François Jaquet
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des sciences sociales, Faculty Member
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Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic... more
Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people's judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene's dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance.
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Qu'ont de commun les énoncés « Brigitte Bardot est une sorcière », « Le père Noël mange des chaussettes » et « François Hollande est en pourparlers avec le Grand Schtroumpf » ? C'est simple : littéralement, ils sont faux parce... more
Qu'ont de commun les énoncés « Brigitte Bardot est une sorcière », « Le père Noël mange des chaussettes » et « François Hollande est en pourparlers avec le Grand Schtroumpf » ? C'est simple : littéralement, ils sont faux parce qu'ils reposent sur des présupposés ontologiques erronés – respectivement, ils présupposent l'existence de pouvoirs magiques, du père Noël et des schtroumpfs. D'après la théorie de l'erreur, il en va de même des énoncés moraux : il est faux que la torture soit injuste, que la générosité soit une vertu et qu'il faille respecter son père. D'une part, ces énoncés présupposeraient l'existence de faits moraux non naturels. D'autre part, le monde ne contiendrait que des faits naturels. Les amis de la morale doivent rejeter l'une de ces deux thèses, et le moins que l'on puisse dire est qu'ils peinent à accorder leurs violons
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According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error... more
According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections”, according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.
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In this study, our goal is to validate a short version (5*5 = 25 items) of the Geneva Utilitarianism Inventory. We then explore the relationship between utilitarianism in five domains and a series of individual differences (cognitive... more
In this study, our goal is to validate a short version (5*5 = 25 items) of the Geneva Utilitarianism Inventory. We then explore the relationship between utilitarianism in five domains and a series of individual differences (cognitive style, psychopathy, empathic concern). Additionally, we investigate the relationship between utilitarianism in the five domains measured by the Geneva Utilitarianism Inventory and participants' attitudes towards animals (as measured through three different scales).
Research Interests: Art and Sciences Humaines
In this study, we investigate the effect of a cognitive load on utilitarian judgment. Participants are presented with scenarios from our six categories of stimuli, and asked either (i) to simply read a sequence of random characters, or... more
In this study, we investigate the effect of a cognitive load on utilitarian judgment. Participants are presented with scenarios from our six categories of stimuli, and asked either (i) to simply read a sequence of random characters, or (ii) to memorize this sequence and restitute it after reacting to the moral scenario.
In the past 15 years, a lot of research in moral psychology has focused on the opposition between deontological and utilitarian moral judgment, often concluding that deontological judgments are emotion-driven while utilitarian judgments... more
In the past 15 years, a lot of research in moral psychology has focused on the opposition between deontological and utilitarian moral judgment, often concluding that deontological judgments are emotion-driven while utilitarian judgments come from higher-order reasoning. However, these research have only investigated the deontological/utilitarian divide by focusing on sacrificial dilemmas (e.g. trolley problems) in which one person is sacrificed to save many. In this project, our aim is twofold. First, we want to create a list of scenarios that will pit deontological and utilitarian moral judgments against each other in contexts that are not sacrificial dilemmas. Second, using this list of scenarios, we want to determine whether some key findings about the deontological/utiltiarian divide extend and generalize beyond the mere case of sacrificial dilemmas.
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In this study, we investigate the effect of a time constraint on utilitarian judgment. Participants are presented with scenarios from our six categories of stimuli, and asked either (i) to make a moral judgment in a very short time, or... more
In this study, we investigate the effect of a time constraint on utilitarian judgment. Participants are presented with scenarios from our six categories of stimuli, and asked either (i) to make a moral judgment in a very short time, or (ii) to wait one minute before answering.
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Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively... more
Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism (we should replace our moral judgments with conative attitudes), naturalism (we should replace our moral judgments with beliefs in non-moral facts), and fictionalism (we should replace our moral judgments with fictional attitudes). In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists can...
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The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called “now-what problem”: if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far,... more
The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called “now-what problem”: if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace our moral beliefs with fictional attitudes, beliefs in natural facts, or conative attitudes. But all these philosophers have set aside an important question about the content of these attitudes: which moral propositions, and more generally which moral theory, should we accept? The present paper addresses this neglected issue, arguing that moral error theorists should adopt a utilitarian moral fiction. In other words, they should accept the set of moral principles whose general acceptance would maximize overall well-being.
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Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic... more
Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duty to help others, and the good justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants h...
