Kristjan Laasik
Zhejiang University, Philosophy Department, Faculty Member
Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situationdependent, insofar as they represent objects'... more
Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situationdependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the "epistemic dependence thesis" (EDT), according to which "perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection to her argument from EDT. To address this objection (or, rather, to bypass it), I will re-formulate the EDT, as a different but closely related thesis that I will call EDT*, informed by the admittedly radical Husserlian view that perception is epistemically rational.
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I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I... more
I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel's proposal that one could be having an irrational experience, in the sense of a hijacked experience that has inherited a sub-threshold epistemic charge from a corrupt outlook. The present discussion is conducted from a Husserlian point of view, according to which perception is rational, rather than arational. I am, however, in this paper, not undertaking to defend the Husserlian view or the rationality of perception, or even to argue that the view I refer to as Husserlian is, in all aspects, the view that Edmund Husserl actually held. I aim merely to provide certain clarifications concerning the more specific topic of irrational visual experiences.
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Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a... more
Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, I will argue that objects can be experienced as MI in the sense of the experience’s not being due to the malfunctioning of a perceptual organ, e.g., when one examines the ways in which the object displays itself, and gains confidence that there is, indeed, nothing the matter with one’s eyes. I will address the issue of MI from the perspective of Husserlian evidentialism, according to which perceptual content is conceived in terms of ways of perceptually exploring the object, thereby gaining evidence pertinent to the object and its properties, e.g., as when one takes a look at the object’s shape from a different angle, or scrutinizes its color in better lighting.
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I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future‐oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived,... more
I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future‐oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived, constancy is a necessary aspect of content. I speak about a “core Husserlian” account so as to capture certain ideas that Michael Madary has presented as the core of Edmund Husserl's approach to perceptual constancy, viz., that “perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of intention and fulfilment” and that this “gives us a way to understand the relationship between different appearances of the same object” (See Madary, M. (2012) “Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.” European Journal of Philosophy 20(1): 145–165.). I take myself to be developing, and perhaps correcting, Madary's view as I discuss the role of the core Husserlian ideas, and counterfactuals, in accounting for shape and color constancy, respectively. I bridge constancy and fulfilment‐conditional content by appealing to the Husserlian notion of constitution, which captures the process in which objectivity and, correlatively, intentional experience, are built up in the experiential flow.
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In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by... more
In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like this just could be Isaac”, “It looks like this is probably Isaac”, “It looks like this is almost certainly Isaac”. I first present my Husserlian account with a focus on the notion of fulfillment, and the idea that the contents of perceptual experience are fulfillment conditions. I then show that this account can be complemented by PC. Finally, I develop a focus on the idea of perceptual self-justification, diverting the perceptual confidence debate from its pre-eminent concern with the relations between perceptual and doxastic confidences, and present an argument to the effect that there are perceptual confidences.
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In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without... more
In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” (CWC) which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The conflicts in question can be regarded as obtaining between different strands of evidence, and our perceptual and emotional experiences can be thus conflicted even among themselves, not only in the special case of a conflict with a judgment.
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Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments... more
Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and Tienson would first have to establish the co-variation of phenomenology and intentional content, but even so, phenomenal intentionality would still emerge as less plausible than its converse, representationalism. I will address these two challenges by appeal to Husserlian ideas. A consideration of perceptual phenomenology (i.e., phenomenal character) shows that there is a kind of perceptual content that is, indeed, determined by phenomenal character. Such content is conceived in terms of fulfillment conditions, or what it takes to bring aspects of objects and scenes to different, and more complete, ways of givenness. We can establish the primacy of phenomenology, relative to such fulfillment-conditional content, by tracing it back to the basic phenomenology of visual and other sensations.
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In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, "Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions" ("Zur Phänomenologie der Täuschungen"), which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was... more
In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, "Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions" ("Zur Phänomenologie der Täuschungen"), which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was a member of the Munich and Göttingen Phenomenological Circles. In my discussion of his largely neglected views, I explore the connection between his ideas concerning “attitudes” (Einstellungen), e.g., of searching for, observing, counting, or working with objects, and the central topic of his text, perceptual illusions, thematized by Leyendecker as a kind of perceptual “deception” (Täuschung). Indeed, Leyendecker argues that a change of attitude is a necessary aspect of an illusion. I argue that Leyendecker’s use of the notion of attitude in accounting for illusions is problematic; yet I also suggest that his ideas are not devoid of philosophical interest, in relation to current debates.
