Philipp Berghofer
University of Graz, Philosophy, Department Member
Fitch’s paradox of knowability proves that, necessarily, if there is an unknown truth, then there is an unknowable truth, a truth that could not possibly be known. As we are not omniscient, we have to conclude that there are unknowable... more
Fitch’s paradox of knowability proves that, necessarily, if there is an unknown truth, then there is an unknowable truth, a truth that could not possibly be known. As we are not omniscient, we have to conclude that there are unknowable truths. I discuss the impact of Fitch’s argument on the question whether there are limits to (human) knowledge and I will show that there is no impact at all.
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In his influential paper "Grasping the Third Realm," John Bengson raises the question of how we can non-accidentally grasp abstract facts. What distinguishes successful intuition from hallucinatory intuition? Bengson answers his... more
In his influential paper "Grasping the Third Realm," John Bengson raises the question of how we can non-accidentally grasp abstract facts. What distinguishes successful intuition from hallucinatory intuition? Bengson answers his "non-accidental relation question" by arguing for a constitutive relationship: The intuited object is a literal constituent of the respective intuition. Now, the problem my contribution centers around is that Bengson's answer cannot be the end of the story. This is because, as Bar Luzon and Preston Werner have recently pointed out, this answer leads to the follow-up question of why certain intuitional experiences are constituted by the facts, but others are not. My objective is to answer this question by specifying precisely what is epistemically defective about intellectual hallucinations. My result is that, in stark contrast to perception, intellectual hallucinations are epistemically defective in the sense that something is overlooked. In successful intuition, by contrast, all relevant possibilities/scenarios are considered/imagined. This has crucial epistemological implications. In particular, I argue that intuitions exhibiting a certain phenomenology cannot fail to successfully grasp abstract facts. I call this the non-accidental correctness thesis, which constitutes the main thesis of this paper.
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In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for nonempirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two... more
In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for nonempirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not constitute knowledge. Finally, I submit a novel analysis of a priori knowledge that avoids the Gettier problem. What is particularly important and distinctive about my analysis is that I neither need to make the justification condition so strong that only infallible justification is allowed, nor do I need to explicitly introduce a truth condition.
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This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's... more
This is the first volume that focuses specifically on phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics. It is also the first volume focusing on the philosophical implications of QBism. This coincidence is not accidental. Phenomenology's rich potential for our understanding of quantum mechanics has long been overlooked by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike. The experience-first approach of phenomenology, its descriptive methodology, and Husserl’s critique of mathematization do not sit well with “mainstream” analytic philosophy of physics. But as this volume will demonstrate, it sits nicely with the basic tenets of QBism. Conversely, QBism constitutes the most consistent and best-developed interpretation of quantum mechanics that fully embraces the Bohrian idea that “the primitive concept of experience is fundamental to an understanding of science” (Fuchs et al. 2014, 749). However, since its inception in the early 2000s, QBism has struggled to connect with the philosophical community. Not only are the underlying intuitions shaping and dominating contemporary philosophy of quantum mechanics—namely, that a scientific theory must be purged of all subjective and operational notions such as “experience” or “measurement” and that, consequently, a successful approach to quantum mechanics must be formulated as a “quantum theory without observers”—at odds with QBism. It seems that sometimes the incommensurability already starts at the level of the basic conceptual framework which, in the case of mainstream analytic philosophy, is not very well suited to express some of QBism’s main tenets. Considering this situation, the main hypothesis of this volume is that phenomenology and QBism are natural bedfellows, and that both can profit from mutual exchange. In order to make this exchange as profitable as possible, the aim of this introductory chapter is to identify, clarify, and motivate some of the cornerstones of phenomenological approaches to quantum mechanics, to shed light on the main ideas and virtues of QBism, and to discuss points of contact and points of possible conflict between these two projects.
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Husserl argued that psychology needs to establish an abstraction that is opposite to the abstraction successfully established in the natural sciences. While the natural sciences abstract away the psychological or subjective, psychology... more
Husserl argued that psychology needs to establish an abstraction that is opposite to the abstraction successfully established in the natural sciences. While the natural sciences abstract away the psychological or subjective, psychology must abstract away the physical or worldly. However, Husserl and other phenomenologists such as Iso Kern have argued that there is a crucial systematic disanalogy between both abstractions. While the abstraction of the natural sciences can be performed completely, the abstraction of psychology cannot. In this context, Husserl argues that the psychological reduction leads to paradoxes. In this paper, I critically discuss whether it is true that the natural sciences can successfully abstract away the subjective. Or more precisely, I raise the question of whether they should.
