Rule 67

Expropriation

Municipality of Binan vs Garcia Meaning of expropriation or eminent domain

180 SCRA 576 The power of eminent domain in particular has been described as a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state
for public use or meet a public exigency. It is also said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and, thus,
inseparable from sovereignty.

Two stages

1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.   It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of
course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the Merits.   So, too, would an order
of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to
the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. 

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing
the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another
of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too,
such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Republic of the Philippines rep by NAPOCOR vs. Initially there is public purpose but then it becomes not necessary for public purpose, what will happen? The action should be
Heirs of SaturninoBorbon vs Municipality of dismissed. The moment that the court or plaintiff determines that it becomes not necessary, it should be dismissed outright.
Panay Rationale? Commit to the purpose.

G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit of the public. If the genuine public necessity ceases or disappears, then there is no
 more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another from public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive
possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.
Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay Power of LGU to exercise eminent domain?

498 SCRA 113

While such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities, and public utilities, the exercise of such
power by the delegated entity is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating
authority and such entities may exercise the powerto expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its
control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Indeed, local government units
themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to local
government units is in reality not eminent but “inferior” since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus,
partake only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units and the latter
cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same.

Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether
the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
NPC vs Santa LoroVda de Capin Is right to eminent domain limited to acquisition of real property? No

569 SCRA 648

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way
easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of
right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.

NPC vs Jocson Prior hearing is not required. Notice and defendant requirement. Exceptions.

206 SCRA 520

Prior hearing is not required before the Republic of the Philippines can be granted immediate possession of the property. The defense
by the owner against immediate possession can be considered on the trial on the merits. All that is requires is notice to the owner and
the deposit.
Republic vs Mupas, Fair market value is thegeneral standard of value in determining just compensation.Jurisprudence broadly defines “fair market
value” as the sum of money that a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would
G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015
agree on as a price to be given and received for a property. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be just, the
compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. While jurisprudence requires the “fair market value” to be the
measure of recovery in expropriation cases, it is not an absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation. There are exceptional
 cases where the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value of the property is difficult to determine.In cases
where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain, the court may use other just and equitable market methods of
valuation in order to estimate the fair market value of a property.

Just compensation must not extend beyond the property owner’s loss or injury. This is the only way for the compensation paid to be
truly just, not only to the individual whose property is taken, but also to the public who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even as
undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the
prejudice of the public.

MCWD v. J. King and Sons, Delegation of power of eminent domain.

G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015 As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often
does, delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner (MWCD) is one
of the numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No. 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the
power of eminent domain.

New system of immediate payment under RA 8974.

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred
percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.
Republic of the Philippines rep by DPWH vs. Market value.
Arlene R. Soriano
Considered an effective forbearance, it is now subject to legal interest. Entitled to legal interest.
G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015

In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines ruling, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate
at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Court’s own words:

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed
from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest
on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per
annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.

Yujuico vs Atienza, Jr Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle land owner to recover expropriated lot.
 472 SCRA Non-payment of just compensation does not automatically entitle the private landowner to recover possession of expropriated lots.
However, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance
with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five year limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity.

What happened there was order of just compensation, but plaintiff did not pay defendant. Supreme Court ordered recovery of
property.

Look at the facts. If yujuico case, if Just Compensation is not paid within how many years, entitled to recovery of possession. IF not
same, apply GR that recovery of possession is not entitlement but only interest.
NPC vs. Heirs of MacabangkitSangkay Inverse condemnation proceedings

GR No. 165828, August 24, 2011 "Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency. While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal
proceedings. The phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an
action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding."

Recovery of just compensation is imprescriptible. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency
differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of
property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may
be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.

The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the
Constitution  while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the
State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a
right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an
inverse condemnation,  for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without
just compensation.It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for
private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision.
Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel,
as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering
without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.
 NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying
due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
National Power Corporation v. Spouses Did SC apply the principle that the value of the property at the time of taking or filing whichever comes first in this case? Was the
SaludaresSaludares filing or taking first? Taking first. SC did not use taking as basis for just compensation. Rationale: this court cannot allow petitioner to
profit from its failure to pay just compensation.
G.r. No. 189127, April 25, 2012

The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values forReal Property for the
Year 2000.

Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its
value in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses’
property. Because it failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just
compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR
continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply
with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on
their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when
respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation.

Differentiate with Oroville case. NTC vs Oroville vs. NPC vs Saludares. Same instances, sangkay, tecson, saludares. In Oroville, the SC
used another principle. Why did the SC not apply the GR rule in this case? Allegation of napocor is because according to them they
already paid. No intention to pay.
Secretary of DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson Computation of legal interest is in DPWH vs Republic vs tecson, the principle that the value of just compensation at the time of taking
or filing whichever comes first prevails. Exceptions are in saludares and sangkay cases mentioned in Oroville. In tecson when did the
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015
taking happen, 1940, when was the action for recovery of possession of real property filed, 1994. But SC still said taking was done
long before, M.R. decision. Legal interest may 1 1916, 6% what was applied was 12% because of CB circular. Also SC added exemplary
damages.

