Animal Morality

Martha Nussbaum’s recent book, The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal, is profound and insightful. Humility and dignity are two central virtues in all major religions and ethical systems, which express the equal status of human beings. Nussbaum emphasizes the value of dignity in the spheres of morality and human behavior. While agreeing with her on this issue, I also stress the value of humility in these areas.

Evidence of morality has been observed in animal behaviour studies of great apes, some monkeys, wolves, hyenas, dolphins, whales, elephants, rats and mice. Stories of animals feeding disabled ones is remarkably common. Sighted animals have often been seen feeding blind ones. Morality seems to have evolved from play. Morality is like a game with rules, and punishments for breaking them. Animals play out of choice, and continued participation depends upon empathy, fairness, co-operation and trust. Animals that habitually cheat don’t get played with. Play therefore is necessarily fair. Through it, each animal gets to understand what is acceptable to others and what is not—what is right, and what is wrong! Play, for social animals, is essential practice for sociality, and the rules of sociality for any species are its morals. If justice is seen as a set of social rules meant to maintain group harmony, then it is equivalent to play.

Are animals moral agents? In this paper, a theologian and an anthropologist unite to bring the resources of each field to bear on this question. Alas, not all interdisciplinary conversations end harmoniously, and after much discussion the two authors find themselves in substantial disagreement over the answer. The paper is therefore presented in two halves, one for each side of the argument. As well as presenting two different positions, our hope is that this paper clarifies the different understandings of morality in our respective fields and will help to offset confusion in interdisciplinary dialogue. In what follows, we each present our case. In the first section, Adam Willows argues that moral activity necessarily involves the use of reason, symbolic thought and language and is on that basis an exclusively human affair. In the second, Marcus Baynes-Rock discusses his experience of relationality with other creatures; a relationality which, he argues, creates a shared understanding of obligations which are characteristically moral.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether morality is uniquely human, and to argue that emotions are the basis of morality in the sense that moral behavior is produced by emotions. In order to support my suggestion, I first intend to investigate the nature and function of emotions. Furthermore, I adopt an evolutionary perspective suggesting that our biology pushed us toward caring about certain things surrounding us. In accordance with this assertion, I endeavor to examine whether moral judgments and moral beliefs can be illustrated in a non-cognitivist way from the perspectives of both naturalist philosophers and evolutionary scientists. Accordingly, I defend the view that moral judgment is a non-propositional, psychological attitude. From a contemporary perspective, we might argue that Hume‘s interpretation of moral judgment adopts a non- cognitivist and non-propositional attitude. Moreover, moral judgment does not express a proposition that describes facts and is truth evaluable; rather, it expresses feelings. In this sense, moral judgment is a psychological inclination to feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, the particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval in terms of moral judgment.

Are animals moral agents? In this paper, a theologian and an anthropologist unite to bring the resources of each field to bear on this question. Alas, not all interdisciplinary conversations end harmoniously, and after much discussion the two authors find themselves in substantial disagreement over the answer. The paper is therefore presented in two halves, one for each side of the argument. As well as presenting two different positions, our hope is that this paper clarifies the different understandings of morality in our respective fields and will help to offset confusion in interdisciplinary dialogue.

In what follows, we each present our case. In the first section, Adam Willows argues that moral activity necessarily involves the use of reason, symbolic thought and language and is on that basis an exclusively human affair. In the second, Marcus Baynes-Rock discusses his experience of relationality with other creatures; a relationality which, he argues, creates a shared understanding of obligations which are characteristically moral.

[El artículo completo se encuentra disponible en: http://www.dilemata.net/revista/index.php/dilemata/article/view/145/139 ]

En “¿Pueden los animales ser morales?” Rowlands argumenta que hay animales no humanos que son sujetos morales. Pero la tesis que Rowlands se ocupa principalmente de defender en este artículo es otra. Consiste en que es necesario hacer una distinción entre la subjetividad moral propiamente dicha y la capacidad de llevar a cabo evaluaciones morales. Que hay animales no humanos que son sujetos morales se sigue una vez aceptamos esto, a la vista de evidencias empíricas como las que refiere Rowlands.
Aquí voy a defender que, de manera general, la propuesta de Rowlands es correcta. Pero sostendré que su argumentación es problemática por identificar ciertas definiciones de la que llama “agencia moral” no implicadas entre sí, defender una teoría de la imputación discutible e implicar compromisos metaéticos innecesarios. Asimismo, indicaré que para nombrar los planos a los que Rowlands se refiere como “subjetividad” y “agencia” hay ya una terminología disponible, si bien no exenta de problemas, que es la proporcionada por la distinción entre moral y ética. Finalmente haré algunos apuntes en relación a quiénes pueden ser considerados sujetos morales y éticos.

In this thesis I put forward a new definition of anthropocentrism based on a thorough overview of use in the literature and via analogy with other centrisms, such as androcentrism. I argue that thus clarified anthropocentrism is unjustified and results in problems for nonhuman animals and that any nonhuman ethic should wish to avoid. I then demonstrate how important nonhuman ethics theories are anthropocentric on this definition, and do not address anthropocentrism, in a way that results in these problems for nonhumans. I therefore propose a nonhuman ethic that aims to be less anthropocentric. I do this by first considering morality in light of evolution and second by looking at nonhuman moral codes. I draw upon both of these to set out a less anthropocentric nonhuman ethic and show why this account is at least as viable as, and less problematic than, the current theories as well as outlining its beneficial implications for nonhuman animals and the field. I conclude that anthropocentrism and approaching nonhuman ethics in the manner I have is therefore important for considering nonhuman issues, and that the theory I have put forward is advantageous.