Railway Applications Katalog25214
Railway Applications Katalog25214
Railway Applications Katalog25214
Safety-Related Controller
HIMatrix
for
Railway Applications
Contact
HIMA contact details:
HIMA Paul Hildebrandt GmbH + Co KG
P.O. Box 1261
68777 Brhl, Germany
Phone: +49 6202 709-0
Fax: +49 6202 709-107
E-mail: info@hima.com
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 7
1.1 Structure and Use of the Document 7
1.2 Validity and Current Version 8
1.3 Target Audience 8
1.4 Formatting Conventions 9
1.4.1 Safety Notes 9
1.4.2 Operating Tips 10
2 Usage Notes 11
2.1 Intended Use 11
2.1.1 Scope 11
2.1.1.1 De-Energize to Trip Principle 11
2.1.1.2 Energize to Trip Principle 11
2.1.2 Non-Intended Use 11
2.2 Test Conditions 12
2.2.1 Climatic Requirements 12
2.2.2 Mechanical Requirements 13
2.2.3 EMC Requirements 13
2.2.4 Power Supply 14
2.2.5 ESD Protective Measures 14
2.3 Additional Test Conditions for Railway Applications 15
2.3.1 Climatic Requirements 15
2.3.1.1 Derating of Digital Outputs 15
2.3.2 Mechanical Requirements 16
2.3.3 EMC Requirements 16
2.3.4 Demanding Requirements 17
2.4 Tasks and Responsibilities of the Operator and the Machine and System
Manufacturers 18
2.5 Additional System Documentation 18
3 Safety Concept for Using the PES 19
3.1 Safety and Availability 19
3.1.1 Calculating the THR Values 19
3.1.2 Self-Test and Fault Diagnosis 19
3.1.3 PADT 20
3.1.4 Structuring Safety Systems in Accordance with the Energize to Trip Principle 20
3.1.4.1 Detection of Failed System Components 20
3.1.4.2 Safety Function in Accordance with the Energized to Trip Principle 20
3.2 Time Parameters Important for Safety 21
3.2.1 Fault Tolerance Time 21
3.2.2 Safety Time 21
3.2.3 User Program Safety Time 21
3.2.4 Response Time 21
3.2.5 Processor System Watchdog Time 22
4 Central Functions 25
4.1 Power Supply Units 25
4.2 Functional Description of the Central Part 25
4.3 Self-Tests 26
4.3.1 Microprocessor Test 26
4.3.2 Memory Areas Test 26
4.3.3 Protected Memory Areas 26
4.3.4 RAM Test 26
4.3.5 Watchdog test 26
4.3.6 Test of the I/O Bus Inside the Controller 27
4.3.7 Reactions to Processor System Failures 27
4.4 Fault Diagnosis 27
5 Inputs 28
5.1 General 28
5.2 Safety of Sensors, Encoders and Transmitters 29
5.3 Safety-Related Digital Inputs 29
5.3.1 General 29
5.3.2 Test Routines 29
5.3.3 Reaction in the Event of a Fault 29
5.3.3.1 CPU OS V7 and Higher 29
5.3.3.2 CPU OS up to V6.x 29
5.3.4 Surges on Digital Inputs 30
5.3.5 Configurable Digital Inputs 30
5.3.6 Line Control 31
5.4 Safety-Related Analog Inputs (F35, F3 AIO 8/4 01 and F60) 32
5.4.1 Test Routines 34
5.4.2 Reaction in the Event of a Fault 34
5.4.2.1 CPU OS V7 and Higher 34
5.4.2.2 CPU OS up to V6.x 34
5.5 Safety-Related Counters (F35 and F60) 35
5.5.1 General 35
5.5.2 Reaction in the Event of a Fault 35
9 Configuring Communication 63
9.1 Standard Protocols 63
9.2 Safety-Related Protocol (safeethernet) 63
9.2.1 ReceiveTMO 64
9.2.2 Response Time 65
9.2.3 Maximum Cycle Time of the HIMatrix Controller 66
9.2.4 Calculating the Worst Case Reaction Time 66
9.2.5 Calculating the Worst Case Reaction Time with two Remote I/Os 67
9.2.6 Terms 67
9.2.7 Assigning safeethernet Addresses 68
Appendix 69
Glossary 69
Index of Figures 70
Index of Tables 71
Index 72
1 Introduction
This manual contains information on how to operate the HIMatrix safety-related automation
devices in the intended manner.
