(1) This case involves the expropriation of over 500,000 square meters of land by the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA) in 1969 for the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
(2) In 1979, the court ordered PIA to pay compensation to the landowners at P6 per square meter but PIA failed to fully pay for over 20 years.
(3) The landowners argued the 1979 judgment was no longer enforceable due to prescription while PIA argued partial payments interrupted prescription. The court ultimately ruled in favor of PIA, finding the land was still being used for public purposes and partial payments constituted compliance with the judgment.
(1) This case involves the expropriation of over 500,000 square meters of land by the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA) in 1969 for the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
(2) In 1979, the court ordered PIA to pay compensation to the landowners at P6 per square meter but PIA failed to fully pay for over 20 years.
(3) The landowners argued the 1979 judgment was no longer enforceable due to prescription while PIA argued partial payments interrupted prescription. The court ultimately ruled in favor of PIA, finding the land was still being used for public purposes and partial payments constituted compliance with the judgment.
(1) This case involves the expropriation of over 500,000 square meters of land by the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA) in 1969 for the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
(2) In 1979, the court ordered PIA to pay compensation to the landowners at P6 per square meter but PIA failed to fully pay for over 20 years.
(3) The landowners argued the 1979 judgment was no longer enforceable due to prescription while PIA argued partial payments interrupted prescription. The court ultimately ruled in favor of PIA, finding the land was still being used for public purposes and partial payments constituted compliance with the judgment.
(1) This case involves the expropriation of over 500,000 square meters of land by the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA) in 1969 for the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
(2) In 1979, the court ordered PIA to pay compensation to the landowners at P6 per square meter but PIA failed to fully pay for over 20 years.
(3) The landowners argued the 1979 judgment was no longer enforceable due to prescription while PIA argued partial payments interrupted prescription. The court ultimately ruled in favor of PIA, finding the land was still being used for public purposes and partial payments constituted compliance with the judgment.
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Republic v CA & HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS G.R. No.
146587 July 2, 2002
J. Vitug
FACTS
Sep. 19, 1969:
PH Information Agency instituted (3) expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Bulacan, covering a 544,980 sqm of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the "Voice of the Philippines" project. PIA, took over the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had ceased its operations thereat. PIA deposited P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property.
Feb. 26 1979, RTC rendered a decision ordering PIA to:
> pay the defendants the just compensation for said property at the rate of P6 per sqm, with legal rate of interest from Sept. 19, 1969, until fully paid. 76,589-square meter property owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of Rs, forms part of the expropriated area. PIA failed to pay to Rs 5 years later, or on May 9 1984, Rs filed → a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. RTC Bulacan, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on PIA, through the OSG. Order was not complied with -> Rs filed a motion urging the RTC to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by PIA at the inception of the expropriation. RTC granted the motion. In the meantime, Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hec. of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until Sept. 16 1999 when PIA filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a countermotion to adjust the compensation from P6 per sqm to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5k per sqm or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. Mar.1 2000,: RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of Rs, vacating its decision of Feb. 26, 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription. CA outrightly denied PIA's petition for certiorari. > based on S4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Hence this petition by PIA. > the motion which Rs had filed on Feb. 17 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-yr prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. > the receipt by Rs of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on July 23, 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of Ps and effectively estopped Rs from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the RoC. Rs' Answers: > pursuant to S6, Rule 39, of the RoC, the failure of PIA to execute the Feb judgment, within 5 years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. > The motion for payment, dated May 9 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55, could not be considered as having interrupted the 5-year period, since a motion, to be considered Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled. Note: The petition being imbued with public interest, SC resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its merits. WON there was GAD on the part of the RTC. Held: Yes (1) Eminent domain defined The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemn or in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. (2) The power is not without its limits: > first, the taking must be for public use, and > second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by PIA. > the P72,683.55 paid to them was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. > PIA has no right to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized: > the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and > the second is public advantage or benefit.
(3) The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Rs question the public nature of the utilization by PIA of the condemned property (present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated). The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. PIA, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. Rs' reliance on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya is misplaced, The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under RA 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
(4) Precedent Cases: In Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, SC ruled:
“xxx plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.”
The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City.
The judgment rendered by the RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to Rs but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of PIA over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property. The exercise of such rights has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of nonexecution.
The right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. Rs, in arguing laches against PIA did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. Rs first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on May 9 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final.
(5) The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
Note: A1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.
CONLUCSION: RTC Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. CA & RTC decisiond are SET ASIDE. Case remanded to the RTC for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. > just compensation: P6 per sqm, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
