Misusing hypothesis: trying to make it carry meanings it won't hold.
Revisiting Corcoran-LaVine-Legault 2014: Meanings of hypothesis. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 248–9.
144. Meanings of hypothesis. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 248–9. (Coauthors: Matt LaVine and Justin Legault)
The primary sense of the word ‘hypothesis’ in modern colloquial English includes “proposition not yet settled” or “open question”. Its opposite is ‘fact’ in the sense of “proposition widely known to be true”. People are amazed that Plato [1, p. 1684] and Aristotle [Post. An. I.2 72a14–24, quoted below] used the Greek form of the word for indemonstrable first principles [sc. axioms] in general or for certain kinds of axioms. These two facts create the paradoxical situation that in many cases it is impossible to translate the Greek form of the word using the English form: the primary sense of the word ‘hypothesis’ in modern colloquial English is diametrically opposed to one sense used by Plato and by his most accomplished student
Given current colloquial English usage it is impossible to get the word hypothesis to carry the connotation of “settled truth” much less “axiomatic truth”. The ‘hypo-’ [under] in the Plato-Aristotle use of ‘hypothesis’ might carry the sense of “basis” or “foundational” as opposed to “less than usual or normal”.
This paradox parallels the one pointed out by Robin Smith: it is impossible for the English word ‘syllogism’ to carry the meaning of its Greek form Aristotle intended. There are other cases as well: it is impossible for the English biological term ‘genus’ to carry the meaning of its Greek form the Greek genos refers to family as in our ‘genealogy’, not to “higher species” as in our ‘generic’.
► JOHN CORCORAN, MATT LAVINE, AND JUSTIN LEGAULT, Meanings of hypothesis.
Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA
E-mail:
corcoran@buffalo.edu
Newton’s Principia Mathematica famously denied “making hypotheses”. His frequently-quoted Latin sentence—“Hypotheses non fingo” (“I make no hypotheses”)—puzzles modern readers and prompts consideration of various interpretations of make and hypothesis.
A literature exists on how fingo (“I make”) could be taken and, in particular, what making could mean applied to hypotheses. Less exists on the ambiguous noun hypothesis—borrowed from Greek by both Latin and English, and with the same spelling. The Greek noun hupothesis is cognate with the verb hupotithenai (“to place-under”): hupo- (“under”); tithenai (“to place”). A Latin-based correlate is to suppose—often used to translate hupotithenai.
A dictionary used in Plato’s Academy defined hupothesis as “indemonstrable first principle” [1, p.1684]. Contemporaneously, Aristotle routinely used hupothesis in a completely different sense—for reductio assumptions in indirect deductions [3, pp. xxx, 210]. Ancient Greek exhibits other metaphorical uses of “to place-under” and literal uses abound.
We treat senses of hypothesis—and cognates such as hypothesize and hypothetical—emphasizing logic.
In logic hypothesis frequently indicates “open question”: continuum hypothesis, Goldbach hypothesis, and, formerly, Fermat hypothesis. In [2], a proposition is defined to be a hypothesis for a given person at a given time if it is neither known true nor known false by that person at that time.
We discuss other logic passages where hypothesis is interchangeable with one or more of several near synonyms: antecedent, assumption, axiom, condition, conjecture, postulate, premise, presupposition, supposition, theory, etc. Broader contexts add explanation, guess, hunch, inference, prediction, speculation, surmise, and others. The adjective, as in hypothetical situation or hypothetical proposition, has near synonyms such as conditional, consequent, imaginary, imagined, inferred, etc.
[1] JOHN COOPER (editor), Plato: Complete Works, Hackett, 1997.
[2] JOHN CORCORAN, Argumentations and logic, Argumentation, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 17-43.
[3] ROBIN SMITH, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Hackett, 1989.