The following conditions must be met to install and start up the HIMatrix automation systems,
and to ensure safety during their operation and maintenance:
Knowledge of regulations.
Proper technical implementation of the safety instructions detailed in this manual performed
by qualified personnel.
HIMA will not be held liable for severe personal injuries, damage to property or the environment
caused by any of the following:
Unqualified personnel working on or with the devices.
De-activation or bypass of safety functions.
Failure to comply with the instructions detailed in this manual.
HIMA develops, manufactures and tests the HIMatrix automation systems in compliance with
the pertinent safety standards and regulations. The use of the devices is only allowed if the
following conditions are met:
They are only used for the intended applications.
They are only operated under the specified environmental conditions.
They are only operated in connection with the approved external devices.
To provide a clearer exposition, this manual does not specify all details of all versions of the
HIMatrix automation devices. Refer to the corresponding manuals for further details.
This manual usually refers to compact controllers and remote I/Os as devices, and to the plug-
i in cards of a modular controller as modules.
Modules is also the term used in SILworX.
This manual distinguishes between the following variants of the HIMatrix system:
Programming tool Hardware Processor operating Communication
system operating system
SILworX F*03 CPU OS V8 and higher COM OS V13 and higher
SILworX Standard CPU OS V7 and higher COM OS V12 and higher
ELOP II Factory Standard CPU OS up to V6.x COM OS up to V11.x
Table 1: HIMatrix System Variants
Projects created with ELOP II Factory cannot be edited with SILworX, and vice versa!
i
SIGNAL WORD
Type and source of risk!
Consequences arising from non-observance
Risk prevention
NOTE
Type and source of damage!
Damage prevention
2 Usage Notes
All safety information, notes and instructions specified in this manual must be strictly observed.
The product may only be used if all guidelines and safety instructions are adhered to.
2.1.1 Scope
The safety-related HIMatrix controllers can be used in applications up to SIL 4 in accordance
with EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129.
The HIMatrix systems are certified for use in process controllers, protective systems, burner
systems, and machine controllers.
When implementing safety-related communications between the various devices, ensure that
the system's overall response time does not exceed the fault tolerance time. All calculations
must be performed in accordance with the rules given in Chapter 9.
Only devices with safe electrical isolation may be connected to the communications interfaces.
2.1.1.1 De-Energize to Trip Principle
The automation devices have been designed in accordance with the de-energize to trip
principle.
A system that operates in accordance with the de-energize to trip principle does not require any
power to perform its safety function.
If a fault occurs, the de-energized state is the safe state adopted by the input and output
signals.
2.1.1.2 Energize to Trip Principle
The HIMatrix controllers can be used in applications that operate in accordance with the
energize to trip principle.
A system operating in accordance with the energize to trip principle requires power (such as
electrical or pneumatic power) to perform its safety function.
When designing the controller system, the requirements specified in the application standards
must be taken into account. For instance, line diagnosis for the inputs and outputs or messages
reporting a triggered safety function may be required.
When using the safety-related HIMatrix control systems, the following general requirements
must be met:
Requirement type Requirement content
Protection class Protection class III in accordance with IEC/EN 61131-2
Pollution Pollution degree II in accordance with IEC/EN 61131-2
Altitude < 2000 m
Housing Standard: IP20
If required by the relevant application standards (e.g., EN 60204,
EN ISO 13849-1), the device must be installed in an enclosure of the
specified protection class (e.g., IP54).
Table 3: General Requirements
NOTE
Electrostatic discharge can damage the electronic components within the HIMatrix
systems!
When performing the work, make sure that the workspace is free of static, and wear
an ESD wrist strap.
If not used, ensure that the modules are protected from electrostatic discharge, e.g.,
by storing them in their packaging.
The HIMatrix variants for railway applications have been developed to meet the following
additional standards for EMC, climatic and environmental requirements.
The devices and modules listed in Table 9 were mechanically tested in accordance with
EN 50155 and are suitable for use on rolling stocks. Testing was performed in accordance with
EN 61373, Category 1, Class B.
