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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998.

CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM,

DAMASO MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR
HERMALINO and PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS
MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES
FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA
MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIM
and GINA MAKIMKIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.
PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeals; Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction

that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.—Quite
noticeably, petitioners’ first assigned error is essentially factual in
nature, i.e., it merely assails the factual findings of both the Court
of Appeals and the trial court. Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction
that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, the findings
of fact of the appellate court being conclusive. We have
emphatically declared that it is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court.

Same; Same; Questions of law are those that do not call for
any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties.—Questions of law are those that do not call for any
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties. In the instant case, petitioners’ assignment of errors
would have this Court go over the facts because it necessarily
entails an examination of the evidence and its subsequent re-
evaluation to determine whether petitioners indeed have no
sufficient outlet to the highway.

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Civil Law; Property; Easements; Essential requisites to be

entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way; Burden of
proving the

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant

estate.—To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way,
the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate
is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. The burden of proving the
existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate.

Same; Same; Same; An easement involves an abnormal

restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate.—It
must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when
considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the
servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on
the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a
charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be
granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.

Same; Same; Same; Mere convenience for the dominant estate

is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement.—We find petitioners’ concept of what is
“adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched

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doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of

right of way there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial,
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Questions relating to

noncompliance with the requisites for conversion of subdivision
lots are properly cognizable by the National Housing Authority,
now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.—Questions
relating to non-compliance with the requisites for conversion of
subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the National Housing
Authority (NHA),

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),

pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 and not by the regular courts.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, where
jurisdiction is vested upon an administrative body, no resort to
the courts may be made before such administrative body shall
have acted upon the matter.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Evaristo P. Velicaria for petitioners.
          Saludo, Agpalo, Fernandez, Aquino counsel for
private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of

respondent Court of Appeals of 16 January 1996 in CA-
G.R. CV Case No. 37273, “Cresencia
1
Cristobal, et al. v.
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., et al.,” which affirmed
2
in toto the
decision of the RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City, dismissing herein
petitioners’ complaint for easement of right of way, and the
Resolution of 14 June 1996 denying their motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10
Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have
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been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar

Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a
subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which
once included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2,
with areas of 164 square meters and 52 square meters,
respectively, located adjacent to petitioners’ property. Lots
1 and 2 were originally part of a private road known as
Road Lot 2 owned exclusively

________________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by

Associate Justices Ramon U. Mabutas and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
2 Judge Celia Lipana-Reyes presiding.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using Road Lot 2

in going to and from the nearest public road. When Visayas
Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979,
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of
Quezon City to3 be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into
residential lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot
2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1
and Lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., sold both
lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor Transfer
Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued. In turn,
Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-
in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a
house on Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found out
that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita
Geronimo and a portion was being used as a passageway by
petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the
spouses complained about the intrusion into their property
to the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a
portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1
with a concrete fence.
Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their
property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet
and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of
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the Paciones. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners

instituted an action for easement of right of way with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO).
On 3 June 1987 the trial court issued a TRO directing
the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the
disputed property. The Paciones objected arguing that
petitioners were not entitled to a TRO since they showed no
valid basis for its

________________

3 Docketed as LRC Case No. Q-1614, “Petition for Issuance of Titles

and/or Approval of Segregation Subdivision and Technical Description.”

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

issuance, and that petitioners had no cause of action

against respondents because there were actually two (2)
accessible outlets and inlets—a pathway right in front of
their gate leading towards an asphalted 5-meter road to
the left, and across an open space to the right adjacent to
respondents’ lot likewise leading to Visayas Avenue.
At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an
ocular inspection of the property. A Board of
Commissioners was constituted for that purpose composed
of representatives chosen by the parties, with Deputy
Sheriff Florencio D. Dela Cruz, Jr., as representative of the
court.
On 3 January 1990 4
Deputy Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr.,
submitted his Report relative to the ocular inspection on
the litigated lots—

x x x there is another way from the Visayas Ave. to the plaintiffs’

