philosophy, the course also engages with Islamic philosophy and examines its role in the West, as well as the work of female philosophers.

Some reflections on the relationship between faith, voting, and political action The purpose of this piece is to look at the role of Christian faith in making political judgments. Many of these points will apply to various religions, but I want to speak from what I know. I am not trying to marginalize others, so much as emphasize the aspects of Christianity that I think most directly relate to citizenship and its obligations. There are times when we are faced with the unimaginable becoming actual. A quick sampling of the phrases being used by Americans across the political spectrum reveals a strong streak of apocalyptic visions for what will befall the country should their candidate lose in November. I have strong concerns of my own, but I will save those for another time and focus on what I know, rather than things I cannot possibly know, such as the future. A brief look at the past, however, reveals there have indeed been times in which the worst possible scenario has happened. People have had to make sense of it and reconcile their faith with their radically changed reality. One such instance was in 410 AD when the Vandals sacked Rome, the Eternal City. Consider that Rome had been one of the mightiest empires in history and had lasted with a distinct political and social culture for over 900 years. How could God allow Rome to fall, when it had converted from paganism to Christianity? Was Rome suffering because it had turned its back on its ancient traditions and had been made soft by Christianity? How should Christian Romans respond to military duties? Responding to questions such as these, and then adding a lengthy book of other topics for good measure, Augustine offers a simple, yet powerful metaphor for understanding the relationship between Church and State. His book The City of God lays a vision of the present world as one in which Christians are citizens of a heavenly city or City of God, but also physically living in the earthly city. The important thing for Christians, he argues, is to remember where your primary citizenship is. Sure, you can be a Roman, a good citizen of Hippo Regius (the town in modern-day Algeria where he was acting as bishop), or any other place, but you are first and foremost a citizen of the heavenly city, subject to the rule of God. So far, there is nothing terribly surprising about this argument. The interesting part of this idea is trying to navigate the inevitable times when your dual citizenships compete, or even conflict with each other. How can people judge when they are supposed to " submit to rulers and those in authority " (Romans 13:1) versus when they should stand firm for their faith and risk being brought " before the rulers and authorities " (Luke 12:11)? Augustine addressed this conflict on a number of levels, but some of the most important ideas to come out of this discussion include things like Just War theory, which continues to be one of the cornerstones of international law and says, amongst other things, that war can only be just when it is defensive, proportional, and conducted from motives of reconciliation and love, rather than fear or hatred. Loving war might seem like an oxymoron if there ever was one, but his example illustrates what he means. Rome, even at its height, was always afraid of losing its power, and so it always had to be at war expanding its empire to protect its borders, increase its supply of goods, and so on. Of course, the more it conquered the more people there were to feed, the larger the borders were that needed defending, the larger the army had to be, and on it went. In contrast, just war only seeks to right a definite and declared wrong and would only occur as a last resort. Once the harm has been rectified, the war is to stop. The Christian value of " love thy neighbor " is obviously not in the acts of warfare, instead it is found in the limits of war and the reconciliation that aims for lasting peace