The devices and modules specified in Table 9 were successfully tested and met the EMC
requirements in accordance with EN 50121-4 and EN 50121-3-2.
2.4 Tasks and Responsibilities of the Operator and the Machine and System
Manufacturers
The operator and the machine and system manufacturers are responsible for ensuring that
HIMatrix systems are safely operated in automated systems and plants.
The machine and system manufacturers must sufficiently validate that the HIMatrix systems
were properly programmed.
For more details on the devices and modules, refer to the corresponding manuals.
The latest manuals can be downloaded from the HIMA website at www.hima.com. The revision
index on the footer can be used to compare the current version of existing manuals with the
Internet edition.
WARNING
Physical injury caused by safety-related automation systems improperly connected or
programmed.
Check all connections and test the entire system before starting up!
If faults are detected during the tests, the operating system switches off the defective device,
module or faulty I/O channel.
In non-redundant systems, this means that sub-functions or even the entire PES will shut down.
All HIMatrix devices and modules are equipped with LEDs to indicate that faults have been
detected. This allows the user to quickly diagnose faults in a device or the external wiring, if a
fault is reported.
Further, the user program can also be used to evaluate various system variables or system
signals that report the device or module status.
An extensive diagnostic record of the system's behavior and detected faults are stored in the
diagnostic memory of the controllers. After a system fault, the recorded data can be read using
the PADT.
For more details on how to evaluate the diagnostic messages, refer to the Manual for Compact
Systems (HI 800 141 E), or to the Manual for the Modular System F60 (HI 800 191 E), Chapter
Diagnosis.
For a very few number of component failures that do not affect safety, the HIMatrix system does
not provide any diagnostic information.
3.1.3 PADT
Using the PADT, the user creates the program and configures the controller. The safety concept
of the PADT supports the user in the proper implementation of the control task. The PADT takes
numerous measures to check the entered information.
The PADT is a personal computer installed with the programming tool.
For the HIMatrix system, two programming tools are available depending on the operating
system version loaded on the controller:
SILworX must be used for CPU OS V7 and higher.
ELOP II Factory must be used for CPU OS up to V6.x.
3.1.4 Structuring Safety Systems in Accordance with the Energize to Trip Principle
Safety systems operating in accordance with the energize to trip principle have the following
functions:
1. The safe state of a device is the de-energized state. This state is adopted, for instance, if a
fault has occurred in the device.
2. The controller can trigger the safety function on demand by switching on an actuator.
3.1.4.1 Detection of Failed System Components
Thanks to the automatic diagnostic function, the safety system is able to detect that devices
have failed.
3.1.4.2 Safety Function in Accordance with the Energized to Trip Principle
The safety function is performed when the safety system energizes one or several actuators,
thus ensuring that the safe state is adopted.
The user must plan the following actions:
Line monitoring (short-circuits and open-circuits) within input and output devices.
These must be configured accordingly.
The actuators' operation can be monitored through a position feedback.
With F*03 devices or modules, a user program cycle can include multiple processor system
cycles. The response time for such user programs must be increased accordingly, see below.
Further, the switching times of the inputs and outputs must be taken into account when
determining the worst case for the overall system.
The response time tResponse is composed of the following elements:
tResponse = tInput + tIn communication + 2*tWDT + tOut communication + tOutput
Determine the safety time and the watchdog time for the system to be controlled.
i
3.3.2 Programming
Personnel developing user programs must observe the following safety requirements.
3.3.2.1 Product-Independent Requirements
In safety-related applications, ensure that the safety-relevant system parameters are
properly configured. The safety manual describes the possible configurations (see
Chapter 7.4.
In particular, this applies to the system configuration, maximum cycle time and safety time
(see Chapter 3.2).
3.3.2.2 Product-Dependent Requirements - CPU OS V7 and Higher
Requirements for using the programming tool:
SILworX must be used for programming.
Once the application has been created, compile the program twice and compare the two
resulting configuration CRCs to ensure that the program was compiled properly.
The proper implementation of the application specification must be validated and verified. A
complete test of the logic must be performed by trial.