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In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention... more
In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention is that, in cases relevantly similar to Schapp’s, we do perceptually experience distant things, viz., as drastically “decayed” things, which are part of distant scenes. In doing so, we adopt towards them a kind of conservative “attitude.” The ideas of decay and scenicness will be unpacked in terms of the Husserlian ideas of fulfilment, and fulfilment conditions, capturing the idea that we perceptually experience objects in terms of anticipated possibilities for further experiences of these objects. These ideas will also be considered in relation to Herbert Leyendecker’s notion of an attitude, e.g., of observing, searching for, or working with objects.
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The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then (more) fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations... more
The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then (more) fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment.” In this paper, I consider the applicability of these conceptions of fulfillment to Husserl’s views of instincts, and conclude that the fulfillment of instincts is best understood not as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment, but as sui generis, “I-fulfillment,” which is distinguished by its peculiarly retrospective nature, and by the fact that when it reveals something, it can also give rise to determinacy where previously there was none.
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In a paper titled “Seeing Empty Space,” Louise Richardson argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain “structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if some region of space is one in which if some visible... more
In a paper titled “Seeing Empty Space,” Louise Richardson
argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain
“structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if
some region of space is one in which if some visible object
were there, one would see it” (SF; Richardson, 2010,
p. 237). I will argue that there is a reason to question
whether a structural feature such as SF is needed in order
to visually experience empty space. I will also propose that
the visual experience of empty space does involve a quite
different structural feature, underscoring the mediating role
of empty space in visual experience.
argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain
“structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if
some region of space is one in which if some visible object
were there, one would see it” (SF; Richardson, 2010,
p. 237). I will argue that there is a reason to question
whether a structural feature such as SF is needed in order
to visually experience empty space. I will also propose that
the visual experience of empty space does involve a quite
different structural feature, underscoring the mediating role
of empty space in visual experience.
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In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as “presence as absence” (“PA”) and “virtual presence” (“VP”). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s... more
In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as “presence as absence” (“PA”) and “virtual presence” (“VP”). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s solution to “the problem of perceptual presence,” or the problem of how to account for our perceptual experience of that which we “strictly speaking” are not seeing.
Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e., his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects are (quasi-perceptually) present to us by various degrees, will not be tenable whether unpacked in terms of PA or VP. E.g., Noë argues that the presence of the tomato in front of him, and the presence of his friend Dominic in a distant country, are different not in kind but in degree only. Neither of the two conceptions of presence renders this plausible.
Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e., his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects are (quasi-perceptually) present to us by various degrees, will not be tenable whether unpacked in terms of PA or VP. E.g., Noë argues that the presence of the tomato in front of him, and the presence of his friend Dominic in a distant country, are different not in kind but in degree only. Neither of the two conceptions of presence renders this plausible.
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Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology (IPE), but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these... more
Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology (IPE), but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a kind of immediate, or “full”, experience of an object or some of its aspects. In the case of visual perception, suppose you are looking at an apple. If you turn it around, you will find yourself in full view of its back side, which was previously anticipated “emptily”, fulfilling or disappointing (confirming or disconfirming) some of your anticipations in regard to it. On the Husserlian view, the success or failure of a visual perceptual experience consists in such fulfillments and disappointments. If we can provide an account of the intentionality of emotions along similar lines, it will necessarily involve the phenomenal contrast between fullness and emptiness, enabling us to support IPE.
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In her paper, “Action and Self-location in Perception”, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object’s intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically,... more
In her paper, “Action and Self-location in Perception”, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object’s intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object’s intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know-how. That, in turn, requires self-locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and an agent, viz., someone who has a capacity for actions. She also makes two objections, viz., the unification objection and the sentient statue objection, to Alva Noe’s sensorimotor view, a different account of how perceptual experience depends on actions. I will argue that her objections jointly render problematic not only Noe’s but also her own view.
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In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I... more
In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings. Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument. Szanto emphatically contrasts the Husserlian, constitutive conception of intentionality with the mainstream, representational conception. If we interpret Siewert’s ideas in representational terms, it will be possible to add to my critical objections. However, I will suggest that it is also possible to interpret, or perhaps to modify, Siewert’s views in Husserlian constitutive terms, thereby addressing the objections raised in the present paper.
