RP v. Herbieto Crim Pro
RP v. Herbieto Crim Pro
RP v. Herbieto Crim Pro
CASE NO. 13
REPUBLIC V. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari (under Rule 45), seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Judgment of the MTC - Consolacion, Cebu granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.
RESPONDENTS: The Herbieto brothers filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of
located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject
Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan. Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents, among others: CENRO
Certificate finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable; Deed of Definite Sale executed by spouses
Herbieto selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein.
REPUBLIC: filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1)
Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.
MTC: set the initial hearing (3 Sept. 1999), all owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the
Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the Notice (27 July 1999) was also posted in a conspicuous place on the Subject
Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette (02 August 1999) and The Freeman Banat News
(19 December 1999).
MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of the subject lots; issued an
Order declaring its Judgment final and executor and directing the Administrator of the LRA to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots. REPUBLIC: appealed the MTC Judgment to the CA.
CA: affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning: there can be no question that the land sought to be registered
has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. It is undisputed that herein
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since 1950. The subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report
may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137,
appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529
which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law.
REPUBLIC: filed this petition, arguing: (1) respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier; (2) it is implicit in the provisions of PD 1529 that the application for registration of title to land shall
be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While
an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same
applicant or applicants and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with
or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did
not acquire jurisdiction over it.
ISSUES:
NO. The MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but
for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed
with respondents' application for registration. Respondents filed a single application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject
Lots.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a
single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC
constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction.
1b. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration
Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.Although the misjoinder of causes
of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC, SC has discovered a defect in the
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the land through publication and service of notice. Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires
that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and
ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots
was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial
hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no
publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed
to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof.
Therefore, the MTC Judgment & Order are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
2.. NO. Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial
confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and
disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
through judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in this case (not PD 1529 as
explained below), Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the
date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very
apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially
confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the CA was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were
claiming title to the Subject Lots under the PD 1529. CA overlooked the difference between the PD 1529 and the Public
Land Act. Under the PD, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim
an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. The Subject Lots
respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may
have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
Note: Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith."