Problem of Induction

The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion of these issues over the last several decades is a certain view of logic hammered out by Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Quine, and many others. Goodman’s nominalism hinges in essential ways on a certain view of formal logic with an extensional quantification theory at its core. This raises many issues, but the one issue most germane here is the conception of predicates ensconced in this view of logic. The problem here is the implicit assumption that there is just one type of first-order predicate. P...

Pragmatic responses to skepticism have been overlooked in recent decades.  This paper explores one such response by developing a character called the Pragmatic Skeptic.  The Pragmatic Skeptic accepts skeptical arguments for the claim that we lack good evidence for our ordinary beliefs, and that they do not constitute knowledge.  However, they do not think we should give up our beliefs in light of these skeptical conclusions.  Rather, we should retain them, since we have good practical reasons for doing so.  This takes the sting out of skepticism: we can be skeptics, of a kind, without thereby succumbing to practical or intellectual disaster.  I respond to objections, and compare the position of the Pragmatic Skeptic to views found in the work of (among others) David Hume, William James, David Lewis, Berislav Marusic, and Robert Pasnau.

The article provides a detailed account and elucidation of Karl Popper’s solution to Hume’s problem of induction. It is pointed out that the solution has two major aspects. The first, explicitly described by Popper as his solution to the problem of induction, is the replacement of the inductivist account of the development of empirical knowledge with the hypothetico-deductivist account. The second has to do with the problem of justification of the hypothetico-deductivist account (which replaces Hume’s problem of the justification of induction). This problem is shown to be dealt with within Popper’s-Bartley’s general solution to the problem of justification, usually described as «non-justificationism», which admits the impossibility of absolute definitive justification (for any position) and replaces the search for such justification with the evaluation of relative advantages/disadvantages of competing approaches, which can provide us with reasons to prefer or tentatively accept one of them.

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

Here I examine the way in which Russell tries to justify the inference from sense experience to the structural features of the external world by means of his five postulates. I first explain how logical constructions allow him to relate scientific theories to sense experience. Then I examine the weak form of realism he wants to defend, namely, epistemic structural realism. Finally, I show how, in Russell's view, the five postulates support the inference from sense experience to the abstract structure of the external wolrd.

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences.

David Stove was a philosopher strong on argument and polemic. His work on the logical intepretation of probability led to a defence of induction in The Rationality of Induction (1986). It resulted too in his denunciation of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyeraband as irrationalists because of their "deductivism" (the thesis that the only logic is deductive logic). Stove also defended controversial views on the intelligence of women and on Darwinism. The article surveys his life and work.

This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed (although into different directions) in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all, or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One may think of David Miller as a contemporary representative of what I consider as the ‘no solution’ version of critical rationalism, while Alan Musgrave stands for the version of ‘critical rationalist induction’. Popper’s own writings admit of either interpretation.

Hume's problem of induction not only asserts that inductive reasoning is circular, but it also implies the stronger claim that it is incapable of justification. Since matters of fact can only be known through experience, any claim of matter of fact can only be justified by recourse to experience, which commits the logical fallacy of circularity each time it attempts to do so. This paper explores Hume's problem and its implications for scientific reasoning. I will first give a brief explication of Hume's problem. Next, I will explore its implications for the scientific goals of explanation, prediction, and control, and whether these goals are capable of justification. Lastly, I will conclude with a pragmatic approach. I will explicitly avoid referring to my analysis as a solution but rather, as a pragmatic approach. I happen to find Hume’s argument persuasive, and I also agree with Hume that induction is incapable of justification insofar as it is circular. Thus, to the extent that solutions are aimed to solve the problem of circularity, I will avoid framing my analysis as such as to not represent it as something that solves the problem of circularity – because it does not.

From the very beginning of hinge epistemology, its advocates have noted certain similarities between Wittgenstein’s thought and that of Hume. They have also, however, accused Hume of ultimately remaining too sceptical and too metaphysical to be enlisted to the cause. I have defended Hume against the second charge
elsewhere. Here, I wish to focus on his epistemology and, more particularly, his account of justification. I shall argue that Hume’s account of how justification comes to an
end is proto-Wittgenstein in numerous respects. It is anti-sceptical without being rationalistic; it is accompanied by an account of how explanation comes to an end that places human practices and the animal behaviour that they grow  from at its centre; it is an early form of hinge epistemology. The first part of this essay is devoted to showing the Hume is a hinge epistemologist. The second half considers what kind of hinge epistemologist he is. The third and final part looks at what contemporary hinge epistemologists can learn from Hume.