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Dans son ouvrage "L’influence de l’odeur des croissants chauds sur la bonte humaine", Ruwen Ogien fait un usage que l’on pourrait appeler « critique » des donnees de la philosophie experimentale. En effet, selon lui: ce que la... more
Dans son ouvrage "L’influence de l’odeur des croissants chauds sur la bonte humaine", Ruwen Ogien fait un usage que l’on pourrait appeler « critique » des donnees de la philosophie experimentale. En effet, selon lui: ce que la philosophie experimentale peut nous permettre de reconnaitre, c’est que rien dans les concepts et methodes de la philosophie morale n’est a l’abri de la contestation et de la revision...
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The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once... more
The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. (According to a fourth theory, ‘substitutionism’, we should modify the content of our moral claims in such a way that they become true.) Putting abolitionism (and substitutionism) aside, our aim is to assess the plausibility of conservationism as an alternative to the – relatively dominant – fictionalism that we find in the literature. Given the difficulty of finding a conservationist view that is both (i) plausible and (ii) not merely a terminological variant of fictionalism, we will argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts.
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For scientific theories grounded in empirical data, replicability is a core principle, for at least two reasons. First, unless we accept to have scientific theories rest on the authority of a small number of researchers, empirical studies... more
For scientific theories grounded in empirical data, replicability is a core principle, for at least two reasons. First, unless we accept to have scientific theories rest on the authority of a small number of researchers, empirical studies should be replicable, in the sense that its methods and procedure should be detailed enough for someone else to conduct the same study. Second, for empirical results to provide a solid foundation for scientific theorizing, they should also be replicable, in the sense that most attempts at replicating the original study that produced them would yield similar results. The XPhi Replicability Project is primarily concerned with replicability in the second sense, that is: the replicability of results. In the past year, several projects have shed doubt on the replicability of key findings in psychology, and most notably social psychology. Because the methods of experimental philosophy have often been close to the ones used in social psychology, it is onl...
Research Interests: Psychology, Clinical Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Personality Psychology, Developmental Psychology, and 15 moreExperimental Psychology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Science, Experimental philosophy, Educational Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Medicine, Replicability, Replication, Reproducibility, and Meta Analysis and Systematic Review
Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman... more
Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable.
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Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic... more
Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people's judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duty to help others, and the good justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene's dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duty to help others.
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The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument... more
The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the second. In response, Singer has grasped the first horn of this dilemma and tried to accommodate Kagan’s apparent counterexamples. In my opinion, this attempt is unpersuasive: the principle of equal consideration is inconsistent with common-sense intuitions on Kagan’s cases. Worse, Singer’s argument begs the question anyway. It therefore faces two serious objections. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with speciesism, however. In the second half of the paper, I propose another, better argument against speciesism, which I argue is immune to both objections. According to this other argument, speciesism is wrong because it involves discriminating on the basis of a merely biological property.
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Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively... more
Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism (we should replace our moral judgments with conative attitudes), naturalism (we should replace our moral judgments with beliefs in non-moral facts), and fictionalism (we should replace our moral judgments with fictional attitudes). In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists cannot consistently subscribe. This leaves us with only one revisionary solution to the now-what problem.
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The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called "now-what problem": if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far,... more
The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called "now-what problem": if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace our moral beliefs with fictional attitudes, beliefs in natural facts, or conative attitudes. But all these philosophers have set aside an important question about the content of these attitudes: which moral propositions, and more generally which moral theory, should we accept? The present paper addresses this neglected issue, arguing that moral error theorists should adopt a utilitarian moral fiction. In other words, they should accept the set of moral principles whose general acceptance would maximize overall well-being. According to a prominent version of the moral error theory, all atomic moral propositions are false because they entail the existence of categorical reasons while all the reasons we have are hypothetical. Consider the proposition Torture is wrong by way of illustration. If the error theory is correct, then this proposition entails that we have a reason not to torture people regardless of our desires. But this implication is false, for all the reasons we have depend on our desires-they are reasons to act in a way that would satisfy our desires. Hence, the proposition Torture is wrong is false. And the same can be said about every atomic moral proposition. The error theory raises the so-called "now-what problem" (Lutz 2014): as error theorists, what should we do with the moral practice-with moral thought and discourse? Obviously, this is not a moral question. Since the error theory entails that there is nothing we morally ought to do, it entails a fortiori that there is nothing we morally ought to do with our moral thought and discourse. The question is prudential and therefore presupposes only that there are things we prudentially ought to do, which may be the case provided that prudential reasons are hypothetical.
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Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of... more
Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of “speciesism” that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of “murder” that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive (Is speciesism wrong by definition?) and the other normative (Should speciesism be wrong by definition?). Relying on philosophers’ use of the term, I first answer the descriptive question negatively: speciesism is a purely descriptive concept. Then, based on both its main functions in the philosophical and public debates and an analogy with racism, I answer the normative question negatively: speciesism should remain a purely descriptive concept. If I am correct, then speciesism neither is nor should be wrong by definition.
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Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this "speciesist belief" plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I... more
Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this "speciesist belief" plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My contention is that this belief is unjustified because it is largely due to an off-track process: our attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the "meat paradox". Most meat-eaters believe that it is wrong to harm animals unnecessarily, yet they routinely and deliberately behave in ways that cause great unnecessary suffering to animals. As recent research suggests, this practical inconsistency puts them in an unpleasant state of dissonance, which they try to escape by resolving the paradox. And they do so in part by adopting the speciesist belief—if animal suffering matters much less than human suffering, then harming animals cannot be so wrong after all. In other words, people form the speciesist belief because it is psychologically convenient. Since this belief-forming process does not track moral truth, I conclude that we are not justified in believing that human interests matter more than the similar interests of non-humans.
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Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are... more
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he adds that utilitarian beliefs about wellbeing—e.g. the belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad—were probably shaped by evolution. Logically, de Lazari-Radek and Singer should therefore reject these beliefs along with the deontological beliefs that evolved. The present paper is a defense of their argument. After considering a number of unsuccessful replies to Kahane’s objection, I put forward a more promising solution: de Lazari-Radek and Singer should combine their objectivist view in metaethics with a subjectivist account of well-being, such as the desire theory. Such a hybrid account would tackle Kahane’s challenge because subjective accounts of value are immune from evolutionary debunking arguments. And it would be compatible with utilitarianism, which (as Kahane remarks) doesn’t fit very well with metaethical subjectivism. Before concluding, I deal with two concerns that this solution might raise: I argue that the desire theory is actually subjective enough to escape Kahane’s objection, and I deny that retreating to the combination of ethical objectivism and prudential subjectivism is ad hoc.
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The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once... more
The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. (According to a fourth theory, ‘substitutionism’, we should modify the content of our moral claims in such a way that they become true.) Putting abolitionism (and substitutionism) aside, our aim is to assess the plausibility of conservationism as an alternative to the – relatively dominant – fictionalism that we find in the literature. Given the difficulty of finding a conservationist view that is both (i) plausible and (ii) not merely a terminological variant of fictionalism, we will argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts.
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Quelle est la nature des faits moraux? Existe-t-il de tels faits ? Les énoncés moraux peuvent-ils prétendre à la vérité ? Vous pensez peut-être que la peine de mort est injuste ? Ou que l’avortement est moralement acceptable ? Se... more
Quelle est la nature des faits moraux? Existe-t-il de tels faits ? Les énoncés moraux peuvent-ils prétendre à la vérité ? Vous pensez peut-être que la peine de mort est injuste ? Ou que l’avortement est moralement acceptable ? Se pourrait-il alors que vous vous trompiez ? C’est en tout cas l’avis des théoriciens de l’erreur. D’après ces philosophes, tous les jugements moraux sont faux parce qu’ils présupposent à tort l’existence de faits moraux à la fois objectifs et non naturels.Organisé autour de ce défi nihiliste, le présent ouvrage aborde les principales théories métaéthiques comme autant de tentatives, plus ou moins fructueuses, de sauver la morale. Les théories qu’on y rencontre combinent invariablement une thèse psychologique (sur la nature des jugements moraux) et une thèse ontologique (sur l’existence d’une réalité morale conforme auxdits présupposés).
Dans le style argumentatif sobre et précis qui caractérise la philosophie analytique, ce manuel de métaéthique – le premier en langue française – entreprend d’évaluer minutieusement un ensemble de théories sur la morale. Bien que destiné en premier lieu aux enseignants de philosophie et à leurs étudiants, il se veut accessible à tous ceux qu’intéresse l’éthique.
Dans le style argumentatif sobre et précis qui caractérise la philosophie analytique, ce manuel de métaéthique – le premier en langue française – entreprend d’évaluer minutieusement un ensemble de théories sur la morale. Bien que destiné en premier lieu aux enseignants de philosophie et à leurs étudiants, il se veut accessible à tous ceux qu’intéresse l’éthique.
