Vol. 466, August 9, 2005 235

8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 466
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 235

Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality
(now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila
*
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO
MANILA, respondent.
Actions; Appeals; While only questions of law may be raised by the

parties and passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review on
certiorari and that findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial
court, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, the
Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on record where it is shown that
the conclusions are findings grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.—It
must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari.
Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Nonetheless, where it is
shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises
or conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts,
the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on record.
Eminent Domain; The right of eminent domain is usually understood to
be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.—The right of eminent
domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power
to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been comprehensively
described as follows: . . . It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a
power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain
appertains to every independent government without the necessity for
constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of
civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not
by implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which
would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cd7b4eef68df091e1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/29
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality (now City)
of Pasig, Metro Manila
for public use without just compensation.” Furthermore, the due process and
equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power.
Same; Local Government Units; The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor—when
the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the
express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is
contained; The condemnor has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation.—The exercise of the right of
eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates
the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given
against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When
the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to
the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is
contained. Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the
burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of
condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied
with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Requisites for Valid Exercise of the Power of Eminent
Domain by Local Government Units.—The Court declared that the
following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
by a local government unit must be complied with: 1. An ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There
is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be

expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; It is incumbent upon the
condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it
237
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 237
desires by agreement; An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party

makes to the other for the celebration of a contract; The offer must be
complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended
and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.—
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid
and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint
and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor
to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement.
Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in
the dismissal of the complaint. An offer is a unilateral proposition which
one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a
power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to
transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation. Corollarily, the
offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of
contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the
proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a clear
certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the requirement of a valid and
definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and
voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to
avoid the expense and delay of a court action; A single bona fide offer that
is rejected by the owner will suffice.—The purpose of the requirement of a
valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes
in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. The law is
designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the
expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is
a substantial right which should be protected in every instance. It
encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner
but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the
landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the
property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer
in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the
property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A
single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
238
Same; Same; Same; A letter offered only to prove the municipality’s

desire or intent to acquire a property for a right-of-way does not prove that
the LGU made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public
use as an access road before filing the complaint for expropriation.—In the
present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint,
it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public
use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to
prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the
photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose
Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. It bears
stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its
desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. The document
was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer
to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because
the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The
respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were
sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
Same; Same; Same; There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s
ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of
the owner’s certificate of title is a substantial compliance with the requisite
offer.—There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioner’s
TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. A
notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an
action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that
those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that
they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens
was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993,
long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching
Cuancos.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed,
the municipality made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the
property, the declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were
already notified of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a
municipal road is not a compliance with Section
239
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 239
19 of R.A. No. 7160.—Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas

clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by
the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a
municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid
and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the
Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr.
Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In the absence of competent
evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all
the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the
declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.
Same; Same; A property that is intended for the construction of a place
of religious worship and a school for its members may still be expropriated.
—We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer
be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction
of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly
explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: It has been
explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical
research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual
increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted. . . . for “whatever is beneficially employed for
the community is a public use.”
Same; Same; Easements; Right-of-Way; Where property is
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the expropriator is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-
of-way under the New Civil Code—case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.—The subject property
is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-
of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is
justified so long as it
240
is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character.
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be
taken.
Same; Same; The testimony of witnesses that although there were other
ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however,
especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the property
sought to be expropriated is more than sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area—absolute
necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will
suffice.—The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a
road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who
were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other
ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however,
especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly
constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that
there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After
all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical
necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the
necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property
and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states
that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to
connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondent’s
complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been
surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
Same; Same; Due Process; Ocular Inspections; An ocular inspection is
part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled
to be present at any stage of the trial—where the property owner was not
notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the
court based on the said inspection has no probative weight.—As correctly
pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular
inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted
an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner
was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right
to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial
as evidence is thereby received and the parties are
241
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 241
entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this

case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property,
any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no
probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the
ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Virginia S. Jose-San Juan for petitioner.
Carlos C. Abesamis and Efren T. Jolo for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59050, and its Resolution dated
February 18, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality
(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take
possession of the subject property.
The Antecedents
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos

Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay
Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of
light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters
in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass
through in case of
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices

Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; Rollo, pp. 6-14.
242

2
2
conflagration. Likewise, the residents
3
in the area needed the road
for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to
acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching
Cuanco4 Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-
66585, which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On April
5
19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund
therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified
of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as
an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on
August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of
the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff
alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its
intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but
they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the
complaint a photocopy
6
of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the
property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession
over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993,
the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-
_______________
2 TSN, 9 January 1996, pp. 4-9.

3 TSN, 1 August 1994, p. 17.
4 Records, p. 17.
5 Exhibit “C,” Id., at pp. 59-60.
6 Records, pp. 19-20.
243
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 243

92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School

Foundation,
7
Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented
road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan
Street.
8
8
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February
1993, they had 9
sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a
deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching
Cuanco Kho and his wife.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for
leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention,
10
which motion the
RTC granted on August 26, 1994.
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special
and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent
domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the
poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to be
expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least
burdensome to it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-
defendants for 11
reimbursement in case the subject property is
expropriated. In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it
has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the
road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was
not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed
counterclaims
12
against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiff’s messenger,
testified on direct examination that on February 23, 1993, he served
a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to
_______________
7 Id., at p. 56.
8 Id., at p. 21.
9 Exhibits “2” and “3.”
10 Id., at p. 24.
11 Records, p. 26.
12 Id., at pp. 31-32.
244

the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store at

No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street, Kapasigan, Pasig. A lady received the
same and brought it inside the store. When she returned the letter to
him, it already bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a
photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store.
13
On cross-examination, he admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte.
Edgardo del Rosario, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid since 1982
declared that he would pass through a wooden bridge to go to E. R.
Santos Street. At times, the bridge would be slippery and many had
met accidents while walking along the bridge. Because of this, they
requested Mayor Vicente Eusebio to construct a road therein. He
attested that after the construction14of the cemented access road, the
residents had water and electricity.
Augusto Paz of the City Engineer’s Office testified that,
sometime in 1992, the plaintiff constructed a road perpendicular
from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid; he was the Project
Engineer for the said undertaking. Before the construction of the
road, the lot was raw and they had to put filling materials so that
vehicles could use it. According to him, the length of the road which
they constructed was 70 meters long and 3 meters wide so that a fire
truck could pass through. He averred that there is no other road 15
through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Manuel Tembrevilla, the Fire Marshall, averred that he had seen
the new road, that is, Damayan Street, and found that a fire truck
could pass through it. He estimated the houses in the area to be
around 300 to 400. Tembrevilla
16
also stated that Damayan Street is
the only road in the area.
_______________
13 TSN, 1 August 1994, pp. 3-8.

14 TSN, 1 August 1994, pp. 15-18.
15 TSN, 9 January 1996, pp. 5-10.
16 TSN, 30 January 1996, pp. 9-10.
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VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 245

Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that,

according to their records, JILCSFI 17
became the owner of the
property only on January 13, 1994.
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of
Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that
the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to
the co-owners. However,
18
the RTC rejected the same letter for being
a mere photocopy.
For the defendant-intervenor, Normita del Rosario, owner of the
property located across the subject property, testified that there are
other roads leading to E. R. Santos Street. She asserted that only
about ten houses of the urban poor are using the new road because
the other residents are using an alternative right-of-way. She averred
that she did not actually
19
occupy her property; but there were times
that she visited it.
Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto.

Tomas Bukid for seven years. From his house, he could use three
streets to go to E. R. Santos Street, namely, Catalina Street,
Damayan Street and Bagong Taon Street. On cross-examination, he
admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas 20
Bukid except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street.
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and
President of JILCSFI, testified that the parcel of land was purchased
for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as
worship center. He averred that the realization of these projects
21
was
delayed due to the passing of the ordinance for expropriation.
The intervenor adduced documentary evidence that on February
27, 1993, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and the co-owners
_______________
17 TSN, 13 March 1996, p. 5.

18 Records, p. 41.
19 TSN, 15 July 1996, pp. 17-19.
20 TSN, 19 August 1996, pp. 8-13.
21 TSN, 25 September 1996, pp. 7-9.
246

agreed to sell 22their property covered by TCT No. PT-66585 for

P1,719,000.00. It paid a down payment of P1,000,000.00 for the
property. After payment of the total purchase 23
price, the Ching
Cuancos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property on
December 13, 1993. On December 21, 24
1993, TCT No. PT-92579
was issued in the name of JILCSFI. 25
It declared the property for
taxation purposes under its name.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the
plaintiff, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4,

Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE
the plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in question for
purposes for which the same is expropriated.
The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to submit at least two (2)
names of their recommended commissioners for the determination of just
compensation within26ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.”
The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No.
21, there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer
requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the
expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of
Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA on the
following assignment of errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE SUBSTANTIALLY COM-
_______________
22 Exhibit “3.”
23 Exhibit “5.”
24 Exhibit “1.”
25 Exhibit “2.”
26 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
247
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 247

PLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT EXPROPRIATED JIL’S PROPERTY

TO BE USED AS A RIGHT OF WAY.
Second Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING JIL’S

EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THERE WAS NO PUBLIC NECESSITY
TO WARRANT
27
THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
The Court of Appeals’ Decision
In a Decision
28
dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of
the RTC. The CA agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff
substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be
made to the owner. The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes,
inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him
the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial
compliance with the “valid and definite offer” requirement under
said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that there was also
constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation
proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated

29
at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26, 1993.
Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject
property based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of
the property sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the
most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also
an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which
_______________
27 CA Rollo, p. 46.
28 Rollo, p. 13.
29 Id., at pp. 10-11.
248

regards the “construction or extension

30
of roads, streets, sidewalks”
as public use, purpose or welfare.
On April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said decision alleging that the CA erred in relying on the
photocopy of Engr. Reyes’ letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because
the same was not admitted in evidence by the trial court for being a
mere photocopy. It also contended that the CA erred in concluding
that constructive notice of the expropriation proceeding, in the form
of annotation of the notice of lis pendens, could be considered as a
substantial compliance with the requirement under Section 19 of the
Local Government Code for a valid and definite offer. JILC-SFI also
averred that no inspection was ever ordered by the trial court to be
conducted on the property, and, if there was one, it had the right to
be present thereat 31
since an inspection is considered to be part of the
trial of the case.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 32
It held that it was not precluded from considering the photocopy of
the letter, notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial
court, since the fact of its existence was duly established by
corroborative evidence. This corroborative evidence consisted of the
testimony of the plaintiff’s messenger that he personally served the
letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance No. 21
which expressly stated that the property owners were already
notified of the expropriation proceeding. The CA noted that JILCSFI
failed to adduce controverting

33
evidence, thus the presumption of
regularity was not overcome.
_______________
30 Rollo, pp. 12-13.

31 CA Rollo, pp. 143-148.
32 Exhibit “H.”
33 Rollo, p. 18.
249
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 249

The Present Petition
In this petition, petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1)

whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite
offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint; (2)
whether its property which is already intended to be used for public
purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3)
whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under
Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid
and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such
offer was not accepted. It argues that, in this case, there was no
evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the
previous owner or the petitioner, the present owner. The petitioner
contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, notifying
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco of the respondent’s intention to construct a
road on its property, cannot be considered because the trial court did
not admit it in evidence. And assuming that such letter is admissible
in evidence, it would not prove that the offer has been made to the
previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not
equivalent to an offer to purchase. The petitioner further argues that
the offer should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of
the property. It noted that the records in this case show that as of
February 1993, it was already the owner of the property. Assuming,
therefore, that there was an offer to purchase the property, the34same
should have been addressed to the petitioner, as present owner.
The petitioner maintains that the power of eminent domain must
be strictly construed since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of
the right to property ownership. All the requirements of the enabling
law must, therefore, be strictly
_______________
34 Rollo, pp. 159-162.
250

