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PNB Vs CFI of Rizal

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RULE 13: FILING

G.R. NO. 63201               May 27, 1992

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, 


vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG — BRANCH XXI, PRESIDED BY JUDGE
GREGORIO G. PINEDA, CHUNG SIONG PEK @ BONIFACIO CHUNG SIONG PEK AND VICTORIA
CHING GENG TY @ VICTORIA CHENG GENG TY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL,
PASIG, METRO MANILA AND/OR HIS DEPUTIES AND AGENTS, Respondents.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65

DOCTRINE: Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee but if he fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster,
service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.

FACTS:

1. Private respondents were the registered owners of three parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila.
2. They leased these lands to Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., which was an organized and
incorporated entity with a corporate term of 25 years. Latter intended to use it as a site for its
factory.The lease was duly annotated at the back of the certificates of title of the lands.
3. The contract of lease provides that the term of the lease is for 20 years beginning from the date of
the contract and is extendable for another term of twenty years at the option of the lessee should
its term of existence be extended in accordance with the law. It was also agreed that the lessee
can use the property as factory site and for that purpose construct any building or improvement
which may be necessary. It was also agreed that such buildings and improvements must be
removed before the termination of the contract.
4. PBM then introduced on the land, buildings, machineries and other improvements. These were
duly annotated at the back of the titles to the lands.
5. Thereafter, PBM executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner PNB, conveying and
transferring all its rights and interests under the contract of lease in consideration of the loans
granted by PNB to PBM.
6. PBM also executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB for a loan of P100,000 and an
addendum to real estate mortgage for another loan of P1,590,000, covering ALL the
improvements constructed by PBM on the leased properties. These were also duly annotated at
the back of the titles.
7. PBM filed a petition for registration of improvements in the titles of the real property owned by the
respondents.
8. Respondents filed a motion to cancel the annotations on their certificates of title pertatining to the
assignment by PBM to PNB of the former's leasehold rights, inclusion of improvements and the
real estate mortgages made by PBM in favor of PNB, on the ground that the contract of lease
entered into between PBM and respondents-movants had already expired by the failure of PBM
and/or its assignee to exercise the option to renew the second 20-year lease and also by the
failure of PBM to extend its corporate existence in accordance with law. The motion also states
that since PBM failed to remove its improvements on the leased premises before the expiration of
the contract of lease, such improvements shall accrue to respondents as owners of the land.
CFI: ISSUED an order on April 22, 1982 directing the CANCELLATION of the inscriptions on the
respondents’ certificates of title.

Petitioner PNB filed an MR but was denied on June 28, 1982.

On August 25, 1982, private respondents filed a motion for entry of final judgment and issuance of a writ
of execution of the order.

On September 14, 1982, respondent court granted the aforesaid motion for entry of final judgment and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to cancel the entries on respondents' certificates of title
stated in the order.

Petitioner PNB filed an omnibus motion to set aside the entry of judgment as ordered by the respondent
court on the ground that it has no prior notice or knowledge of the order of respondent court dated June
28, 1982 which denied its motion for reconsideration of the order and that while there was a certification
from the Bureau of Posts that three registry notices were sent to petitioner's counsel, there was no
allegation or certification whatsoever that said notices were actually received by the addressee.

CFI: DENIED the omnibus motion.

ISSUE: WON the CFI acted capriciously and arbitrarily when it granted the entry of final judgment
and ordered the cancellation of entries on the certificates of title, despite the fact that there was
no certification that the registry notices were actually received by PNB.

Petitioner argues that it had no notice of knowledge that the order denying its motion for reconsideration
was issued. It also argued that the notices of registered mail allegedly containing the said order were not
received by the petitioner’s counsel and that the certification of the Bureau of Posts refers only to the fact
that registry notices were sent, and not to the fact that the notices were actually received by the
addressee.

HELD: NO.

CFI of Rizal did not act capriciously and arbitrarily when it granted the entry of final judgment and ordered
the cancellation of entries on the certificates of title.

Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within
five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of
such time. The fair and just application of that exception depends upon the conclusive proof that the first
notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The best evidence of that fact would be the
certification from the postmaster.

In the instant case, the respondent court found that the postmaster's certification stated that three (3)
notices of the registered mail which contained the order of June 28, 1982 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of April 22, 1982, were sent to petitioner PNB's counsel at Escolta, Manila
which is the address stated in the record of the case. The factual findings of the trial court bear great
weight and is binding upon this Court. Hence, as between the denial of the petitioners' counsel that he
received the notice of the registered mail and the postmaster's certification that said notices were sent to
him, the postmaster's claim should prevail. The postmaster has the official duty to send notices of
registered mail and the presumption is that official duty was regularly performed.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of respondent court dated April 22,
1982, September 14, 1982 and January 12, 1983 are AFFIRMED.
RESOLUTION NO. 2000-263

BE IT RESOLVED, x x x to approve the application of Mr. Obiedo of ARE Square Realty


Development Corporation for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC) for a First
Class Memorial Park x x x.

RESOLUTION NO. 2000-354

BE IT RESOLVED, x x x to approve the application for Development Permit (DP) of Mr. Obiedo x
x x to develop the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park, subject to the following conditions and
compliance of all existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations and further
favorably endorsing the same to the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) for
appropriate action.

ORDINANCE NO. 2000-059

x x x SECTION 3. – the operation and maintenance of the private memorial park-type cemetery
established pursuant to this Ordinance shall be subject to the provisions of the cemetery law
and/or other pertinent laws as well as rules and regulations promulgated or as may be
promulgated by the Municipal Board x x x.

9. Respondents filed a MTD for lack of jurisdiction.

RTC: DISMISSED the petition. RTC found that prayer of petitioners was premature as the questioned
resolutions and ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the way for the endorsement of the
application of the private respondent to the HLURB. It recognized that the HLURB is the entity which will
decide whether the application of the private respondent will be granted or not.

CA: AFFIRMED in toto the RTC. Indeed, the doctrine of administrative remedies requires that resort be
first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry
out their functions and discharge their liabilities within the specialized areas of their competence. Clearly,
the filing of the petition for declaratory relief with the trial court had no basis, as there can be no issue ripe
for judicial determination when the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the
HLURB.

ISSUE/S: W/N THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER IN THIS CASE

HELD: NO.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity
of the provisions in an instrument or statute.
It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be
an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted on
private respondent’s application with finality. What appears therefrom is that the application of private
respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the HLURB for appropriate action, the latter
being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.

WHEREFORE, the April 21, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its August 9, 2006 Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.

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