VOL.

383, JULY 2, 2002 611

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION
AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein
represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and
PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; The

right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.—The right of eminent
domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial
sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent
existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution,
whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its
presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent,
its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power
itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the
State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.
Same; Same; Same; Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning
authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the
property.—The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is
manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to
prove a right to compensation for the taking.

_____________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; The power to expropriate is not without

its limits; In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized
—the first is public employment or the actual use by the public,
and the second is public advantage or benefit.—Obviously,
however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must
be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be
given to the private owner of the property. These twin
proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity
for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one
hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively
restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In
determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized—the first is
public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second
is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter
as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society
advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may
be devoted.
Same; Same; Same; The grant of the power of eminent domain
to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be
understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power
vested in the legislative branch of government.—In insisting on the
return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on
the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda.
de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question.
It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is
not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The
grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the
pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative
branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield
the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but
only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; The constitutional
limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to
be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of
the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government;
Between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.—The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for
public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interests on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order
to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than)
the position he was in before the taking occurred.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for petitioner.
     Pantaleon Law Office for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19

September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of
Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M,
No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980
square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur
Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued
broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities
for the “Voice of the Philippines” project. Petitioner,
through the Philippine Information Agency (“PIA”), took
over the premises after the previous lessee, the “Voice of
America,” had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner
made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed
as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26
February 1979, or more than nine years after the
institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court
issued this order—
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614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:
“Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases
Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43, MacArthur Highway,
Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of
title appearing in the Commissioners’ Appraisal Report consisting
of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated in plan,
Exhibit “A”, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit “I” for the
defendants, and as Appendix “A” attached to the Commissioners’
Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its
complaint;
“Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just
compensation for said property which is the fair market value of
the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per
square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969,
until fully paid; and
“Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes
the aforesaid fees of commissioners,
1
Atty. Victorino P. Evangelista
and Mr. Pablo Domingo.”

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the

76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis
Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents,
which forms part of the expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to
pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to
the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years
later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation
with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated
property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after
ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of
P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the
plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the
implementation thereof. When the order was not complied
with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial
court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to
release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the
sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the
expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their
share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July
1984, granted the motion.

_____________

1 Rollo, p. 66.

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VOL. 383, JULY 2, 2002 615

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

In the meantime, President

2
Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the
expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for
the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be
used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court
order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was
taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when
petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of
just compensation for the expropriated property of the late
Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be
approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs,
opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a
counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per
square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its
current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square
meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of
the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed
order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and
declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescrip-
tion—
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:

_____________

2 The Dispositive Portion of Proclamation No. 22, entitled “TRANS-

FERRING OWNERSHIP OF A PORTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE
PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY TO THE BULACAN STATE
UNIVERSITY.” reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
transfer to the Bulacan State University, twenty (20) hectares of the property
mentioned above, and another five (5) hectares for the exclusive use of the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, adjacent to the university campus, located
in Malolos, Bulacan. The remaining portions of the property fronting the national
highway shall be retained by the Philippine Information Agency for its proposed
development plan, including offices of the PIA Regional Office, the Bulacan
Provincial Information Center, the training center and the depository of
equipment and other properties of PIA.

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616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

“1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on

February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution
of the same by either a motion or an independent
action having already prescribed in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
“2) denies the plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to
Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for
Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999
for the reason stated in the next preceding
paragraph hereof; and
“3) orders the return of the expropriated property of
the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs
conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,
153 SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which
the parties may deem appropriate to institute in
relation with the amount already paid to herein
oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of
the said realty to the Bulacan State University
pursuant to Proclamation 3
No. 22 issued by
President Joseph Ejercito.”
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals
but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear
that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the
judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of
the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for
certiorari, and that if a motion for reconsideration was
denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only
within the remaining period, but which should not be less
than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of
such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later
modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now reading thusly:

“Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed

not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.”

_____________

3 Rollo, pp. 76-77.

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VOL. 383, JULY 2, 2002 617

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should

be made applicable to all cases still pending with the courts
at the time of its effectivity.
4
In Narzoles vs. NLRC, the Court has said:

“The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated
tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous
cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e.,
even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it
not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the
cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits.
Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing
a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. x x x
“The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000,
following its publication in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000
and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two
newspapers of general circulation.
“In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending
Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as curative in nature,
and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
“Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or
to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for
want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc.
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 [1996].)
They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and
curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry
into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has
failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna,
312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, there-

_____________

4 341 SCRA 533 (2000). See also PCGG vs. Desierto, 8 December 2000, G.R. No.
140358, 347 SCRA 561; PCGG vs. Desierto, 19 January 2001, G.R. No. 140323, 349
SCRA 767; Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, 20 March 2001, G.R. No.
144074, 354 SCRA 765; Pfizer vs. Galan, 25 May 2001, G.R. No. 143389, 358
SCRA 240; Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 05 July 2001, G.R. No. 141947, 360 SCRA
521.