Clearly, the award of interest on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment is adequate compensation to
respondents-movants for the deprivation of their property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. Such interest, however
meager or enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and
jurisprudence-standards that have taken into account fairness and equity insetting the interest rates due for the use or forbearance of
 money. Thus, adding the interest computed to the market value of the property at the time of taking signifies the real, substantial, full
and ample value of the property. Verily, the same constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain
and serves as a basic measure of fairness. In addition to the foregoing interest, additional compensation shall be awarded to
respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in view of the government's taking without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. 

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. SC followed the general rule, whichever comes first.
OROVILLE DEVELOPMENT CCORPORATION

G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017

The rulings in MacabangkitSangkay and Saludares are mere exceptions. These rulings, however, are exceptions to the general rule
that just compensation must be reckoned from the time of taking or filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The special
circumstances of the aforementioned cases called for the valuation of just compensation at the time the landowners initiated inverse
condemnation proceedings notwithstanding that taking of the properties occurred first. In  Macabangkit  Sangkay, NAPOCOR did not
even inform the property owners of the construction of the underground tunnels. Hence, it could be said that NAPOCOR employed
stealth instead of complying with the legal process of expropriation. Further, considering that the tunnels were constructed
underground, the property owners came to know thereof only when the purchaser of the property refused to proceed with the sale
upon discovery of the underground tunnels. In this case, however, the transmission lines are visible, such that Oroville could not deny
knowledge of its construction in 1983. In Saludares, NAPOCOR refused to acknowledge the respondents' claim and insisted that it
already paid just compensation because the respondents' property was the same one involved in the Pereyra case. Thus, NAPOCOR
had no intention to pay just compensation. This circumstance does not exist in the case at bench.

The rulings  in MacabangkitSangkay  and  Saludares  are more in consonance with the rules of equity than with the Rules of Court,
specifically Rule 67 on expropriation. Indeed, the practice of construct first, expropriate later is reprehensible and must not be
countenanced. The Court, however, must not lose sight of Section 4, Rule 67 which mandates that just compensation must be
determined "as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first." This provision is, first and
foremost, part of the Rules which the Court itself promulgated for purposes of uniformity, among others.

In Sangkay noted that NPC did not have intention to pay. Did not even inform property owners.

In Saludares because according to the government the property is already subject of another case which was already paid just
compensation.

3rd exception is in NPC vs Marasigan.

National Power Corporation vs Apolonio Did the SC follow the general principle? No because there is no proper allegation at the time of taking. The government failed to
Marasigan, Francisco V. Marasigan, Lilia V. prove when taking took place. Elements of taking. Iota of taking.
Marasigan, Benito V. Marasigan, Jr. and Alicia V.
Marasigan,
 G.R. No. 220367, November 20, 2017 There being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the subject properties at a date preceding the filing of the expropriation
complaint, the time of the taking should be taken to mean as coinciding with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings on
January 23, 2006. Hence, the value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value
when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.

GR is value of property at the time of taking or filing whichever comes first. Except sangkay, saludares, marasigan.
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Can the government enter into an amicable settlement as to the value of just compensation? Yes. Pursuant to a compromise
Secretary of the Department of Public Works agreement. There is nothing under the rules or law which prohibits this. But in this case Supreme Court did not allow the payment of
and Highways (DPWH), vs. Jose Gamir-Consuelo interest. Considering that there is already a contract, it became the law between the parties. Since there is nothing in the contract
Diaz Heirs Association, Inc., providing for interest, no legal interest.

G.R. No. 218732 November 12, 2018

Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling seller. Provided all the requisites for its
exercise are present, a private individual cannot resist the state's exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain. Nevertheless,
there is nothing that precludes the government from entering into a negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a property to
be devoted for a public purpose. In fact, expropriation proceedings or court intervention would be unnecessary should a deed of sale
be executed where the parties come to an agreement as to the price of the property to be sold.

In sum, the award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires private property through voluntary sale is not a matter of
law. Unlike in cases where the state exercises its power of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation proceedings and other
similar actions, in negotiated sale, there is an existing contract that governs the relations of the parties and determines their
respective rights and obligations. In turn, these contractual stipulations should be complied with in good faith, unless they are
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policies. Hence, the laws relating to contracts should govern in case of
controversy in their application.

It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and respondent does not contain any provision or
stipulation for the payment of interest. Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest.
Rule 68

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

Flores vs. Lindo, Jr. The petition has merit.

648 SCRA 772 The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. 10 The mortgage-
creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor
would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
 The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself. 13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.

The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be
consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband,
is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of
attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or
consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.

Marilag vs. Martinez In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against
the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the
G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015
institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative,  not cumulative or
36

successive,   and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage,
37

he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt,  except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in
38

the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged
properties.   Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at
39

public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.

In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the
availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in
this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown
to have attained finality.

As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from
availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had
attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return
 of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's
collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
Rosales vs. CA Since petitioners were deprived of the full use of the ninety-day period within which to pay the judgment debt, the writ of
execution and the order to sell the properties at public auction were null and void. A judgment in an action for foreclosure of
353 SCRA 179
mortgage could only be executed in a manner prescribed in the Rules. Where the order of execution was not in conformity with
the Rules, the same is null and void. 27 The order for defendants to pay the judgment debt within ninety days, prior to the sale of
the foreclosed properties at public auction, is a substantive requirement which cannot be omitted. 28

This 90-day period given in the rule is not a procedural requirement merely; it is a substantive right granted to the
mortgage debtor as the last opportunity to pay the debt and save his mortgaged property from final disposition at the
foreclosure sale. It is one of the two steps necessary to destroy what in law is known as the mortgagor's "equity of
redemption," the other being the sale. It may not be omitted. As the writ of execution or the order allowing the sale of
the mortgaged property was issued without granting the mortgage debtor said 90-day period, the order for the sale of
the property would be a denial of a substantial right and void.

GSIS vs. CFI There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale, except those granted by banks
or banking institutions as provided by the General Banking Act 
175 SCRA 19

Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the general rule that there is no right of redemption after the
judicial foreclosure sale has been confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition of petitioner
GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof at the public sale. His orders dated January 19, 1976 and February 12, 1976 are null and void.

Santos vs ROD of Manila whether the redemption period of "one year from and after the date of the sale," prescribed in section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, for the redemption of property sold in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, should be computed
38 SCRA 42
from the date of the auction sale, in September 1963, as contended by appellant, or from August 26, 1964, when the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, as held by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his appealed resolution.

This issue has long been settled in favor of the ruling made in the contested resolution. As early as June 30, 1959, We have held
that the period of redemption "begins to run not from the date of sale but from the time of registration of the sale in the Office
of the Register of Deeds.
Huerta Alba Resort vs CA On the distinction between the equity of redemption and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the Court in the said case:
7 

"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of redemption.

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage – understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged
property after registration of the foreclosure sale – exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine
National Bank or a bank or banking institution.

Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1)
year from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares that
a judicial foreclosure sale 'when confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties
to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.'
Such rights exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by
the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337).  These
laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem
the property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be
exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry
of Property.

But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the
PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court. . .
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There then
exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish
the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
 Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —

'. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due
to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the
sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the
date of the service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt
and costs.'

This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond
the 90-day period 'from the date of service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before
the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any
longer." (Emphasis supplied)
8 

Sulit vs CA Section 4 of Rule 64, hereinbefore quoted, merely provides that where there is a balance or residue after payment of the
mortgage, the same shall be paid to the mortgagor. While the expedient course desired by respondent court is commendable,
there is nothing in the cited provision from which it can be inferred that a violation thereof will have the effect of nullifying the
sale. The better rule is that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone
will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.   This is likewise
27

in harmony with the decisional rule that in suing for the return of the surplus proceeds, the mortgagor is deemed to have
affirmed the validity of the sale since nothing is due if no valid sale has been made.  28

In the early case of Caparas vs. Yatco, etc., et al.,   it was also held that where the mortgagee has been ordered by the court to
29

return the surplus to the mortgagor or the person entitled thereto, and the former fails to do so and flagrantly disobeys the
order, the court can cite the mortgagee for contempt and mete out the corresponding penalty under Section 3(b) of the former
Rule 64 (now Rule 71) of the Rules of Court.

RULE 69: Partition

 Barrido vs. Nonato GR No. 176492, Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real
October 20, 2014 property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real
property.  Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129  provides:
7 8

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.–
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) 9

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required
limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court
correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.  Every act 16

GLORIA MARCOS, vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition.  Partition
17

BANGI and GENOVEVA DICCION,

may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a
represented by NOLITO SABIANO, G.R.
deed of partition may be presumed.  Thus, in Hernandez v. Andal,  the Court emphasized that:
18 19

No. 185745               October 15, 2014

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has
been completely or partly performed.

Leoveras vs. Valdez 652 SCRA 61 The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong.43 Partition is the division between two or more persons of real or personal property, owned in
common, by setting apart their respective interests so that they may enjoy and possess these in severalty, 44 resulting in the
partial or total extinguishment of co-ownership.45
 In the present case, the parties agreed to divide the subject property by giving the petitioner the 3,020 square meters
"residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal road."46 There is no dispute that this 3,020- square meter portion is
the same parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2 (which is not the subject of the respondent’s action for reconveyance) in the
Affidavit and the Subdivision Plan presented by the petitioner before the Register of Deeds. The fact that the Agreement lacks
technical description of the parties’ respective portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by a single
certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each were determined and
became separately identifiable, as in this case.

One of the legal effects of partition, whether by agreement among the co-owners or by judicial proceeding, is to terminate the
co-ownership and, consequently, to make the previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to
him.
Garingan vs. Garingan 455 SCRA 480

The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition, and the action will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest in the property in dispute. In this case, Hadji Munib, et al. failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.
8 

Butiong vs. Plazo G.R. No. 187524, Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
August 5, 2015 of age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is
only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds.
The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or
the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the
office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will
or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then
the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.   An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
29

Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate
either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying
for the appointment of an administrator by the court.   The reasons that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
30

there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners
of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.  33

Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement
of estate as law expressly permits the same.