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Department for Culture and Communication
Linköping University
Linköping, Sweden
Harald Wiltsche
Linköping University, Culture & Communication (IKK), Faculty Member
- Institute for Advanced Study, Program in Interdisciplinary Studies, Department MemberUniversity of Graz, Philosophy, Faculty Memberadd
- I am Professor of Philosophy at Linköping University, Sweden, recurring visiting scholar at the Institute for Advance... moreI am Professor of Philosophy at Linköping University, Sweden, recurring visiting scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study, and P.I. of the four-year research projekt "Intentionality and Symbolic Construction", which is funded by the Austrian Science Fund. For more information about me and my work please go to www.haraldwiltsche.comedit
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As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objectifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl’s worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics,... more
As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objectifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl’s worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics, the first aim of our paper is to show that many of his critical arguments are no less relevant today. By addressing the formalism and current interpretations of quantum theory, we illustrate how topics surrounding the mathematization of nature come to the fore naturally. Our second aim is to consider the program of reconstructing quantum theory, a program that currently enjoys popularity in the field of quantum foundations. We will conclude by arguing that, seen from this vantage point, certain insights delivered by phenomenology and quantum theory regarding perspectivity are remarkably concordant. Our overall hope with this paper is to show that there is much room for mutual learning between phenomenology and modern physics.
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Edmund Husserl devoted considerable effort to the development of a phenomenological theory of rationality, as, for instance, part four of Ideas 1 attests. After providing some necessary background, I will spell out the details of... more
Edmund Husserl devoted considerable effort to the development of a phenomenological theory of rationality, as, for instance, part four of Ideas 1 attests. After providing some necessary background, I will spell out the details of Husserl's account. Yet, as I will also argue, Husserl's official doctrine is untenable due to several ambiguities and internal tensions. Hence, my primary aim in this paper is to offer a modified phenomenological theory of rationality that avoids the problems of Husserl's original account.
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Table of Contents: "Phenomenological Approaches to Physics"
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Anyone interested in understanding the nature of modern physics will at some point encounter a problem that was popularized in the 1960s by the physicist Eugene Wigner: Why is it that mathematics is so effective and useful for describing,... more
Anyone interested in understanding the nature of modern physics will at some point encounter a problem that was popularized in the 1960s by the physicist Eugene Wigner: Why is it that mathematics is so effective and useful for describing, explaining and predicting the kinds of phenomena we are concerned with in the sciences? In this chapter, we will propose a phenomenological solution for this "problem" of the seemingly unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences. In our view, the "problem" can only be solved-or made to evaporate-if we shift our attention away from the why-question-Why can mathematics play the role it does in physics?-, and focus on the how-question instead. Our question, then, is this: How is mathematics actually used in the practice of modern physics?
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Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our... more
Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our understanding of these issues is certainly more nuanced today than it was only a couple of years ago, more work needs to be done in order to arrive at an adequate picture of the intricate relations between philosophy and physics on the one hand and of how philosophical reflections on the physical sciences evolved during the last century on the other. This volume addresses one of the remaining blind spots, namely the role of phenomenology in the development of 20 th century (philosophy of) physics. In this introductory chapter, we shed light on the characteristics and historical development of phenomenological approaches to physics, indicate how current debates in philosophy of physics could benefit from phenomenological approaches, and provide summaries of the individual chapters.
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The aim of this paper is to show that scientific thought experiments and works of science fiction are highly suitable tools for facilitating and increasing understandingof science. After comparing one of Einstein’s most famous thought... more
The aim of this paper is to show that scientific thought experiments and works of science fiction are highly suitable tools for facilitating and increasing understandingof science. After comparing one of Einstein’s most famous thought experiments with the science fiction novel “The Forever War”, I shall argue that both proceed similarly in making some of the more outlandish consequences of Special Relativity Theory intelligible. However, as I will also point out, understanding in thought experiments and understanding in science fiction differ in one important respect: While the former aim at what I shall call “physical understanding”, science fiction novels typically have “existential understanding” as their target.