The system response to faults in the fail-safe input and output modules must be defined in
the user program in accordance with the system-specific safety-related conditions.
A feature of the SILworX programming tool shows which changes have been performed to
the user program or system configuration. The analysis of the changes (change impact
analysis IA) must define the required test scope. This impact analysis must take the
expected changes based on the performed modifications, the result of the SILworX
comparison feature and the required regression tests into account
3.3.2.3 Product-Dependent Requirements - CPU OS up to V6.x
Requirements for using the programming tool:
ELOP II Factory must be used for programming.
Once the application has been created, compile the program twice and compare the two
resulting configuration CRCs to ensure that the program was compiled properly.
The proper implementation of the application specification must be validated and verified. A
complete test of the logic must be performed by trial.
The system response to faults in the fail-safe input and output modules must be defined in
the user program in accordance with the system-specific safety-related conditions.
3.3.3 Communication
When implementing safety-related communications between various devices, ensure that
the overall response time does not exceed the fault tolerance time. All calculations must be
performed in accordance with the rules given in 9.2.
Data must be transferred over closed transmission systems (Category 1) in accordance with
EN 50159.
Open transmission systems (Category 2 and Category 3) in accordance with EN 50159 may
be used, if additional measures are taken to guarantee that the transmission channel is
secure (e.g., firewalls or encryption).
At this stage, the serial interfaces may only be used for non-safety-related purposes.
All devices to be connected to the communication interfaces must be equipped with safe
electrical separation.
4 Central Functions
The devices of type F1.., F2.., F3.. are compact systems that cannot be modified.
The controllers of type F60 are modular systems that, when combined with a power supply
module and a processor module, may be used with up to 6 I/O modules.
4.3 Self-Tests
The self-test facilities detect individual faults that may lead to a safety-critical operating state
and trigger, within the safety time of the controller, predefined fault reactions which bring the
faulty components into a safe state.
The following section specifies the most important self-test routines of safety-related processor
systems.
5 Inputs
Overview of the HIMatrix system inputs:
Device Type Number Safety-related Interference- Electrically
free separated
Compact systems
F20 Digital 8 1)
F30 Digital 20 1)
F35 Digital 24 1)
24-bit counter 2 1)
Analog 8 1)
F1 DI 16 01 Digital 16 1)
F3 DIO 8/8 01 Digital 8 1)
F3 DIO 16/8 01 Digital 16 1)
F3 AIO 8/4 01 Analog 8 1)
F3 DIO 20/8 02 Digital 20 1)
Modular system F60
DIO 24/16 01 Digital 24
DI 32 01 Digital 32
(configurable for
line control)
DI 24 01 (110 V) Digital 24
CIO 2/4 01 24-bit counter 2
AI 8 01 Analog 8
MI 24 01 Analog or 24
digital
1)
Ground L-
Table 17: Overview of the Inputs
5.1 General
Safety-related inputs can be used for both safety-related signals and non-safety-related signals.
The controllers provide status and fault information as follows:
Through the diagnostic LEDs on the devices and modules.
Using system signals or system variables that the user program is able to evaluate.
Storing messages in the diagnostic memory that can be read by the PADT.
Safety-related input modules automatically perform high-quality, cyclic self-tests during
operation. These test routines are TV tested and monitor the safe functioning of the
corresponding module.
For a few number of component failures that do not affect safety, no diagnostic information is
provided.
5.3.1 General
The digital inputs are read once per cycle and saved internally; cyclic tests are performed to
ensure their safe functioning.
Input signals that are present for a time shorter than the time between two samplings, i.e.,
shorter than a cycle time, may not be detected.
The measures specified above are not necessary if the plant design precludes surges from
i occurring within the system.
In particular, the design must include protective measures with respect to overvoltage,
lightning, earth grounding and plant wiring in accordance with the relevant standards and the
manufacturer's specifications.
The controller pulses the digital outputs to detect the line short-circuits and open-circuits on the
lines connected to the digital inputs. To do so, configure the Value [BOOL] -> system variable in
SILworX or the DO[01].Value system signal in ELOP II Factory. The variables for the pulsed
outputs must begin with channel 1 and reside in direct sequence, one after the other. See the
section about system variables or system signals in the corresponding manuals.
