Fortich vs. Corona

1/20/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 289
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona
*
G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR

OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; “Errors of

Judgment” and “Errors of Jurisdiction,” Compared; Words and
Phrases; An error of judgment is one which the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
only by an appeal, while an error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, and which error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.—Anent the first issue, in order to
determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it
is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an
error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed in Rule 43

is inapplicable where the petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with
“grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond the public respondent’s
jurisdiction” when said resolution substantially modified the
earlier decision which had long become final and executory.—It is
true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001686b185f4e1c72b6b2003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be

taken to the Court of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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Fortich vs. Corona
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15)

days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in this
particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
considering that the present petition contains an allegation that
the challenged resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with
“grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond his (respondent Secretary
Renato C. Corona’s) jurisdiction” when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
which had long become final and executory. In other words, the
crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an
error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. x x x
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary
cases—cases in which the act of the lower court or quasijudicial
body is wholly void.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the full

discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant.—The Supreme Court
has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs.
Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al.
As we have further stated in Cuaresma: “x x x. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive

jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket.” Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be dis-
626
Fortich vs. Corona
cussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and

requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court
of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension of the Rules; That the

Supreme Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.
—That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.
We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: “Be it
remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.”
Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; A motion for

reconsideration is not necessary when the questioned resolution is
a patent nullity.—As to the second issue of whether the
petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before
seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is
not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity,
as will be taken up later.
Same; Same; ‘‘Forum Shopping,’’ Explained; Words and

Phrases. ------‘‘There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to
defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.
This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the
second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
“The test for determining whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of
Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum
627
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Fortich vs. Corona
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present

or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in the other, as follows: ‘There thus exists between the action
before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all
the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; The test for determining whether a party

has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration.—It is clear from the above-quoted rule that
the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the
DAR Secretary’s order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition
and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the
civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and
cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds:
(1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner
NQSRMDC’s title, used documents which were earlier declared
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC’s
title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3)
without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The
present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it

seeks the nullification of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution of the
Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution
was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Real Party In

Interest” and “Real Interest,” Explained; One whose interest over
land is a mere expectancy is not a real party in interest.—The
fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for
intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have
to deny for lack of
628
Fortich vs. Corona
merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the

farmerbeneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties
in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex “I” in their
motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the
alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the
dispositive portion of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which
directs the DAR “to carefully and meticulously determine who
among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.”
However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are
those purportedly “Found Qualified and Recommended for
Approval.” In other words, movants are merely recommendee
farmer-beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real
party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants’ interest over the
land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real
parties in interest.
Administrative Law; Judgments; The act of the Office of the

President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
earlier decision which had already become final and executory,
was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.—When the
Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as
no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto,
the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win”

Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section
4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1)
motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally
meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section
7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996
to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in
re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
629
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Fortich vs. Corona
March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
Same; Same; The orderly administration of justice requires

that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations;
A resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has
attained finality, is utterly void.—The orderly administration of
justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-
judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules
and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice
system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act
which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which substantially
modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained
finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by
Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is “a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law Office for petitioner.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel for intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by

some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City
on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that
even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried
to intervene for the strikers’ “cause.”
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Fortich vs. Corona
1
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the
Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424,
which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four
(144)hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the
President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C.2 Corona, to issue the socalled “Win-Win”
Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying
its earlier Decision after it had already become final and
executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the
land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of
forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one
hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the “Win-Win” Resolution culminate in victory
for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come
to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the “Win-
Win” Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform
from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is:
What is the legal effect of the “Win-Win” Resolution issued
by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision
involving the same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from
the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San

Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
The property is covered
_______________
1 Annex “AA,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 163-167.
2 Annex “A,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 48-63.
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Fortich vs. Corona
3
by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple

plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation,
now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a
multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10)
years under the Crop Producer and Grower’s
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title.
The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed
the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
acquisition
4
and assessed the land value at P2.38
million.
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR’s action. In February,
1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives “to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities” 5
concerning the subject land “until further orders.”
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the
DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum,
dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to
open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name
of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings
to determine the just compensation of the subject
property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and
filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce
the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify
the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation
of the subject property.
_______________
3 Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 64-65.

