Erik Nelson

I argue that a Kantian inspired investigation into animal morality is both a plausible and coherent research program. To show that such an investigation is possible, I argue that philosophers, such as Korsgaard, who argue that reason demarcates nonhuman animals from the domain of moral beings are equivocating in their use of the term 'rationality'. Kant certainly regards rationality as necessary for moral responsibility from a practical standpoint, but his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal means that he can only establish it as a marker for morality from a theoretical standpoint. This means that when it comes to evaluating the moral capabilities of others, rationality can be neither necessary nor sufficient for morality, leaving open the possibility of other empirical markers for moral responsibility. I argue that the higher faculties, character, implicit knowledge of universality, and antecedent practical pleasures (which provide a way to distinguish between morally motivated behaviour and other types of socially motivated behaviour) can all serve as empirical markers for morality. There is empirical evidence that at least some animals have conceptual capabilities and therefore the empirical marker of the higher faculties. In addition, there is suggestive evidence that merits further investigation for the other three markers. While this will not provide a definitive answer on whether animals are capable of acting morally, it will provide a Kantian outlook that can be used to evaluate empirical and philosophical work on animal morality.

While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual content. In contrast, I argue that Pepperberg's work with Alex (and other African grey parrots) provides evidence that the vocal articulations of at least some parrots have conceptual content. Using Frege's insight that numbers assert something about a concept, I argue that Alex's ability to answer the question "How many?" depended upon a prior grasp of conceptual content. Developing this claim, I argue that Alex's arithmetical abilities show that he was capable of using numbers as both concepts and objects. Frege's theoretical insight and Pepperberg's empirical work provide reason to reconsider the capabilities of parrots, as well as what sorts of tasks provide evidence for conceptual content.

Many philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament (the justification of deductive inferences). This paper will show that the demand for justification, for the very inferences that are required for justification, is deeply problematic. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. For Wittgenstein, two concepts are internally related if my understanding of one is predicated on my understanding of the other. Separating the two concepts so that one can be applied to the other is then a misunderstanding of role that these concepts play.

Alexander Livingston’s fascinating examination of William James’ work in Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of Pragmatism argues that “William James was an important and innovative theorist of politics.” Livingston claims that James’ anti-imperialist arguments in the letters, editorials, and speeches collected in the Nachlass are an important part of James’ philosophical corpus that provides a critical lens through which the rest of James’ work can be fruitfully read. Though Livingston is not the first to propose a political reexamination of James’ thought, his careful and systematic book-length work provides one of the strongest and most sustained arguments for a historical reinterpretation of James. In this review, I point out some of the strengths and limitations of Livingston's project.

Some philosophers claim that understanding a word requires one to understand its connection to other words. Using this claim, they have argued that talking animals, like parrots, are only capable of mere mimicry. Using Frege's insight into the structure of number concepts, I argue that nonhuman animals who can count or do basic arithmetic demonstrate that they understand these connections. The linguistic capabilities of humans are therefore less unique than we tend to think.

Over the last couple years I put together a list of advice for graduate students applying for a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) scholarship or grant. SSHRC proposals have a different set of norms and requirements  than many other other grants and scholarships, but I expect that many of these tips could also be helpful for other types of applications. I applied for a SSHRC scholarship four times before I was successful, and over the course of that time I took workshops, participated in writing groups, had many conversations with peers and mentors, and attended courses on how to write a SSHRC proposal. I have combined much of the advice I picked up along the way and combined it with approaches that worked for me personally (and others I know). I consider this a living document, so if you see any egregious omissions or shortcomings, do not hesitate contact me. I hope these tips can make the process somewhat less painful for other applicants.

This is a draft version of a syllabus for a philosophy course on cognitive science. Any suggestions or criticisms are certainly welcome, especially suggestions for ways I can include more women philosophers/scientists, philosophers/scientists of colour, etc. on the reading list.

Contemporary accounts of the possession conditions for basic logical concepts rely on either the subject being primitively compelled by transitions that are isomorphic to the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constant or the rules are an innate property of the subject’s language of thought. Drawing from Heidegger’s work in the philosophy of logic and Boghossian’s work on inference, I argue that any attempt to explain logical inference as a form of rule following will lead to arguments for the impossibility of logic or an infinite regress. An under-explored alternative to defining all inferences as instances of following a rule is to take some inferences as basic – inferences that do not follow rules and provide a starting point for our inferential practices. I propose that neural networks can provide a useful model for understanding basic inferences as a primitive ability since they show how one can infer in accordance with a logical principle without necessarily following a rule. Determining whether a subject possesses a basic logical concept is arrived at then by interpreting their inferential behaviour.

Common sense has often been unflatteringly defined as a grab-bag of unjustified beliefs and incoherent intuitions. Likewise, G. E. Moore’s work as the 20th Century’s champion of common sense philosophy is often regarded as little more than a historical curiosity, rife with arguments that are both unconvincing and question begging. In opposition to these claims, I will show that common sense beliefs and Moore have been unfairly overlooked and that a closer examination of his work will provide important epistemological insights. In “A Defence of Common Sense” Moore makes a list of common sense assertions that the non-philosopher would regard as obvious truths. The list asserts commonly accepted beliefs such as that he has a body and that objects exist outside his mind. The purpose of Moore's project was to reject the speculative claims of idealism as well as provide a response to skeptical worries about the justification of one’s most basic knowledge claims. While Moore invokes the notion of common sense to defend his list of beliefs he never bothers to define or defend the notion of common sense itself. In this paper I propose a definition for common sense beliefs as learned but not taught knowledge. Drawing on both Moore and the later Wittgenstein, I will show that common sense beliefs are  acquired through an interaction between the agent and the world and that they are necessary for the construction of further beliefs. This perspective on common sense beliefs can both provide a better defence of Moore's project and provide the tools through which a diagnosis of skeptical dilemmas can be reached.