Comparative Constitutionalism

La presente obra colectiva tiene por finalidad el estudio de diversos temas relacionados con el Derecho Constitucional, ello como aporte para la Universidad de Guanajuato, la cual a través de su División de Derecho, Política y Gobierno, siempre ha propiciado que los estudiosos del derecho, tengan diversos espacios en las que se publiquen los resultados de su investigación.
Este libro representa el esfuerzo de autoridades, profesores y alumnos, quienes actuando coordinadamente, han hecho posible que este espacio de diálogo académico vea la luz, nutrido con las aportaciones de destaca- dos estudiosos del derecho, quienes a través de una convocatoria abierta y en la línea de investigación correspondiente al Derecho Constitucional, lograron que sus trabajos de investigación fueran dictaminados favorablemente y aprobados para su publicación por profesores investigadores integrantes del Programa de Investigaciones Jurídicas del Departamento de Derecho.
Esta obra contiene veintitrés trabajos de investigación; cada uno de ellos aborda un tema novedoso que invita a los estudiosos del derecho a profundizar su estudio, y abre la puerta para la realización de futuras investigaciones, de frontera y con la calidad académica que siempre ha caracterizado a esta Alma Mater.

Finding the appropriate balance between diversity and social cohesion is a common concern in constitutional design, particularly in societies divided along ethno-linguistic and religious lines. Constitution drafters have often addressed this quest through federalism: in fact, federal arrangements seek to facilitate a balance between unity and diversity to curb tensions typical of highly diverse societies.
Aside from designing the institutional architecture and power division within a state, constitutions are also repositories of shared values (...)

The article substantiates the necessity of studying the nature of human dignity in contemporary European constitutions and case-law of constitutional courts.
The texts of the constitutions concerning the structural placing of the term "dignity" in them — the preamble, separate articles, the first articles, and its independent formulation are analyzed. The following aspects of the nature of human dignity
are highlighted as whether it is only a constitutional value, a principle, or also an independent constitutional right; its definition and abstract features; absolute or relative nature; universality, equality or differentiation; its owners — a living person, or also unborn or dead human; its interaction with the negative and positive obligations
of the state; as the ground for restricting human rights and freedoms. It is stated that in relation to these problematic aspects of the nature of human dignity different positions and approaches in the case law of European constitutional courts have been formed. Attention is drawn to the necessity of its taking into account by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the development of its own unified and non-contradictory positions regarding the nature of human dignity.
Key words: human dignity, human rights, case law practice.

We, the people' is the most popular phrase from the constitutions. In spite of the fact that the number of countries including preamble as part of their constitution has been on the rise, preambles have received scant attention in academia. The importance of preambles has been established in multiple studies yet preambles have been looked at in isolation from socioeconomic environmental contexts. Our article attempts to present a unique insight by correlating preambles with the socio-economic, environmental, and infrastructural context within which they exist. It explores whether these correlations exist and if they do with which features and to what extent and the possibility of a causal link.

We pursue a statistical study between various indicators that reflect the growth of a country and the presence or absence of various elements in preambles across the world. Our study finds that correlations exist between the economic-social-environmental and infrastructural context of a nation-state and different elements in their preambles. Our study rigorously engages with patterns in development indicators across years to provide correlational insights into the role of preambles not just as a dormant reference but as active fragments of the socio-political-economic reality of a nation-state. We hope our article establishes grounds for a further study of the manner in which preambles and the non-political aspects of a nation-state can engage with each other.

Although much academic writing on constitutional courts makes explicit and implicit use of the term 'role', this term has not been structured hitherto from a theoretical perspective. On closer examination, the imprecise use of the term is readily obvious. In many publications that make explicit or implicit use of the term 'role', the expression could be substituted with 'function'. Indeed, in many cases the terms are used interchangeably. The chapter proposes that the terms 'role' and 'function' should be used in a more deliberate and systematic manner. It argues that a theory of institutional roles is helpful for a better understanding of how constitutional courts have developed in different countries. One reason for this lies in the threefold nature of the term 'role'. First, it refers to the court's self-image and presentation. Second, it reflects the expectations and ascriptions conferred by its target publics (the legal system , politics, civil society and an international public). Third, it alludes to the function of the institution in the 'play as it is performed'. Finally, three ideal types of court role – guardian, arbiter and founder – are examined.

