Avicenna

At a close analysis, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī's Maqāṣid al-falāsifa [Intentions/Doctrines of the Philosophers] reveals itself as a richly stratified work, where the most rational trends of Avicennan falsafa intertwine with an approach strongly influenced by religious revelation. Focusing on the fifth and final treatise of the Physics of the Maqāṣid, this paper analyses the way in which prophecy is not only discussed as the subject-matter of a specific philosophical analysis, but also prominently employed throughout the treatise as a doctrinal authority in the context of otherwise purely philosophical argumentations. The great number of quotations from the Qurʾān and from the tradition of prophetic deeds and sayings (aḥādiṯ) showcases in particular al-Ġazālī's ability to weld and crosspollinate the two traditions of Greek-Arabic philosophy and Islamic religion.

The famous argument for the existence of God is analyzed with a survey of the Greek and Arabic influences of Avicenna's system.

Turning to the text, The Salvation, ‘’Metaphysics,’’ II. 12, it is stated that ‘’at any one and the same time there cannot be for anything that is possible in itself a cause that is possible ad infinitum’’ (II.12.2). Here he’s saying that a possible being cannot have an infinite amount of causes at the same time. Because if that infinite totality of causes would itself have either an internal cause or an external necessary cause. It can’t be internal, because it would either be (a) necessary, which is not an option because everything internal to that totality is possible; then (b) an internal possible cause – which is not an option because that would make it a part of the totality and a part can’t be a cause of the whole. So if that cause is not internal, then it has to be external. It can’t be possible, because all of the possible causes have been established in that inner totality. Therefore it has to be necessary. He concludes the argument by stating that:
Thus, things existing possibly terminate in a cause existing necessarily, in which case not every effect that exists as something possible will have simultaneously with it a cause that exists as something possible, and so an infinite number of causes existing at a single time is impossible. (II.12.2)
This argument can be considered as a subsidiary conclusion to Avicenna’s main argument for the proof of God’s existence (McGinnis 166-67). There are considered to be four main categories of arguments: (1) the metaphysical proof from necessity; (2) the proof from movement; (3) the proof from causality; (4) the proof from ontology (Netton 172-73). The themes are similar to the discussions on the problem of infinite causal regress as discussed for example in book two of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I think that he is essentially concerned with establishing a logical argument that integrates a hierarchy of ontological causality rather than simply natural causality. In that sense, it could be considered similar to the ‘’a posteriori cosmological arguments’’ of the quinque via  of ThomasAquinas (Netton 173).

‘[A] valid concept of “Islam” must denote and connote all possible “Islams,” whether abstract or “real,” mental or social’ (104)... Ahmed seeks to avoid two major pitfalls: (1) making Islam into a static essence or a category within an essentialist framework – such as proscription/prescription, ‘religion’,‘civilization’, ‘culture’, ‘orthodoxy’, etc., and (2) rendering Islam into a totally incoherent concept by conceding that there are as many islams as there are communities or individuals. Ahmed’s thesis (presented in Chapter 5) is that Islam is best conceptualized as a process of meaning-making or hermeneutical engagement in which the human agent engages with the Divine Revelation granted to Muhammad in one or more of this Revelation’s hierarchical dimensions – Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text – in order to constitute meaning for himself."

The unique copy of al-Majālis al-sab‘ bayna al-Shaykh wa al-‘Āmirī (Ragıp Paşa Library 1461, ff. 150a-162b) consists of seven sessions including forty-one questions and answers. While the name of al-‘Āmirī (d. 381/992) does not appear in the texts except for the title, we understand from the phrases at the end that the al-Shaykh in the title corresponds to Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). In this article, I will broadly describe structural characteristics of al-Majālis and examine the historical and geographical possibility of the philosophical debate between al-‘Āmirī and Ibn Sīnā outlined in al-Majālis. Then, I will compare the philosophical approach in the first three sessions of al-Majālis, where the stages of coming of the universe into being are treated, with al-‘Āmirī’s extant works. I can talk two principal conclusions of the article: (i) It was historically and geographically possible that young Ibn Sīnā and his older contemporary al-Āmirī could make the debate told in al-Majālis. (ii) The examination and comparison for the first three sessions of al-Majālis shows that the answers are mostly consistent with the approach of al-‘Āmirī according to his extant works and this leads me to conclude that the one asks questions or comments is Ibn Sīnā while the one answers is al-‘Āmirī.