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In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended a Ph.D thesis, titled Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, in which he argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain... more
In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended a Ph.D thesis, titled Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, in which he argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain order, or form, that manifests itself in the orderly, predictable variation of perspectives, in the course of experience. He also argues that we do not visually perceive distant things, like a house far down in the valley, due to a lack of such color order.
While accepting, with qualifications, Schapp’s claim concerning the need for a color order, I will argue that we can visually perceive distant things. I will also argue that Schapp’s discussion of distant things is, nevertheless, of current interest, viz., by comparison of his views with Alva Noë’s recent arguments to the effect that we do not visually perceive distant objects.
While accepting, with qualifications, Schapp’s claim concerning the need for a color order, I will argue that we can visually perceive distant things. I will also argue that Schapp’s discussion of distant things is, nevertheless, of current interest, viz., by comparison of his views with Alva Noë’s recent arguments to the effect that we do not visually perceive distant objects.
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Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her... more
Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable for establishing that kind properties are represented in visual experiences, insofar as the method draws upon first-person intuitions eclectically.
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"In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary... more
"In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Ibid.). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian spatiotemporal visual horizons, on the other.
I argue that Madary’s arguments, for a Husserlian view of the two visual systems, are not convincing. When the notion of visual horizon is adequately understood as a constitutive notion, there will be reason to regard the connections between dorsal processing and the Husserlian spatiotemporal horizons as tenuous at best.
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I argue that Madary’s arguments, for a Husserlian view of the two visual systems, are not convincing. When the notion of visual horizon is adequately understood as a constitutive notion, there will be reason to regard the connections between dorsal processing and the Husserlian spatiotemporal horizons as tenuous at best.
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Edmund Husserl on tuntud kui fenomenoloogia rajaja ning möödunud sajandi ja käesoleva aja mõjukaimaid filosoofe, seda eriti kontinentaalses, kuid viimasel ajal ka analüütilises traditsioonis. Fenomenoloogia on filosoofia suund, mis uurib... more
Edmund Husserl on tuntud kui fenomenoloogia rajaja ning möödunud sajandi ja käesoleva aja mõjukaimaid filosoofe, seda eriti kontinentaalses, kuid viimasel ajal ka analüütilises traditsioonis. Fenomenoloogia on filosoofia suund, mis uurib seda, kuidas esemed on meile kogemuses antud, laskumata metafüüsilistesse spekulatsioonidesse näiteks selle üle, kas materiaalsed asjad on olemas või mitte meie kogemusest sõltumatult. Niisuguse orientatsiooni raames on Husserl andnud panuseid mitmetesse filosoofilistesse teemadesse; käesolevas artiklis keskendun ma tema tajufilosoofiale, visandades tõlgenduse, milles Husserli käsitlus asjade konstitutsioonist ehk antusest tajus on selgitatud täitumistingimuste mõiste kaudu.
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In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how... more
In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On one hand, there is the problem of how to conceive of the presence of objects as wholes, front side and back, and their constant properties. On the other hand, there is the problem of how to account for the presence of unattended detail. I focus on the first problem, which Noë approaches by invoking Husserlian ideas. I argue that Noë’s enactive view encounters difficulties, which can be dealt with by complementing it with Edmund Husserl’s idea of fulfillment and generally restoring the view to its original Husserlian context. Contrary to Noë’s purport, this involves regarding the view not as a theory of perception and perceptual content but as part of a descriptive-clarificatory project of conceptual analysis. The Husserlian phenomenologist analyzes, e.g., the concept of shape or color by investigating the fulfillment conditions pertinent to shape or color. In general, my critique of Noë’s enactive view serves to caution philosophers against unprincipled uses of Husserlian ideas.
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In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned... more
In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), I bring center-stage the notion of perceptual fulfillment, a kind of non-inferential confirmation, which may take place as part the ongoing perceptual experience. Thus, when looking at a red tomato, I may anticipate that if I turn it around, the back side will also be revealed as red, and this perceptual anticipation may be either fulfilled or disappointed. Since the very presence of the object can be accounted for in terms of such anticipations, instantiating fulfillment conditions, I consider perceptual contents to be fulfillment conditions.
I update the Husserlian approach by emphasizing this idea, as well as by using it to engage with various philosophical issues. I justify the project of so updating the view by appeal to the interest and value of being able to bring it to bear on current debates. I justify the updated view by appeal to the fruitful outcomes of these philosophical engagements.