Este estudio documenta en forma cuantitativa las reformas constitucionales en América Latina – tanto la promulgación de nuevas constituciones como reformas parciales – desde 1978 con un énfasis especial en el periodo 1990-2012. Se analiza al mismo tiempo si ha aumentado la frecuencia de reformas en las últimas dos décadas. Y se estudia hasta que punto América Latina es diferente en lo que se refiere a la frecuencia de reformas constitucionales y la rigidez de sus constituciones en comparación con otras regiones del mundo.

Freedom of assembly is one of the fundamental rights that form the backbone of democracy. It guarantees people the right to public and peaceful assembly, enabling them to express their own views and bring some influence to bear upon social and political processes. The purpose of this article is to analyse the legal measures introduced in Poland as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in the restriction of freedom of association and the right to protest. For the purpose of this analysis, compliance with formal legislative requirements, as well as the actual application of and compliance with the adopted legal measures, will be taken into account. Additionally, the broader political and legal context of the analysed measures should be considered, as they are related to a crisis of the rule of law in Poland that has been ongoing since 2015.

This chapter examines the experience of the Colombian and Chilean Courts in their attempt to enforce social and economic rights (SERs) and to navigate tensions present in LASC constitutions. We evaluate the prospects of SER litigation and the processes of deliberation and popular participation set in motion by courts. We address whether two seemingly conflicting commitments – inclusive citizen participation at the grassroots level and new forms of judicial activism – can be reconciled. Are SER enforcement processes in which unelected judges wield considerable power compatible with participatory and deliberative democracy? We conclude that Colombian and Chilean courts are most effective in the role of dialogue igniters, shaking up the political process directly (as in Colombia) or indirectly (as in Chile). A key precondition for their success is effective inclusion of citizens at the grassroots level, as opposed to simple promotion of inter-branch dialogue.

Research Topic : "Constitutionalism" .
Programme: LL.M. (Master of Laws)
Course Name: COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW OR SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE
Definition of Constitutionalism ,Meaning of Constitutionalism,Traditions of Constitutionalism, Political constitutionalism: from mixed government to representative democracy, Legal constitutionalism: from the separation of powers to rights and judicial review, Difference between constitution and constitutionalism,Usage of Constitutionalism , History of Constitutionalism ,Important features of Constitutionalism, Entrenchement,Writtenness,Elements of Constitutionalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Constitutionalism and The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and constitutional conventions, Constitutionalism in different countries,Organic Global Constitutionalism, Case Laws where principle of ‘Constitutionalism’ is legally recognized
by Supreme Court of India

The present publication is the first volume in a series on “Intellectual Property, Practice and Analysis”. It is dedicated to draft guidelines for examination of trademarks in “Sakpatenti”, the National Intellectual Property Center of Georgia, according to European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) guidelines on European Union Trademarks. The guidelines are designed to bring together, systematically, the principles of practice derived from the jurisprudence of National and European courts, the case-law of Sakpatenti’s Chamber of Appeals as well as EUIPO’s Boards of Appeals. They provide an important source to develop coherent, predictable decisions in the field of intellectual property rights in Georgia, in harmony with EU law.
The accurate enforcement of intellectual property rights is the next stage of the Georgian and EU law approximation process. It is therefore important to acknowledge international approaches and to reflect the general practice of the European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). Intellectual Property Rights are emphasized in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement which is an essential part of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and Their Member States, Of the One Part, and Georgia, of the other Part (“Association Agreement”). It contains an economic integration mechanism with the EU and opens up the EU market for Georgia. According to the Association Agreement, each final decision taken by Sakpatenti shall be duly reasoned.
The current publication is drafted to ensure that the obligations according to the Association Agreement are met and that the respective trademark registration legislation and procedures in Georgia are transparent, rational and well-grounded. This publication examines one of the absolute grounds for the refusal of trademark applications: namely, public order and the accepted principles of morality. Various cases are analysed in detail, examples are presented and the Guidelines for the investigation of the Georgian law on Trademarks, Article 4(1)(g) are drafted. This norm stipulates one of the absolute grounds of refusal for trademark registration, namely, if a sign or a combination of signs “insults or is contrary to national dignity, religious sentiment and traditions and moral standards”. Consequently, Georgian law as well as EU and international trademark legislation stipulates public order and accepted principles of morality as grounds for the refusal of trademark registrations which shall be assessed according to the EUIPO’s Guidelines for Examination and both National and EU case-law.
The aim of this publication is to raise public awareness about intellectual property rights. It is intended to be used in practice by trademark experts, applicants, trademark attorneys, lawyers, judges and any person interested in this subject-matter.
Insofar as it is the first publication in the series “A Commentary on the Georgian Law on Trademarks”, Sakpatenti would be grateful to receive any comments and suggestions.