T1
T2
Configurable 5...2000 s
The safety-related accuracy is the guaranteed accuracy of the analog input without device or
module fault reaction. This value must be taken into account when configuring the safety
functions.
The value range for the inputs depend on the device or module:
F35 controller
Input Measuring Current, Range of values in the application Safety-related
channels method voltage FS1000 1) FS2000 1) accuracy
8 Unipolar 0...+10 V 01000 02000 2%
8 Unipolar 020 mA 0500 2) 01000 2) 2%
3)
01000 02000 3)
1)
can be configured by selecting the type in the PADT
2)
with external 250 shunt adapter, part no.: 98 2220059
3)
with external 500 shunt adapter, part no.: 98 2220067
Table 19: Analog Inputs of the F35 Controller
F60 controller
Input Measuring Current, Range of values in the application Safety-related
channels method voltage FS1000 1) FS2000 1) accuracy
AI 8 01
8 Unipolar -10+10 V -10001000 -20002000 1%
8 Unipolar 020 mA 01000 3) 02000 3) 1%
8 Unipolar 020 mA 0500 2) 01000 2) 4%
4 Bipolar -10+10 V -10001000 -20002000 1%
MI 24 01
Unipolar 020 mA 02000 4) 1%
1)
can be configured by selecting the type in the PADT (F60)
2)
with external 250 shunt adapter, part no.: 00 0710251
3)
with external 500 shunt adapter, part no.: 00 0603501 (accuracy 0.05%, P 1 W)
4)
internal shunts
Table 21: Analog Inputs of the F60 Controller
The AI 8 01 module of the HIMatrix F60 can be configured in the user program for 8 unipolar or
4 bipolar functions. However, it is not allowed to combine functions on a module.
The analog inputs of the F35 controller, the F3 AIO 8/4 01 remote I/O and the AI 8 01 module
operate with voltage measurement. With the analog inputs of the HIMatrix F35 and
F3 AIO 8/4 01, digital outputs of the own system (F35) or of other HIMatrix controllers can be
monitored to detect open-circuits. Further information is available in the manuals of the
corresponding HIMatrix controllers.
If an open-circuit occurs (the line is not monitored by the system), any input signals is processed
on the high-resistance inputs. The value resulting from this fluctuating input voltage is not
reliable; with voltage inputs, the channels must be terminated with a 10 k resistor. The internal
resistance of the source must be taken into account.
To measure currents, the shunt is connected in parallel to an input; in doing so the 10 k
resistor is not required.
The inputs of the MI 24 01 module are only current inputs, because of the internal shunts, and
cannot be used as voltage inputs.
If input channels are not used, the measurement input must be connected to the ground. If an
open circuit occurs, negative influences (fluctuating input voltages) on other channels can thus
be avoided.
Operating system version Procedure
CPU OS V7 and higher It is sufficient not to assign unused inputs global variables.
CPU OS up to V6.x For the unused input channel, set the corresponding signal
AI[0x].Used to the default value FALSE or 0 in ELOP II Hardware
Management. In doing so, the channel is masked out in the user
program, i.e., no signals of this channel are available within the
logic.
Table 22: Configuration of Unused Inputs
5.5.1 General
A counter channel can be configured for operation as a high-speed up or down counter with
24-bit resolution or as a decoder in Gray code.
If used as high-speed up or down counters, the pulse input and count direction input signals are
required in the application. The counter is only reset in the user program.
The CIO 2/4 01 counter module of the F60 has 4-bit or 8-bit encoder resolution, whereas the
F35 has a 3-bit or 6-bit encoder resolution. A reset is possible.
2 independent 4-bit inputs may only be connected to an 8-bit input (example of F60) using the
user program. No switching option is planned for this purpose.
The encoder function monitors the change of the bit pattern on the input channels. The bit
patterns on the inputs are directly transferred to the user program. They are represented in the
PADT as decimal numbers corresponding to the bit pattern (Counter[0x].Value).
Depending on the application, this number (which corresponds to the Gray code bit pattern) can
be converted into, for example, the corresponding decimal value.
