David Hunt

Conference paper presented at the 2017 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind Association.

Abstract: Richard Joyce defends two metaethical claims: one, that we must embrace an error theory of morality and two, that having done so, we should adopt a fictionalist stance towards moral thought and discourse. Here, I grant the controversial claim that an error theory of morality is unavoidable, but object to the recommendation that error theorists should embrace revolutionary fictionalism.  I begin with a brief outline of the motivation for Joyce’s view.  I then present his view and make my objection to it.  I conclude that error theorists should look elsewhere for their next metaethical move.

Moral error theorists argue that moral thought and discourse are systematically in error, and that nothing is, or can ever be, morally permissible, required or forbidden. I begin by discussing how error theorists arrive at this conclusion. I then argue that if we accept a moral error theory, we cannot escape a pressing problem – what should we do next, metaethically speaking? I call this problem the ‘what now?’ problem, or WNP for short. I discuss the attempts others have made to respond to the WNP, and in each case I show that the responses fail to be satisfying. I then propose a new response to the WNP, which I call revolutionary relativism. I define revolutionary relativism, explain why it is preferable to the existing responses to the WNP, and defend it against the most problematic objections I anticipate that opponents might raise. I conclude that revolutionary relativism succeeds where previous WNP responses fail, and that if we accept a moral error theory, we should become revolutionary relativists.