Preston J Werner
(*Note to those without Academia.edu membership: my papers are also available on my website, http://prestonjwerner.webnode.com)
My research interests are in metaethics (especially moral epistemology), philosophy of perception, and metaphysics.
My dissertation defends a perceptual account of moral knowledge over a priori alternatives, with a special focus on issues of epistemic access.
I can be contacted at pjwerner1 at gmail.com
Supervisors: David Sobel
Address: Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
My research interests are in metaethics (especially moral epistemology), philosophy of perception, and metaphysics.
My dissertation defends a perceptual account of moral knowledge over a priori alternatives, with a special focus on issues of epistemic access.
I can be contacted at pjwerner1 at gmail.com
Supervisors: David Sobel
Address: Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p , other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true.
Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting this challenge begins by pointing out that we are semantically or conceptually competent in our use of the normative terms, and then argues that this competence guarantees the non-accidental truth of some of our first-order normative beliefs. In this paper, I argue against this strategy by illustrating that this competence based strategy undermines the non-naturalist's ability to capture the robustly normative content of our moral beliefs.
roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p , other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true.
Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting this challenge begins by pointing out that we are semantically or conceptually competent in our use of the normative terms, and then argues that this competence guarantees the non-accidental truth of some of our first-order normative beliefs. In this paper, I argue against this strategy by illustrating that this competence based strategy undermines the non-naturalist's ability to capture the robustly normative content of our moral beliefs.