lot existing at the time of the ocular inspection. Plaintiffs can use
the street originating from Visayas Avenue, identified as Ma.
Elena St., which is about 2.5 m. in width and about 150 m. in
length up to an intersection, meeting a private road, which is
about 100 meters in length, that ends at the lower portion of the
right side of the adjacent vacant lot previously identified, and at
the back of a lot with concrete fence located at the back of the
plaintiffs’ property. From that point the plaintiff must enter the
adjacent vacant lot (entry to the said lot is still possible during
the ocular inspection because the barbed wires were not properly
placed) to reach a gate at the side of the plaintiffs’ lot, about 16 m.

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from the end of the private road, allegedly used by the plaintiffs
before the adjacent lot was enclosed by barbed wires. According to
Atty. Mendoza, counsel for the defendants, that gate no longer
exist(ed) at the time of the ocular inspection.

As may be observed from the above report, only one outlet

was indicated by Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr. The other outlet
across an open space to the right referred to by the Pacione
spouses was not reflected thereon. However, on the basis of
the report as well as the testimonial and documentary evi-

________________

4 Annexes “F” and “F-1”; Rollo, pp. 35-37.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

dence of the parties, the trial court dismissed the complaint

holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of
right of way was not proved, i.e., the absence of an
alternative adequate way 5or outlet to a public highway, in
this case, Visayas Avenue.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing
that the trial court erred in finding that they failed to
sufficiently establish the essential fact that from their
property no adequate outlet or access to a public highway
existed; and, that the conversion of the Road Lot into two
(2) residential lots by Cesar Ledesma, Inc., was violative of
PD No. 957, hence illegal, and the titles issued as a
consequence of the conversion were null and void.
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered its
assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial court—

The burden of proving the existence of the requisites of easement

of right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. In the
case at bar, plaintiff-appellants failed to prove that there is no
adequate outlet from their property to a public highway.
Convenience of the dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the
legal right is ‘adequacy.’ Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as
in this case, even if the outlet, for one reason or another, be
inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely
unjustified. To justify the imposition of an easement of right of
way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial necessity for it.

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A right of way is legally demandable, but the owner of the

dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary
choice. Art. 650 of the Civil Code provides for the criteria in the
establishment of such easement but it has been settled that the
criterion of ‘least prejudicial’ prevails over shortest distance. Each
case must be weighed according to its individual merits and
judged according to the sound discretion of the court (Costabella
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 193 SCRA 333
[1991]).

________________

5 Rollo, pp. 395-401.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

The second assigned error has no legal leg to stand on since

plaintiff-appellants cannot just introduce a new issue to an
already settled one, especially for the first time on appeal.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioners now come to us with the following assignment
of errors: First, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
doctrine in Costabella, considering that in the instant case
the four (4) requisites that must be complied with by an
owner of the dominant estate in order to validly claim a
compulsory right of way have been clearly established by
petitioners, contrary to the Decision appealed from, and
that the facts in Costabella are not the same as in the
present case. Second, the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in holding that the question of legality or illegality of the
conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., is a new issue raised for the first time
on appeal, because such issue appeared in the complaint
filed before the trial court.
Quite noticeably, petitioners’ first assigned error is
essentially factual in nature, i.e., it merely assails the
factual findings of both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court. Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of
law, the findings
6
of fact of the appellate court being
conclusive. We have emphatically declared that it is not
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the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence

all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors7 of law that may have been committed by the lower
court.