complied with. Compliance with such requirements cannot be

presumed but must be proved by the local government exercising the
power. The petitioner adds that the local government should,
likewise, comply with the requirements for an easement of right-of-
way; hence, the road must be established at a point least prejudicial
to the owner of the property. Finally, the petitioner argues that, if the
property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted
35
to another
public use, its expropriation should not be allowed.
For its part, the respondent avers that the CA already squarely
resolved the issues raised in this petition, and the petitioner failed to
show valid and compelling reason to reverse the CA’s findings.
Moreover, it is not the function of the Supreme
36
Court to weigh the
evidence on factual issues all over again. The respondent contends
that the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer
to purchase has been made and that they refused to accept such offer
considering their failure to specifically deny such allegation in the
complaint. In light of such admission, the exclusion of the
photocopy 37of the letter of Engr. Reyes, therefore, is no longer
significant.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed38upon by the Supreme Court in
petitions for review on certiorari. Findings of fact of the CA,
affirming those of the trial39 court, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal.
_______________
35 Rollo, pp. 168-175.

36 Id., at p. 196.
37 Id., at pp. 97-98.
38 Vicente v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 136112, 28 January 2003, 396
SCRA 282.
39 Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, 7 August 2003, 408 SCRA 484.
251
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 251

Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding

grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the
judgment is based on misapprehension40of facts, the Supreme Court
may reexamine the evidence on record.
Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope of
such power has been comprehensively described as follows:
. . . It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the

primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the
general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every
independent government without the necessity for constitutional
recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized
countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which
would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses
act as additional safeguards
41
against the arbitrary exercise of this
governmental power.
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the
State or by its42
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of
private rights. It is one of the harshest pro-
_______________
40 Chan v. Maceda, Jr., G.R. No. 142591, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 352.
41 Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, 14 March
2000, 328 SCRA 137.
42 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
252

ceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign

delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict
43
construction
will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority
to condemn is to be strictly
44
construed in favor of the owner and
against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to
which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms 45
or clear
implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the
burden of proving
46
all the essentials necessary to show the right of
condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has
complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The grant of the power of
eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19
of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That
the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
_______________
43 District Board of Trustees of the Daytona Beach Community College v. Allen, 428 So.2d
704 (1983).
44 Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 259 Conn. 592, 790 A.2d 1178 (2002).
45 City of Birmingham v. Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 So.2d 305 (1941).
46 Gordon v. Conroe Independent School District, 789 S.W.2d 395 (1990).
253
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 253

based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:

Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit
must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property 47sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
Valid and Definite Offer

Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale.—(a) The offer to buy
private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify
the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the
price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of
sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a
price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive
shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an
agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation
or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any
member
_______________
47 Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, supra.
254

of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in

the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of
sale shall be drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive

to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the
terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds
together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or
spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the
property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement

of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property
48
before filing
its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent
upon the condemnor to exhaust 49
all reasonable efforts to obtain the
land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the
mandatory50 requirement will result in the dismissal of the
complaint.
An offer is a unilateral proposition which
51
one party makes to the
other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of
acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to 52
transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation.
Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient
clearness the kind of contract intended and
_______________
48 Wampler v. Trustees of Indiana University, 241 Ind. 449, 172 N.E.2d 67 (1961).
49 Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, supra.
50 Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Katz, 334 N.J. Super 473, 759
A.2d 1247 (2000).
51 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Volume IV, 1991 Edition, p. 448.
52 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 976.
255
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 255

53
definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.
An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both54
the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be

first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public55
purposes in order to avoid
the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give
to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and
inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is 56
a
substantial right which should be protected in every instance. It
encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the
landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of
litigation. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and
the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of
the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely
perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property 57
for a
reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single
bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its
definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it
has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering
the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer
only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-
settled that persons dealing with
_______________
53 Tolentino, supra, p. 449.