The article aims to demonstrate that Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) centrality in Islamic intellectual history is not restricted to the branches of theoretical philosophy; rather, he also has had a deep and strong influence on the conception of practical philosophy until modern times. I will discuss the impact of Avicenna’s view of practical philosophy by analyzing his different classifications of practical philosophy throughout his career and the factors behind his disregard for practical philosophy in his philosophical summas on the basis of his view of the relationship between philosophy and šarī‘a. To demonstrate my argument regarding Avicenna’s influence on the conception of practical philosophy in Islamic tradition, I will refer to major works on the classification of sciences, and the commentaries (šurūḥ) and glosses (ḥāwāšī) on the two most important and widely circulated philosophical summas in the post-Avicennan philosophy, including al-Abharī’s (d. 663/1264) Hidāyat al-ḥikma and al-Kātibī’s (d. 675/1276) Ḥikmat al-‘ayn.

İslam felsefe geleneğinin en etkili ismi olarak kabul edilen İbn Sînâ’nın (ö. 428/1037), felsefî/aklî bilimler tasnifine dair Kitâbu aksâmi’l-hikme ve tafsîlihâ’sı (literatürde yaygın olarak bilinen ismiyle Risâle fî aksâmi’l-ulûmi’l-akliyye’si), onun bu alana dair kaleme aldığı bilinen “yegâne” müstakil eser olarak hem klasik hem de modern dönemde sadece İbn Sînâ’nın değil, genel olarak felâsifenin felsefe tasavvurunun ve bilimler tasnifinin tespit ve yorumlanmasında da doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak kendisine sıklıkla müracaat edilen bir eser olmuştur. İbn Sînâ tarafından ne zaman kaleme alındığını bilmediğimiz Aksâmü’l-hikme’nin hem tasnif hem de muhteva itibariyle içerdiği yenilikler, onun, eş-Şeyhu’r-reîs’in yetişkinlik döneminde kaleme alındığı ihtimalini güçlendirmektedir. Pek çok defa basılan ve iki tenkitli neşri bulunan Aksâmü’l-hikme’nin bu çalışmada sunulan tenkitli neşri, İbn Sînâ’nın eserlerine dair görece erken tarihli mecmualar içinde yer alan iki nüshasına dayanmaktadır: (a) İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi A[rapça] Y[azmalar], nr. 4755, vr. 83b-91b ve (b) Bursa İnebey Kütüphanesi, Hüseyin Çelebi, nr. 1194, vr. 152b-155b.

The leading theory regarding the number of basic elements in classical natural sciences is formulated in the peripatetic school of philosophy, which assumes four basic elements to exist. They propose three possible explanations in support of this theory: 1) Reasoning based on the position of objects in nature and their natural inclinations, taking into view the qualities of being light or heavy; 2) Reasoning by considering fundamental sensible qualities all objects share (hotness, coldness, wetness, dryness); 3) Reasoning by dint of composition and analysis. Then, instances of the four classical elements (earth, water, air and fire) was determined through an inductive method of reasoning. Abou Reihan al-Biruoni and Suhrawardi were critical of this theory and refused to accept fire as a basic element, calling it hot air. Hence, by modifying the criteria behind the classification of basic elements, Suhrawardi categorized them according to their visual qualities and, therefore, reduced the number of elements to three: opaque (Hajez), translucent (Moghtased) and subtle (Latif). In this paper, the arguments deployed by the philosophers of the peripatetic school and constitutive of Suhrawardi's criticism about the four elements was investigated and it was revealed that Suhrawardi's motive in this new method of categorization, in which fire was removed from among basic elements, was more metaphysical, and did not, in fact, abide by the rules of natural sciences.

