Deduction

► JOHN CORCORAN, What syllogisms are: three views, eight centuries.
Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA
E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu
  At issue is the nature of “the syllogisms” in Prior Analytics [1]. For centuries from the 1200s, the dominant view was enshrined in the medieval mnemonic “Barbara-Celarent” [2]: syllogisms are certain valid premise-conclusion arguments commonly mislabeled “inferences”.  In the mid-1900s many modern logicians adopted a contrary view credited to Jan Łukasiewicz [3]: syllogisms are certain true universal propositions informally called “implications”. A fruitful two-sided debate ensued producing evidence weakening the Łukasiewicz case.
  Toward the last quarter of the 1900s, a third contender appeared. Independently, John Corcoran [4] and Timothy Smiley [5] took the class of syllogisms to exclude propositions while including not only the valid arguments recognized as syllogisms in medieval times but also deductions establishing validity. A deduction contains, over and above premises and conclusion of an argument, a chain of reasoning showing that the conclusion’s information is contained in that of the premises. The debate became three-sided for twenty years or more.
  The Łukasiewicz view lacks current defenders leaving the debate to the medieval and Corcoran-Smiley views.
  This study details all three views—emphasizing their differences. For example, the medieval syllogisms are valid but ‘true’ does not apply to them, though their premises and conclusions are all true or false. The Łukasiewicz syllogisms are all true but the term ‘valid’ as applied to arguments is inappropriate. The Corcoran-Smiley syllogisms cannot be said to be true in the sense applicable to propositions but they are all valid in the sense that their conclusions follow from their premises. Moreover, many of them containing chains of reasoning are “cogent” [6] in an epistemic sense not applicable either to the Łukasiewicz or to the medieval syllogisms.
  [1] ROBIN SMITH, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Hackett, 1989. 
  [2] JOHN CORCORAN, DANIEL NOVOTNÝ, AND KEVIN TRACY,  Deductions and Reductions Decoding Syllogistic Mnemonics, Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review,  vol.2 (2018), pp. 5–39.
  [3] JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, Aristotle’s syllogistic, Oxford UP, 1951.
  [4] JOHN CORCORAN, Aristotle’s Prototype Rule-based Underlying Logic, Logica Universalis, vol. 2 (2018) pp. 9-35.
  [5] TIMOTHY SMILEY, What is a Syllogism?, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 2 (1973) pp. 136–154.
[6] JOHN CORCORAN, Argumentations and logic, Argumentation, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 17–43.

The tenant of a residential lease is under duty to pay rent regularly, on time and in full as required by section 4 (5) (a) of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. Failure to pay rent on time or withholding rent is a material breach and may lead to the cancellation of lease or the landlord's refusal to renew it.

“Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds.  Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.

This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols.
It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes.
To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic.
Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition that is defended by traditionalists. But it is also viewed as analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of “Aristotelian” traditional logic. But even if “genuine” logic comes to be regarded as excluding second-order reasoning, which seems less likely today than fifty years ago, its effectiveness as a heuristic instrument will remain and its importance for understanding the history of logic and mathematics will not be diminished.
Second-order logic may someday be gone, but it will never be forgotten.
Technical formalisms have been avoided entirely in an effort to reach a wide audience, but every effort has been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor.
People who do not know second-order logic cannot understand the modern debate over its legitimacy and they are cut-off from the heuristic advantages of second-order logic.  And, what may be worse, they are cut-off from an understanding of the history of logic and thus are constrained to have distorted views of the nature of the subject.  As Aristotle first said, we do not understand a discipline until we have seen its development.  It is a truism that a person's conceptions of what a discipline is and of what it can become are predicated on their conception of what it has been.

In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction,
induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how
Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction,
induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding
them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better
understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions
between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical
and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between
mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison
between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers’ view of
mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries.