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Quelle est la nature de la morale ? Quelle place tient-elle dans l’existence humaine ? La métaéthique ne cherche pas à répondre aux questions éthiques, portant sur ce que nous devons faire ou sur ce qu’est la vie bonne, mais à en... more
Quelle est la nature de la morale ? Quelle place tient-elle dans l’existence humaine ? La métaéthique ne cherche pas à répondre aux questions éthiques, portant sur ce que nous devons faire ou sur ce qu’est la vie bonne, mais à en éclairer le sens. Elle s’interroge sur la possibilité et sur l’objet de la connaissance morale, sur la fonction réelle des discours moraux ou encore sur l’effet motivationnel qu’ont sur nous les normes et les valeurs. Elle soumet ainsi l’éthique à des questions relevant de l’épistémologie et de l’ontologie, de la sémantique et de la psychologie. Ce manuel, le premier en son genre en langue française, offre un panorama général des questions, des courants et des méthodes de la métaéthique contemporaine. Rassemblant treize études approfondies, il propose une introduction accessible et des contributions originales à ce champ en plein essor.
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People's attitude to animals is similar to the attitude Westworld has people adopt vis‐a‐vis the hosts: People often deem animal suffering acceptable because it improves their well‐being but still feel upset when an animal is... more
People's attitude to animals is similar to the attitude Westworld has people adopt vis‐a‐vis the hosts: People often deem animal suffering acceptable because it improves their well‐being but still feel upset when an animal is mistreated just for the sake of it. Speciesism is the view that human well‐being matters more than that of other creatures. One justification for this view attempts to ground human beings’ special moral status in their membership in the human species itself. Some of Westworld's characters are visibly tempted by this kind of justification. Logan is a prime example. One common argument in defense of speciesism is that non‐human animals are far less intelligent than human beings. Westworld's characters have interesting discussions about free will. In Westworld, all dialogues about free will focus on whether the hosts are determined or whether they could act otherwise.
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On peut dire, entre autres, d’une personne, d’un point de vue, d’un choix, d’une justification ou d’une action qu’elles sont impartiales. Ces diverses formes d’impartialité pourraient toutefois être ramenées aux jugements impartiaux dont... more
On peut dire, entre autres, d’une personne, d’un point de vue, d’un choix, d’une justification ou d’une action qu’elles sont impartiales. Ces diverses formes d’impartialité pourraient toutefois être ramenées aux jugements impartiaux dont elles semblent univoquement dérivées. C’est pourquoi il sera exclusivement question de l’impartialité comme propriété des jugements. Selon une définition plausible [Rawls, 2009], un jugement est impartial si, et seulement si, son auteur y souscrirait même s’il n’occupait pas la position qu’il occupe actuellement. Par ‘sa position’ on entendra non seulement son identité, mais également ses intérêts et autres affects, les relations personnelles qu’il entretient avec d’autres sujets, etc. Ainsi, si Yvette approuve ce que fait Raimond parce qu’elle l’aime à la folie, le jugement d’Yvette n’est pas impartial. De même, si Célestin pense que les hommes devraient avoir un meilleur salaire que les femmes parce qu’il est un homme, le jugement de Célestin n’es...
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In a central variant, moral fictionalism is the view that we should replace moral belief with make-believe, that is, be disposed to accept some moral propositions in everyday contexts and to reject all such propositions in more critical... more
In a central variant, moral fictionalism is the view that we should replace moral belief with make-believe, that is, be disposed to accept some moral propositions in everyday contexts and to reject all such propositions in more critical circumstances. It is said by its opponents to face three significant problems: in contrast with a real morality, a fictional morality would not allow for deductive inferences; moral make-believe would lack the motivational force that is typical of moral belief; and moral make-believers could not genuinely disagree with one another about ethical matters nor, consequently, articulate their practical conflicts in moral terms. This chapter argues that all three objections rest on a misconception of the kind of attitudes recommended by fictionalism. Once misleading analogies are dismissed and the nature of moral make-believe is clarified, it becomes clear that a fictional morality would preserve deductive inference, moral motivation, and ethical disagreement.
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The notion of speciesism has been central to animal ethics since the mid-1970s. This chapter explores three issues that it raises. First, in response to the conceptual question “What exactly is speciesism?”, I argue that speciesism is... more
The notion of speciesism has been central to animal ethics since the mid-1970s. This chapter explores three issues that it raises. First, in response to the conceptual question “What exactly is speciesism?”, I argue that speciesism is best defined as discrimination on the basis of species membership. Second, in response to the empirical question “Does speciesism exist?”, I argue that most people do discriminate on the basis of species membership. Third, in response to the moral question “Can speciesism be justified morally?”, I argue that it cannot. If all this is on the right track, it follows that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way we treat animals.