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This paper aims at demystifying the doctrine of originary givenness. By the doctrine of originary givenness I understand the Husserlian claims that (i) originary presentive experiences are a source of immediate justification, (ii)... more
This paper aims at demystifying the doctrine of originary givenness. By the doctrine of originary givenness I understand the Husserlian claims that (i) originary presentive experiences are a source of immediate justification, (ii) originary presentive experiences are our ultimate source of justification, and (iii) originary presentive experiences gain their justificatory force precisely from their phenomenal character of originary givenness. It is shown that these claims are immune to Sellars' objections. Clarifying why the doctrine of originary givenness avoids Sellars' objections will help us to better understand the relationship between experience and belief as well as the relationship between experiential justification and inferential justification.
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Research Interests: Epistemology, Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy Of Mathematics, Phenomenology, Intuition, and 8 moreEpistemic Justification, Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Internalism/Externalism, Phenomenology Of Intuition, Mathematical intuition, Husserlian phenomenology, Phenomenology of Perception, and phenomenological epistemology
Research Interests: Epistemology, Philosophy of Physics, Phenomenology, Intuition, Epistemic Justification, and 12 morePhilosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Internalism/Externalism, Phenomenology Of Intuition, Mathematical intuition, Husserlian phenomenology, Perceptual Learning, Transcendental Phenomenology, Hermann Weyl, Blindsight, Phenomenology of Perception, phenomenological epistemology, and Qbism
Recently, perceptual learning has become a focus of philosophical investigations. This is because the phenomenon of perceptual learning sheds light on the nature of perception. It tells us that the physical objects that are perceived are... more
Recently, perceptual learning has become a focus of philosophical investigations. This is because the phenomenon of perceptual learning sheds light on the nature of perception. It tells us that the physical objects that are perceived are not the sole causes of perceptual states, it reveals that previous experiences shape the way we perceive, and it brings into focus an experience’s phenomenal character. Hence, there is no doubt that perceptual learning has crucial implications for philosophy of mind. Only very recently, however, have researchers begun to investigate whether we can draw genuinely epistemological lessons from perceptual learning. In the first section, we shall see that such epistemological lessons do indeed exist. The rest of the paper is devoted to showing that there are analogous cases of intuitional learning. By discussing simple examples, it is argued that such cases of intuitional learning suggest that intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that have a distinctive phenomenal character, and that it is this distinctive phenomenal character that makes intuitions a source of immediate justification.
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Evidentialism and mentalism enjoy much popularity. In fact, mentalist evidentialism is often considered the most plausible internalist approach towards epistemic justification. However, mentalist evidentialism does not amount to a... more
Evidentialism and mentalism enjoy much popularity. In fact, mentalist evidentialism is often considered the most plausible internalist approach towards epistemic justification. However, mentalist evidentialism does not amount to a comprehensive theory of epistemic justification. In their attempt to complete their epistemological system and to answer the question of why experiences are justifiers, Conee and Feldman supplement mentalist evidentialism with explanationism. They take principles of best explanation to be the fundamental epistemic principles. In this paper, I show that explanationist mentalist evidentialism is plagued by severe shortcomings. What is more, I argue for an alternative in the spirit of Conee and Feldman's internalism that avoids the problems of explanationism, offering a straightforward commonsense account of epistemic justification. The fundamental epistemological principles are phenomenological principles.
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Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience's distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain... more
Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience's distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to make a distinction between evaluative experiences directed at concrete cases and ethical intuitions directed at general principles. The focus will be on evaluative experiences. I argue that evaluative experiences constitute a sui generis type of experience that gain their justificatory force by virtue of their presentive evaluative phenomenology. In section 1, I introduce and motivate the phenomenological idea that certain experiences exhibit a justification-conferring phenomenology. In section 4, I apply this idea to morally evaluative experiences. In section 5, I suggest that certain epistemic intuitions should be considered epistemically evaluative experiences and I outline a strong parallelism between ethics and epistemology.
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As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objec-tifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl's worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics,... more
As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objec-tifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl's worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics, the first aim of our paper is to show that many of his critical arguments are no less relevant today. By addressing the formalism and current interpretations of quantum theory, we illustrate how topics surrounding the mathematization of nature come to the fore naturally. Our second aim is to consider the program of reconstructing quantum theory, a program that currently enjoys popularity in the field of quantum foundations. We will conclude by arguing that, seen from this vantage point, certain insights delivered by phenomenology and quantum theory regarding perspectivity are remarkably concordant. Our overall hope with this paper is to show that there is much room for mutual learning between phenomenology and modern physics.
