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    Wulf Gaertner

    ABSTRACT
    Auf den ersten Blick erscheint der Vorschlag, einen Markt für Organe einzurichten, völlig abwegig. Sollte eine zivilisierte Gesellschaft ein System tolerieren, in dem Menschen zum Ersatzteillager für andere Menschen werden? Auch auf den... more
    Auf den ersten Blick erscheint der Vorschlag, einen Markt für Organe einzurichten, völlig abwegig. Sollte eine zivilisierte Gesellschaft ein System tolerieren, in dem Menschen zum Ersatzteillager für andere Menschen werden? Auch auf den zweiten Blick erscheint ein solcher Mechanismus nicht akzeptabel, zumal die im Rahmen eines kommerziellen Handels notwendigen Geldzahlungen insbesondere ärmere Schichten der Bevölkerung anlocken würden. Würde die kommerzielle Organspende dazu führen, die Schwachen in der Gesellschaft in moderner Form auszubeuten? Auf den dritten Blick muss der objektive Beobachter jedoch feststellen, dass die Wartezeit für eine Niere durchschnittlich 3–5 Jahre beträgt. Als Konsequenz davon sterben zahlreiche Menschen in der Warteschlage für eine transplantierbare Niere, weil sie nicht rechtzeitig ein für sie geeignetes Spenderorgan finden können [4].
    The author asserts toward the end of his contribution to Problem Study 3 that a model has been developed “which is quite a general image of a real life model of a balanced system of social groups in a new suburb”. No doubt about the... more
    The author asserts toward the end of his contribution to Problem Study 3 that a model has been developed “which is quite a general image of a real life model of a balanced system of social groups in a new suburb”. No doubt about the generality of Rupnik’s approach; a lot of interesting features have been introduced into the model, aspects which (may) play an important role in the construction of a new suburb. The present respondent, however, has the impression that Rupnik’s stochastic control model may be a bit too ambitious when it comes to real life applications.
    A little more than two hundred years ago, in 1785, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, better known as “Marquis de Condorcet”, published his “Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des... more
    A little more than two hundred years ago, in 1785, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, better known as “Marquis de Condorcet”, published his “Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix”. With some justification Condorcet can be considered as one of the founders of social choice theory. In his work Condorcet discussed, among other things, the case of consistent majority voting and — what is perhaps more interesting — the situation where majority voting generates a set of inconsistent propositions. The proposed resolution scheme for the latter case, however, was fairly vague, at least for voting procedures with more than three candidates. Actually, Condorcet never followed the idea of restricting preference profiles.
    In his fundamental paper of 1950, Nash constructs a model of a bargaining situation with two persons and formulates a set of axioms which uniquely characterize a bargaining solution, the so-called Nash solution. In Nash’s model... more
    In his fundamental paper of 1950, Nash constructs a model of a bargaining situation with two persons and formulates a set of axioms which uniquely characterize a bargaining solution, the so-called Nash solution. In Nash’s model preferences of the persons over a set X of feasible alternatives are expressed by cardinal von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Among the alternatives in X there exists a certain alternative x 0, the alternative of disagreement, often called status quo. In the general case of n ≥ 2 persons, the pair (X,x 0) is mapped by the utility functions of the persons onto a pair (S, d) in an n-dimensional utility space. (S,d) is called a bargaining situation with n persons, if S is a convex and compact subset of ℝn, if d is an element in S, and if there exists an alternative x with an image s in S such that every person strictly prefers x tox 0, i.e. s > d. For every bargaining situation a bargaining solution. selects a point f(S, d) in S.
    ... W. Gaertner 1 and P~ K. Pattanaik 2 1 Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universitfit Osnabriick, Postfach 4469, D-4500 Osnabrtick, Federal Republic of Germany 2 ... Among our teachers, Bhabatosh Datta and Tapas Majumdar took a... more
    ... W. Gaertner 1 and P~ K. Pattanaik 2 1 Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universitfit Osnabriick, Postfach 4469, D-4500 Osnabrtick, Federal Republic of Germany 2 ... Among our teachers, Bhabatosh Datta and Tapas Majumdar took a deep interest in welfare economics. ...
    ABSTRACT
    Professor Arrow began his celebrated monograph ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’ (1951) with the following words: ‘In a capitalist democracy there are essentially two methods by which social choice can be made: voting, typically used... more
    Professor Arrow began his celebrated monograph ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’ (1951) with the following words: ‘In a capitalist democracy there are essentially two methods by which social choice can be made: voting, typically used to make “political” decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make “economic” decisions’ (p. 1). Roughly twenty years later, in his Nobel prize lecture, Kenneth Arrow (1974) argued: ‘If we want to rely on the virtues of the market but also to achieve a more just distribution, the theory suggests the strategy of changing the initial distribution rather than interfering with the allocation process at some later stage. Thus … there is an irreducible need for a social or collective choice on distribution.’
    In a series of papers several authors have given both sufficient and necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preference relation under the simple majority decision rule. The aim of this paper is not only to... more
    In a series of papers several authors have given both sufficient and necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preference relation under the simple majority decision rule. The aim of this paper is not only to introduce a new necessary and sufficient condition for transitivity of the social relation, but also to establish the connection between this condition of ‘cyclically mixed preferences’ and the well known conditions of ‘extremal restriction’, ‘value restriction’, ‘limited agreement’, and ‘dichotomous preferences’. While the latter conditions rule out the joint occurrence of certain individual preference orderings our condition excludes no individual ranking.
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    ... held in New York, Kaushik Basu raised the issue of whether people should be allowed to waive fundamental human rights. ... However, in other passages (see paras 26, 39, and 82), Rawls concedes that for a limited period there may be a... more
    ... held in New York, Kaushik Basu raised the issue of whether people should be allowed to waive fundamental human rights. ... However, in other passages (see paras 26, 39, and 82), Rawls concedes that for a limited period there may be a trade‐off between liberty and well‐being. ...
    ABSTRACT
    There are various ways in which decisions can be taken in a society. In the modern industrialized societies of the western hemisphere the two most prominent methods by which societal decisions are being made are (a) the voting procedure... more
    There are various ways in which decisions can be taken in a society. In the modern industrialized societies of the western hemisphere the two most prominent methods by which societal decisions are being made are (a) the voting procedure which effectuates political as well as economic choices (for the latter type of choice consider for example a city-council’s decision on the extent of supply of public goods) and (b) the market mechanism which by coordinating individual decisions through the price system brings about economic choices.

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