In Part 1 of my book, I provide a preparatory overview of Husserl’s 1907 Thing and Space lecture series. In Part 2, I deal with Alva Noë’s enactivism and the various ways in which it proves deficient, and the ways in which I propose to improve it from the Husserlian perspective. In Part 3, I focus on a critique of the rival idea that contents are accuracy conditions, as well as taking up the issue of how to demarcate between what we do and do not perceptually experience, or the issue of determining how rich perceptual experiences are. In Part 4 of the book, I discuss miscellaneous relevant topics.
I update the Husserlian approach by emphasizing this idea, as well as by using it to engage with various philosophical issues. I justify the project of so updating the view by appeal to the interest and value of being able to bring it to bear on current debates. I justify the updated view by appeal to the fruitful outcomes of these philosophical engagements.
In Part 1 of my book, I provide a preparatory overview of Husserl’s 1907 Thing and Space lecture series. In Part 2, I deal with Alva Noë’s enactivism and the various ways in which it proves deficient, and the ways in which I propose to improve it from the Husserlian perspective. In Part 3, I focus on a critique of the rival idea that contents are accuracy conditions, as well as taking up the issue of how to demarcate between what we do and do not perceptually experience, or the issue of determining how rich perceptual experiences are. In Part 4 of the book, I discuss miscellaneous relevant topics.
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In his remarkable book, Visual Phenomenology, Michael Madary argues for the claim that "visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment" (Madary 2017, p. 3), by drawing upon lines of evidence from Husserlian... more
In his remarkable book, Visual Phenomenology, Michael Madary argues for the claim that "visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment" (Madary 2017, p. 3), by drawing upon lines of evidence from Husserlian phenomenology, philosophy of perception, and the cognitive sciences. While he considers Edmund Husserl as a major influence upon his ideas, he does not aim to adhere to Husserl's views in every regard, but instead to develop Husserlinspired views of his own, muster support for them, and bring them to bear on various issues (Ibid., pp. 4, 181). His book is therefore likely to be of interest not only to scholars of Husserlian phenomenology, but also to non-Husserlian philosophers of perception, as well as to cognitive scientists.
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Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that... more
Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s views and providing Kantian and Husserlian correctives where needed.
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In his new book, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff defends panpsychism, the view that ‘consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world’ (2019, p. 23), arguing that the... more
In his new book, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff defends panpsychism, the view that ‘consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world’ (2019, p. 23), arguing that the view is superior to the dualist and materialist alternatives. Since Goff regards the study of consciousness as an interdisciplinary project, his panpsychist account is concerned with re-shaping the science of consciousness, and conceived as dependent upon the deliverances of such a reformed science. Goff also undertakes to elucidate aspects of the broader human significance of the panpsychist outlook.
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Norman Sieroka’s book is about “the systematic, structural relations between phenomenological and (neuro)physiological aspects of perception, consciousness, and time, with a specific focus on hearing” (p. 4), based on Leibniz’s and... more
Norman Sieroka’s book is about “the systematic, structural relations between phenomenological and (neuro)physiological aspects of perception, consciousness, and time, with a specific focus on hearing” (p. 4), based on Leibniz’s and Husserl’s views. While Sieroka displays a great depth of knowledge in his discussions of these two philosophers, his main aims are not exegetic, but consist, rather, in casting new light on the said philosophical and interdisciplinary issues. However, the scope of his interpretative project is ambitious. There is, on the one hand, Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, for whom perception is, first and foremost, conscious. On the other hand, there is Leibniz, the great rationalist metaphysician, who stands out in his era for bringing center-stage various kinds of unconscious perception. Sieroka effectively reconciles these seemingly very different perspectives, as he argues for numerous points of similarity between them and synthesizes them for mutual enrichment.
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These notes summarize the entire text of Edmund Husserl's "Thing and Space", section by section, without attempting to provide any additional commentary or exegesis. (Unfortunately, quite a number of dictation errors escaped my notice... more
These notes summarize the entire text of Edmund Husserl's "Thing and Space", section by section, without attempting to provide any additional commentary or exegesis. (Unfortunately, quite a number of dictation errors escaped my notice when I edited these notes. They are bound to occasionally trip you as you parse my sentences.)