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Husserlian phenomenology is an ambitious project, aiming to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that for any science, indeed for any piece of knowledge, phenomenology must be capable of elucidating the... more
Husserlian phenomenology is an ambitious project, aiming to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that for any science, indeed for any piece of knowledge, phenomenology must be capable of elucidating the legitimacy of this science or piece of knowledge. But how can phenomenology, a science of the structures of consciousness, serve as the ultimate science? To answer this question, we shed light on Husserl’s teachings on the variety, epistemic force, and systematic role of experiences. The idea, roughly, is that every piece of knowledge can be traced back to epistemically foundational experiences. To be more precise, it is experiences that bear the mark of originary givenness that play this role. Investigating the sources of knowledge, then, means investigating modes of givenness – the ways experiences present the objects they are directed at. Perceptual experiences, introspective experiences, eidetic intuitions, and evaluative experiences are among the various types of originary presentive experiences. In our Husserlian picture, different sources of knowledge correspond to different types of experiences, which in turn correspond to different types of evidence. It is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to clarify these correlations.
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Table of Contents: "Phenomenological Approaches to Physics"
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In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One... more
In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are typically mentioned in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This is surprising because here one can find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early modern physics was noticeably influenced by phe-nomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. Engaging with the phenomenological tradition is also of systematic value since it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism.
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The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental... more
The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: What does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics.
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Perceptual experiences justify. When I look at the black laptop in front of me and my perceptual experience presents me with a black laptop placed on my desk, my perceptual experience has justificatory force with respect to the... more
Perceptual experiences justify. When I look at the black laptop in front of me and my perceptual experience presents me with a black laptop placed on my desk, my perceptual experience has justificatory force with respect to the proposition that there is black laptop on the desk. The present paper addresses the question of why perceptual experiences are a source of immediate justification: What gives them their justificatory force? I shall argue that the most plausible and the most straightforward answer to this question consists in what I call the phenomenological conception of perceptual justification. Perceptual experiences justify by virtue of their distinctive presentive phenomenology. This is a truly internalist conception that enjoys significant advantages over rival conceptions. In the course of his paper, I demonstrate the advantages of the phenomenological conception and defend it against a recent objection.
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Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the... more
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl's a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.
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It is well known that Husserl considered phenomenology to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that phenomenology must clarify the ultimate phenomenological-epistemological principle that leads to ultimate... more
It is well known that Husserl considered phenomenology to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that phenomenology must clarify the ultimate phenomenological-epistemological principle that leads to ultimate elucidation. But what is this ultimate principle and what does ultimate elucidation mean? It is the aim of this paper to answer these questions. In section 2, we shall discuss what role Husserl's principle of all principles can play in the quest for ultimate elucidation and what it means for a principle to be ultimately elucidating (letztaufklärend) and ultimately elucidated (letztaufgeklärt). We will see that the Husserlian thesis that originary presentive intuitions are an immediate and the ultimate source of justification qualifies as the ultimate epistemological principle.
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Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our... more
Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our understanding of these issues is certainly more nuanced today than it was only a couple of years ago, more work needs to be done in order to arrive at an adequate picture of the intricate relations between philosophy and physics on the one hand and of how philosophical reflections on the physical sciences evolved during the last century on the other. This volume addresses one of the remaining blind spots, namely the role of phenomenology in the development of 20 th century (philosophy of) physics. In this introductory chapter, we shed light on the characteristics and historical development of phenomenological approaches to physics, indicate how current debates in philosophy of physics could benefit from phenomenological approaches, and provide summaries of the individual chapters.