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Anyone interested in understanding the nature of modern physics will at some point encounter a problem that was popularized in the 1960s by the physicist Eugene Wigner: Why is it that mathematics is so effective and useful for describing,... more
Anyone interested in understanding the nature of modern physics will at some point encounter a problem that was popularized in the 1960s by the physicist Eugene Wigner: Why is it that mathematics is so effective and useful for describing, explaining and predicting the kinds of phenomena we are concerned with in the sciences? In this chapter, we will propose a phenomenological solution for this “problem” of the seemingly unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences. In our view, the “problem” can only be solved—or made to evaporate—if we shift our attention away from the why-question—Why can mathematics play the role it does in physics?—, and focus on the how-question instead. Our question, then, is this: How is mathematics actually used in the practice of modern physics?
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The aim of this paper is twofold: First, I shall argue that intersubjectivity—far from being the death knell of phenomenology—plays an important role in many areas of Husserl’s thinking. This is true in particular of the phenomenological... more
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, I shall argue that intersubjectivity—far from being the death knell of phenomenology—plays an important role in many areas of Husserl’s thinking. This is true in particular of the phenomenological interpretation of the positive sciences where intersubjectivity turns out to be a necessary condition of scientific inquiry on several levels. As I shall argue, science is not only contingently communal, for instance, because of its complexity and the resulting need for division of cognitive labor. Rather, the intersubjective character of science is grounded in the very architecture of subjectivity, which, as Husserl realized, “is what it is […] only within intersubjectivity” (Husserl 1970, 172, my emphasis).
The second aim of this paper is to critically discuss some of the specifics of Husserl’s philosophy of science. Taking a cue from his early remarks about scientific method, I will consider the view according to which Husserl was as an early supporter of hypothetico-deductivism. Building on a case study from modern solar neutrino research, I will argue that a hypothetico-deductivist reading of phenomenology not only leads to an incomplete imagine of science, but also impoverishes phenomenology in its attempt to account for the intersubjective character of scientific inquiry.
To appear in: Kjosavik, F., Beyer, C. & Fricke, C. (eds.): Husserl's Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity. Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications, London & New York: Routledge.
The second aim of this paper is to critically discuss some of the specifics of Husserl’s philosophy of science. Taking a cue from his early remarks about scientific method, I will consider the view according to which Husserl was as an early supporter of hypothetico-deductivism. Building on a case study from modern solar neutrino research, I will argue that a hypothetico-deductivist reading of phenomenology not only leads to an incomplete imagine of science, but also impoverishes phenomenology in its attempt to account for the intersubjective character of scientific inquiry.
To appear in: Kjosavik, F., Beyer, C. & Fricke, C. (eds.): Husserl's Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity. Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications, London & New York: Routledge.
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This is the grant proposal for a 4-year research project on Hermann Weyl's phenomenological philosophy of physics. The project, which will officially start in 2019, is financed by the Austrian Science Fund and will be carried out at the... more
This is the grant proposal for a 4-year research project on Hermann Weyl's phenomenological philosophy of physics. The project, which will officially start in 2019, is financed by the Austrian Science Fund and will be carried out at the University of Graz and Stanford University. Part of the project is a four-year Post-Doc position that will be advertised in early 2019.
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Article on phenomenology for the "Handbook Epistemology", edited by G. Melchior and Grajner, M.
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Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents " in the flesh; " it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference... more
Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents " in the flesh; " it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference between thinking about a laptop on the desk, imagining a laptop on the desk, believing or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk, and actually visually perceiving a laptop on the desk. Only perception has a presentive character with respect to physical objects. Epistemologically, perception distinguishes itself by being a source of immediate justification for beliefs about physical states of affairs. Believing, imagining, or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk does not justify a person in believing so. However, if the person sees that there is a laptop on the desk, it is plausible to assume that she is thereby justified in believing that there is a laptop on the desk. Only perception is a source of immediate justification with respect to such states of affairs. In the phenomenological as well as in the recent analytic tradition, there have been attempts to connect the phenomenological and the epistemological distinctiveness of perception: It has been argued that perception is a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of its presentive phenomenal character. In the analytic tradition, however, it has been often overlooked that the phenomenal character of perception is not exhausted by its presentive character. Perception, essentially, also has a co-presenting character; it has a horizontal structure. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the epistemological significance of the horizontal structure of perception.