(In Georgian language : ევროკავშირის ინტელექტუალური საკუთრების უწყების (EUIPO) ექსპერტიზის სახელმძღვანელო პრინციპები და საქართველოს პრაქტიკა )

წინამდებარე წიგნში ეროვნული და ევროკავშირის კანონმდებლობის სისტემური, შედარებით-სამართლებრივი მეთოდით ანალიზის საფუძველზე, ასევე, საერთაშორისო პრაქტიკის, კერძოდ, ევროკავშირის ინტელექტუალური საკუთრების უწყებაში (EUIPO) ექსპერტიზის სახელმძღვანელო პრინციპების, ადამიანის უფლებების, ეროვნული სასამართლო და კონსტიტუციური სამართალწარმოების პრაქტიკიდან გამომდინარე, განხილულია სასაქონლო ნიშნები, რომელთა რეგისტრაცია ეწინააღმდეგება ზნეობრივ ნორმებს: საჯარო წესრიგს და მორალის აღიარებულ პრინციპებს; განმარტებულია სასაქონლო ნიშნის რეგისტრაციაზე უარის თქმის ერთ-ერთი საფუძველი, რომელიც განსაზღვრულია „სასაქონლო ნიშნების შესახებ“ საქართველოს კანონის მე-4 მუხლის პირველი პუნქტის „ზ“ ქვეპუნქტით. ზემოაღნიშნული ნორმა გაანალიზებულია საქართველოს კონსტიტუციითა და ადამიანის უფლებათა და თავისუფლებათა ევროპული კონვენციით გარანტირებულ გამოხატვის თავისუფლებასთან მიმართებით, ასევე, საქართველოს სახელმწიფოსა და საქართველოს სამოციქულო ავტოკეფალურ მართლმადიდებელ ეკლესიას შორის დადებული შეთანხმების ჭრილში. ნაშრომში ჩამოყალიბებულია სასაქონლო ნიშნის რეგისტრაციისას ექსპერტიზისთვის სახელმძღვანელო პრინციპები საერთაშორისო სტანდარტების შესაბამისად, რაც სასარგებლო იქნება მოსამართლეებისთვის, საქპატენტის თანამშრომლებისთვის, პატენტრწმუნებულებისა და ინტელექტუალური საკუთრების უფლებებით
დაინტერესებული ნებისმიერი პირისათვის.
© საქპატენტი, ელენე სეხნიაშვილი

Demokrasi tak melulu berarti dari, oleh, dan untuk rakyat. Demokrasi memiliki beragam makna, yang tak satupun hingga hari ini diakui layak menegaskan standar universal hegemonik pengejawantahan nilai-nilai demokrasi. Variasi demokrasi, baik itu prosedural (USA dan Barat) vis a vis substantif (China, Singapore), people (Populis Extreme Right) vis a vis humanity (Kosmopolit Uni Eropa), dan sebagainya, namun sekurang-kurangnya karakteristik utama perwujudan daripada nilai-nilai demokrasi barat adalah adanya Pemilihan Umum, Multy-Party System dan Pemisahan Kekuasaan.

John Rawls is the best-known political philosopher in the modern period. The purpose of this article is to determine John Rawls's contribution to modern political philosophy. This article opens with a biography of Rawls. From thereon, it introduces and discusses John Rawls's four roles of political philosophy, and this article provides an introduction to Rawls's writings in political philosophy. It provides an exposition on the fundamental ideas of Rawls's 'Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993)', and at the end of this article, discussed the basic ideas of 'Law of people' (1999).

Key Words: Political Philosophy/ Social Justice/ Liberalism

Стаття присвячена аналізу правомірності відновлення дії окремих положень Конституції України у 2014 році на основі дослідження співвідношення принципів вер­ ховенства права та верховенства конституції. Зроблено висновок, що за умов еволю­ ційного конституційного розвитку верховенство конституції є одним із засобів забез­ печення верховенства права. Поряд із цим обґрунтовано пріоритет верховенства права у тих випадках, коли верховенство конституції захищає свавільну владу, перед­ бачені конституцією засоби боротьби із державним свавіллям вичерпані і політична нація вдається до свого права на опір. В результаті зроблено висновок про правомір­ ність відновлення дії Конституції України у 2014 році. Ключові слова: верховенство права, верховенство конституції, відновлення дії Конституції України, конституціоналізм.