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618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

fore, by their very essence, are retroactive. (Municipality

5
of San
Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)”

At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing

the “public nature” of the expropriated property. The
petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has
resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its
merits.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court,
petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents
had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other
motions subsequent thereto, was made within the
reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year
prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979
judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by
respondents of partial compensation in the sum of
P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance
on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped
respondents from invoking prescription 6
expressed in
Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view
that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court,
the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26
February 1979, within five years after it had become final
and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion.
The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the
subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55
by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be
considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since
a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be
made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner.
Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them
by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984
order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made
by petitioner when it first entered possession of the
property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial
payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA

_____________

5 At pp. 537-538.
6 Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the Statute of Limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

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VOL. 383, JULY 2, 2002 619

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the

Bulacan State University even while the just compensation
due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be
an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property7 within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a
State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose
provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its
presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due
exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the
power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even
that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to
every form of property the State needs for public use and,
as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of
individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or
implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to
resume the possession8 of the property whenever the public
interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest
in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely
serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the
property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to possession,
9
but to prove a
right to compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits:
first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that
just compensation
10
must be given to the private owner of
the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in
the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand,

_____________

7 Bernas, 1987 Edition, p. 276, quoting Justice Story in Charles River

Bridge vs. Warren Bridge.
8 US vs. Certain Lands in Highlands (DY NY) 48 F Supp 306.
9 US vs. Certain Lands in Highlands (DY NY) 48 F Supp 306; San
Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District vs. Gage Canal Co. (4th Dist),
226 Cal App 2d 206, 37 Cal Rptr 856.
10 Seña vs. Manila Railroad Co., 42 Phil. 102.

620

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively

restraining
11
the former and affording protection to the
latter. In determining “public use,” two approaches are
utilized—the first is public employment or the actual use
by the 12public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being
subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society
advances, its demands upon the individual so increases,
and each demand is a new 13 use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion
thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the
Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the
Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the
public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the
condemned property, pointing out that its present use
differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the
1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no
moment. The property has assumed a public character
upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the
condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within
its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the
only limitation being that it be for public use, which,
decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,
respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in 14
Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya
where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative
remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It
might be borne in mind that the case involved the
municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and
of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent 15
domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160
cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-
encompassing power vested in

_____________

11 Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550.

12 Thornton Development Authority vs. Upah, (DC Colo) 640 F Supp
1071.
13 Visayan Refining, supra.
14 153 SCRA 291 (1987).
15 See Local Government Code of 1991.

621

VOL. 383, JULY 2, 2002 621

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

the legislative branch of government. For local

governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by
enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature,
but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is
not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of
inferior, domain or only as broad
16
or confined as the real
authority would want it to be. 17
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private
landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the
termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court
ruled—

“The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be

made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject
of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in
said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of
an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows
that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of
their expropriated lots—which are still devoted to the public use
for which they were expropriated—but only to demand the fair
market value of the same.
“Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs’ prayer for: ‘such
other remedies,18 which may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises.’ ”

The Court proceeded 19to reiterate its pronouncement in

Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of
property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid
landowner was denied even while no requisite
expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The
landowner was merely given the relief of recovering
compensation for his property computed at its market
value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the
State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on
the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the
payment of just compensation to herein respondents but
likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of
petitioner over which parties, as

_____________

16 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349.

17 17 SCRA 107 (1966).
18 At p. 112.
19 106 Phil. 1017.

622

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Republic vs. Court of Appeals

20
well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied,
utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised
dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The
exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed
has amounted to at least a partial compliance or
satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any
claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In
arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-
payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller
in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might
perhaps apply. An 21in rem proceeding, condemnation acts
upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount 22
title is in the public under a new and independent title;
thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for
securing better title against all 23the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did
not take into account that the same argument could
likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted
proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May
1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become
final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to
compel payment against herein petitioner would militate
against them. Consistently with the rule that one should
take good care of his own concern, respondents should have
commenced the proper action upon the finality of the
judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent
deprivation24
of their ownership and possession of the
property.
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one

_____________

20 Mines vs. Canal Authority of the State (Fla) 467 So2d 989, 10 FLW
230.
21 Cadorette vs. US CCA (Mass) 988 F2d 215.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 17 SCRA 107 (1966), supra.
 623

VOL. 383, JULY 2, 2002 623

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

who desires to sell, it

25
fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public
use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time when compensation
26
is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment,
legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better
27
than) the position he was
in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct
in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to
be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in
September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed,
28
being an effective forbearance, at 12%
per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation
29
and inflation of the value of the currency over
time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in
case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation
shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to
the contrary is stipulated, 30
has strict application only to
contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual
agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary
inflation 31
to be taken into account to alter the value of the
currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order,
dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February
1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only
authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily,
private respondents, although not enti-

_____________

25 Manila Railway Co. vs. Fabie, 17 Phil. 206.

26 Philippine Railway Co. vs. Solon, 13 Phil. 34.
27 Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, 96 SCRA 831 (1980).
28 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78
(1994).
 29 US vs. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119, 82 L Ed 1219, 58 S
Ct 799.
30 Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, supra.
31 Ibid.

624

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

tled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to

be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just
compensation already fixed by final judgment of the
Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square
meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the date of “taking” of the property, i.e., 19
September 1969, until the due amount shall have been
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its
resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE.
Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision
promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-

Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, resolution and decision set aside.

Note.—Eminent domain is the inherent right of the

state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public
use upon payment of just compensation. (Robern
Development Corporation vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150
[1999])

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