54 Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, 20 October 2004,
441 SCRA 1.
55 City of Atlantic v. Cynwyd Investments, 148 N.J. 55, 689 A.2d 712 (1997).
56 In Re University of Avenue in City of Rochester, 82 Misc. 598, 144 N.Y.S. 1086
(1913).
57 Chambers v. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., 265 Ind. 336, 355 N.E.2d
781 (1976).
256

property covered by a Torrens certificate

58
of title are not required to
go beyond what appears on its face.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it
filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only
evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with
Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the
letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only
one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The letter reads:
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO

18 Alcalde Jose Street
Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cuanco:
This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos

Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila embraced in and
covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of
fifty-one (51) square meters is needed by the Municipal
Government of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way
for the benefit of several residents living in the vicinity of your
property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your
information.
In this connection, may we respectfully request your
presence in our office to discuss this project and the price that
may be mutually agreed upon by you and the Municipality of
Pasig.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
Technical Asst. to the Mayor59
on Infrastructure
_______________
58 Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141463, 6 August 2002, 386 SCRA 301.
59 Records, p. 57.
257
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 257

It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter

only to 60prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-
of-way. The document was not offered to prove that the respondent
made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover,
the RTC rejected the document because the respondent 61
failed to
adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent,
likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent
to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its
messenger, Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received
the original of the said letter. But Togonon testified that he merely
gave the letter to a lady, whom he failed to identify. He stated that
the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later
gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one
Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination,
that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter.
Togonon also declared that he did not know and had never met
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte:
Q And after you received this letter from that lady, what did you do
afterwards?
A I brought it with me, that letter, and then I went to Caruncho.
Q So, [M]r. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that this
letter intended to Mr. Lorenzo was served at Pasig Trading which
was situated at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993?
A Yes, Ma’am.
ATTY. TAN:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT:
_______________
60 Id., at p. 38.
61 Records, p. 41.
258

Do you have any cross-examination?

ATTY. JOLO:
Just a few cross, Your Honor, please. With the kind permission
of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. JOLO:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Mr. Lorenzo Ching [Cuanco]
A I do not know him.
Q As a matter of fact, you have not seen him even once, isn’t not
(sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q This Luz Bernarte, do you know her?
A I do not know her.
Q As a matter of fact, you did not see Mrs. Bernarte even once?
A That is correct.
Q And as a matter of fact, [M]r. Witness, you did not see Mrs. Luz
Bernarte affixing her signature on the bottom portion of this
demand letter, marked as Exh. “C-2”?
62
A Yes, Sir.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter
is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the
property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of
the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss
the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both
parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of
petitioner’s TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the
requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world
of the pendency of an action involving the
_______________
62 TSN, 1 August 1994, pp. 6-8.
259
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 259

title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who

acquire an interest in the property do so at their63own risk and that
they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis
pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on
November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the
RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the
ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by the
municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a
municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement of a
valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise
that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property.
In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent
made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property,
aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance
is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
The respondent contends, however, that the Ching Cuancos,
impliedly admitted the allegation in its complaint that an offer to
purchase the property was made to them and that they refused to
accept the offer by their failure to specifically deny such allegation
in their answer. This contention is wrong. As gleaned from their
answer to the complaint, the Ching Cuancos specifically denied such
allegation for want of sufficient64 knowledge to form a belief as to its
correctness. Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, such
form of denial, although not specific, is sufficient.
_______________
63 Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, G.R. No. 143994, 11 July 2002, 384
SCRA 535.
64 Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 10. Specific denial.—A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial.
260