Reasoning by analogy is one of the most frequently used techniques of legal argument. In this Article, Professor Brewer presents a detailed model of that reasoning process. With its focus on the special features of analogies that are offered as justificatory arguments, Professor Brewer's model provides clear criteria that lawyers, judges, students, and scholars can use critically to assess any given argument by analogy. Moreover, challenging a widely held view, Professor Brewer uses this model to argue that legal reasoning by analogy, like analogical argument in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences, can have a great deal of rational force when properly executed. He explains that reasoning by analogy is a three-step rule-guided process that legal reasoners typically deploy when they are in doubt about the scope of a legal concept or rule and want to use an analysis of examples to help resolve that doubt. The three-step process consists of an inference (of the type known as "abduction") from chosen examples to a rule that could resolve the doubt; confirmation or disconfirmation, by a process of reflective adjustment, of the rule thus inferred; and application of the confirmed rule to the case that occasioned the doubt. Professor Brewer also highlights the interpretive criteria that readers of analogical arguments should use in trying to understand their exact structure and content. He maintains, for example, that analogical arguments offered by judges who endorse certain widely shared rule of law values should presumptively be interpreted as relying in a special way on deductively applicable rules within the broader three-step analogical reasoning process. His discussion locates issues regarding the proper interpretation of legal analogies within broader jurisprudential debates over the extent to which legal arguments can, do, and should satisfy rule of law values.

This chapter situates Mill’s System of Logic (1843/1872) in the context of some of the meta-logical themes and disputes characteristic of the 19th century as well as Mill’s empiricism. Particularly, by placing the Logic in relation to Whately’s (1827) Elements of Logic and Mill’s response to the “great paradox” of the informativeness of syllogistic reasoning, the chapter explores the development of Mill’s views on the foundation and function of, and the relation between, ratiocination and induction. It provides a survey of the Mill-Whewell debate on the nature of induction, Mill’s account of putatively a priori disciplines such as the science of number, and Frege’s criticisms of the Logic as psychologistic.

Dans les Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, Descartes fonde sa première théorie de la science sur deux « actes de l’intellect » : intuitus et deductio. Au moment de définir le concept d’intuition, Descartes précise qu’il en fait un « usage nouveau », qui ne doit pas être confondu avec la signification courante qu’on lui a donnée dans les Écoles. L’exposition de ses premières découvertes scientifiques impliquerait donc une noétique différente de celle que lui ont enseignée ses maîtres jésuites. Reprenant un mot ancien, Descartes lui donne une signification neuve et un rôle inédit dans l’édifice de la connaissance humaine. Mais on n’a pas toujours compris le sens historique et philosophique de cette démarcation : de qui et de quoi Descartes entend-il se démarquer ? Et qu’y avait-il au juste de nouveau dans l’usage qu’il proposait ? Notre enquête propose de retracer l’histoire de cette idée d’intuition intellectuelle au cours de l’âge classique, chez les premiers lecteurs des Regulae, Malebranche, Locke, dans les entrées des dictionnaires et des encyclopédies du XVIIIe siècle, dans les nouveaux manuels de logique inspirés de Locke. Nous retraçons cette histoire jusqu’à ce que Kant, en 1770, semble y mettre le point final, en affirmant qu’il n’y a pas en l’homme de connaissance intuitive intellectuelle. Pourtant, et c’est tout le paradoxe, lorsque Kant formule ce constat d’échec, le mot même d’intuition s’est enfin, et pour la première fois, imposé dans le vocabulaire philosophique européen.

Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.

In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction, induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction, induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers’ view of mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries.

The Laws of Thought is an exploration of the deductive and inductive foundations of rational thought. The author here clarifies and defends Aristotle’s Three Laws of Thought, called the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction and Exclusion of the Middle – and introduces two more, which are implicit in and crucial to them: the Fourth Law of Thought, called the Principle of Induction, and the Fifth Law of Thought, called the Principle of Deduction. This book is a thematic compilation drawn from past works by the author over a period of eighteen years.

This paper is part of a larger collection of papers, namely: Eleatic Ontology: origin and reception. Tome 1.1. Galgano, N. and Cherubin, R. (eds.), Part 2 -- https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/FilosofiaClassica/issue/view/1583.