Dans le récit Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān d’Avicenne, les compagnons du narrateur qui ne le quittent jamais sont qualifiés par le sage de « mauvais compagnons ». Le premier, qui marche devant, représente l’imagination qui « enjolive le faux et forge les mensonges ». Les deux autres désignent l’âme irascible et l’âme concupiscente. Pourtant, la suite du récit confère un caractère ambivalent à l’imagination. Car d’une part elle trompe l’homme en l’incitant à s’imaginer ce qui n’est pas, mais d’autre part, elle peut aussi « servir l’âme en ce qu’elle a de plus élevé ». Et c’est notamment elle qui est déterminante dans les processus prophétique et poétique. Décrivant les étranges formes composées que voit le narrateur, le récit conclut que l’on « dirait que les figures composites dessinées par les peintres ont été transférées de cette région ». Le récit, poétique lui-même, procède ainsi à une mise en abime qui nous permet de prendre pleinement la mesure de sa portée esthétique.

Il nous semble que cette dimension poétique mûe par l’imagination active pourrait fournir les moyens d’arbitrer la divergence d’interprétation du récit – et de la figure du mal – entre Goichon et Corbin. D’autant que leurs deux lectures correspondent à ce que Ricoeur nomme – en les critiquant – lecture allégorique d’une part et lecture gnostique d’autre part. Pour Ricoeur, la symbolique du mal offre un paradigme pour réussir à penser les symboles en général précisément parce qu’elle représente ce qui ne peut jamais être pleinement rationalisé, retranscrit. Ricoeur se demande « comment peut-on penser à partir du symbole, sans retourner à la vieille interprétation allégorisante, ni tomber dans le piège de la gnose ? » (Le conflit des interprétations, p. 296). La piste de réponse qu’il expérimentera se situe dans le pouvoir de transformation de soi que possède précisément l’imagination. Or, si dans le fond du récit avicénien, l’imagination peut séduire l’âme et la tourner vers le sensible, dans la forme, elle est aussi imagination poétique qui rend possible d’autre modes d’être, montrant la voie de l’intelligible.

در نوشته‌ی پیشِ رو به بررسیِ چاپِ انتشاراتِ مولی از دانشنامه‌ی علاییِ ابنِ سینا می‌پردازم. در این راستا می‌کوشم به کوتاهی از ویژگی‌های ساختاریِ دانشنامه و جایگاهِ آن در میانِ نوشته‌های ابنِ سینا سخن بگویم. هم‌هنگام با این هدف، افزون بر تاریخچه‌ی ویرایشِ دانشنامه‌ی علایی، تبارِ چاپیِ ویراستِ مولی را نشان می‌دهم، و گوشه‌ای از درستی‌ها و نادرستی‌های رخ‌داده در کارِ خطیرِ ناشر و دیباچه‌نگارِ دانشنامه را گوشزد می‌کنم. همچنین بر اهمیتِ آموزشی و فلسفیِ دانشنامه‌ی علایی همچون نوشتاری جامع در فلسفه‌ی سینوی انگشت‌گذارده، بر ابنِ سیناپژوهان، و به‌ویژه همزبانانِ ابنِ سینا، به دلیلِ کم‌توجهی و کم‌لطفی به این نوشتارِ ارجمند خرده می‌گیرم، و بر چراییِ آن اندک پرتوی می‌افکنم. روشن خواهم کرد که چرا ویراستِ مولی از نظرِ تصحیح اثری‌ است ناکام، و از نظرِ فلسفی مهم‌ترین نوآوریِ ساختاریِ ابنِ سینا را ضایع کرده است. خواهم گفت که دیباچه‌ی بلندِ دانشنامه هیچ پیوندی با متنِ کتاب ندارد و از نظرِ پژوهشی نیز چیزی به دانسته‌های ما پیرامونِ دانشنامه‌ی علایی نمی‌افزاید. برین پایه، این ادعا را پیش می‌نهم که دانشنامه‌ی علایی همچنان نیازمند است به یک ویراستِ انتقادیِ دیگر، با بهره‌گیری از دانشِ نسخه‌شناسی و بر اساسِ نسخه‌های بیشتر، و بلکه همه‌ی نسخه‌های پرشمارِ آن.
In the present piece, I examine the most recent edition of Avicenna’s Danešnāme-ye ʿAlāyī published by Mawlā Publishing house in Tehran. With this aim, I will briefly discuss the structural characteristics of the Danešnāme and situate it within Avicenna's oeuvre in respect to his other summae. Arguing for the significance of Danešnāme-ye ʿAlāyī as a comprehensive summa of Avicennan philosophy, I will draw attention to its neglect and marginalization by contemporary Avicennan scholarship, even in the Persian speaking world, and suggest reasons for the regrettable underestimation of this invaluable text. Having provided an overview of the editorial and publishing genealogy of the Danešnāme, and then of Mawlā’s earnest edition, I will consider a number of errors and shortcomings exhibited by the latter, whilst acknowledging some of its merits. I will identify certain systematic flaws in the editorial techniques that inform Mawlā’s edition, on the one hand, and a structural mistake that has entirely ruined one of the characteristic philosophical innovations of the Danešnāme, on the other hand. I observe that the long preface to the text bears no relation to the Danešnāme, and provides scholars with no useful insight into either Avicennan philosophy in general or the Danešnāme in particular. Concluding that the Mawlā edition is woefully lacking, I suggest that Danešnāme-ye ʿAlāyī still stands in need of a new critical edition based on sounder editing techniques, and informed by consideration of a wider range of manuscripts. If we are to gain a more comprehensive picture of the development of Avicenna’s philosophical project, I urge the scholarly community to pay this work the careful attention that it deserves.