6 Outputs
Overview of the HIMatrix system outputs:
Device Type Number Safety- Electrically
related separated
Compact systems
F20 Digital 8 1)
Pulse 4 - 1)
F30 (configurable for line control) Digital 8 1)
F35 Digital 8 - 1)
F1 DI 16 01 Pulse 4 1)
F2 DO 4 01 Digital 4 1)
F2 DO 8 01 Digital 8
F2 DO 16 01 Digital 16 1)
F2 DO 16 02 Relay 16
F3 DIO 8/8 01 Digital 1-pole 8 1)
Digital 2-pole 2
F3 DIO 16/8 01 Digital 1-pole 16 1)
Digital 2-pole 8
F3 AIO 8/4 01 Analog 4 - 1)
F3 DIO 20/8 02 Digital 8 1)
(configurable for line control)
Modular System F60
DIO 24/16 01 Digital 16
(configurable for line control)
DO 8 01 (110 V) Relay 8
CIO 2/4 01 Digital 4
AO 8 01 Analog 8
1)
Ground L-
Table 24: Overview of the Outputs
6.1 General
The controller writes to the safety-related outputs once per cycle, reads back the output signals
and compares them with the specified output data.
The safe state of the outputs is the 0 value or an open relay contact.
The safety-related output channels are equipped with three testable switches connected in
series. Thus, a second independent shutdown function, which is a safety requirement, is
integrated into the output module. If a fault occurs, this integrated safety shutdown function
safely de-energizes all channels of the defective output module (de-energized state).
The CPU watchdog signal is the second way to perform a safety shutdown: If the watchdog
signal is lost, the safe state is immediately adopted.
This function is only effective for all digital outputs and relay outputs of the controller.
The error code allows the user to configure additional fault reactions in the user program.
The system monitors its operating voltage and de-energizes all outputs at a undervoltage of
< 13 V.
NOTE
Malfunctions of the connected actuators are possible!
Pulsed outputs must not be used as safety-related outputs (e.g., for activating safety-
related actuators)!
The system monitors its operating voltage and de-energizes all outputs at a undervoltage of less
than 13 V.
With a 2-pole connection, observe the following notes:
If the requirements previously described cannot be met, observe the following case:
i If a short-circuit occurs between DO- and L-, a relay may be energized or some other actuator
may be set to a different switching state.
Reason: During the monitoring time specified for line diagnosis, a 24 V level (DO+ output) is
present on the load (relay, switching actuator) allowing it to receive enough electrical power to
potentially switch to another state.
The monitoring time must be configured such that an actuator cannot be activated by the line
diagnosis test pulse.
The system monitors its operating voltage and de-energizes all outputs at a undervoltage of less
than 13 V.
With the DO 8 01 module and the F2 DO 8 01 and F2 DO 16 02 remote I/Os, the outputs are
equipped with three safety relays:
Two relays with forcibly guided contacts.
One standard relay.
This enables the outputs to be used for safety shutdowns.
NOTE
Module malfunctions are possible!
Prior to inserting the module into the system, check the following:
Module's DIP switch settings.
Module configuration in the user program.
Depending on the device type selected (...FS1000, ...FS2000) during configuration, multiple
values must be taken into account in the logic for the output signals to obtain identical output
values (see the AO 8 01 Manual HI 800 195 E, Chapter Signals and Error Codes for the
Outputs).
Each group of two analog outputs are galvanically connected:
Outputs 1 and 2.
Outputs 3 and 4.
Outputs 5 and 6.
Outputs 7 and 8.
The analog output circuits have current or voltage monitoring, read back and test channels
(even for parallel output circuits), as well as two additional safety switches for the safe
disconnection of the output circuits in the event of a fault. This ensures that the safe state is
achieved (current output: 0 mA, voltage output: 0 V).
6.7 Analog Outputs with Safety-Related Shut-Down (F3 AIO 8/4 01)
The remote I/O writes to the analog outputs once per cycle and saves the values internally.
All the outputs are non-safety-related, but all together they can be shut down safely.
To achieve SIL 4, the output values must be read back via safety-related analog inputs and
evaluated in the user program. Reactions to incorrect output values must also be specified in
the user program.
The operating system is loaded into the controller's central unit (CPU) and must be used in the
current version certified by TV for safety-related applications.