During the fifth century BCE Parmenides had many and qualified readers, among whom Zeno, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Melissus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias.
Three of them tried to do much more than what he was able to do with the ‘deductive exercise’ we encounter in 28B8.1-33 (or, in the case of Melissus, with the whole doctrine of being), and they succeeded. Indeed, that they strived to overcome the high standard already reached by Parmenides in the invention of strictly deductive passages is basically out of the question.
My paper is devoted to account for the ambitious aims Zeno, Melissus, and Gorgias attained, each in a very distinguished manner.

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences.

ABSTRACT: This paper contends that Stoic logic (i.e. Stoic analysis) deserves more attention from contemporary logicians. It sets out how, compared with contemporary propositional calculi, Stoic analysis is closest to methods of backward proof search for Gentzen-inspired substructural sequent logics, as they have been developed in logic programming and structural proof theory, and produces its proof search calculus in tree form. It shows how multiple similarities to Gentzen sequent systems combine with intriguing dissimilarities that may enrich contemporary discussion. Much of Stoic logic appears surprisingly modern: a recursively formulated syntax with some truth-functional propositional operators; analogues to cut rules, axiom schemata and Gentzen's negation-introduction rules; an implicit variable-sharing principle and deliberate rejection of Thinning and avoidance of paradoxes of implication. These latter features mark the system out as a relevance logic, where the absence of duals for its left and right introduction rules puts it in the vicinity of McCall's connexive logic. Methodologically, the choice of meticulously formulated meta-logical rules in lieu of axiom and inference schemata absorbs some structural rules and results in an economical, precise and elegant system that values decidability over completeness.

Since its inception, logic has studied the acceptable rules of reasoning, the rules that allow us to pass from certain statements, serving as premises or assumptions, to a statement taken as a conclusion.
The first kinds of such rules were distilled by Aristotle and are known as moduses. Stoics ramified Aristotle’s system, and for centuries, the syllogistic remained the main tool for logical deduction.
With the birth of formal logic, new types of deduction emerged, and to support this new kind of inference, the deductive systems were used. Since then, the deductive systems have been at the heart of logical investigations. In one form or the other, they are used in all branches of logic.
Contemporary understanding of science, as a theory of a high degree of exactness, requires treating it as a deductive theory (a deductive system). Generally speaking, such a theory (system) is a set of its sentential expressions which are derivable (deducible) from some expressions of the set selected as axioms, by means of deduction (inference) rules. The expressions obtained as a result of derivation from a given set of expressions are consequences; that is, they have a proof. The principal feature of deductive systems (theories) is the deducibility or provability of their theorems. From a verygeneral point of view, there are two m ethods of deduction: (a) the axiomatic method (Hilbert style
method) and (b) the natural deduction method (Jaśkowski–Słupecki–Borkowski, Gentzen or semantic tableaux). Method (b) leads to natural deduction systems, while the most often used method (a) leads to
presentation (or characterization) of logical and mathematical theories as axiomatic deductive systems.
Methods (a) and (b) are used in different scientific disciplines, such as physics, chemistry, sociology, philosophical and psychological sciences, information sciences, discursive sciences, computer science,
and some technical sciences.
Deductive sciences have not always been built explicitly as axiomatic systems. Depending on the degree of methodological precision, three of their forms have been distinguished: pre-axiomatic, non-formalized axiomatic, and formalized axiomatic. As we know, a pre-axiomatic form was commonly used in arithmetic and geometry, and later in set theory and probability theory. Their axiomatization was carried out only at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. In contrast, such mathematical theories as the Boolean system and theories of groups, rings, and fields were built as formalized axiomatic systems since inception. The deductive method (calculi) is most often used for formalizations of theories, but these theories also admit formalization as natural deductive systems. Formalized axiomatic systems are rooted in a tradition originated by G. Frege (1891, 1903), but the first axiomatic system (non-formalized) in the history of science—as it was disclosed by Jan Łukasiewicz in his seminal monograph on Aristotle’s syllogistic (1951)—was Aristotle’s syllogistic system.
J. Łukasiewicz initiated the construction of the first systems of syllogistic satisfying the contemporary requirements, and thus, the requirements of formalized axiomatic systems. He constructed a formalization of syllogistic logic on two levels using (in addition to the commonly used axiomatic method by means of proof) a new axiomatic method by means of rejection—the so-called axiomatic rejection, or refutation, method. He and his disciples (mainly J. Słupecki and his collaborators) applied this method to the bi-level formalization of
some classical and non-classical logical deductive systems of sentences or names. This approach allows one to define two disjoint sets of language expressions of a given system: the set of all its theses (theorems), which are asserted, accepted, intuitively true expressions (called the assertion system), and the set of all the other expressions—non-accepted, or intuitively false, refuted, rejected expressions of the system (called the rejection or the refutation system). In such a way, the bi-level formalization of deductive systems provides some new inspiration to build different sciences.
This book is a collection of articles included in the special issue “Deductive Systems” of Axioms regarding mainly the logical deductive system. They are ordered in accordance with the well-known division of logic into term logic (logic of names) and propositional logic (propositional calculus), which correspond to two historical stages of the development of logic, namely, Aristotelian logic and the logic of stoics, with the latter being a contemporary counterpart of propositional logic. Deductive systems for classical propositional logic are broadly known, and one of them is most often assumed for the term logics. Systems for non-classical propositional logics, which are inspired by philosophy, are introduced in the book later than systems related to term logics. Term logic can be interpreted in predicate logic, that is, the second part of contemporary logic. Predicate logic is the basis of
mathematical deductive systems (theories).