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How Husserlian phenomenology is related to the empirical sciences, particularly psychology, is among the most intriguing though also most controversial topics in Husserl scholarship. On several occasions, for instance in Ideas I, Husserl... more
How Husserlian phenomenology is related to the empirical sciences, particularly psychology, is among the most intriguing though also most controversial topics in Husserl scholarship. On several occasions, for instance in Ideas I, Husserl frames the relationship as if the empirical sciences could not have any positive impact on phenomenological research. Since phenomenology is an eidetic, a priori science, such a claim is at least prima facie plausible. As argued in a text drafted by Edith Stein on behalf of Husserl, “Zur Kritik an Theodor Elsenhans und August Messer” (Husserliana 25), the relationship is far more complex. This largely unknown text is a highly important contribution of early phenomenology to the ongoing debate on the relationship between phenomenology and empirical science. Here Stein / Husserl challenge a common view of the phenomenological method, which was widespread among their contemporaries and is still effective nowadays. They do so by conceding that eidetic phenomenological insights leave room for fallibility and that empirical evidence can reveal that an a priori eidetic finding must be mistaken although the former cannot strictly speaking refute the latter. This, of course, raises systematic questions that are relevant to any phenomenology in Husserl’s tradition. Is apodictic evidence fallible? Can empirical evidence supplement or even defeat a priori insights? Can phenomenological investigations benefit from psychological research? If so, how? Combining phenomenological and empirical investigations seems particularly appropriate for the field of research Edith Stein is best known for: empathy.
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Article on phenomenology for the "Handbook Epistemology", edited by G. Melchior and Grajner, M.
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In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl (1) evidence determines epistemic justification and (2) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one’s ultimate evidence consists of one’s originary presentive intuitions.... more
In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl (1) evidence determines epistemic justification and (2) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one’s ultimate evidence consists of one’s originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. While Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely their originary givenness.
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For Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centerpiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in... more
For Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centerpiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in apparent isolation without clarifying their systematic unity, the significance of noetics is often overlooked. Although Husserl has repeatedly stressed the importance of a phenomenological epistemology, what the concrete theses of such an undertaking are supposed to be often remains obscure. We shall see that the best way to clarify this is by providing a detailed account of Husserl's noetics as it is developed in Husserl's lecture courses " Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge " (1906/07) and " Logic and General Theory of Science " (1917/18). This is the main aim of the present paper. We will shed light on the significance, systematic unity, and concrete theses of noetics. Furthermore, I shall show in what way the main theses of noetics are present in Husserl's other works, even if the term noetics does not even occur. Finally, we will see that some basic ideas of Husserl's noetics play an important role in current analytic epistemology and we will indicate how a phenomenological epistemology could enrich current debates.
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Husserl claims that his phenomenological-epistemological system amounts to a " universal " form of empiricism. The present paper shows that this universal moment of Husserl's empiricism is why his empiricism qualifies as a rationalism.... more
Husserl claims that his phenomenological-epistemological system amounts to a " universal " form of empiricism. The present paper shows that this universal moment of Husserl's empiricism is why his empiricism qualifies as a rationalism. What is empiricist about Husserl's phenomenological-epistemological system is that he takes experiences to be an autonomous source of immediate justification. On top of that, Husserl takes experiences to be the ultimate source of justification. For Husserl, every justified belief ultimately depends epistemically on the subject's experiences. These are paradigms of empiricist claims and thus Husserl seems to subscribe to empiricism. However, what is universal about Husserl's " empiricism " is that he does not limit the concept of (justification-conferring) experiences to sensory experiences or sensory experiences plus introspective intuitions but broadens the concept of experience such that also a priori intuitions are included. Husserl insists that logical, mathematical, and phenomenological intuitions such as ~(p ˄ ~p), 2 + 2 = 4, and " Experiences necessarily bear the mark of intentionality " provide non-inferential justification analogous to how sensory experiences can non-inferentially justify beliefs such as " There is a table in front of me. " Importantly, Husserl makes clear that such a priori intuitions are not about our concepts but about reality. This is why Husserl's universal empiricism is a rationalism. Husserl differs from traditional rationalism as he allows that a priori intuitions can be fallible and empirically underminable. This distinguishes Husserl’s rationalism from Descartes’ and makes him a proponent of moderate rationalism as currently championed by Laurence BonJour.
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The present paper aims to exemplify how engaging with current debates in analytic epistemology can help to motivate transcendental phenomenology.
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Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship... more
Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl's basic epistemological principles, such as the " principle of all principles, " seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show (i) that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.
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The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from... more
The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something.
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The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl's conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures... more
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl's conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl's conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl's specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl's claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given.