La acción pública de constitucionalidad a debate es un estudio de los argumentos que puede aportar el mecanismo colombiano de acceso directo de los ciudadanos al control de constitucionalidad al debate sobre la legitimidad democrática del control judicial de las leyes. Al mismo tiempo, el estudio recupera  argumentos de este debate clásico del derecho constitucional que pueden ser aplicados para defender la legitimidad de la Corte Constitucional
de Colombia. El texto principal de Jorge Roa se complementa con las lecturas en clave comparada de Elisabetta Crivelli, Mia Caielli y Roberto Toniatti sobre el funcionamiento de mecanismos similares de control judicial en Italia y de la public interest litigation en India.

In constitutional democracies, the interpretative and adjudicative power is vested in
the court. The judiciary as the third arm of government originally has the power to
check the exercise of powers by the other arms and even that of itself. This power
mostly covers wide areas with respect to rights and obligations of any person,
authority and the government. Conversely, Court has adhered to restrictions on its
own power. Such restrictions include the so-called justiciability doctrines- standing,
ripeness, mootness, political question doctrine and so on. Whereas, the import of the
idea of separation of power from whence judicial power emanated, in Montesquieu’s
view, is to ensure political liberty –liberty to the people. To this Researcher, to secure
this liberty, the power must be exercised without permitting superfluous and
unbridled restrictions. The concern of this Study is on three restrictive theories, viz￾the directive principles doctrine, political question doctrine and ripeness cum locus
stand. It particularly evaluates the concept of justiciability in view of –directive
principles idea as contained in both Nigerian and Indian Constitutions and how it is
treated by their courts vis-a-vis the treatment of its contents by South African court; -
political question doctrine as it applies in the U.S and Nigeria courts perspectives
today; and lastly, -how the Nigerian courts apply the doctrine of locus standi in
comparison with ripeness to questions bordering on the constitutionality of
legislations. The doctrines are tested on normative and institutional standpoints of
justiciability theory. It concludes that Nigerian judges need to be proactive and firmly
on these three aspects to secure people’s liberty and so that law will not cease in its
function as a tool of social engineering in our society.

This is the full text of the keynote speech made by Justice Saleem Marsoof, PC at the Annual Research Symposium of the Faculty of Law of the University of Colombo held on 19th December 2020 on a virtual Zoom platform at the height of the Covid 19 pandemic. In his keynote address delivered under the title “The Constitution and the Law at Crossroads: Reflections and Foresights of a Judge”, Justice Marsoof reflects on the seventy odd years of Sri Lanka’s post- independence history in the context of its Ethnic and Constitutional crises, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Sri Lanka’s social fabric and the Constitutional issues that it gave rise to. Placing emphasis on the concept of ‘the Sovereignty of the People’ which is well ingrained in the current Constitution of Sri Lanka, he stressed the need for a broad consultative process for the enactment of a new Constitution for Sri Lanka that fully reflects the aspirations of the People of Sri Lanka. Justice Marsoof also touched on the very important issue of whether the Courts of Sri Lanka may progressively develop the Common Law of Sri Lanka, which as noted by Lord Diplock in his celebrated judgment in Kodeeswaran v Attorney General (1967) 72 NLR 337 (PC)  has been built on a Roman-Dutch law foundation, and has suggested ways in which certain doubts created by the later decision of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in Priyani Zoysa v Rianzie Arsekularatne (2001) 2 SLR 293 in this regard may be resolved by including appropriately worded provisions in the proposed new Constitution.

The ideas and practices of written constitutions and constitutionalism that originated in the West in the 18th century were first imported into China in the late 19th century. There were three eras of constitution-making in modern Chinese history: the last decade of Qing imperial rule (1901-11), the republican era (1911-1949), and the communist era (1949-). The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Mainland in 1949 inaugurated a new era of constitution-making under the Soviet Union’s influence. However, even today, the discussion of “constitutionalism” (xianzheng) is still discouraged by the PRC regime, although the concepts of the (socialist) Rule of Law and human rights have been affirmed by constitutional amendments in 1999 and 2004 respectively. Part I of this paper will first review the historical evolution of constitutions in the modern world, and then consider the concepts and theories of constitutions and constitutionalism in the contemporary world. Part II introduces the historical and ideological contexts of constitutional developments in modern China, and describes the operation of the Chinese constitutional system. Part III considers the present state and future prospects of constitutionalism in China. Finally, part IV concludes the chapter.

Since the incorporation of decree powers into the Turkish constitutional system in 1971, the Constitutional Court (the Court) had adopted a disposition which has tended to construe decree powers in a narrow margin. In this context, the Court looked for additional conditions besides the conditions set in the constitution for the empowerment of executive with decree powers: the tripartite test which required that the empowerment should be urgent, necessary and important. The Court acted in a similar way for emergency decrees by examining them-although the supervision of emergency decrees is prohibited in the constitution. Thanks to this attitude, decree powers both in ordinary times and emergencies were restricted and used with aims solely seen necessary to abolish the reasons which caused the usage of decrees. However, the Court changed its case law regarding decree powers and opened the way for the possibility of executive influence on law making. For ordinary decrees, it abandoned the practice of looking for "extra" conditions not present in the constitution's text in 2011. With its judgment in late 2016, the Court gave up controlling emergency decrees as well. This retreat by the Court has greatly influenced the recent inflation of executive dominance in Turkey.

In recent years, democratization research has increasingly emphasized the role of constitutional courts in the transformation of formerly authoritarian countries towards democracy. Only rarely do these studies explore the question of what it means in a socio-political context for an institution to ‘play a role’. In addition, the term ‘role’ is often used synonymously with ‘function’, even though both concepts originate from very different social science traditions.
From a socio-legal perspective, this book aims to unearth the potential of role theory for democratization studies and comparative research on constitutional courts. The focus of the study is not the well-known normative question of whether and to what extent courts have the legitimacy to intervene in the democratic process. Instead, the debates surrounding that question are viewed as the empirical context in which processes of attribution of legitimacy take place and in which constitutional courts act as the bearer of roles, communicating with different kinds of audiences (legal academia, politics, civil society, and international actors).
Based on sociological role theory and historical-sociological new institutionalism, in the tradition of Max Weber, the book develops an ‘ideal type’ framework of analysis intended to connect with the debates in legal scholarship. This heuristic framework aims to establish empirical points of reference to assess whether and to what extent constitutional courts act as ‘guardians’ of predetermined constitutional rules, manage and decide social and political conflicts as ‘umpires’, or define the values of the legal-political community in the role of ‘founder’.
This analytical approach is then applied to two cases of newly-founded constitutional courts in democratizing political systems: the German Federal Constitutional Court in post-fascist Germany during the period 1952-1961, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the period of post-Communist transformation between 1990 and 1995. The focus of each case study is the constitutional court’s most highly controversial cases, their socio-political context, and the reactions of the court’s main audiences. The case studies show that the role of ‘guardian’, which according to legal scholarship is the main role of constitutional courts, played mostly in the background. In most cases, the courts acted as umpires or founders. In the light of this finding, the remainder of the study engages in a comparative analysis of the development of the constitutional court system in both countries. It seeks to explain the partial disempowerment of the Hungarian court in 2010-11; a situation that, despite many conflicts between politics and the court, has not been experienced in Germany.
A printed version of the book can be obtained here: https://www.epubli.de/shop/buch/32786