In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises is just as worthy of belief as the scientist’s philosophical assumptions. If so, then the purely philosophical argument will also succeed. In part two I consider three motivations, each of which comprises a distinct philosophical methodology, for the opposing view: (1) the Moorean idea that common sense enjoys greater plausibility than philosophy; (2) case judgments should trump general principles; (3) reflective equilibrium and conservatism. I argue that all three motivations fail.

This is part II in a series of papers outlining Abstraction Theory, a theory that I propose provides a solution to the characterisation or epistemological problem of induction. Logic is built from first principles severed from language such that there is one universal logic independent of specific logical languages. A theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed which provides the basis for the dissolution of the 'grue' problem and problems of the non-uniqueness of probabilities in inductive logics. The problem of counterfactual conditionals is generalised to a problem of truth conditions of hypotheses and this general problem is then solved by the notion of abstractions. The probability calculus is developed with examples given. In future parts of the series the full decision theory is developed and its properties explored.

Hume's Problem of Induction has perplexed thinkers for centuries, and is commonly assumed to have no real solution: there is no way to logically justify drawing conclusions based on induction. But is it really irrational to rely on inductive reasoning?

Popper proposed falsificationism as a solution to the problem of induction. What was that problem and how does falsificationism purport to solve it? Is it a plausible solution?


Falsificationism, sometimes called critical empiricism is a branch of the critical rationalism in philosophy of science. It was originally advanced by Karl R. Popper, an Austrian-British philosopher and philosopher of science and is a further development of two fundamental problems in epistemology, which he describes in his main work “The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959)”. One of the two problems is the so-called “Hume’s problem of induction”, the question of the validity or the grounds of the general propositions of empirical science, especially the laws of nature. Although the problem of induction was formulated in empiricism, it is a problem of all philosophies or sciences that permit inductive inferences as proof procedures. It is a modern variant of nominalism, which denies the reasonable orders of rationalism, but also based on measurements generalizations of science, an observer-independent reality.

Aborder De la Certitude par le prisme de l’induction, ce serait apparemment mettre le doigt sur une convergence massive entre Wittgenstein et Hume. Nous nous efforçons de mettre en cause les présupposés d’une lecture humienne de ces notes en montrant que la réponse de Wittgenstein au scepticisme ne s’inspire ni d’une "solution sceptique" d’inspiration naturaliste, ni d’un naturalisme consistant qui se présenterait comme une réponse directe au scepticisme. Wittgenstein nous propose, plutôt qu’une reformulation du problème de l’induction, une remise en cause du problème lui-même : nous défendons par conséquent que ces notes peuvent être lues comme une mise en cause radicale de la menace agitée par Hume dans l’Enquête. Nous le montrons en distinguant deux versions de la dissolution du problème de l’induction que nous nommons faible – c’est la reformulation strawsonienne du problème (le problème de l’induction est dissous (par Hume) dans l’exacte mesure où il se confond avec le faux problème de sa justification, l’adoption d’un naturalisme pragmatique rend la justification rationnelle des procédures inductives dépourvue de sens, pour ce faire, nous mettons en relation les premiers écrits de Strawson son Introduction to Logical Theory avec les conférences plus tardives Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985), et forte – c’est la retraduction putnamienne du problème (dans « Strawson and Skepticism » et « Rethinking Mathematical Necessity »), selon laquelle on assiste bien plutôt à une remise en question du problème de l’induction lui-même. Putnam y montre en effet que la mise en cause de l’uniformité de la nature est radicalement incohérente.

The article discusses the problem of choosing between inductive methods in Rudolf Carnap’s inductive logic. It has been held that, if one has no background knowledge, there is no way to justify the use of one inductive method instead
of another one. Even the non-inductive method, which gives no regard to experience, cannot be considered worse than the inductivist methods giving regard to experience. However, it can be shown that, by using Carnap’s own
success criterion for inductive methods, there is an inductivist method which is to be preferred over the non-inductive method. The result will be compared to Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction.

No-free-lunch theorems are important theoretical result in the fields of
machine learning and artificial intelligence. Researchers in this fields
often claim that the theorems are based on Hume’s argument about
induction and represent a formalisation of the argument. This paper
argues that this is erroneous but that the theorems correspond to and
formalise Goodman’s new riddle of induction. To demonstrate the correspondence among the theorems and Goodman’s argument, a formalisation of the latter in the spirit of the former is sketched.

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve's reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson's argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.

I discuss Charles Pigden’s paper ‘Coercive theories of meaning, or why language shouldn’t matter (so much) to philosophy’ and ask whether theories of meaning whose primary purpose is to discredit rival philosophies as meaningless necessarily employ artificially narrow conceptions of meaningfulness.  In the course of my argument I ask whether the colloquial-rhetorical use of words like ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningless’ has made it difficulty for philosophers to see just how novel and radical their own accusations of talking nonsense are.

In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising.

›Bottom-up‹ and ›top-down‹ are common terms of methods in all sciences. However, both methods are not an invention of modern times, but rather have often been used in the history of science by synonyms and hypnoyms such as ›ascending‹ and ›descending‹, ›induction‹ and ›deduction‹, in order to describe and structure complex banks of knowledge. Paradigmatic for such a structuring are the medieval summa and the modern system. But, according to current research, such a summa has already been made in late antiquity by Dionysius the Areopagite; on the other hand, all modern system requirements were first fulfilled by Johann Gottlieb Fichteʼs ›Science of Knowing 1804‹. For that reason, the present study ›Summa and System‹ analyses the bottom-up- and top-down-methods in Dionys and Fichte, the prehistory of both methods and contrasts them with current models in philosophy of science. In doing so, it has been found that the first completed summa and the first completed system apply several methods, that are as yet unknown, in order to solve the problem of induction.

›Bottom-up‹ und ›top-down‹ sind heutzutage gängige Methodenbezeichnungen in allen Bereichen der Wissenschaft. Dennoch sind beide Methoden keine Entdeckung der Moderne, sondern wurden unter Begriffen wie beispielsweise ›Auf-‹ und ›Abstieg‹, ›Induktion‹ und ›Deduktion‹ in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte häufig verwendet, um komplexe Wissensbestände vollständig aufzuarbeiten und zu strukturieren. Paradigmatisch für eine derartige Aufarbeitung stehen die mittelalterliche Summa und das neuzeitliche System. Aktuellen Studien zufolge hat aber bereits Dionysius Areopagita in der Spätantike eine derartige Summe verfasst, während in der Neuzeit erst J. G. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre (1804) allen Systemansprüchen genügen konnte. Daher beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Studie mit den Auf- und Abstiegsmethoden bei Dionysius und Fichte, ihrer antiken Vorgeschichte und kontrastiert ihre Methoden mit der aktuellen Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Dabei zeigt sich, dass beide Autoren bei der Aufstiegs- bzw. bottom-up-Methode bislang unberücksichtigte Strategien zur Lösung des Induktionsproblems anwenden.

SOUZA, Pedro Bravo de. Hume, o Problema da Indução e a Falácia de Inversão de Quantificadores. In: MORAES, João Antonio de; ROGRIGUES, Fernando de Assis; PANTALEÃO, Nathália Cristina Alves. Tecnologias e Sociedade: Discussões Contemporâneas. São Paulo: FiloCzar, 2019

The article is an attempt to answer the question whether the
result of the connection between corroboration and verisimilitude is an inductive element in the Popperian methodology. For this purpose the essay collates Karl Popper’s view with David Hume’s scepticism and inductionism of Rudolf Carnap. Further on the paper analizes the ćompromising”(for inductionism and critical falsificationism) proposition of Evaldas Nekraˇsas. The article also contains a presentation of Imre Lakatos’ allegation of Popper’s scepticism and the accusation of inductionism as formulated by John Watkins. The study of the disputes between the philosophers leads to the conclusion that the critical views are baseless. The final hypothesis is that these are not the right ways of proving the allegations of crypto-inductionism.

Em "Deconstrucción de la irrealidad" (FARIA, 2002), encontramos não só um diagnóstico preciso da origem da tese irrealista tardia de Goodman, mas também uma sugestão de como, apesar do nominalismo de Goodman, podemos evitar a tese contra-intuitiva de que fazemos mundos ao fazer versões corretas de mundos. Se o entrincheiramento é a única resposta que temos para a caracterização da projetabilidade, parece então que teríamos de conviver com essa consequência irrealista. A sugestão de Paulo passa pelo enfrentamento do paradoxo das esmeraldas "verzuis" por meio de quaisquer restrições empíricas que possamos colocar à projetabilidade de predicados. Paulo Faria defende que a incorporação desse tipo de restrição, embora não implique a defesa de uma posição realista, especialmente aquilo que normalmente se chama de 'realismo metafísico', reflete o que Cora Diamond, na falta de um nome melhor, cunhou de 'espírito realista' ou, para usar a expressão do Paulo, uma atitude realista. A resistência de Goodman em adotar essa estratégia teria sido responsável pelo seu irrealismo. Neste artigo, tentarei defender que não há como se livrar completamente do entrincheiramento para caracterizar a projetabilidade de predicados, embora a restrição empírica sugerida por Paulo seja bem-vinda tanto quanto for possível alcançá-la, e que a atitude do Goodman em relação ao entrincheiramento revela mais realismo do que possa parecer a primeira vista.

