Matthew Lutz
My research interests are in Ethics and Epistemology, with a particular interest in moral epistemology. My dissertation is on moral skepticism, wherein I argue that moral knowledge is impossible for moral non-naturalists. I have a number of continuing projects. Within moral epistemology, I am interested in evolutionary debunking arguments, moral disagreement, and the question of whether moral naturalism can avoid epistemic issues (my suspicion: no). Within metaethics more broadly, I'm interested in moral supervenience, the nature of our moral concepts, and moral error theory. And within epistemology more broadly, I'm interested in the nature of justification and how justification relates to knowledge, whether the Gettier problem can be solved, the prospects for a causal theory of knowledge (better than one might think!), and how pragmatic considerations relate to knowledge attributions.
Address: Wuhan, Hubei, China
Address: Wuhan, Hubei, China
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Papers by Matthew Lutz
Penultimate Draft
Penultiamte draft.
agents like us in situations like ours, because we are unable to rule out some skeptical hypothesis.
In this paper, I defend a moral skeptical hypothesis argument – the Moral Closure Argument – against a number of objections. This argument is not novel, but it has rarely been taken seriously because it is widely held that the argument has serious flaws. My task in this paper is to argue that these supposed flaws are merely apparent; the Moral Closure Argument is much more potent than it might seem.
Explanationist Evidentialism (EE): the Regress Objection and the Threshold Objection. In this paper, I develop a version of EE that is independently plausible and empirically grounded, and show that it can meet Appley and Stoutenburg's objections. Forthcoming in Synthese.
Penultimate Draft
Penultiamte draft.
agents like us in situations like ours, because we are unable to rule out some skeptical hypothesis.
In this paper, I defend a moral skeptical hypothesis argument – the Moral Closure Argument – against a number of objections. This argument is not novel, but it has rarely been taken seriously because it is widely held that the argument has serious flaws. My task in this paper is to argue that these supposed flaws are merely apparent; the Moral Closure Argument is much more potent than it might seem.
Explanationist Evidentialism (EE): the Regress Objection and the Threshold Objection. In this paper, I develop a version of EE that is independently plausible and empirically grounded, and show that it can meet Appley and Stoutenburg's objections. Forthcoming in Synthese.