In der Demokratisierungsliteratur wird zunehmend auf die Rolle der Verfassungsgerichte in demokratischen Systemtransformationen hingewiesen. Selten wird die Frage theoretisch expliziert, was es eigentlich heißt, wenn eine Institution in einem gesellschaftlichen Kontext „eine Rolle spielt“. Zudem wird der Begriff der Rolle oftmals synonym mit dem der „Funktion“ verwendet, obwohl beide Begriffe aus sehr unterschiedlichen sozialwissenschaftlichen Theorietraditionen stammen.
Diese Arbeit versucht aus politikwissenschaftlicher und rechtssoziologischer Perspektive, den Rollenbegriff für die Demokratisierungsforschung und die vergleichende Verfassungsgerichtsforschung fruchtbar zu machen. Dabei steht nicht die schon oft diskutierte, normative Frage im Vordergrund, ob und wie stark die Verfassungsgerichte in den Prozess demokratischer Gesetzgebung eingreifen sollen. Stattdessen werden die Debatten über diese Frage als empirischer Kontext von Prozessen der Legitimitätszuschreibung verstanden, in denen die Gerichte als Rollenträger auftreten, die mit verschiedenen Arten von Publikum (Rechtswissenschaft, Politik, Zivilgesellschaft, internationale Akteure) – hier als Teilöffentlichkeiten bezeichnet – kommunizieren.
Angelehnt an die soziologische Rollentheorie und auf der Grundlage des historisch-soziologischen Neoinstitutionalismus wird, in Anschluss an die Max Webersche Theorietradition, ein idealtypisches Untersuchungsraster entwickelt, das an rechtswissenschaftliche Debatten anschlussfähig sein soll: Dieses heuristische Raster will empirische Anknüpfungspunkte dafür geben, ob und inwieweit Verfassungsgerichte als „Hüter“ von vorgegebenen Verfassungsnormen auftreten, wann sie als „Schiedsrichter“ von politischen und gesellschaftlichen Konflikten tätig werden, und wann sie als „Gründer“ die Werte einer rechtlich-politischen Gemeinschaft definieren.
Dieser Ansatz wird dann auf zwei Fälle von neugegründeten Verfassungsgerichten in sich demokratisierenden politischen Systemen zur Anwendung gebracht: den Fall des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im postfaschistischen Deutschland (Untersuchungszeitraum: 1952-1961) und den Fall des ungarischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs, der vor dem Hintergrund der postkommunistischen Systemtransformation agierte (Untersuchungszeitraum: 1990-1995). Untersucht werden vor allem hochkontroverse Urteile, ihr gesellschaftlicher Kontext und die Reaktionen der Teilöffentlichkeiten. Ergebnis der Analyse ist, dass die von der Rechtswissenschaft vorrangig postulierte „Hüterrolle“ des Gerichts eher im Verborgenen gespielt wurde. In den meisten Fällen trat das Gericht als Schiedsrichter und Gründer auf. Darauf aufbauend wird die Entwicklung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit bis heute vergleichend analysiert und danach gefragt, wie sich die Teilentmachtung des ungarischen Verfassungsgerichts im Jahr 2010/2011 erklären lässt, die – trotz zahlreicher Konflikte zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und Politik – in Deutschland bisher keine Entsprechung gefunden hat.

Eine gedruckte Fassung des Buches ist hier erhältlich: https://www.epubli.de/shop/buch/32786

Rezensionen:
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Robert Chr. van Ooyen, in: Portal für Politikwissenschaft, http://pw-portal.de/rezension/37365 (veröffentlicht am 31.07.2014): Nach van Ooyen bietet die Arbeit ein "ausgezeichnetes mehrdimensionales Analyseraster, das auf Richterpersönlichkeiten / Richterverhalten, Regierungssystem, Öffentlichkeit und historische Mentalitäten abstellt"

Herbert Küpper, in: Jahrbuch Ostrecht 1/2014, S. 203: "eine für Juristen ebenso interessante wie erkenntnisreiche Erweiterung der klassischen rechtswissenschaftlichen
Perspektive auf die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit."

Péter Sólyom, Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie: https://www.academia.edu/24793572

El presente trabajo tiene por objetivo analizar el principio de reserva competencial, cuyo origen se ubica en el modelo constitucional anglosajón. El estudio toma como ejemplo un caso suscitado en San Luis Potosí entre 1875 y 1878, en el que intervinieron órganos políticos y jurisdiccionales del estado y la federación para sostener la competencia en dicho asunto. Para ello, echaron mano de mecanismos y ordenamientos jurídicos. En última instancia, fue la Suprema Corte de Justicia la que resolvió la contienda, en invocación de la reserva competencial. El ensayo intenta articular varias áreas de interés: la distribución de poder entre el gobierno federal y los gobiernos de los estados, la interacción político-jurídica de diversos actores locales y el papel del Poder Judicial federal, en el marco del federalismo mexicano. Este análisis ayuda a entender cómo el principio de reserva competencial transitó de la tradición anglosajona hacia las primeras constituciones mexicanas, cuya redacción se mantuvo prácticamente intacta en el texto de la Constitución de 1917.
De manera particular, buscamos entender el dinamismo de las instituciones jurisdiccionales y políticas de San Luis Potosí y su interacción con las establecidas en esta entidad que representaban los intereses de la federación; de modo que perfilaremos la reserva competencial a través del examen de un caso concreto. El estudio se nutre de fuentes históricas que permiten conocer el uso político e invocación de dicho principio en tribunales de ambos órdenes durante el último cuarto del siglo XIX. Estas razones nos motivan a escribir sobre la relación entre la tradición del constitucionalismo local y la Constitución política federal de 1917 en el marco del primer centenario de su promulgación. El caso que motiva este trabajo lo hemos localizado en el Archivo Histórico de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, y se complementa con datos del Archivo Histórico del Estado de San Luis Potosí.

