Estate of Jimenez

8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 349
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone
*
G.R. No. 137285. January 16, 2001.
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE, respondent.
Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for certiorari is

the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
—The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave
abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment
committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as
“grave abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and
patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and
despotically.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari has been deemed to be justified in order

to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge
has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there
may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal
would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the judgment complained of.—As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will
not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of
judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the
exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not
assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain
exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cd7ac3ac1fed82c42003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/27
Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed
to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 241
injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of
justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.
Same; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Appeals; Pleadings and

Practice; Two Phases of Expropriation Proceedings; Appeal is the remedy
from the final orders issued in either the first or second phase of the
expropriation proceedings.—Expropriation proceedings involve two (2)
phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the
right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to
be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a
final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the
determination of just compensation to be ascertained by three (3)
commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally
disposes of the second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an
appeal.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; The remedies of

certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain
exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when
public welfare so requires; A final and executory order can only be annulled
by a petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court.—We affirm the appellate court’s reliance on the
cases of Aguilar v. Tan and Bautista v. Sarmiento wherein it was ruled that
the remedies of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in
certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or
when public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its discretion
by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and
executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its
action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and
executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by a
petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed.
Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes of the case, if
appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or the interest of
substantial justice requires, a petition for certiorari may be availed of upon
showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
242
Same; Same; Same; Same; The interpretation of the rule, that a

petition for certiorari can be availed of despite the fact that the proper
remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where the petition is filed within
the reglementary period for appeal is too restrictive—it is not a condition
sine qua non that the filing of a petition for certiorari be within the fifteen
(15) day period to appeal.—According to petitioner the rule that a petition
for certiorari can be availed of despite the fact that the proper remedy is an
appeal only applies in cases where the petition is filed within the
reglementary period for appeal. Inasmuch as the petition in the case at bar
was filed after the fifteen (15) day regulatory period to appeal, said
exceptional rule as enshrined in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and Bautista v.
Sarmiento is not applicable. We find this interpretation too restrictive. The
said cases do not set as a condition sine qua non the filing of a petition for
certiorari within the fifteen (15) day period to appeal in order for the said
petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse petitioner’s contention
would render inutile the sixty (60) day period to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, which also involved an
expropriation case where the parties entered into a compromise agreement
on just compensation, this Court entertained the petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal and despite its being filed after the lapse
of the fifteen (15) day period to appeal the same. We ruled that the Court has
not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when
the proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling
considerations would warrant such a recourse. If compelled to return the
subject parcel of land, the respondent would divert its budget already
allocated for economic development in order to pay petitioner the rental
payments from the lessee banks. Re-adjusting its budget would hamper and
disrupt the operation of the economic zone. We believe that the grave abuse
of discretion committed by the trial court and the consequent disruption in
the operation of the economic zone constitutes valid and compelling reasons
to entertain the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is

not phrased to make the instances mentioned therein the sole grounds for a
petition for certiorari.—Petitioner next argues that the instances cited under
Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court whereby an appeal is not allowed
are exclusive grounds for a petition for certiorari. Inasmuch as the August 4,
1997 Order rescinding the compromise agreement does not fall under any of
the instances enumerated therein, a petition for certiorari will not prosper.
This reasoning is severely flawed. The said section is not phrased to make
the instances mentioned therein the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari.
It only states that Rule 65 may be availed of under the grounds mentioned
therein, but it never intended said enumeration to
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VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 243
be exclusive. It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is

granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings.
Expropriation; Eminent Domain; An expropriation case involves two

(2) orders—an expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation—
and once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.—
Petitioner cites cases which provide that upon the failure to pay by the
lessee, the lessor can ask for the return of the lot and the ejectment of the
former, this being the lessor’s original demand in the complaint. We find
said cases to be inapplicable to this instant case for the reason that the case
at bar is not a simple ejectment case. This is an expropriation case which
involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an order fixing just
compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is
taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be
questioned.
Same; Same; Public Use; Words and Phrases; The “public use”
requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible
and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.—This Court holds
that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B
and that the same was for a valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero,
this Court has ruled that, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced
by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend
has been summarized as follows: this Court has ruled that the taking to be
valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play . . . It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at
234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4 (2nd
Ed. 1977) The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage.
Same; Same; Same; The authority given to the PEZA to expropriate