Lorsque Goodman expose sa « nouvelle énigme de l’induction », il veut la distinguer d’un vieux problème, celui de la justification du principe d’uniformité de la nature : peut-on montrer que le futur ressemblera au passé, et que ce qui vaut jusqu’aujourd'hui comme loi de la nature continuera de valoir comme tel à l’avenir ? C’est avec toutes ces vieilles questions que Goodman entend rompre, en posant la question des généralisations légitimes et des prédicats projectibles. A quelles conditions, et pour quelles raisons, peut-on dire que certaines généralisations sont confirmables par leurs instances observées (i.e. nomologiques), contrairement à d’autres qui sont pourtant empiriquement équivalentes ? Il ne s’agit plus de donner un fondement à l’induction, mais de trouver un critère précis pour distinguer les hypothèses qu’on peut légitimement induire de celles dont l’induction serait absurde. Ainsi présentée, la thèse de Goodman apparaît double. (A) D’une part, il existe un second problème de l’induction, distinct de l’ancien, mais qui reste un authentique problème de l’induction. (B) D’autre part, ce problème est soluble par la définition d’un critère de confirmation empirique, qui permet de distinguer les généralisations susceptibles d’être confirmées par leurs instances, des généralisations non-nomologiques. Nous voulons montrer qu’on ne peut pas à la fois (A) poser le nouveau problème de l’induction et (B) chercher un critère de distinction des hypothèses nomologiques et non nomologiques. En effet, si l’on confronte plusieurs hypothèses ou généralisations à partir des mêmes observations, alors elles doivent être toutes aussi nomologiques les unes que les autres. Inversement, si l’on se donne des hypothèses ou généralisations qui ne sont pas toutes nomologiques, on ne peut pas les comparer au sein d’une même induction, ni donc poser l’énigme de Goodman. Le problème posé en (A) ne trouve donc pas de solution adéquate en (B). Et comme nous acceptons la thèse (A) et l’existence d’un problème goodmanien de l’induction, nous nierons qu’on puisse le résoudre par le type de solutions envisagées en (B). Nous finirons donc par formuler ce problème et le type de solution que, selon nous, il appelle.

When Goodman put forward his “New Riddle of Induction”, he distinguished if from the old problem of justifying the so-called “Principle of Uniformity of Nature”: proving that the future will resemble the past, and that still standing lawful regularities will continue to hold. He intended to break with these ancient questions, while asking about lawlike generalizations and projectible predicates instead: how are we to separate those generalizations which are rightfully confirmed by their observed instances (i.e. nomological) and those accidental ones which are nonetheless empirically equivalent? One shall not seek a ground for induction anymore, but a criterion for nomological hypothesis. Therefore Goodman’s claim seems twofold: (A) one has to face a second problem of induction, which is distinct from the old one while genuinely being a problem about induction, and (B) this new problem is solvable by a criterion of empirical confirmability, which discriminates nomological from accidental generalizations. We claim that one cannot genuinely (A) face this new problem of induction while (B) looking for such a criterion. Indeed, we argue, when one compares several hypothesis or generalizations on the same observational basis, then they must appear as equally nomological. Conversely, if one is considering hypothesis or generalizations which are not equally nomological, then one is actually unable to compare them on the same observational basis, hence to formulate the “New Riddle”. Therefore the issue raised in (A) cannot be adequately solved in (B). Yet we do accept the claim (A) that a new and distinct problem of induction is to be confronted. Thus we deny that (B) offer an adequate type of solutions to this problem, which we shall finally formulate in a more suitable manner.

En esta sesión (de una versión) del curso optativo de Lógica inductiva examinamos los prospectos del bayesianismo para responder al problema de Hume vis-à-vis algunos resultados empíricos que sugieren que las reconstrucciones bayesianas ofrecen descripciones erróneas del razonamiento humano (en especial, debido a los sesgos cognitivos).

I discuss Charles Pigden’s paper ‘Coercive theories of meaning, or why language shouldn’t matter (so much) to philosophy’ and ask whether theories of meaning whose primary purpose is to discredit rival philosophies as meaningless necessarily employ artificially narrow conceptions of meaningfulness.  In the course of my argument I ask whether the colloquial-rhetorical use of words like ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningless’ has made it difficulty for philosophers to see just how novel and radical their own accusations of talking nonsense are.

Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and about ourselves and other living things as a part of the universe, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we need to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme, inherited from the past, that is still built into the institutional/intellectual structure of academic inquiry in the 21st century.  In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom.  The outcome would be what we so urgently need: a kind of inquiry rationally designed and devoted to helping us make progress towards a genuinely civilized world.  We would succeed in doing what the Enlightenment tried but failed to do: learn from scientific progress how to go about making social progress towards as good a world as possible.

This paper considers Norton’s Material Theory of Induction. The material
theory aims inter alia to neutralize Hume’s Problem of Induction. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the material theory's capacity to achieve this end. After pulling apart two versions of the theory, I argue that neither version satisfactorily neutralizes the problem.

Within the mystical experience itself we can no more prescind from the problem associated with the notion of causality than from any other state of human affairs. In other words, mystical experience is no more exempt from logical problematics-simply because it deals with the individual in relation to the Absolute-than any other type of experience, and any epistemological attempt to render this account coherent must sooner or later come to terms with the Problem of Induction. Let us first, however, be clear about the problem before we begin to address it. The sequence of events within which we are accustomed to discern any causal relation, such that the effect perceived is construed to be in necessary relation to a perceived cause-which is to say as invested with the same type of logical cogency that obtains between premises and conclusions-essentially result from what David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding had called a "customary conjunction", a kind of psychological reflex conditioned by the perceived regular succession of contiguous events. The implications of this type of putative association are profound, and critical to our examination of the concatenation of events we find occurring within the mystical experience. Let us be more to the point. With no disconfirming instance occurring within our experience of any sequence of events that appear to instantiate a regular succession, we interpret what are essentially two separate and unrelated events-or events related only through observation-as causally conjoined and therefore necessarily related. A simple analogy will, I think, suffice.

--

Citation information: Feldbacher-Escamilla, C. J., Gebharter, A., Brössel, B., & Werning, M. (2020). Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition” [Introduction]. Synthese. Synthese, 197(4), 1381-1390. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02334-2

Цель статьи — реконструкция концептуальных оснований содержащегося в «Трактате о человеческой природе» Давида Юма проекта оригинальной социологии. Ядром юмианской социологии является детально разработанное учение об аффектах, которое при знакомстве с наследием великого шотландского мыслителя обычно остается вне поля зрения как эпистемологов, так и представителей социальных наук. Учение об аффектах Юма содержит все необходимые ключи к пониманию истинных замыслов, задач и масштабов его социологической мысли. В центре внимания юмианского учения об аффектах находятся вопросы влияний, наблюдаемых в отношениях между эмоциональной составляющей природы человека и многообразными формами его практических действий. По мнению Юма, способность воображения, оперирующая над идеями, сама по себе не может снабжать агента набором регулярных и единообразных практик. Подлинной основой любых привычных форм действия агента всегда являются эмоции и аффекты. Влияния эмоций и аффектов на агента различно по своему характеру: эмоции как первичные впечатления (впечатления ощущений) инициируют действия совершаемые агентом, аффекты же как вторичные впечатления (впечатления рефлексии) придают этим действиям регулярную и единообразную форму. Именно аффекты определяют характер и структуру привычек агента и позволяют избегать традиционных логических затруднений при решении загадки индукции. Привычка не возникает как простой результат многократных совершений тех или иных действий, а формируется пристрастиями действующего агента. На фоне бурно растущего в современных социальных науках интереса к различным практико-ориентированным теориям и концепциям юмианская социология обретает актуальное прочтение, демонстрируя силу своих аргументов и способность стать новым значимым источником теоретических интуиций.

Eines der Merkmale, welches die Evolution in der Natur so verblüffend erscheinen lässt, ist die Tatsache, dass sie Pflanzen und Tiere hervorbringt, die durch ihren außerordentlich hohen Grad von Zweckangepasstheit den Eindruck erwecken, als wären sie von einem intelligenten Wesen erfunden worden. Dass die Philosophen, bevor in Form der Evolutionstheorie eine wissenschaftliche Erklärung für dieses verblüffende Phänomen zur Verfügung stand, darin gerne einen Hinweis auf die Existenz eines Schöpfergottes sehen wollten, ist daher nicht einmal unverständlich. Zugleich verweist die aus heutiger Sicht naive Vorstellung vom intelligenten Schöpfergott auf eine der zentralen philosophischen Fragestellungen im Zusammenhang mit der Evolutionstheorie: Wie ist es möglich, dass ein evolutionärer Prozess, dessen Fortgang durch die Wirkung dreier simpler Komponenten, nämlich die Reproduktion, Variation und Selektion von Genen, vorangetrieben wird, genuin kreative Leistungen hervorbringt? Oder kurz: Wie können evolutionäre Prozesse Neuheit schaffen?