Submitted: 2017

Dans le récit, la vierge Chimie invite douze nations (égyptienne, hébraïque, grecque, romaine, arabe, germanique, etc.) à un banquet. Leurs principaux représentants (Hermès Trismégiste, Marie la Juive, Démocrite, Morien, Avicenne, Albert le Grand, etc.), réunis autour d’une « table d’or », paient leur écot en faisant tour à tour l’apologie de leur vénérable hôtesse, souillée par les incessantes attaques d’orgueilleux et d’ignorants incarnés par le seul Pyrgopolynice.

Il appartient au lecteur, avec l’aide d’Isis, de récolter, de rassembler et de réunir, dans cette fresque impressionnante d’érudition, les enseignements les plus précieux que l’auteur y a éparpillés:

« Parmi les choses sublunaires, une qui est unique et paraît très abstruse, comme n’existant pas, s’offre à tous ceux qui parlent philosophie à toutes les époques et dans tous les pays, indigne donc d’être recherchée, cependant bien considérée par d’innombrables hommes qui ne s’attachent pas à la surface, mais pénètrent la chose en profondeur, afin de la remarquer des yeux et de la percevoir par l’intellect, comme un point immobile; ils l’ont décrite des milliers et des milliers de fois, en des langages très divers, certes à mots couverts et en figures.

Cette chose, c’est le SUJET DE LA CHIMIE.

S’accordent sur cette chose, à l’exclusion de tous les ignorants : les philosophes de toutes les époques, même les plus reculées ; les plus anciens poètes, dans leurs allégories et fictions primordiales ; les peuples de toutes les nations, quels que soient leurs talents, langues, mœurs, religions, lois ou autres usages, dans les nombreux royaumes non seulement d’Europe, mais aussi d’Afrique et d’Asie. »

La  révélation en tant que forme de langage exprime la vérité en termes non apodictiques. Cette définition, qui insiste sur la dimension linguistique du Coran, implique des éléments de tension. Et cela non seulement, comme le reconnaissaient déjà les théologiens du Kalām, à cause de l’écart qu’il faut nécessairement poser entre le langage de Dieu et celui de l’homme. La réflexion philosophique ne peut pas s’empêcher d’ajouter, aux difficultés sémantiques de la théologie, une question ultérieure : quel est le rapport entre le texte sacré et la vérité ? Le problème de la philosophie n’est donc plus seulement celui de la langue – le langage divin est supérieur, éternel et inaccessible mais il doit en même temps être soumis aux règles de la langue (il doit être compréhensible voire signifiant et analysable dans les termes de la critique sémantique) – mais aussi celui de son contenu de vérité.

فبعض هذه الأمور إنما يجب عليه من جهة ما هُوَ طبيب أن يتصوره بالماهية فقط تصوراً علمياً، ويصدّق بهليته تصديقاً عَلَی أنه وضع له مقبول من صاحب الْعِلْم الطَّبِيعِيّ ، وبعضها يلزمه أن يبرهن عليه فى صناعته، فما كان من هذه كالمبادئ فيلزمه أن يتقلد هليتها، فإن مبادئ العلوم الْجُزْئِيَّة مسلمة وتتبرهن وتتبين فى علوم اُخَر أقدم منها، وهكذا حتّي يرتقي مبادئ العلوم كُلّها إلی الحكمة الأوْلی التي يقال لها علم ما بعد الطبيعة. وإذا شرع بعض المتطببين وأخذ يَتَكَلَّم فى إثبات العناصر والمزاج وما يتلو ذلك مما هُوَ موضوع الْعِلْم الطَّبِيعِيّ فإنه يغلط من حيث إنه يورد فى صناعة الطِّبِّ ما لَيْسَ من صناعة الطِّبِّ ويغلط من حيث يظن أنه يبيّن شيئاً ولا يَكُونُ قد بيّنه البتة .
و«جالينوس»، إذ حأوْل إقامة البرهان عَلَي  الْقِسْم الأوْل فلا يجب أن يحأوْل ذلك من جهة أنه طبيب ولكن من جهة أنه يحب  أن يَكُونَ فيلسوفاً يَتَكَلَّم فى الْعِلْم الطَّبِيعِيّ ، كما أن الفقيه إذا حاوْل أن يثبت صحة وجوب متابعة الإجماع فلَيْسَ ذلك له من جهة ما هُوَ فقيه، ولكن من جهة ما هُوَ متكلم ولكن الطبيب من جهة ما هُوَ طبيب والفقيه من جهة ما هُوَ فقيه لَيْسَ  يمكنه أن يبرهن عَلَي  ذاك بتة!  وإلا وقع الدَّوْر
القانون في الطب ابن سينا
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The doctoral dissertation provides a systematic study of the commentary on Porphyry’s (d. 305) Isagoge composed in Arabic by the Persian philosopher Ibn Sînâ (m. 1037), better known in the West as Avicenna. The book in question (in Arabic Kitâb al-Madkhal, “Book of the Introduction”) is part of the philosophical summa of the Book of the Healing (Kitâb al-Shifâ’). It is a remarkably original reworking of a Greek text which has played a fundamental role in the history of philosophy since Late Antiquity, both because of its function as an introduction to Aristotle’s Logic (Organon) and because of its subject matter, namely the doctrine of the universals, which gave rise to a well-known philosophical debate throughout the Latin Middle Ages. At the present time, there is only one Arabic edition of K. al-Madkhal (printed in Cairo in 1952), which is flawed in many respects, while an English translation of the whole work is still lacking, as is a systematic study of it. The dissertation is articulated into three sections: (i) a new edition of the Arabic text; (ii) an English translation from the Arabic and (iii) a first complete commentary of the work. (i) As to the edition of the Arabic text, the number of manuscripts taken into account, selected according to philological criteria, largely exceeds that of the Cairo edition. More precisely, the selection was based on a preliminary collation made on a text sample, which allowed to establish for the first time a number of genealogical relations between the different manuscripts. Furthermore, this edition also takes into account the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work, given that it can be counted among the earliest extant witnesses of the work. (ii) The English translation is based on the Arabic text that was the object of a new edition in part (i) and is accompanied by an apparatus of exegetical notes. (iii) Finally, the systematic commentary, the first to tackle the work in its entirety, represents a tool to reach a thorough understanding of the philosophical issues at stake.