The programming tool serves for creating the user program with the application-specific
functions that should be performed by the automation device. The programming tool is also
used to configure and operate the operating system functions.
The code generator integrated in the programming tool translates the user program into a
machine code. The programming tool uses the Ethernet interface to transfer this machine code
to the flash EPROM of the automation device.
Perform a comprehensive functional test when starting up a safety-related controller for the first
i time or after modifying the user program.
Create a project archive.
WARNING
Physical injury possible due to defective configuration!
Neither the programming tool nor the controller can verify certain project-specific
parameters. For this reason, enter these parameters correctly and verify the whole entry.
These parameters are:
System ID
Rack ID, refer to the system manuals (HI 800 141 E and HI 800 191 E).
Safety Time
Watchdog Time
Allow Online Settings (prior to SILworX V5: Main Enable)
Autostart
Start Allowed
Load Allowed
Reload Allowed
Global Forcing Allowed
The following parameters are defined in the programming tool for actions permitted during the
automation device's safety-related operation and are referred to as safety-related parameters.
Parameters that may be defined for safety-related operation are not firmly bound to any specific
requirement classes. Instead, each of these must be agreed upon together with the responsible
test authority for each separate implementation of the controller.
The following table describes the effect of Target Cycle Time Mode.
Target Cycle Effect on user programs Effect on reload of processor modules
Time Mode
Fixed The PES maintains the target cycle time Reload is not processed if the target cycle
and extends the cycle if necessary. If the time is not sufficient.
processing time of the user programs
exceeds the target cycle time, the cycle
duration is increased.
Fixed-tolerant Such as Fixed. At most, the duration of every fourth cycle is
increased to allow reload.
Dynamic- Such as Dynamic. At most, the duration of every fourth cycle is
tolerant increased to allow reload.
Dynamic HIMatrix maintains the target cycle time as Reload is not processed if the target cycle
well as possible and also executes the cycle time is not sufficient.
as quickly as possible.
Table 26: Effect of Target Cycle Time Mode
Global variables can be connected to these system variables; the value of the global variables is
modified using a physical input or the user program logic.
Example: A key switch is connected to a digital input. The digital input is assigned to a global
variable associated with the system variable Read only in Run. The owner of a key can thus
activate or deactivate the operating actions Stop, Start and Download.
All requirements about protection against manipulation specified in the safety and application
standards must be met. The operator is responsible for authorizing employees and
implementing the required protective actions.
NOTE
Only authorized personnel may be granted access to the HIMatrix controller!
Take the following measures to ensure protection against unauthorized changes to the
controller:
Change the default settings for user name and password!
Users must keep their passwords secret.
Upon completion of the start-up phase, disconnect the PADT from the controller and
only connect it again if changes are necessary.
PES data can only be accessed if the PADT in use is operating with the current version of the
programming tool and the user project is available in the currently running version (archive
maintenance!).
The connection between PADT and PES is only required for downloading the user program or
reading the variables or signals. The PADT is not required during normal operation.
Disconnecting the PADT and PES during normal operation protects against unauthorized
access
The I/O concept of the system must include an analysis of the field circuits, i.e., the type of
external components:
External components (field devices)
- Input signals during normal operation (de-energize-to-trip principle with digital field
devices)
- Input signals in the event of a fault:
- Definition of required safety-related redundancies (1oo2, 2oo3)
- Discrepancy monitoring and reaction
- Positioning and activation during normal operation
- Safe reaction/positioning at shutdown or after power loss
Two essential advantages results from using symbolic names instead of physical addresses:
The system denominations of inputs and outputs can be used in the user program.
The modification of how the signals are assigned to the input and output channels does not
affect the user program.
Signals do not refer in this manual to optical, acoustic or photometric signals such as used in
i railway systems.
8.2 Procedures
This chapter describes the procedures typically used for developing the user programs for
safety-related HIMatrix controllers.
CPU OS up to V6.x
Proceed as follows to assign the value of a variable to an I/O channel:
The locking and unlocking functions are only available with controllers and the F3 DIO 20/8 01
i remote I/O, but not with the remaining remote I/Os!