4 Par. 12, Petition; Ibid., p. 6.

5 Annex “C,” Petition; ibid., pp. 66-67.
632

Fortich vs. Corona
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably

on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank “to seriously
comply with the terms of the order dated March 31,
1992”; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director’s
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the
summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto;
and (c) directing the Land Bank “to return the
claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC’s 6
subject
property to the DAR until further orders.”
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order
and cancelled the trust account
7
it opened in the
name of petitioner NQSRMDC.
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development
Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor
8
Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, dated
January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along
Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is
situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the
OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996,
pertinent portions of which we quote:
“Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the

Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San
Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to
attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people.
“Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class
municipalities may authorize the classification of five percent
(5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of
their utilization or disposition.
_______________
6 Annex “D,” Petition; ibid., p. 68.

7 Annexes “E,” “F” and “G,” Petition; ibid., pp. 69-71.
8 Annex “H,” Petition; Ibid., p. 72.
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VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 633

Fortich vs. Corona
“On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use

Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11
December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed
by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA
(Bukidnon AgroIndustrial Development Association).
“Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon
Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report
submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian
Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February
1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.
The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project
proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
“1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes

the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education;
Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum,
Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports
Development Complex which covers an area of 24
hectares;
“2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn
processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products;
rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable
rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food
delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products
such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed
and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and
abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
“3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks
for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo
estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
“4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a
360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing
project covering an area of 20 hectares.
“The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated

January 4, 1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and
Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship
projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the
Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal,
provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office
(Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director,
signing ‘By Authority of PAUL G. DOM-
634

Fortich vs. Corona
INGUEZ,’ Office of the President-Mindanao; the Secretary of

DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
“In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration,
Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru
Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office,
interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion ‘as long
as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is
P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x.’ Also,
the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative,
San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the
proposed conversion of the land in question ‘as it will provide
more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside
investments that will come and employment opportunities that
will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.’
“On the same score, it is represented that during the public
consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March
1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected
barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the
project.
“Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation,
however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao,
invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section
65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant
application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agroindustrial and, instead, placed the same under
the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution
thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with

irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and
reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to
Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series
of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
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VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 635
Fortich vs. Corona
“A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on

January 9, 1995 by applicant
9
but the same was denied (in an
Order dated June 7, 1995).”
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional

Director “to proceed with the compulsory 10
acquisition and distribution of the property.”
11
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed
the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the
subject land as the same would be more beneficial
to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary’s
order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for 12certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul
G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for
Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation 13
of the
proposed project, sent a memorandum to the
President favorably endorsing the project with a
recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider
his decision in denying the application of the
province for the conversion of the land.
14
14. Also, in a memorandum to the President dated
August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III,
then Secretary of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG), recommended the
conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the
President “hold the implementation of the DAR
order to distribute the land in question.”
_______________
9 Annex “AA,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 163-166.

10 Annex “S,” Petition; Ibid., p. 113.
11 Annex “T,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 115-120.
12 Annex “U,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 121-146.
13 Annexes “V” and “V-1,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 147-150.
14 Annex “W,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 151-153.
636

Fortich vs. Corona
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, 15

in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution ordering
the parties to observe status quo pending resolution
of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on
October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor
General, manifested before the said court that the
DAR was merely “in the processing stage of the
applications of farmers-claimants” and has agreed
to respect
16
status quo pending the resolution of the
petition.
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
issued a Decision on OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated
March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary’s
decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
“After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-à-vis the grounds

upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we
find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be
sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-
industrial would open great opportunities for employment and
bring about real development in the area towards a sustained
economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even
tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
“Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime
agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to
mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there
is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely
passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to
the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself,
subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was,
for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine
Packing Corporation.
“On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice
of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on
withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by
_______________
15 Annex “X,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 154-156.

16 Annex “Y,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 157-158.
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VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 637

Fortich vs. Corona
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the
DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No.
6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of
compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease
contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company,
or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from
pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner’s land.
“On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the
Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to the
land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares
of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70’s and another 400 hectares in
the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years
ago, for which they have not received ‘just compensation’ up to
this time.
“Neither can the assertion that ‘there is no clear and tangible
compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries’ hold
water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak
about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
“Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of
identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial
purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their
local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
government units autonomy in their local affairs including the
power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
“WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the
said legal mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations
of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the
instant application
17
of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby
APPROVED.”
_______________
17 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
638

Fortich vs. Corona
17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for

reconsideration of the OP decision.
18. On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP

decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from
the subject land to DECS
18
for the establishment of
the NQSR High School.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the

4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over
the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed
against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR,
without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation
of NQSRMDC’s title on August 11, 1995 and had it
transferred in the name of19 the Republic of the Philippines
under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused
the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the 20name of
137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on21 April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a

complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil
Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation
of title, damages and injunction against DAR and
141 others. The RTC then issued22 a Temporary
Restraining Order on April 30, 1997, and a Writ of
23
Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,
restraining the DAR
_______________
18 Par. 37, Petition; rollo, pp. 14-15.