Public Necessity
We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no

longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for
the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its
members.65 As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of
Appeals, thus:
It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and
each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. .
. . for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.”
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be benefi
_______________
Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made
in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (Emphasis
supplied)
65 G.R. No. 106440, 29 January 1996, 252 SCRA 412.
261
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 261

cially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic
instrument and one that “is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so
as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in
store.” Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly
observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public
use which is just as broad as “public welfare.”
Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a
public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain”
when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to
give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for
what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way,
more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least
prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate
outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of
the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle portion of
the petitioner’s entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into
two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its
school building and worship center.
262

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing

a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential
requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil
Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction,
the grantee of the power of eminent domain 66
may determine the
location and route of the land to be taken
67
unless such determination
is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so
long as it is for 68the public good and there is genuine necessity of
public character. Government may 69
not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a
road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses,
who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although
there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no
vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than
sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the
construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity70
is not
required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for
constructing
71
the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and not
elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of
_______________
66 Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Watson, 419 So. 2d 1351 (1982).

67 Alabama Power Co. v. Tauton, 465 So. 2d 1105 (1984).
68 Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. L-72126, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 640.
69 Moday v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, 20 February 1997, 268 SCRA
586.
70 Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-55166, 21 May 1987, 150
SCRA 89.
71 See City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, supra, where the Court
noted that the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through
the cemetery; Manotok v. National
263
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 263

the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and
most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R.
Santos Street. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said
portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best possible
ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
On this point, the trial court made the following findings:
. . . The contention of the defendants that there is an existing alley that can
serve the purpose of the expropriator is not accurate. An inspection of the
vicinity reveals that the alley being referred to by the defendants actually
passes thru Bagong Taon St. but only about one-half (1/2) of its entire
length is passable by vehicle and the other half is merely a foot-path. It
would be more inconvenient to widen the alley considering that its sides are
occupied by permanent structures and its length from the municipal road to
the area sought to be served by the expropriation is considerably longer than
the proposed access road. The area to be served by the access road is
composed of compact wooden houses and literally a slum area. As a result
of the expropriation of the 51-square meter portion of the property of the
intervenor, a 3-meter wide road open to the public is created. This portion of
the property of the intervenor is the most convenient access to the interior of
Sto. Tomas Bukid since it is not only a short cut to the interior of the Sto.
Tomas Bukid but also an easy path for vehicles entering the 72
area, not to
mention the 3-meter wide road requirement of the Fire Code.
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no

showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted
during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was
not notified thereof. The petitioner was, there-
_______________
Housing Authority, supra, where the Court observed that there is no showing as to
why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation or what necessity
impelled the particular choices or selection.
72 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
264

fore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an

ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received
73
and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial.
Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified
of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the
court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The
findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular
inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss
the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an

expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. (Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of
Francisco Pastor, 334 SCRA 127 [2000])
The authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is
an exercise of its police power not the power of eminent domain.
(Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
367 SCRA 175 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
73 Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence, 3rd ed., 1996, p. 52, citing Benton v. State, 30
Ark. 329; Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. War Auction Co., 47 Colo. 446, 1076 Pac.
1073.
265
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8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 466

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 235

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Actions; Appeals; While only questions of law may be raised by the

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 237

desires by agreement; An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; A letter offered only to prove the municipality’s

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 239

19 of R.A. No. 7160.—Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 241

entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos

1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2 TSN, 9 January 1996, pp. 4-9.

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 243

92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store at

13 TSN, 1 August 1994, pp. 3-8.

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 245

Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that,

Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto.

17 TSN, 13 March 1996, p. 5.

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

agreed to sell 22their property covered by TCT No. PT-66585 for

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4,

First Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 247

PLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT EXPROPRIATED JIL’S PROPERTY

Second Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING JIL’S

The Court of Appeals’ Decision

proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

regards the “construction or extension

failed to adduce controverting

30 Rollo, pp. 12-13.

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 249

The Present Petition

In this petition, petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1)

34 Rollo, pp. 159-162.

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

complied with. Compliance with such requirements cannot be

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

35 Rollo, pp. 168-175.

VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 251

Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding

Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope

. . . It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the