Corcoran, J. 1989. Argumentations and Logic. Argumentation 3: 17-43

Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved.  These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract.  Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described.  Perennial philosophic problems, epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective.  So much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumentations that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity.

KEY WORDS: hypothesis, theorem, argumentation, proof, deduction, premise-conclusion argument, valid, inference, implication, epistemic, ontic, cogent, fallacious, paradox, formal, validation.

“Argumentations and Logic” has been used in courses at University of Barcelona, Bryn Mawr College, University of Buffalo, Buffalo State College, State University of Campinas, Canisius College, Federal University of Goiás, Fredonia University, Grand Valley State University, University of Lausanne, Niagara University, University of Santiago de Compostela, SUNY Potsdam, and elsewhere.
It has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, and Persian. Insha’Allah, in the fullness of time there will be translations into Chinese and Czech.

The life of the law is, and should be, logic suffused by experience and experience tempered by logic. That is the principal proposition I defend in this essay.

It is now a commonplace that Holmes's declaration "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" is, as Thomas Grey has said, the "central slogan of legal modernism.'" Holmes first offered it in 1880 in a review of C. C. Langdell's book on contracts,' and he repeated itprO.!1Jine.ntly at the opening of The Common Law. published in the same year, where it serves as part of an extended admonition about the limitations of "logic" in the best explanation of common law doctrines: 
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law. To accomplish that task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to 'show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it 'is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious; even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a hook, of mathematics. 
I refer to this basic thesis as Holmes's "anti-logic." The anti-logic thesis is not a passing fancy on Holmes's part. Rather, he maintained and repeated it (though not always in the same words) for at least twenty-five years, from the 1880 review of Langdell's book to his 19.05 dissent in Lochner v. New York, in which he declared: "[Gleneral propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise." The anti-logic thesis is, of course, also a major emphasis in his essay of The Path of the Law. I detail Holmes's anti-logic thesis in part I of this chapter and challenge it in several respects in part II.

Introduce students to inductivist and deductivist models of science (all of which, Haack will argue, fail, and for related reasons. It doesn't follow, however, as radical sociologists of science imagined, that science isn't a rational enterprise... but that's for a later lecture.

Το διασημότερο απόσπασμα του Γενικού Σχολίου ξεκινά με την περίφημη εξαγγελία «hypotheses non fingo», αναφορικά με τον «λόγο (reason), την εξήγηση για τις ιδιότητες της βαρύτητας στις οποίες έχει αναφερεθεί αμέσως προηγουμένως ο Νεύτων: κατά κύριο λόγο, πρόκειται για την συμπεριφορά της βαρύτητας σύμφωνα με τον νόμο αντιστρόφου τετραγώνου, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του κεντρικού («κεντρομόλου») και παγκόσμιου-καθολικού χαρακτήρα της, και της αναλογίας της με τις ποσότητες ύλης (μάζες) των αλληλεπιδρώντων σωμάτων. Αυτό διότι, κατά τον ίδιο, ό,τι δεν «παράγεται (is deduced) από «φαινόμενα», θα πρέπει να αποκαλείται υπόθεση. Και δεν έχει μπορέσει -«μέχρι στιγμής»- να παραγάγει από φαινόμενα έναν τέτοιο «λόγο». Ενώ οι «υποθέσεις», ακόμη και αν είναι «φυσικές» ή «μηχανικές», δεν έχουν θέση στην «πειραματική φιλοσοφία». Στην (φυσική) φιλοσοφία αυτού του είδους, όπου ο ίδιος αυτοτοποθετείται, οι προτάσεις «παράγονται» από «φαινόμενα» και γενικεύονται μέσω επαγωγής. Κοινά παραδεκτές (τουλάχιστον για τότε) ποιότητες όπως η αδιαπερατότητα ή η κινητικότητα των σωμάτων, καθώς και νόμοι που τις διέπουν -όπως οι νόμοι της κίνησης που ο ίδιος διατύπωσε, καθώς και ο επίμαχος νόμος της βαρύτητας- έχουν ανακαλυφθεί με τέτοια μέθοδο, σημειώνει. Τελειώνοντας το απόσπασμα, βεβαιώνει πως είναι αρκετό ότι η βαρύτητα υπάρχει πραγματικά, δρα σύμφωνα με τους νόμους που έχει ο ίδιος παρουσιάσει, και επαρκεί ως εξήγηση όλων των κινήσεων, τόσο στην ουράνια όσο και στη γήινη σφαίρα -τις οποίες με αυτό τον τρόπο ενοποίησε. Η εξαγγελία του Νεύτωνα περί «υποθέσεων», και γενικότερα το υπό συζήτηση απόσπασμα, θα πρέπει ίσως, μέχρι ορισμένου βαθμού, να ιδωθεί υπό το φως μιας διάκρισης μεταξύ θεωρησιακής (speculative) και πειραματικής (experimental) φυσικής φιλοσοφίας. Η συνήθης κατανόηση της εναντίωσης του Νεύτωνα στις «υποθέσεις» τον παρουσιάζει ως κάποιον που αποφεύγει να βασιστεί στον θεωρησιακό και θεωρούμενο ως γνω-σιολογικά προβληματικό (στο πεδίο της φυσικής φιλοσοφίας, τουλάχιστον) a priori στοχασμό, και αντ΄ αυτού προχωρά με αυστηρό τρόπο από εμπειρικά παρατηρησιακά και πειραματικά δεδομένα («φαι-νόμενα») σε συμπεράσματα καλά θεμελιωμένα σε τέτοια δεδομένα, αποκλείοντας και απορρίπτοντας επισφαλείς εικασίες -ακόμη και αν αυτές θα εξηγούσαν τα δεδομένα, αν ήταν αληθείς. Προτείνεται ένα ιδεώδες εμπειρικής «απόδειξης», όπως φαίνεται να αξιώνει ο όρος «παραγωγή (deduction)». Ενώ ό,τι δεν πληροί τις προδιαγραφές που τίθενται από ένα τέτοιο ιδεώδες, θα πρέπει να εξοβελίζεται από την («πειραματική») φιλοσοφία. Θα δούμε ότι υπάρχουν περιορισμοί σε μια τέτοια αξίωση, καθώς και σε μια αντίστοιχη ανάγνωση του Νεύτωνα. Ωστόσο, δεν θα παρεκκλίνουμε πολύ από μια παρόμοια ερμηνευτική κατεύθυνση, καθότι, εκτός του ότι είναι αρκετά συνήθης, δίνει μια καλή αφετηρία για στοχασμό γύρω από τη μέθοδο, και οδηγεί με φυσικό τρόπο στις κατάλληλες γνωσιολογικές αλλά και ιστορικές «διορθώσεις» της απλουστευτικής εικόνας.