Sur la non-approbation par référendum, le 4 décembre 2016, de la réforme constitutionnelle sponsorisée par le Gouvernement dirigé par le leader du Parti Démocratique Matteo Renzi, ont pesé plusieurs raisons, certaines de nature politique, et d'autres plus strictement constitutionnelles. L'intention des constituants était de rendre le référendum constitutionnel un remède à utiliser en cas de manque d'un consensus transversal en Parlement entre les partis politiques. Au cours du temps, la nature de ce référendum a néanmoins changé: d'un instrument «oppositionnel» par rapport à une volonté parlementaire incertaine il est devenu un outil de « confirmation» presque plébiscitaire des réformes d'origine gouvernementale. La distorsion de la nature du référendum constitutionnel dans les expériences les plus récentes montre que la tentative de se distancer des objectifs des constituants a échoué. Le débat sur la réforme constitutionnelle et le référendum a produit des divisions profondes non seulement au niveau des forces politiques et de la société civile, mais même dans la communauté des constitutionnalistes, avec des affrontements souvent enflammés et fortes implications politiques. Abstract There are several reasons for the rejection by referendum, on 4 December 2016, of the constitutional reform sponsored by the Government led by the Democratic Party leader, Matteor Renzi. Some reasons are of a political nature, other of a constitutional one. The intention of the constitutional legislator was to transform the constitutional referendum into a remedy used in case of absence of a consensus within the Parliament, between the political parties. However, in time, the nature of the referendum has changed: from an "opposition" tool versus an uncertain  Professeur de droit public comparé à l'Université de Milan, Italie. 154 ANGELA DI GREGORIO parliamentary will, it has become an almost plebiscitary tool of "confirmation" of the governmental reforms. The distortion of the nature of the constitutional referendum in the most recent cases shows that the attempt to take a distance from the goals of the constitutional legislator failed. The debate on the constitutional reform and the referendum produced deep divisions not only at the level of political forces and of civil society, but also within the community of constitutional lawyers, with frequently inflamed confrontations and with strong political implications.

This article studies how the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has come to develop a sophisticated judicial gloss on the provisions of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitutional document, in ways unforeseen by the Chinese National People's Congress that enacted it. The ascendancy of constitutional common law in Hong Kong after the end of British rule is remarkable when considered in light of the continuing denial of democratic self-rule by China's authoritarian Party-state. This article argues that the profusion of political transaction costs due to the fragmentation of the ruling elite and state-society discord consequent to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty has created the requisite space for the Court to craft, with impunity, consequential yet politically realistic doctrines bearing on such weighty matters as constitutional interpretation, central-local relations, separation of powers, and rights protection.

The word ‘democracy’ too often has been used to justify actions
which seriously contradict the democratic ideal. We wish to help restore a real, practical meaning – and value – to the word and the concept of ‘democracy’ because it is important to us in Trinidad and Tobago. Around the world, ‘democracy’ is regularly used to legitimate unpopular and repressive authority, used interchangeably with the ‘will of the people’ (embodied in the government or ruling party), ‘rule of law’, ‘majority rule’, ‘advancement of freedom’, or ‘end of tyranny’. Indeed, ‘democracy’ is so abused on all sides of the political prism that it seems to have little real meaning any longer. Unfortunately, the misuse of the word ‘democracy’ occurs not only for dishonourable reasons. It occurs also because of genuine misunderstanding and confusion by well-meaning people who have acquired simple, formulaic, but commonly expressed, understandings of democracy. The lack of clarity on what democracy precisely is, allows other less laudable – and occasionally sinister – goals to be advanced, sometimes unintentionally.