The idea of the Suspended Man in Space or Suspended man in the air is also known with titles of Flying Man or Floating Man and Into Thin Air. Avicenna introduces this idea in The Book of Healing, and Remarks and Admonitions (Pointers and Reminders or Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), and a treatise on Knowledge of the Rational Soul, and in the Risālah aḍḥawīyah fī amr al-miʻād  or Judgment Day. This repetition reflects the importance of this idea in his mind. He also points out this argument in his two writings, Al-Taʿlīqāt and Discussions (al-Mubāḥathāt), which contain his dialogues with his disciples, and provides explanations about some criticisms sustained against the idea. This indicates that, since that time, the idea, which is considered one of Avicenna’s innovations, has been debated and criticized.
we should point out that the idea of the suspended man in space proposed by Ibn Sina, which has had extensive applications in the Muslim world and the Western world to the present time, intends to demonstrate an immaterial soul for man; the soul that perceives itself as intuitive knowledge and is not a body or a part of the body. In this paper, four different interpretations of this idea were presented. For any further critique and analysis of the Avicennian idea of the suspended man, these four readings must be initially taken into account. Among these readings, some considered philosophical and abstract aspects and some considered empirical aspects. With the simultaneous attention to these interpretations, we can gain a more comprehensive view of this argument and, thus, take a more in-depth look at the vital matter of the human soul and its immateriality.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions – Greek, Latin, and Arabic – and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This final volume focuses on intellectual operations and analyses some of the most exciting issues pertaining to the conceptual representation of the external world. The contributions cover the historical traditions and their impact on contemporary philosophy of mind.

Avicenna’s doctrine of prophecy has a “systemic” dimension, since Avicenna deals with this central event of Islam in various disciplines and parts of his works: in psychology (theory of perception, doctrine of locomotion, and noetics), as to its cognitive and operational aspects, and in the three branches of practical philosophy, because of the prophetic foundation of ethical, economical, and political conduct. A further account of prophecy interconnects all these diverse and scattered treatments: it is its discussion in metaphysics, the highest discipline of the system, which conveys the proof of the necessary existence of prophecy. Metaphysics is deputed to provide this proof since it takes “existent qua existent” as its subject-matter and, by considering restricted areas of the scope of “existent”, it grounds the epistemological principles of all the other disciplines. To document at its best the dependence of the accounts of prophecy in psychology and practical philosophy on the metaphysical discussion of it, the present article examines the doctrine of prophecy in Avicenna’s philosophical magnum opus Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Book of the Cure/Healing), with particular regard to its psychology (Kitāb al-Nafs, Book of the Soul), metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt, Science of the divine things), and practical philosophy (the appendix on this subject in the last two chapters of the Ilāhiyyāt).

Cet article est consacré à la « multitude », un terme clé aujourd’hui dans les interprétations opéraïste et populiste de Machiavel. À travers l’étude du lexique des auteurs appartenant à la tradition aristotélicienne et thomiste, cet article met en évidence l’ambiguïté substantielle de ce terme et de ce sujet collectif. L’analyse que Machiavel consacre en particulier à la multitude en tant que composante « désordonnée » du corps politique, révèle des analogies avec la réflexion contemporaine de Pietro Pomponazzi (De incantationibus). Du point de vue de l’histoire des
sciences sociales, l’hypothèse développée est que la découverte de la dimension psychique de la multitude au début du XVIe siècle constitue un tournant épistémique qui permet de repenser la chronologie de la foule comme objet d’étude et de gouvernement.

What are the most fundamental concepts of our mind in Avicenna's philosophy and what was his influence on Thomas Aquina's philosophy? Thomas built on Avicenna's work and founded the concepts on the concept of being, ordering the others hierarchically.

Ibn  Sina’s  philosophy  has  been  subject  to  various  criticisms  from  Western philosophers over the course of the centuries. In this paper, the focus is on recent criticisms that gravitate about the doctrine of necessity. It is held that Ibn Sina’s view allows for no freedom: no freedom for God, for man, or in nature. Each of
these  areas  deserves  closer examination. I will argue that Ibn  Sina’s  position is best described as a version of soft determinism or compatibalism; and I will try to elaborate the precise sense in which Ibn Sina’s views are deterministic. It is not my intention to defend Ibn Sina’s view of compatibalism or determinism; but it is
important to emphasize that he did not intend to deny divine or human freedom.