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Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents " in the flesh; " it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference... more
Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents " in the flesh; " it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference between thinking about a laptop on the desk, imagining a laptop on the desk, believing or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk, and actually visually perceiving a laptop on the desk. Only perception has a presentive character with respect to physical objects. Epistemologically, perception distinguishes itself by being a source of immediate justification for beliefs about physical states of affairs. Believing, imagining, or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk does not justify a person in believing so. However, if the person sees that there is a laptop on the desk, it is plausible to assume that she is thereby justified in believing that there is a laptop on the desk. Only perception is a source of immediate justification with respect to such states of affairs. In the phenomenological as well as in the recent analytic tradition, there have been attempts to connect the phenomenological and the epistemological distinctiveness of perception: It has been argued that perception is a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of its presentive phenomenal character. In the analytic tradition, however, it has been often overlooked that the phenomenal character of perception is not exhausted by its presentive character. Perception, essentially, also has a co-presenting character; it has a horizontal structure. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the epistemological significance of the horizontal structure of perception.
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Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our... more
Much ink has been spilled over the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19 th and early 20 th century as well as over the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. Although our understanding of these issues is certainly more nuanced today than it was only a couple of years ago, more work needs to be done in order to arrive at an adequate picture of the intricate relations between philosophy and physics and of how philosophical reflections on the physical sciences evolved during the last century. The aim of this conference is to address one of the remaining blind spots, namely the role of phenomenology in the development of 20 th century physics and for the philosophical interpretation of physics. The conference will be organized around three topical areas: 1) The first concerns the direct impact phenomenology might have had on the development of 20 th century physics. For instance, a handful of recent studies have pointed to the phenomenological background of mathematicians and physicists such as Hermann Weyl or Fritz London. The conference is interested in papers that expand on these studies or go beyond them by adding to the list of physicists with phenomenological leanings. 2) The second topical area concerns the influence of phenomenology on different attempts to understand the physical sciences from a philosophical point of view. On the one hand, we are interested in papers that focus on phenomenological influences on " standard " philosophy of science in the Anglo-American tradition. On the other hand, we welcome contributions focussing on the phenomenological impact on other traditions such as the French tradition of philosophy and history of science (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, Koyré, Foucault etc.). 3) The third topical area concerns genuinely phenomenological contributions to contemporary philosophy of physics. Is the framework of phenomenology adequate to make sense of modern physics? Are there specific aspects of the research practice in modern physics that could be better understood through phenomenological analyses? What ramifications does a phenomenological approach have for long-standing debates about, for instance, realism and anti-realism, the ontological status of models or the interpretation of space-time? Finally, what can phenomenology tell us about the limits of physics or the project of mathematically describing nature in general? How to estimate the relationship between nature and mathematics?
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Ontic structural realism refers to the novel, exciting, and widely discussed basic idea that the structure of physical reality is genuinely relational. In its radical form, the doctrine claims that there are, in fact, no objects but only... more
Ontic structural realism refers to the novel, exciting, and widely discussed basic idea that the structure of physical reality is genuinely relational. In its radical form, the doctrine claims that there are, in fact, no objects but only structure, i.e., relations. More moderate approaches state that objects have only relational but no intrinsic properties. In its most moderate and most tenable form, ontic structural realism assumes that at the most fundamental level of physical reality there are only relational properties. This means that the most fundamental objects only possess relational but no non-reducible intrinsic properties. The present paper will argue that our currently best physics refutes even this most moderate form of ontic structural realism. More precisely, I will claim that 1) according to quantum field theory, the most fundamental objects of matter are quantum fields and not particles, and show that 2) according to the Standard Model, quantum fields have intrinsic non-relational properties.
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Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a... more
Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators such as Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christopher Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl's writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.
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Huemer's Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) states that every seeming is a source of prima facie justification. Arguably, the most common objection against PC consists in referring to counterexamples. This sort of objection has... more
Huemer's Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) states that every seeming is a source of prima facie justification. Arguably, the most common objection against PC consists in referring to counterexamples. This sort of objection has particularly been championed by Markie (2005). In order to meet Markie's objection, a dogmatist could endorse a restricted version of PC. Here, a dogmatist is one who believes that at least one kind of seeming is a source of prima facie justification. This paper aims to show that a dogmatist could benefit from replacing Huemer's seemings with Husserl's phenomenological intuitions as being the ultimate source of prima facie justification.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its first international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor, master, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current... more
The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its first international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor, master, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology, metaethics, and metaphysics. Husserl's conceptions of originary givenness, evaluative experience, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism, the theory of value, (moral) emotions, moral epistemology, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of modality. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with, discuss with, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event. The conference will be an online event. If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name, affiliation, and research interests. If you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions should not exceed 500 words, must be written in English (conference language), and should be prepared for blind review.