END OF PUBLISHED ONE-PAGE PAPER
APPENDIX BY CORCORAN
Post. An. I.2 72a14–24
Barnes 1991
An immediate deductive principle I call a posit if one cannot prove it but it is not necessary for anyone who is to learn anything to grasp it; and one which it is necessary for anyone who is going to learn anything whatever to grasp, I call an axiom (for there are some such things); for we are accustomed to use this name especially of such things. A posit which assumes either of the parts of a contradiction—i.e., I mean, that something is or that something is not—I call a supposition; one without this, a definition. For a definition is a posit (for the arithmetician posits that a unit is what is quantitatively indivisible) but not a supposition (for what a unit is and that a unit is are not the same).
COMMENT: (1) Barnes translates hupothesis by “supposition”, which he mistakenly supposes to render Aristotle’s meaning. At least it contains ‘posit’ as a part as hupothesis contains thesis. (2) It is impossible for the English word ‘supposition’ to carry the meaning Aristotle needs here. A supposition is something someone supposes, not something every rational animal can know with certainty and without relying on previous certain knowledge. (3) It is impossible for the English word ‘posit’ to carry the meaning Aristotle needs here. A posit is something someone posits; positing something known would be like purchasing something one owns already.
Preus, A. 2007. Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
HYPOTHESIS. Ὑπόθεσις. Literally, something that is “put under.” (Hypo, under; plus thesis, that which is placed.) Widely used for all sorts of “proposals”. In the Meno (86e), Socrates describes (somewhat obscurely) a hypothetical method used by geometers and then suggests a parallel method for examining “virtue” (aretē) that involves the supposition that if virtue is knowledge (epistēmē), then it can be (or is) taught. In the Phaedo (100–101), Socrates again resorts to a hypothetical method that involves asserting a plausible hypothesis and examining its consequences until one finds that it leads to a contradiction. In the Republic (VII.533c, in the Line passage), dialectic is said to be the art that “eliminates hypotheses and proceeds to the first principle.” In the Parmenides, Parmenides describes the method of dialectic as examining both the hypothesis and its negation (136).
Aristotle uses the word hypothesis to refer to a fundamental presupposition; for example, he says that “the hypothesis of a democratic constitution is freedom” (Politics VI.2, 1317a40). He also often uses the word in a logical sense, either for a postulate (undemonstrated first principle) or for a proposition that is “proposed” for proof or refutation. Finally (in this rapid summary), in his discussion of necessity, hypothetical or conditional (ex hypotheseōs) necessity is contrasted with “simple” necessity (Physics II.9,
199b34; Parts of Animals I.1, 639b24).
COMMENT: (1) Preus does not mention the Platonic uses of ‘hupothesis’ for indemonstrable first principles [sc. axioms] in general or for certain kinds of axioms. (2) Preus does not mention anything problematic about Aristotle’s use of ‘hupothesis’ both for an axiom and for something not even settled. (3) Preus does not give us a clue as to how ‘hupothesis’ is used literally, for something that is “put under”. Is the foundation of the Parthenon ever called a ‘hupothesis’? Probably. Is the pillow put under the head of a sleeping baby ever called a ‘hupothesis’? Probably. Did any Greek text use ‘hupothesis’ literally? Yes: some examples would help. (4) Preus tells us that ‘hupothesis’ is “Widely used for all sorts of “proposals”’. Yet he does not give even one example of ‘hupothesis’ used for any sort of proposal. When Phillip proposed that Aristotle become little Alexander’s teacher, was the word ‘hupothesis’ appropriate? Yes. Greek dictionaries list dozens of uses of ‘hupothesis’ outside of logic and philosophy, where the word was used with metaphorical force. In order to understand a metaphorical use it is necessary to master the main literal uses.
Acknowledgements: Susanne Bobzien, George Boger, Carlo Cellucci, Joseph Corcoran, Willard Randorf Corcoran, Paolo Crivelli, Crissy Field, Joaquin Miller, Sriram Nambiar, Clifton Park, Anthony Preus, Roberto Torretti, Kevin Tracy, Blair Rhode, Margarita Rocas, and others. Special thanks to Anthony Preus, friend and colleague for over fifty years.