Özet

Bu makalenin konusunu TCK md. 188/2’de düzenlenen uyuşturucu madde ihracı suçunda mahsup hükmü oluşturmaktadır.
Bu kapsamda söz konusu hükmün niteliği, ne bis in idem ve ne bis poena in idem ilkeleri bağlamında ortaya konulmuş,
uyuşturucu madde ihraç ve ithali eylemlerinin ayniyeti tespit edilmiş, TCK’nın mahsuba dair 16, 63 ve 188/2
hükümleri arasındaki ilişkiye açıklık getirilmiş, uyuşturucu madde ihracı suçunda mahsubun koşulları ele alınmıştır.
Yapılan inceleme sonucunda; ne bis in idem kuralının düzenlendiği TCK md. 9-13 arasındaki hükümlerin ve 188/2’nin
tarafı olduğumuz uluslararası sözleşmelerle uyumlu olduğu, yurt dışında infaz edilen bedensel cezalarla ilgili özel düzenlemelere
gereksinim olduğu, Türkiye ile arasında ikili ya da çok taraflı sözleşme bulunmayan ülkeler bakımından
müsadere kararlarının tanınması konusundaki boşluğun doldurulması gerektiği ve 188/2 hükmünün anayasaya uygun
yorum gereğince Türkiye’ye uyuşturucu madde ithal suçunda da uygulanabileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Abstract
This article is concerned with the deduction of punishments for the export of narcotic substances regulated under
the article 188/2 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC). Within this scope, nature of the given provision is revealed in
the light of ne bis in idem and ne bis poena in idem principles, sameness of importation and exportation acts of
drug substance is ascertained, the relationship between the provisions under 16, 63 and 188/2 of the Turkish Penal
Code on deduction are clarified, and conditions of deduction in drug substance exportation offense are discussed.
As a result of the perusal performed, it is concluded that the provisions regarding ne bis in idem regulated under
the articles between 9 and 13 in the Turkish Penal Code and 188/2 are in compliance with the international treaties
we are a party of, that there is a need for special regulations on corporal punishments executed abroad, that it is
required to fill the gaps on recognizing the confiscation from the point of the states which there are no treaties with
neither mutually nor multilaterally and that pursuant to the interpretation of provision 188/2 in conformance with
the constitution it can also be applied for importing drugs to Turkey offense.

The syllogistic mnemonic known by its first two words Barbara Celarent introduced a constellation of terminology still used today. This concatenation of nineteen words in four lines of verse made its stunning and almost unprecedented appearance around the beginning of the thirteenth century—before or during the lifetimes of the logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, both of whom owe it their lasting places of honor in the history of syllogistic. The mnemonic, including the theory or theories it encoded, was prominent if not dominant in syllogistics for the next 700 years until a new paradigm was established in the 1950s by the great polymath Jan Łukasiewicz,

Literal and figurative speech are important fundamentals that language is composed of and to understand the figurative speech it needs to be comprehended through the literal meaning. However, literal speech can be understood differently due to an obstacle that deceives the linguistic words from apprehending the real meaning of them. Scholars have indulged into the interpretation of the figurative speech with a different method of approaches.
The topic being is among the ongoing dispute in the circle of Islamic scholars. In this shorten article, by using dissimilar Islamic references I will highlight the definition and the problematic issues related to the topic, such as classification of the figurative speech and so on, as I will uncover the impact of the literal and figurative speech on legal verdict deduction and its influences in the legal science.