Western liberal constitutionalism, the dominant vision of which is rights-oriented and court centric is hegemonic to the discourse. While important, this is a particular rather than total expression of constitutionalism which conflates constitutionalism with liberalism and treat this as paradigmatic. This may obscure all other non-liberal models or fuel their dismissal as sham constitutions. A third space must be found, without collapsing anti-constitutionalist, illiberal despotism with no objective limits on power into the sphere of constitutionalism, and without equating judicial review with constitutionalism. To that end, this article seeks to advance the project of pluralising understandings of constitutionalism, drawing from the rich variety of constitutional experiments in Asia, with its multiplicity of religions, political ideologies government systems, cultures, and levels of economic development. Against an idealised model of liberal constitutionalism deployed as an organisational tool to highlight features of nonliberal constitutionalism in their full variety, the article examines three typologies of constitutionalism: religious, socialist and communitarian. In so doing, the idea of normatively desirable and defensible constitutionalist models is investigated, through an inquiry that goes beyond text and courts to other sites of constitutional practice and governance.

The engagement of conservative, populist governments with constitutional reform and constitution-making is perceived as a significant threat to the rule of law and democracy within the European Union. Constitutionalists often assume a relation of mutual exclusion between populism and constitutionalism.  In contrast, I argue that while populism ought to be understood as a rejection of liberal constitutionalism, it equally constitutes a competing political force regarding the definition of constitutional democracy. The article first discusses populist constitutionalism in the context of the two, main modern constitutional traditions: the modernist and the revolutionary ones. Second, I discuss the  populist critique of liberal constitutionalism, with a central focus on the recent cases of right-wing  populism in power in East-Central Europe. Four dimensions are prominent: 1) popular sovereignty  as the key justificatory claim of populism; 2) majority rule  as the main populist mode of government; 3) instrumentalism  as the legal-practical approach of populists; and 4)
legal resentment  as the populists’ main attitude towards public law. In conclusion, I argue that while the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism provides significant insights into structural problems of liberal democracy, populist constitutionalism ultimately fails to live up to its own democratic promise.

In my book on the spread of juristocracy, I only briefly discussed the circumstances of the emergence of the German constitutional judiciary in the late 1940s, which signifies one of the beginnings of today's juristocracy. https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Pokol-B%C3%A9laebook/dp/B096KYFHN2/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&qid=1624379666&refinements=p_27%3ABe %CC%81la+Pokol&s=books&sr=1-1 This topic remains taboo, so there is little material on it, but some historians have begun to examine it without bias. However, it still completely escapes the attention of German constitutional scholars and constitutional law scholars in general. Anticipating that my book will meet with criticism from these scholars, I have subsequently examined in detail the beginnings of the distortion of constitutional adjudication into a juristocracy. This short paper contains my investigation of that.

The future of economic and social rights is unlikely to resemble its past. Neglected within the human rights movement, avoided by courts, and subsumed within a conception of development in which economic growth was considered a necessary (and, by some, sufficient) condition for rights fulfillment, economic and social rights enjoyed an uncertain status in international human rights law and in the public laws of most countries. Yet today, under conditions of immense poverty, insecurity, and social distress, the rights to education, health care, housing, social security, food, water, and sanitation are increasingly at the top of the human rights agenda. Economic and social rights are now present in most of the world’s constitutions, most of the main human rights covenants, and are often given an explicit justiciable status. At the same time, as different legal traditions and regions embrace this shift, their highly integrated economies face a profound reckoning with economic justice. The future cannot be predicted; but neither can it be ignored. This introduction to a book with 21 chapters incorporates a detailed examination of constitutions, courts and international mechanisms of accountability. These signal a transformation in debates about human rights, democracy, law and development.

This paper aims to show the connection between ideas on natural law, human dignity and tradition in the legal-political thought of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, an influential earlier judge of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court. It starts out from the Catholic background of the legal theorist, and his close connection to Carl Schmitt, probably the most charismatic legal thinker of the age, who, however, burnt himself by his support of the Nazi regime. Böckenförde was politically closest to the Social Democrats, yet political theology remained crucial for his legal thought. His interpretation of the German Grundgesetz was founded on a very strong, universalist interpretation of the concept of human dignity, which he took as the most important, founding value in the value catalogue of the Basic Law. Although not a conservative, Böckenförde also claimed that in a specific legal sense, tradition also plays a major role in legal interpretation. He took over from the writings of his bro...

It is a complete proceeding of the 7th Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges on General Election Law held by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in Jakarta, on 12-15 July 2010. This proceeding is a very valuable resources for anyone who is interested with comparative constitutional laws, particularly on constitutional courts or other equivalent institutions in dealing with general elections. I contributed as an editor in the proceeding.