According to Avicenna, some of the objects of mathematics exist and some do not. Every existing mathematical object is a non-sensible connotational attribute of a physical object and can be perceived by the faculty of estimation. Non-existing mathematical objects can be represented and perceived by the faculty of imagination through separating and combining parts of the images of existing mathematical objects that are previously perceived by estimation. In any case, even non-existing mathematical objects should be considered as properties of material entities. They can never be grasped as fully immaterial entities. Avicenna believes that we cannot grasp any mathematical concepts unless we first have some specific perceptual experiences. It is only through the ineliminable and irreplaceable operation of the faculties of estimation and imagination upon some sensible data that we can grasp mathematical concepts. This shows that Avicenna endorses some sort of concept empiricism about mathematics.

The doctrine of trascendentals in the middle ages implies that there are certain concepts first conceived by the intellect and common to all things. Avicena is one of the mayor fonts of this doctrine and his influence in Thomas Aquinas’ conceptualization of the doctrine is determining. In the present work this influence is showed by establishing a few theses from the epistemological, logical and ontological point of view that are implied in a doctrine of first concepts. Then is discussed Aertsen’s position that there is not in Avicena a doctrine of trascendentals because the lack of a conceptual relation between the primary notions. The aim is to defend the same position as Aertsen but because of different reasons.

Ovaj rad bavi se Ibn Sinaovim prevedenim djelima uz kraće napomene o njima tamo gdje je to bilo potrebno. Također, ovdje navodimo radove koji govore o njegovom životu i djelu. Među te prijevode i radove o njemu uvršteni su samo oni napisani na bosanskom, hrvatskom i srpskom jeziku i hronološki su poredani. Svakako da ne možemo tvrditi da su obuhvaćeni svi prijevodi ovog mislioca niti njegovi autorski te radovi prevedeni o njemu na spomenutim jezicima, ali smo zasigurno uspjeli većinu djela posložiti na jednom mjestu. Radovi o njemu tematski su se kretali od filozofije preko medicine pa do sufizma.

İnsani düşünen öznenin bilfiil akletme esnasında kendi akletme nesnesiyle ne tür bir ilişkiye sahip olduğu sorunu İbn Sînâ epistemolojisinin en önemli meseleleri arasında yer alır. İbn Sînâ bu meseleyle ilgili, Aristoteles’in De Anima 3.4’ünde ortaya konularak kendisine kadar ulaşan bir akıl-makul özdeşliği teorisini tevarüs etmiştir. Bu çalışma İbn Sînâ’nın, bilfiil akletme esnasında bilen ve bilinen özdeşliğini savunan bu teoriyle ilgili nihai tutumunu belirleme amacı taşımaktadır. Bununla birlikte filozofun nihai tutumunu belirleme hususunda bazı zorluklar bulunur. İbn Sînâ erken dönem eserlerinden  el-Mebde’ ve’l-me‘âd’da özdeşlik tutumunu kabul etmiş, daha sonra eş-Şifâ/en-Nefs ve el-İşârât’ta Forfiriyos’a atfettiği, ancak gerçek muhatabının kim olduğu belirsizlik taşıyan bir özdeşlik tutumunu sert bir şekilde reddederek akledilirlerin gayrimaddi temsili fikrini savunmuş, diğer taraftan eş-Şifâ/en-Nefs sonrasındaki eserlerinde de hâlâ bir tür ittihat dilini kullanmaya devam etmiştir. Makale İbn Sînâ külliyatını bu sorun etrafında aporetik bir okumaya tabi tutmaktadır. Buna göre İbn Sînâ akledilirler için bağımsız bir konu elde etmesini mümkün kılacak aracısız zati farkındalık idraki ile dolaylı zati taakkul arasında bir ayrıma sahip olmadığı el-Mebde’de ittihat görüşünü savunmuş, ancak bu ayrıma zemin teşkil eden “uçan adam” metaforunu kullandığı eş-Şifâ/en-Nefs’ten itibaren temsil yaklaşımına geçerek sonraki eserlerinde tutarlı bir şekilde bu yaklaşımı sürdürmüştür. Bu sonucun İbn Sînâ’nın tevarüs ettiği akletme teorileri açısından nasıl bir bağlama yerleştirilebileceği ve filozofun reddettiği Forfiriyosçu tutumun gerçekte kime veya kimlere ait olabileceği soruları makalenin üzerinde duracağı diğer meseleleri teşkil eder.