In this response to Bloch et al., after thanking them for their careful work exploring what's wrong with modus morons, Haack poses a series of more philosophical questions about the grounds of logic---questions she believes are beyond the scope of the "philosophical proof theory" they adopt. She also explains how her approach to relativism differs from Paul Boghossian's apparently much less nuanced critique.

One the themes of classical Pragmatism, at least in Peirce's and Vailati's philosophy, is the cognitive role of deductive inference. Is deduction a source of knowledge? The answer seems to be in the positive when it is claimed that deductive inference draws the consequences of our hypotheses and brings them to the test of experience. I basically agree with this claim, but I also think that a careful analysis is needed on what we mean in this context by "source" and "knowledge" in particular. We must distinguish, as Vailati did, heuristic from epistemic value. Making deductive predictions does not amount to acquiring knowledge, but it certainly has heuristic value. So, deduction is not a source of knowledge if by "source" we mean a necessary or a sufficient condition of it, but it is a source of knowledge if we mean something like a heuristic device.

We claim that abduction should primarily be studied from the perspective of its use. The big question "What is abduction?" is most often interpreted substantively and this distracts attention from the instrumental aspect of this form of reasoning. We propose to address the problem by asking "How abduction is used?". As a result of our approach we see the fact that abduction needs to be construed as concerned with both generation and evaluation of hypotheses, and, furthermore, that abduction is a compound form of reasoning.

Descartes claimed that he thought he could deduce the assumptions of his Meteorology by the contents of the Discourse. He actually began the Meteorology with assumptions. The content of the Discourse, moreover, does not indicate how he deduced the assumptions of the Meteorology. We seem to be left in a precarious position. We can examine the text as it was published, independent of Descartes’ claims, which suggests that he incorporated a presumptive or hypothetical method. On the other hand, we can take Descartes’
claims as our guide and search for the epistemic foundations of the Meteorology independent of the Discourse. In this paper, I will pursue the latter route. My aim is to explain why, and how, Descartes thought that he had deduced the assumptions of the Meteorology. My interest, in this case, is solely Descartes’ physical foundation for the Meteorology, in the physics and physiology that resulted in Descartes’ explanation. With this aim, I provide an interpretation of Descartes’ World where many of its conclusions serve as evidence for the assumptions of the Meteorology. I provisionally conclude that Descartes thought that his World was the epistemic foundation for his Meteorology.

For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I then develop an account on which informational contents are indeterminate in their membership. This allows there to be cases in which it is indeterminate whether a given deduction is informative. Nevertheless, on the picture I present, there are determinate cases of informative (and determinate cases of uninformative) inferences. I argue that the model I offer is the best way for an account of content to respect the meaning of the logical constants and the inference rules associated with them without collapsing into a classical picture of content, unable to account for informative deductive inferences.

Over the last decade, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have elaborated an influential naturalistic account of human reasoning. Their distinctive hypothesis is that its adaptive rationale-and primary function-is to produce and assess reasons in interpersonal justification and argumentation. In this paper I argue, first, that their characterization of reasoning as based on metarepresentations threatens to oversophisticate reasoning and faces the problem of vicious regress. Second, I argue that they owe us a coherent account of the cognitive role of reasons in reasoning.

The way scientific discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery (like the deductive, cognitive, and evolutionary), but also new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, methods, heuristic procedures and even a logic of discovery have been investigated, extracted, reconstructed and refined. The outcome is a ‘scientific discovery revolution’: not only a new way of looking at discovery, but also a construction of tools that can guide us to discover something new. This is a very important contribution of philosophy of science to science, as it puts the former in a position not only to interpret what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that they can employ in their activity.

If computer programs were smarter, they would, like people, recognize sequences of events, form models of their environment, and formulate rules based on experience.  This paper describes the development of a program designed to address the difficult computational problems involved in integrating the inductive and deductive reasoning necessary to perform such tasks.  “Theme One” is a prototype program composed of “Index”, a learning algorithm for sequential data, and “Study”, an algorithm for building logical models.  The project goal is an interactive research tool that assists students and investigators in the exploration of qualitative data using artificial intelligence.