“for the construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches
thereto” is broad enough to give it substantial leeway in deciding for what
244
public use the expropriated property would be utilized.—-Accordingly,

subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated “for the construction . . . of terminal
facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” The authority is broad enough
to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the
expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,
respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest
was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA’s
original charter.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “necessary” in

condemnation proceedings does not mean absolutely indispensable but
requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose,
growth and future needs of the enterprise; PEZA cannot attain a
selfsustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in
the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private
landowners to part with their properties—the purpose of creating an
ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if PEZA directly owns the
areas subject of the expansion program.—In Manila Railroad Co. v.
Mitchel, this Court has ruled that in the exercise of eminent domain, only as
much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the
condemnation. The term “necessary,” in this connection, does not mean
absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the
taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The
respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if
inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by
the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties. The
purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if
respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.
Same; Same; Same; The expropriation of a lot for the purpose of being
leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of
making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons
working at the industries located in PEZA, and the expropriation of
adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the
purpose of the law.—The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the
subject lot to banks and building terminals was not expressly mentioned in
the original charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA
devoted the lot to said purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is
not impressed with merit. It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree
No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial
and investment area. According to the comprehensive wording of
Presidential Decree No. 66, the said decree did not intend to limit re-
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VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 245
spondent PEZA to the establishment of an export processing zone but it was

also bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land “for the
construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.”
Republic Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad language employed
by Presidential Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA
shall devote the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation
of an industrial estate, an export processing zone, free trade zones, and the
like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to
banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of making
banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working
at the industries located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas
therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the
law. In such a manner, PEZA’s goal of being a major force in the economic
development of the country would be realized.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Separation of Powers; The Legislature

may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location
of the improvement; In the absence of some constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial
in their character.—Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that: . . .(T)he
Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private
property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is wellsettled that the
utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity
for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of the people. In the absence of
some constitutional on statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and
expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain, are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character.
Same; Same; Same; PEZA can vary the purpose for which a
condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use.
— Petitioner contends that respondent is bound lay the representations of its
Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the
lot was to be devoted for the construction of government offices. Anent this
issue, suffice it to say that PEZA can vary the purpose for which a
condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use.
246
Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to

establish for as long as the same are for public purpose.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; The concept of just compensation

embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking-—-payment of just compensation should follow as a
matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued.—We
have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just”
inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right
immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment
must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a
violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be

deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Fernandez, Pacheco and Dizon Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

1
Before us is a 2petition for review on certiorari
3
of the Decision and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1998 and
January 14, 1999, respectively, which ordered the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with
the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B while
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by

Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino, in CA-G.R. SP No.
46112, Rollo, pp. 61-70.
2 Id., pp. 72-74.
3 Tenth Division.
247
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 247

4
setting aside the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3,
1997 of the said Regional Trial Court which ordered the peaceful
turnover to petitioner Estate of Salud Jimenez of said Lot 1406-B.
The facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), initiated before 5
the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated
riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of
the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of
29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez
under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry
6
of Deeds of Cavite. 7
More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order
dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to
expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of
the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot
would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl

Corp., and hence
8
would not be utilized for a public purpose.
In an Order dated October 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered
the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was
maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, private respondent
PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
_______________
4 The appellate court erroneously declared that it is the Order dated July 11, 1991
and not the Order dated August 4, 1997 which ordered the peaceful turn-over to the
Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406-B.
5 Entitled “EPZA v. Jose Pulido, Vicenta Panganiban, et al.,” docketed as Civil
Case No. N-4079 assigned to Branch 17; Rollo, pp. 75-84.
6 In a Motion to Dismiss filed on June 10, 1981, petitioner sought the dismissal of
said expropriation case contending that the intended expropriation is not for a public
purpose. On August 11, 1981, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of private respondent PEZA over Lot 1406. On August 13, 1981,
Deputy Provincial Sheriff, in behalf of private respondent PEZA, took possession of
Lot 1406 owned by petitioner.
7 Rollo, pp. 88-92.
8 Id., pp. 93-96.
248

Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering

two (2) proposals, namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent’s appeal with respect to

Lot 1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for
damages and loss of income for the possession of said lot
by private respondent.
2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No.
T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay
for the lot.
Private respondent’s Board approved the “proposal” and the

compromise agreement was signed by private respondent through its
then administrator Tagumpay Jardiniano assisted by Government9
Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said compromise agreement
dated January 4, 1993 is quoted hereunder:
1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order

of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which
released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On

the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to
waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss
of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of
said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118
square meters which forms part of the lot registered under
TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the
name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and
exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be
transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot
1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in
favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable
Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid
the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said
defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-
14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of
the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to
be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
immediately final and executory.
_______________
9 Id., pp. 97-99.
249
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 249

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the
approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the
parties, consequent with the
10
withdrawal of the appeal with the Court
of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial court
approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the lot
covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus,
on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed
11
a “Motion to Partially
Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993.”
12
12
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the
said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and
directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to
the petitioner. Disagreeing 13
with the said Order of the trial court,
respondent PEZA moved for its reconsideration. The same 14proved
futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its Order dated
November 3, 1997. 15
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of
petitioner, corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November
3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that
should be surrendered and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before 16
the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
nullify the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and 17
November 3, 1997 of
the trial court. Petitioner filed its Comment on January 16, 1998.
18
Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated
March 25, 1998 upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement,
ratiocinating thus:
_______________
10 Id., pp. 100-101.

11 Id., pp. 102-111.
12 Id., pp. 112-116.
13 Id., pp. 117-123.
14 Id., pp. 124-126.
15 Id., pp. 127-131.
16 Id., pp. 132-164.
17 Id., pp. 165-192.
18 See Note No. 1, supra.
250

A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and if a

party fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may regard
it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accordance
with Article 2041 of the Civil Code which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.”
The Supreme Court had the occasion to explain this provision of law in
the case of Leonor v. Sycip (1 SCRA 1215). It ruled that the language of the
abovementioned provision denotes that no action for rescission is required
and that the aggrieved party by the breach of compromise agreement, may
regard the compromise agreement already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code,
which speaks of “a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise” and
provides that “the compromise may be annulled or rescinded” for the cause therein
specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041
confers upon the party concerned not a “cause” for rescission, or the right to
“demand” rescission, of a compromise, but the authority, not only to “regard it as
rescinded,” but, also, to “insist upon his original demand.” The language of this
Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no
action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by
the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit
contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need
not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may “regard” the compromise
agreement already, “rescinded.”
Nonetheless, it held that:
Having upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, what is then the
status of the expropriation proceedings? As succinctly discussed in the case
of Leonor v. Sycip, the aggrieved party may insist on his original demand as
if there had never been any compromise agreement. This means that the
situation of the parties will revert back to status before the execution of the
compromise agreement, that is, the second stage of the
251
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 251

expropriation 19 proceedings which is the determination of the just

compensation.
xxx
Thus, the appellate court partially granted the petition by setting

aside the order of the trial court regarding “the peaceful turn over to
the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot No. 1406-B” and instead ordered
the trial judge to “proceed with the hearing of the expropriation
proceedings regarding
20
the determination of just compensation over
Lot 1406-B.” 21
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision dated22 March
25, 1998. However, public respondent in a Resolution dated
January 14, 1999 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
FILED BY RESPONDENT PEZA IN CA-G.R. SP. NO. 46112 WHEN IT