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Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our... more
Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our understanding of these issues is certainly more nuanced today than it was only a couple of years ago, more work needs to be done in order to arrive at an adequate picture of the intricate relations between philosophy and physics and of how philosophical reflections on the physical sciences evolved during the last century. The aim of this conference is to address one of the remaining blind spots, namely the role of phenomenology in the development of 20 th century physics and for the philosophical interpretation of physics. The conference will be organized around three topical areas: 1) The first concerns the direct impact phenomenology might have had on the development of 20 th century physics. For instance, a handful of recent studies have pointed to the phenomenological background of mathematicians and physicists such as Hermann Weyl or Fritz London. The conference is interested in papers that expand on these studies or go beyond them by adding to the list of physicists with phenomenological leanings. 2) The second topical area concerns the influence of phenomenology on different attempts to understand the physical sciences from a philosophical point of view. On the one hand, we are interested in papers that focus on phenomenological influences on " standard " philosophy of science in the Anglo-American tradition. On the other hand, we welcome contributions focussing on the phenomenological impact on other traditions such as the French tradition of philosophy and history of science (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, Koyré, Foucault etc.). 3) The third topical area concerns genuinely phenomenological contributions to contemporary philosophy of physics. Is the framework of phenomenology adequate to make sense of modern physics? Are there specific aspects of the research practice in modern physics that could be better understood through phenomenological analyses? What ramifications does a phenomenological approach have for long-standing debates about, for instance, realism and anti-realism, the ontological status of models or the interpretation of space-time? Finally, what can phenomenology tell us about the limits of physics or the project of mathematically describing nature in general? How to estimate the relationship between nature and mathematics?
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Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl's late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl's portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean... more
Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl's late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl's portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science.Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a historiographical shortcoming. On Ihde’s view, it is only on the basis of a distorted picture of Galileo that Husserl can “create“ (Ihde 2011: 69–82) the division between Lifeworld and the “world of science“, a division that is indeed fundamental for Husserl’s overall position. Hence, if successful, Ihde’s argument effectively undermines Husserl’s late philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that Ihde’s criticism does not stand up to closer historical or philosophical scrutiny.
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This is a revised version of my earlier paper on the topic. It is published in the Pittsburgh Phil of Science Archive together with a number of other papers on thought experiments (cf. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12334/). It will also... more
This is a revised version of my earlier paper on the topic. It is published in the Pittsburgh Phil of Science Archive together with a number of other papers on thought experiments (cf. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12334/). It will also appear in the Routledge Companion on Thought Experiments later this year.
The aim of this paper is to present an outline of a phenomenological theory of thought experiments. In doing so, I am dealing with a topic that is currently starting to receive increased attention from philosophers with phenomenological leanings. However, since no serious attempt has been made to tackle the issue in a systematic fashion, I will not merely review existing phenomenological work on thought experiments. For the most part, my paper is programmatic: its aim is to suggest some basic directions in which a phenomenological theory of scientific thought experiments should be developed.
The aim of this paper is to present an outline of a phenomenological theory of thought experiments. In doing so, I am dealing with a topic that is currently starting to receive increased attention from philosophers with phenomenological leanings. However, since no serious attempt has been made to tackle the issue in a systematic fashion, I will not merely review existing phenomenological work on thought experiments. For the most part, my paper is programmatic: its aim is to suggest some basic directions in which a phenomenological theory of scientific thought experiments should be developed.
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In this short piece for a handbook on Husserlian phenomenology I try to tease out the relations between Husserl, the Vienna Circle (and Logical Positivism/Empiricism more generally) and the nascent analytic movement.
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This is an penultimate draft (with some minor typos) for our forthcoming anthology, containing invited papers presented at the International Wittgenstein Symposion in 2014.
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This is a heavily revised version of my earlier piece on Meillassoux. The paper is currently under review. In a widely discussed essay that was originally published in 2006, Quentin Meillassoux launches a sweeping attack against... more
This is a heavily revised version of my earlier piece on Meillassoux. The paper is currently under review.
In a widely discussed essay that was originally published in 2006, Quentin Meillassoux launches a sweeping attack against “correlationism”. Correlationism is an umbrella term for any philosophical system that is based on “the idea [that] we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux 2012, p. 5). Thus construed, Meillassoux’ critique is indeed a sweeping one: It comprises major parts of the philosophical tradition since Kant, both in its more continental and in its more analytical outlooks. In light of this critique, the aim of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, I shall defend phenomenology against Meillassoux’ main argument, the “argument from ancestrality”. On the other hand, I will argue that this argument, albeit unsuccessful in its original form, can be modified to pose a more serious threat. Although this modified version can also be circumvented, it forces phenomenologists to clarify their stance towards the natural sciences.