Logical reasoning in any form is an important aspect of life; it is persuading or convincing others with logic through writing or speech, for example, scientists, politicians, businessmen, financiers, solicitors and many others do this. This paper points out the frequent inefficacy of logical presentations, arguments and debates per se in bringing about the correct and wonted outcomes. It describes the scenario of people frequently involved in fruitless arguments and debates, and shows why the application of logic, for example, in logical argument or debate, could not often achieve the desired outcomes, much of the time ending up with frustration, unhappiness, bad feelings and poor relationships. Scenarios from mathematics, which probably represents the most rigorous form of logical reasoning, and science are described as well. The paper also delves into the problems encountered in logical reasoning as well as some modes of reasoning. It would be difficult and might be impossible to reason with and convince someone with a closed mind-set, someone who has made up the mind not to be convinced, or even someone who is not intelligent enough to be convinced. The paper, which is published in an international mathematics journal, presents a resolution to this serious problem, which is important, as that would be conducive to peace and harmony.

Bu çalışma Saf Aklın Eleştirisi’nde özellikle Dedüksiyon bölümünün açıklanmasında hayati önemi haiz olan ancak zor yapısı nedeniyle anlaşılması oldukça
güç görünen “Şematizm” bölümüne odaklanacaktır. Şematizm, Kant’ın ömrü hayatı süre zarfından başlayarak filozof ve düşünürlerin ilgisini zorluğu ile çekmiş
ve genel olarak anlaşılmazlık nedeniyle çok fazla üzerine eğilinmemiş ancak kilit
niteliğinde bir bölümdür. Şematizm, Kant felsefesinde belirleyici yargıların
imkânı ve Dedüksiyon bölümlerini kapsayıcı, dolayısıyla transendental felsefenin
imkân zeminini kuran yapıya ışık tutar. Kant Şematizmle duyusallık ve anlama
yetisi arasındaki köprüyü incelikli bir biçimde kurarak hem emprisizm hem idealizme mesafesini korumayı başarır. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma Kant’ın Saf Aklın
Eleştirisi’nde ortaya koyduğu felsefi tabloyu Şematizm bölümü ile aydınlatarak Şematizmin transendental felsefe için ne denli büyük bir öneme sahip olduğuna işaret edecektir.

The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward.

“Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds.  Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61–76.
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Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols.
It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes.
To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic.
Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as radical: an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition, a tradition that is defended by classical logicians. But it is also viewed as reactionary: as being analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of “Aristotelian” traditional logic.

The 'without deduction or set-off' clause does not oust the jurisdiction of a court. Tenants must be cautious and seek legal advice when intending to exercise the common law right to deduct from rentals. the South African courts and the provincial rental housing tribunals have jurisdiction to decide on the merits of each case in the context of the lease contract, the circumstances surrounding the need for repairs and the evidence of the parties.

Duncan Pritchard recently proposed a Wittgensteinian solution to closure-based skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, all epistemic systems assume certain truths.The notions that we are not disembodied brains, that the Earth has existed for a long time and that one's name is such-and-such all function as "hinge commitments." Pritchard views a hinge commitment as a positive propositional attitude that is not a belief. Because closure principles concern only knowledge-apt beliefs, they do not apply to hinge commitments. Thus, from the fact that a subject knows that he is sitting
in a room, and the fact that the subject's sitting in a room entails his bodily existence, it does not follow that the subject also knows that he is not an envatted brain. This paper rejects Pritchard's non-belief reading of hinge commitments. I start by showing that the non-belief reading fails to solve the skeptical paradox because the reasons that Pritchard uses to support the non-belief reading do not exempt hinge propositions from closure principles. I then proceed to argue that the non-belief reading is false as it
claims that hinge commitments, unlike ordinary beliefs, are rationally unresponsive—with the help of a scenario in which a subject's experience is internally chaotic, we can safely conclude that the hinge commitment that one is not systematically mistaken about the world is equally responsive to one's evidential situations.