WAS MADE A SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST APPEAL IN CLEAR
CONTRAVENTION OF THE HONORABLE COURTS RULING IN
SEMPIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (263 SCRA 617) AND ONGSITCO
VS. COURT OF APPEALS (255 SCRA 703) AND DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE ORDER OF THE CAVITE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE SPECIAL CIVIL

ACTION OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER, THE COURT OF APPEALS
NEVERTHELESS WRONGLY INTERPRETED THE PHRASE
“ORIGINAL DEMAND” CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 2041 OF THE
CIVIL CODE. THE ORIGINAL DEMAND OF PETITIONER ESTATE IS
THE RETURN OF THE SUBJECT LOT (LOT 1406-B) WHICH IS
SOUGHT TO BE EX-
_______________
19 Italics supplied.
20 Rollo, p. 70.
21 Id., pp. 193-207.
22 See Note No. 2, supra.
252

PROPRIATED AND NOT THE DETERMINATION OF JUST

COMPENSATION FOR THE LOT. FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE IMPORT
OF THE PHRASE IN QUESTION IS CORRECT, IT IS ARTICLE 2039
OF THE CIVIL CODE AND NOT ARTICLE 2041 WHICH IS
APPLICABLE 23TO COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS APPROVED BY
THE COURTS.
We rule in favor of the respondent.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
entertaining the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the same being actually a substitute for lost
appeal. It appeared that on August 11, 1997, respondent received the
Order of the trial court dated August 4, 1997 annulling the
compromise agreement. On August 26, 1997, the last day for the
filing of a notice of appeal, respondent filed instead a motion for
reconsideration. The Order of the trial court denying the motion for
reconsideration was received by respondent on November 23, 1997.
The reglementary period to appeal therefore lapsed on November
24, 1997. On November 27, 1997, however, respondent filed with

the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 46112. Petitioner claims that appeal is the proper remedy
inasmuch as the Order dated August 4, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court is a final order that completely disposes of the case. Besides,
according to petitioner, respondent is estopped in asserting that
certiorari is the proper remedy inasmuch as it invoked the fifteen
(15) day reglementary period for appeal when it filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 26, 1997 and not the sixty (60) day period
for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for
certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there24
is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 17-18.

24 Rules of Court, Rule 65, sec. 1.
253
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 253

of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is
not the same as “grave abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion
is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be25 shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal
is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as
well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise
thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and
not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in
certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be
relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in
order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the
trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment,

or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an
ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve 26
a party from
the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first
phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of
plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to
be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would
be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase
concerns the determination of just compensation to be ascertained
by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount
to be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be
done, this order finally disposes of27 the second stage. To both orders
the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
_______________
25 Miranda v. Abaya, 311 SCRA 617, 631 (1999).

26 BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267 (1998).
27 Municipality of Biñan vs. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584 (1989).
254

In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11,
1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties
subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to
abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an
action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial could only
validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the
payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of
the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in
effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991
which was already final and executory.
We
28
affirm the appellate court’s29reliance on the cases of Aguilar v.
Tan and Bautista v. Sarmiento wherein it was ruled that the
remedies of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive
remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave
abuse of discretion, or when public welfare so requires. The trial
court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order of
expropriation which has long become final and executory and by
ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was
clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and
executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by
a petition to annul
30
the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that
effect was filed. Hence, though an order completely and finally
disposes of the case, if appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law or the interest of substantial justice requires, a petition
for certiorari may be availed of upon showing of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
According to petitioner the rule that a petition for certiorari can
be availed of despite the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal
only applies in cases where the petition is filed within the regle-
_______________
28 31 SCRA 205 (1970).