In a widely discussed essay that was originally published in 2006, Quentin Meillassoux launches a sweeping attack against “correlationism”. Correlationism is an umbrella term for any philosophical system that is based on “the idea [that] we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux 2012, p. 5). Thus construed, Meillassoux’ critique is indeed a sweeping one: It comprises major parts of the philosophical tradition since Kant, both in its more continental and in its more analytical outlooks. In light of this critique, the aim of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, I shall defend phenomenology against Meillassoux’ main argument, the “argument from ancestrality”. On the other hand, I will argue that this argument, albeit unsuccessful in its original form, can be modified to pose a more serious threat. Although this modified version can also be circumvented, it forces phenomenologists to clarify their stance towards the natural sciences.
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Analytic philosophers talk a lot about intuitions. Phenomenologist talk a lot about intuition too. But do they talk about the same thing? My tentative answer in this paper will be “no”. However, it is, as I hope, no boring,... more
Analytic philosophers talk a lot about intuitions. Phenomenologist talk a lot about intuition too. But do they talk about the same thing? My tentative answer in this paper will be “no”. However, it is, as I hope, no boring, unqualified “no”. The overall take
home message is notthat there is no hope for dialogue between the analytic and the phenomenological treatments of intuition(s). Rather, my thesis is that phenomenologists who talk about intuition do not talk about intuitions, but about something that resembles seemings in Michael Huemer’s sense of the term.
home message is notthat there is no hope for dialogue between the analytic and the phenomenological treatments of intuition(s). Rather, my thesis is that phenomenologists who talk about intuition do not talk about intuitions, but about something that resembles seemings in Michael Huemer’s sense of the term.
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Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary... more
Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's epistemology as well as his more substantial comments regarding the natural sciences indeed result in a (sophisticated version of) scientific anti-realism which bears certain resemblances to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism; b) This scientific anti-realism can be defended against the two most common objections raised in the secondary literature; c) It is only by means of this sophisticated version of scientific anti-realism that phenomenology can circumvent the problem of “scientific objectivism“.
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Within philosophy, thought experiments seem to be mainly utilized by philosophers from the analytical camp. There, thought experiments are a widely accepted tool for the analysis of a huge variety of philosophical problems. However, so... more
Within philosophy, thought experiments seem to be mainly utilized by philosophers from the analytical camp. There, thought experiments are a widely accepted tool for the analysis of a huge variety of philosophical problems. However, so far, no systematic attempts to analyze thought experiments from a phenomenological perspective have been made. This paper is intended as a step towards filling this gap. Although I will only deal with one single philosophical thought experiment, I hope to give at least some insight into the method of thought experimental reasoning. Yet, in doing so, I not only wish to shed some light on the prospects and limits of thought experiments. I also hope to contribute to a better understanding of phenomenology, namely of the eidetic method in general and to the notion of essential laws in particular.