19 Annex “BB,” Petition; Ibid., p. 168.
20 Annex “CC,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 169-176.
21 Annex “DD,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 177-189.
22 Annex “EE,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 190-191.
23 Annex “GG,” Petition; Ibid., pp. 193-194.
639
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 639

Fortich vs. Corona
and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting

from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
24
24
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order was issued
by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
denying DAR’s motion for reconsideration for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared
that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for
reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by
some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the
lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC
case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-
beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of
the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the
OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10,
1997, some persons claiming to be
farmerbeneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property
filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-
C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion
25
of the entire 144-hectare property be set
aside.
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with
the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He created an
eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF)
chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero
to look into the controversy 26 and recommend
possible solutions to the problem.
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President
resolved the strikers’ protest by issuing the so-
called “Win-Win”
_______________
24 Annex “FF,” Petition; Ibid., p. 192.

25 Par. 17, Respondents’ Comment, rollo, p. 532.
26 Par. 18, ibid., p. 533.
640

Fortich vs. Corona
Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary

Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of

the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated
March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
“1. NQSRMDC’s application for conversion is APPROVED

only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44)
hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
“2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares
traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable
for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way
to said portion from the highway provided in the portion
fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and
other concerned government agencies are directed to
immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area,
valuation of the property and generation of titles in the
name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
“3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to
carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
“4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further
directed of expedite payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the
CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by
NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
“5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to
render full assistance to the Department of Agrarian
Reform in the implementation of this Order.
“We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113

farmers on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or
merits thereof since 27it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
“SO ORDERED.”
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 61-62.
641
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 641

Fortich vs. Corona
A copy of the “Win-Win” Resolution was received by

Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B.
Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November
28
28
24, 1997 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer
for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December
29
12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To
Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in
interest as they were “previously identified by respondent
DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare”
property30 subject of this case. The motion was vehemently
opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution,
the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was
prompted to issue the said resolution “after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary
Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with
this purely political decision to appease the ‘farmers,’ by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996
which has been declared 31
final and executory in an Order of
23 June 1997 . . . .” Thus, petitioners further allege,
respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona “committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued 32
the questioned
Resolution of 7 November 1997 . . . .” They availed of this
extraordinary writ of certiorari “because there is no other
plain, speedy
33
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.” They never filed a
_______________
28 Par. 3, Petition; Ibid., p. 4.

29 Rollo, pp. 195-200.
30 Ibid., pp. 280-282.
31 Petition, ibid., p. 17.
32 Ibid., p. 18.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
642

Fortich vs. Corona
motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution

“because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and34 it
would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration . . . .”
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed
the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the
following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been

to file a petition for review directly with the Court
of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed “Win-Win”
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be

resolved, including the incident on the motion for
intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the
recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to
draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
35
and which
error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand,
an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which
36
is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. This error is 37correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of any38
quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the
Office of the
______________
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Fernando vs. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288.
36 Ibid., Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.
37 Ibid.
38 Except those issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (Sec. 2,
Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court).
643
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 643

Fortich vs. Corona
39
President, may be taken to40the Court of Appeals by filing a
verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from 41
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,
whether the appeal involves questions
42
of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law.
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the

remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering
that the present petition contains an allegation
43
that the
challenged resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued
with “grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond his 44
(respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona’s) jurisdiction”
when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final
and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done.
The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
“SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board

or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x x x x x x.”
_______________
39 Section 1, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.

40 Sections 3 & 5, ibid.
41 Section 4, ibid.
42 Section 3, ibid.
43 Petition, rollo, p. 5.
44 Ibid., p. 18.
644

Fortich vs. Corona
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly

extraordinary cases—cases in which the 45act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the
person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act “may file a
verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court.” The
proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in
Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
“SEC. 4. Where petition filed.—The petition may be filed not later

than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)”
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court,

Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original 46
concurrent 47 jurisdiction to 48
issue a writ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these
three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition
must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed
_______________
45 Fernando vs. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288.