29 138 SCRA 587 (1985).
30 Rules of Court, Rule 47, sec. 2.
255
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 255

mentary period for appeal. Inasmuch as the petition in the case at bar
was filed after the fifteen (15) day regulatory period to appeal,31 said
exceptional rule as enshrined
32
in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and
Bautista v. Sarmiento is not applicable. We find this interpretation
too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition sine qua non
the filing of a petition for certiorari within the fifteen (15) day period
to appeal in order for the said petition to be entertained by the court.
To espouse petitioner’s contention would render inutile the sixty
(60) day period to file a petition
33
for certiorari under Rule 65. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, which also involved an expropriation
case where the parties entered into a compromise agreement on just
compensation, this Court entertained the petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal and despite its being filed after the
lapse of the fifteen (15) day period to appeal the same. We ruled that
the Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for
certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal,
where valid
34
and compelling considerations would warrant such a
recourse. If compelled to return the subject parcel of land, the
respondent would divert its budget already allocated for economic
development in order to pay petitioner the rental payments from the
lessee banks. Re-adjusting its budget would hamper and disrupt the
operation of the economic zone. We believe that the grave abuse of
discretion committed by the trial court and the consequent disruption
in the operation of the economic zone constitutes valid and
compelling reasons to entertain the petition.
Petitioner next argues that35the instances cited under Section 1 of

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court whereby an appeal is not allowed
_______________
31 See Note No. 20.

32 See Note No. 29.
33 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 171 (1998).
34 Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998).
35 RULE 41. SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal—An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
256

are exclusive grounds for a petition for certiorari. Inasmuch as the

August 4, 1997 Order rescinding the compromise agreement does
not fall under any of the instances enumerated therein, a petition for
certiorari will not prosper. This reasoning is severely flawed. The
said section is not phrased to make the instances mentioned therein
the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari. It only states that Rule
65 may be availed of under the grounds mentioned therein, but it
never intended said enumeration to be exclusive. It must be
remembered that a wide breadth36 of discretion is granted a court of
justice in certiorari proceedings.
In the second assignment of error, petitioner assails the
interpretation by the Court of Appeals of the phrase “original
demand” in Article 2041 of the New Civil Code vis-a-vis the case at
bar. Article 2041 provides that, “If one of the parties fails or refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.” According to petitioner, the appellate court erred in
interpreting “original demand” as the fixing of just compensation.
_______________
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counter-claims, cross-claims and third party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate civic action under Rule 65. (n)
36 Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 365 (1999).
257
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 257

Petitioner claims that the original demand is the37 return of Lot 1406-
B as stated in petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for
expropriation inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation
order in the compromise agreement subjected the said order to
rescission. Since the order of expropriation was rescinded, the
authority of respondent to expropriate and the purpose of
expropriation have again38become subject to dispute.
Petitioner cites cases which provide that upon the failure to pay
by the lessee, the lessor can ask for the return of the lot and the
ejectment of the former, this being the lessor’s original demand in
the complaint. We find said cases to be inapplicable to this instant
case for the reason that the case at bar is not a simple ejectment case.
This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an
expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the
first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority
to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the incorporation of the
expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject
said order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by
petitioner of respondent’s authority to expropriate the subject parcel
of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is
evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement
which states that the “swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot
1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant
Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government
based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991.” It
is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties
limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just
compensation to petitioner. Said expropriation order is not closely
intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by

respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate.
_______________
37 The motion to dismiss asked for the return of Lot 1406-B inasmuch as
respondent would not devote the lot to public use.
38 Leonor v. Sycip, 1 SCRA 1215 (1961); Tionson v. Court of Appeals, 49 SCRA
429 (1973); Barreras, et al. v. Garcia, et al., 169 SCRA 401 (1989).
258

No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The

Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was
subject to payment.
This Court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting “original demand” to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order
dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by
petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private respondent’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406-A, the matter of
payment of just compensation was the only subject of the
compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993. Under the
compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive
respondent’s Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When
respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434,
petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of the
expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of
Appeals is in accordance with Sections 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. 39
We also find as inapplicable the ruling in Gatchalian v. Arlegui,
a case cited by petitioner, where we held that even a final judgment
can still be compromised so long as it is not fully satisfied. As
already stated, the expropriation order was not the subject of the
compromise agreement. It was only the mode of payment which was
the subject of the compromise agreement. Hence, the Order of
Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 can no longer be annulled.
After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner
inconsistently contends that said article does not apply to the case at
bar inasmuch as it is only applicable to cases where a compromise
has not been approved by a court. In the case at bar, the trial court
approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner insists that Articles
2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should apply. Said
articles provide that:
_______________
39 Gatchalian v. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 (1977).
259
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 259