From the madrasa-graduate establishing the scientific method to the inventor of algebra; from the geographer of the most accurate map in the pre-modern world to the theologian-poet whose travels exceeded Marco Polo, Magellan or Columbus; from a million-word medical encyclopedia to Enlightenment’s bestselling Arabic novel; from North America’s bestselling poet to Reagan’s favourite medieval economist; from the Shariah judge that inspired Europe’s most freethinking university to the scholar who at the pinnacle of his fame walked away from it all: we will examine their influence in their time and ours. The course, back by popular demand, will visit the brighter side of the medieval Dark Ages: the golden age of Islam, to make sense of the present.

★ Rabia 717-801 
★ al-Khwarizmi 780-850
★ ibn al-Haytham 965-1040
★ al-Biruni 973-1050
★ ibn Sina  . 980-1037
★ al-Idrisi 1100 -1165
★ ibn Tufayl 1105-1185
★ al-Ghazali 1126-1198 
★ ibn Rushd 1058-1111
★ Saladin 1137-1193
★ Nasir al-din Tusi 1201-1274
★ ibn Arabi 1165-1240
★ Mevlana Rumi 1207-1273
★ ibn Batuta 1304-1369
★ ibn Khaldun 1332-1406

Ibn Sina is generally known as one of the most important philosophers and physicians, one whose contributions to science and philosophy have attracted numerous studies. This article provides an outline of his philosophy of science which determined the framework for his understanding of natural philosophy. Rather than being of historical interest, the article argues, Ibn Sina's philosophy of science is a useful beginning for developing a contemporary Islamic philosophy of science. The article also discusses Ibn Sina's importance in the philosophy of health and medicine. Keywords: Contributions of Ibn Sina in various sciences; Islamic philosophy of science; health and medicine in Islam; Ibn Sina and contemporary Islamic intellectual thought. Ibn Sina is without doubt the most widely known intellectual figure concerned with science in Islamic civilization. He has, in fact, gained the image of a folk hero, especially in the zones of Arabic, Persian, and Turkic cultures, where numerous stories concerning his exceptional intellectual powers came into being in the form of folktales told by grandmothers to their grandchildren over the centuries. Moreover, his medical heritage is alive wherever Islamic medicine is still practiced, such as in Pakistan and India, and his influence as a philosopher and even theologian is to be felt wherever the Islamic philosophical tradition survives, as in Persia. The sign of respect for him as almost the archetype of the Muslim philosopher-scientist can be seen in the number of hospitals, schools, and centers of research bearing his name from Morocco to Malaysia. In this essay we shall limit the definition of science to the mathematical and natural, while remembering that Ibn Sina also made major contributions to the sciences of language, music, psychology, etc., and even the occult sciences (al-'ulum al-gharibah), not to speak of the supreme science or metaphysics (al-ilahiyyat) which determined the framework for his understanding of natural philosophy (al-ilahiyyat).

This article is a brief review of Ibn Sina’s practical philosophy. It begins with a discussion of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neo-Platonic influences on Ibn Sina’s practical philosophy, as well as the influence of Farabi, and of Islamic religious teachings. The creative synthesis invented by Ibn Sina requires a particular view of the relation between religion and philosophy in such a manner that religion shapes the direction of philosophical inquiry, and philosophy opens the way to a more profound and esoteric understanding of religion.