The paper is structured as follows: Before I can focus on my actual subject matter, I must to do some stage-setting in the first section. I will characterize the notion of (givenness in) adumbrations and its consequences for the phenomenology of perception. I will then go on to say a word or two on the concepts of essentiality and apodictic Evidenz. Section two is concerned with the presentation of a concrete thought experiment, namely the "eyeball thought experiment". This thought experiment seems to undermine the phenomenological position according to which givenness in adumbrations belongs to the very essence of physical thinghood. Section three is concerned with two tasks: On the one hand, I will give a general characterization of what I take thought experiments to be. On the other hand, I shall explain why the eyeball thought experiment fails in undermining the phenomenological position. Crucial for my argument is the distinction between first-person-imagination and second-person-imagination. However, as I will emphasize in section four, the eyeball thought experiment not only deserves criticism. It also delimits the scope of the phenomenological notion of apodicticity. Finally, in section five, I will briefly reflect on the epistemological significance of the distinction between first- and second-person-imagination
The paper is structured as follows: Before I can focus on my actual subject matter, I must to do some stage-setting in the first section. I will characterize the notion of (givenness in) adumbrations and its consequences for the phenomenology of perception. I will then go on to say a word or two on the concepts of essentiality and apodictic Evidenz. Section two is concerned with the presentation of a concrete thought experiment, namely the "eyeball thought experiment". This thought experiment seems to undermine the phenomenological position according to which givenness in adumbrations belongs to the very essence of physical thinghood. Section three is concerned with two tasks: On the one hand, I will give a general characterization of what I take thought experiments to be. On the other hand, I shall explain why the eyeball thought experiment fails in undermining the phenomenological position. Crucial for my argument is the distinction between first-person-imagination and second-person-imagination. However, as I will emphasize in section four, the eyeball thought experiment not only deserves criticism. It also delimits the scope of the phenomenological notion of apodicticity. Finally, in section five, I will briefly reflect on the epistemological significance of the distinction between first- and second-person-imagination
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Our claim is that the debate on thought experiments lacks an adequate account on the body. The only exception so far is David Gooding. It is for this reason that our considerations begin with a brief summary of Gooding's views. However,... more
Our claim is that the debate on thought experiments lacks an adequate account on the body. The only exception so far is David Gooding. It is for this reason that our considerations begin with a brief summary of Gooding's views. However, it is our claim that a non-naturalistic, phenomenological take on the body is more appropriate when it comes to a philosophical understanding of thought experimental reasoning. We illustrate this claim by giving a phenomenological explanation of Newton's thought experiments on absolute space.
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It is the aim of this paper to take some first steps towards a phenomenological approach to thought experiments. In doing so, I am dealing with a topic that is as yet largely unexplored. So far, only a handful of contributions were... more
It is the aim of this paper to take some first steps towards a phenomenological approach to thought experiments. In doing so, I am dealing with a topic that is as yet largely unexplored. So far, only a handful of contributions were devoted to a phenomenological analysis of TEs. And since none of them tackles the issue in a systematic fashion, my aim is to suggest some basic directions in which a phenomenological framework for the analysis of TEs should be developed.
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Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and 8 moreSpeculative Realism, Scientific Realism, Enactivism, Quentin Meillassoux, Cognitive Sciences, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Bas Van Fraassen, and Scientific Realism, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Science
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Page 54. Überlegungen zum wissenschaftsphilosophischen Subtext in Karl Jaspers' Allgemeiner Psychopathologie Harald A. Wiltsche I In seiner philosophischen Autobiographie beschreibt Jaspers die Situation an der Hei ...
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An anthology on Karl Jasper's ground-breaking work on the methodology of psychopathology.
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Much of what Husserl thought needs to be done in order to make philosophy truly "scientific" is encapsulated in the well-known slogan "Back to the things themselves!". Instead of forcing problems into a pre-established (and potentially... more
Much of what Husserl thought needs to be done in order to make philosophy truly "scientific" is encapsulated in the well-known slogan "Back to the things themselves!". Instead of forcing problems into a pre-established (and potentially artifical) theoretical mold, phenomenology seeks to ground claims to knowledge in experience through which "the things themselves" appear. But what does Husserl mean by "experience"? And what precisely are the "things themselves"?
It is these questions that I wish to address in my talk. In order to do so, I will start with a brief exposition of Husserl's critique of empricism in the first part of my presentation. I will then use this critique as a foil against the background of which Husserl's positive views regarding philosophical "Wissenschaftlichkeit" will be characterized. The third and final part of my talk is concerned with the question as to how these views shape Husserl's interpretation of the physical sciences. My thesis is that, although Husserl opposed empiricism in crucial respects, his understanding of scientific theories resembles that of more radical empiricists such as Bas van Fraassen.
It is these questions that I wish to address in my talk. In order to do so, I will start with a brief exposition of Husserl's critique of empricism in the first part of my presentation. I will then use this critique as a foil against the background of which Husserl's positive views regarding philosophical "Wissenschaftlichkeit" will be characterized. The third and final part of my talk is concerned with the question as to how these views shape Husserl's interpretation of the physical sciences. My thesis is that, although Husserl opposed empiricism in crucial respects, his understanding of scientific theories resembles that of more radical empiricists such as Bas van Fraassen.
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I critically examine Jim Brown's Platonist account on scientific thought experiments, especially his newly introduced notion of Platonic Idealizations.
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Reading Assignments for a Graduate Course at the Center for History of Science/University of Graz, Austria.