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence,

intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the
provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.
However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the
other if the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a
litigation already commenced.
Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences
which they might have with each other, the discovery of documents
referring to one or more but not to all of the questions settled shall not itself
be a cause for annulment or rescission of the compromise, unless said
documents have been concealed by one of the parties.
But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one
thing to which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly
discovered documents. (n)”
Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through 40
mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
The applicability of the above-quoted legal provisions will not

change the outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the
compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by
swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate
the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded.
This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that
41
the same was for a valid
public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero, this Court has ruled that,
the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as follows:
this Court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or
_______________
41 154 SCRA 461, 467-468 (1987).
260

parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the

purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play . .
. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the
Constitution of the Philippines 523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977)
The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To

the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the
public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage.
In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that what
ultimately emerged 42is a concept of public use which is just as broad
as “public welfare.”
Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of
eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter,
Presidential Decree No. 66, which provides that:
Section 23. Eminent Domain.—For the acquisition of rights of way, or of

any property for the establishment of export processing zones, or of low-
cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the
protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs,
wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities,
structures and approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and
power to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation
proceedings. Should the authority elect to exercise the right of eminent
domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name
of the Authority and it may proceed in the manner provided for by law.
(italics supplied)
Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated “for the

construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and approaches
thereto.” The authority is broad enough to give the respondent
substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated
_______________
42 252 SCRA 412, 422 (1996), quoting Joaquin Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1987 ed., p. 282.
261
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 261

property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,

respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the
rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were
even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending
respondent PEZA’s original charter, which provides that:
Sec. 7. ECOZONE to be a Decentralized Agro-Industrial, Industrial,

Commercial/Trading, Tourist, Investment and Financial Community.—
Within the framework of the Constitution, the interest of national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, ECOZONE shall be
developed, as much as possible, into a decentralized, self-reliant and self-
sustaining industrial, commercial/trading, agro-industrial, tourist, banking,
financial and investment center with minimum government intervention.
Each ECOZONE shall be provided with transportation, telecommunications
and other facilities needed to generate linkage with industries and
employment opportunities for its own habitants and those of nearby towns
and cities.
The ECOZONE shall administer itself on economic, financial, industrial,
tourism development and such other matters within the exclusive
competence of the national government, (italics supplied)
Among the powers of PEZA enumerated by the same law are:
Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of PEZA Board.—The Philippine Economic

Zone Authority (PEZA) Board shall have the following function and
powers:
(a) Set the general policies on the establishment and operations of the ECOZONE,
Industrial estate, exports processing zones, free trade zones, and the like;
xxx
(c) Regulate and undertake the establishment, operation and maintenance of
utilities, other services and infrastructure in the ECOZONE, such as heat, light and
power, water supply, telecommunications, transport, toll roads and bridges, port
services, etc. and to fix just, reasonable and competitive rates, fares, charges and fees
43
thereof.
_______________
262

44
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, this Court has ruled that in the
exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is
necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term
“necessary,” in this connection, does not mean absolutely
indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking
for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise.
The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable
ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding
areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to
part with their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE
and other facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the
areas subject of the expansion program.
The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to
banks and building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the
original charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA
devoted the lot to said purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took
effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be pointed out that
Presidential Decree No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a
viable commercial, industrial and investment area. According to the
comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said
decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment
of an export processing zone but it was also bestowed with authority
to expropriate parcels of land “for the construction . . . of terminal
facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” Republic Act No. 7916
simply particularized the broad language employed by Presidential
Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall
devote the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and
operation of an industrial estate, an export processing zone, free
trade zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the
purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a
terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation
facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries
located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore
comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law.
In such a manner, PEZA’s goal of being a major force in the
_______________
44 50 Phil. 832, 837-838 (1927).
263
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 263

economic development of the country would be realized.

Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that:
. . . (T)he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating

private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may
select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled
that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public
necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent45
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.
Inasmuch as both Presidential Decree No. 66 and Republic Act No.

7916, bestow respondent with authority to develop terminal facilities
and banking centers, this Court will not question the respondent’s
lease of certain portions of the expropriated lot to banks, as well as
the construction of terminal facilities.
Petitioner contends that respondent is bound by the
representations of its Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified
before the trial court that the lot was to be devoted for the
construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say
that PEZA can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be
devoted to, provided that the same is for public use. Petitioner
cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to
establish for as long as the same are for public purpose.
Lastly, petitioner appeals to the sense of justice and equity to this
Court in restoring the said lot to its possession. From the time of the
filing of the expropriation case in 1981 up to the present, respondent
has not yet remunerated the petitioner although respondent has
already received earnings from the rental payments by lessees of the
subject property.
_______________
45 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
264

We have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces not

only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property

owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before
46
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss. Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of
right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any
delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the
delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable
and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to
defeat the ends of justice.
We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving
what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order
was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement
between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993.
However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its
obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent
caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had
a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and
meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or
rental income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this
oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by 47
respondent.
As we have ruled in Cosculluela vs. Court of Appeals:
In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in
operation since 1976. The project is benefiting the farmers specifically and
the community in general. Obviously, the petitioner’s land cannot be
returned to him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what
was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a
government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s
property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and execu-
_______________
46 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, 408-409 (1996)
quoting Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990).
47 164 SCRA 393, 401 (1988).
265
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 265

tory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for
the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest
possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such
a despotic and irresponsible stance.
Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we

cannot, however, grant the petitioner’s prayer for the return of the
expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July

11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner cited 48
Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. de Villaroya to
support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot where
this Court ruled that “under ordinary circumstances, immediate
return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy.”
However, the said statement was not the ruling in that case. As in
other cases where there was no prompt payment by the government,
this Court declared in Sorsogon that “the Provincial Government of
Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any
further delay be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any
patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount
necessary to implement this decision.” However, this Court also
stressed and declared in that case that “In cases where land is taken
for public use, public interest, however, must be considered.”
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this
case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation
proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-
B and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed
with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil
Case No. N-4029, regarding the determination of just compensation
for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT No. T-113498-
Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
_______________
48 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).
266

People vs. Painitan
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena,

JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the

power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. (Moday vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 [1997])
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. (Barangay
San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, 334 SCRA
127 [2000])
The content and the manner of just compensation provided for in
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
(Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 340 SCRA 59 [2000])
——o0o——
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8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 349

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for certiorari is

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari has been deemed to be justified in order

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 241

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

Same; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Appeals; Pleadings and

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; The remedies of

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

Same; Same; Same; Same; The interpretation of the rule, that a

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 243

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

be exclusive. It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is

Expropriation; Eminent Domain; An expropriation case involves two

Same; Same; Same; The authority given to the PEZA to expropriate

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

public use the expropriated property would be utilized.—-Accordingly,

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “necessary” in

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 245

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

spondent PEZA to the establishment of an export processing zone but it was

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Separation of Powers; The Legislature

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to

Same; Same; Just Compensation; The concept of just compensation

violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

1 Penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by

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would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering

1. Withdrawal of private respondent’s appeal with respect to

Private respondent’s Board approved the “proposal” and the

1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order

released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On

9 Id., pp. 97-99.

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001 249

10 Id., pp. 100-101.

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and if a

Nonetheless, it held that:

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expropriation 19 proceedings which is the determination of the just

Thus, the appellate court partially granted the petition by setting

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE

FILED BY RESPONDENT PEZA IN CA-G.R. SP. NO. 46112 WHEN IT

GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE SPECIAL CIVIL

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PROPRIATED AND NOT THE DETERMINATION OF JUST

We rule in favor of the respondent.

24, 1997. On November 27, 1997, however, respondent filed with