________________

6 Remalante v. Tibe, G.R. No. 59514, 25 February 1988, 158 SCRA 138,
citing Chan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-27488, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 737.
7 Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez, No. L-16394, 17 December 1966, 18
SCRA 973.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioners insist that their petition raises a question of

law, that is, the correctness of the appellate court’s ruling
that one who has an existing passageway, however
inconvenient that passageway may be, is no longer entitled
to an easement of right of way.
We do not agree. Questions of law are those that do not
call for any examination of the probative
8
value of the
evidence presented by the parties. In the instant case,
petitioners’ assignment of errors would have this Court go
over the facts because it necessarily entails an examination
of the evidence and its subsequent re-evaluation to
determine whether petitioners indeed have no sufficient
outlet to the highway.
Petitioners next claim that the findings of the appellate
court are based on misapprehension of facts, which
circumstance warrants a review of the appellate court’s
decision. Yet, they failed to sufficiently demonstrate this
allegation in their pleadings. Absent a clear showing that
the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand.
At any rate, even assuming that the first assignment of
error may be properly raised before this Court, we find no
reversible error in the assailed decision. To be entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
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proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way

claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the
9
dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. The burden of proving

________________

8 Uniland Resources v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.

95909, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 751, 755.
9 Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 63996, 15
September 1989, 177 SCRA 527, 533.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

the existence of these

10
prerequisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent.
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an
outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the
left side of petitioners’ property and which is connected to a
private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is
about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate, hence petitioners have no
cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to
Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to
prove that the easement they seek to impose on private
respondents’ property is to be established at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is
only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of
the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private
respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their
property, considering that its already small area will be
reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even
render the property useless for the purpose for which
private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and
when considered with reference to the obligations imposed
on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal
restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and
is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient
estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the
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dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing

evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his
claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet,
petitioners allege that the path walk is much longer,
circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one
has to pass by Ma.

________________

10 Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 25

January 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 340.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

Elena St., turn right to a private road, then enter a vacant

lot, and turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until
one reaches petitioners’ property.
We find petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet”
a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that
in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of
way there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial,
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it
can be satisfied without 11
imposing the easement, the same
should not be imposed. 12
Thus, in Ramos v. Gatchalian, this Court disallowed
the easement prayed for—even if petitioner therein “had to
pass through lots belonging to other owners, as temporary
ingress and egress, which lots were grassy, cogonal and
greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud”—because it
would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that
mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice
to serve as basis for the easement.
13
Also, in Floro v. Llenado, we refused to impose an
easement of right of way over petitioner’s property,
although private respondent’s alternative route was
admittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse several
rice lands and rice paddies belonging to different persons,
not to mention that said passage, as found by the trial
court, was impassable during rainy season.
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private
respondents’ property is the most convenient, being the
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shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue.

However, it is not enough that the easement be where the
way is shortest. It is more important that it be where it will
cause the least preju-

________________

11 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Vol. II, 1992 Ed., pp. 387-388.
12 G.R. No. 75905, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 703.
13 G.R. No. 75723, 2 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713.

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Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals

14
dice to the servient estate. As discussed elsewhere,
petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the
proposed right of way shall be at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate.
The second assignment of error was likewise properly
rejected by the appellate court. Primarily, the issue of
legality or illegality of the conversion of the road lot in
question
15
has long been laid to rest in LRC Case No. Q-
1614 which declared with finality the legality of the
segregation of the subdivision survey plan of the disputed
road lot. Consequently, it is now too late for petitioners to
question the validity of the conversion of the road lot.
Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the
requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are properly
cognizable by the National Housing Authority (NHA), now
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
16
Board (HLURB),
pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 and not by the regular
courts. Under17
the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is vested upon an
administrative body, no resort to the courts may be made
before such administrative body shall have acted upon the
matter.
WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED. The 16 January
1996 Decision and the 14 June 1996 Resolution of the
Court of

________________

14 See Quimen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331, 29 May 1996.

15 See Note 3 and Annex “I”; Rollo, pp. 56-58.
16 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.”
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Sec. 22. No owner shall change or alter roads, open spaces,

infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision
developments as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority
and the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners
association, or in the absence of the latter, by the majority of the lot
buyers in the subdivision.
17 Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74223, 27 November
1990, 191 SCRA 687.

133

VOL. 291, JUNE 22, 1998 133

People vs. Tumaob, Jr.

Appeals denying reconsideration thereof are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and

Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

——o0o——

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