46 Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; People vs. Cuaresma, et
al., 172 SCRA 415, 423; Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, et al., 156 SCRA 753, 766.
47 Section 2, ibid.
48 Section 3, ibid.
645
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 645

Fortich vs. Corona
only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided

by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this
matter of concurrence
49
of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et al., through now Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, thus:
“x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari

(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which
may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter’s competence
to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those ‘in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.’ This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals.” (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to

take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to
be observed and 50
which has been reiterated in51
subsequent
cases, namely:
52
Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs.
Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guz-
_______________
49 Supra.
50 Cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. One, 1997
edition, p. 721.
51 G.R. Nos. 111416-17, Sept. 26, 1994.
52 G.R. No. 123352, Feb. 7, 1996.
646

Fortich vs. Corona
53 54
man, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have
further stated in Cuaresma:
“x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original

jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket.”
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary

jurisdiction over
55
the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as

correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national
interest because of the magnitude of the problem created
by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will
be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly
void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of
time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules
in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We56
reiterate what we said in Piczon vs.
Court of Appeals:
“Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
_______________
53 G.R. No. 123573, Feb. 28, 1996.

54 G.R. No. 125500, Aug. 7, 1996.
55 Eugenio vs. Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 109404, Jan. 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 106, 110.
56 190 SCRA 31, 38.
647
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 647

Fortich vs. Corona
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we

forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.”
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed

a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking
judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is
not necessary
57
when the questioned resolution is a patent
nullity, as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim
that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for
certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint
for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No.
2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum
shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
“There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse

opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not
only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection
with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially
so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was
brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
“The test for determining whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of
Buan
_______________
57 Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, L-19850, Jan.
30, 1964; Luzon Surety Co. vs. Marbella, et al., L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960; Dir. Of
Lands vs. Santamaria, 44 Phil. 594, all cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, supra, p. 710.
648

Fortich vs. Corona
vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as
follows:
‘There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case
No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the
identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
58
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.’ ”
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners

are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A
cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners
does not show that the said cases are similar with each
other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary’s order to
proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of
the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in

RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and
cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of
petitioner NQSRMDC’s title, used documents which were
earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the
cancellation of NQSRMDC’s title was made without
payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present
petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it
seeks the nullification of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution
of the Office of the Presi-
_______________
58 First Philippine International Bank, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

252 SCRA 259, 283 (Jan. 24, 1996).
649
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 649

Fortich vs. Corona
dent dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued

long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is
the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In
their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-
beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties
in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex “I” in
their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries.
Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to
the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed “Win-
Win” Resolution which directs the DAR “to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.” However, a perusal of the
said document reveals that movants are those purportedly
“Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval.” In
other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in
interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, 59
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Undoubtedly, movants’ interest over the land in question is
a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in
interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which

movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null
and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to
stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and
executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the “Win-Win” Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the
Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
________________
59 Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 27.
650

Fortich vs. Corona
“SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President

shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become
final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period.
“Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.”
(Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that “The Rules of

Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable.”
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated
June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996
final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative
Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration
is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996.
And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,”
as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was
not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of

March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the
Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which
had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord
finality to administrative determinations. 60
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
_______________
60 174 SCRA 258, 271.
651
VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 651

Fortich vs. Corona
“Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the President had long become final and executory, the
same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of
a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata
[Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna
Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-
15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata
which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.
Castro, supra at 503].”
The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The 61noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our
justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle
must always be maintained by those who wield the power
of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which
substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after
it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void 62
resolution, as aptly
63
stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street
in a 1918 case, is “a lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, 64

or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.”
_______________
61 Legarda, et al. vs. Savellano, et al., 158 SCRA 194, 200.

62 One of the first Justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
63 El Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921.
64 Ibid., at p. 949.
652

People vs. Gaorana
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED.

The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued
by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For
Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza,

JJ., concur.
Petition granted, Resolution nullified and set aside.

Motion for leave to intervene denied.
Note.—If a lower court prematurely assumes

jurisdiction over a case, then it becomes an error of
jurisdiction which is a proper subject of a petition for
certiorari. (BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA
267 [1998])
——o0o——
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1/20/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 289

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; “Errors of

Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed in Rule 43

judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 625