If all three system variables are ON: no access to the controller is possible. In this case, the
controller can only adopt the STOP/VALID CONFIGURATION state after a restart. Then loading
a new user program is possible.
Example for using these system variables:
2. After loading and starting, change the switches in the online controller following the specified
order:
Start/Restart Allowed for OFF
Load Allowed for OFF
Main Enable for OFF
The following switches may only be set to different values after receiving consent from the test
i authority:
Forcing Allowed for ON
Stop at Force Timeout for ON / OFF
Start/Restart Allowed for ON
Autostart for ON
Unlocking procedure - To be able to unlock the controller (Main Enable set to ON), the
controller must be in STOP. Main Enable cannot be activated while the controller is operating
(RUN state), but it can be deactivated.
To allow a restart after the CPU initialization (e.g., after voltage drops), proceed as follows when
unlocking the PES:
The system monitors that the user program is loaded completely. Afterwards, the user program
can be started, i.e., the routine begins to be processed in cycles.
HIMA recommends backing up project data, e.g., on a removable medium, after loading a user
i program into the controller.
This is done to ensure that the project data corresponding to the configuration loaded into the
controller remains available even if the PADT fails.
HIMA recommends a data back up on a regular basis also independently from the program
load.
Take the following point into account when reloading step chains:
i The reload information for step sequences does not take the current sequence status into
account. The step sequence can be accordingly changed and set to an undefined state by
performing a reload.
The user is responsible for this action.
Examples:
Deleting the active step. As a result, no step of the step chain has the active state.
Renaming the initial step while another step is active.
As a result, a step chain has two active steps!
8.2.6 Forcing
Forcing is the procedure by which a variable's current value is replaced with a force value. The
variable receives its current value from a physical input, communication or a logic operation. If
the variable is forced, its value does no longer depend on the process, but is defined by the
user.
WARNING
Use of forced values can disrupt the safety integrity!
Forced value may lead to incorrect output values.
Forcing prolongates the cycle time. This can cause the watchdog time to be
exceeded.
Forcing is only permitted after receiving consent from the test authority responsible for
the final system acceptance test.
When forcing values, the person in charge must take further technical and organizational
measures to ensure that the process is sufficiently monitored in terms of safety. HIMA
recommends to setting a time limit for the forcing procedure.
Refer to the System Manual for compact systems (HI 800 141 E) and for modular systems
(HI 800 191 E) for more details on forcing.
8.2.7 Changing the System Parameters during Operation - CPU OS V7 and Higher
Some system parameters or switches may be changed during operation (online). An application
case is the temporary increase of the watchdog time to be able to perform a reload.
Parameters that can only be modified online
Parameter Hardware Operating system version
System ID All All
Safety Time All All
Resource Watchdog Time All All
Target Cycle Time All CPU OS V8 and higher
Target Cycle Time Mode F*03 CPU OS V8 and higher
Allow Online Settings All CPU OS V8 and higher
Main Enable Default CPU OS prior to V8
Autostart All All
Start Allowed All All
Load Allowed All All
Reload Allowed F*03 CPU OS V8 and higher
Global Forcing Allowed All All
Global Force Timeout Reaction All All
Table 32: Online Changeable Parameters
Prior to using an online command to set parameters, make sure that this change will not result
in a safety-critical state. If required, organizational and/or technical measures must be taken to
prevent the accident from occurring.
Allow Online Settings or Main Enable allows one to change the remaining parameters. Allow
Online Settings or Main Enable can be set to TRUE in the STOP state.
The safety time and watchdog time values must be checked and compared to the safety time
required by the application and to the actual cycle time. These values cannot be verified by the
PES!
With F*03 devices or modules, system parameters may also be changed during operation by
performing a reload.
This documentation is required for the acceptance test of a system subjected to approval by a
test authority (e.g., TV). This acceptance test only applies to the user functionality, but not to
the safety-related modules and automation devices of the HIMatrix system that have already
been approved.
A user program cycle can take multiple processor cycles. This can be controlled with the
resource and user program parameters. SILworX uses these parameters to calculate the user
program watchdog time:
Watchdog timeuser program = watchdog timeprocessor module * maximum number of cycles
Usually, the individual user programs operate interference-free and independently to one
another. However, reciprocal influence can be caused by:
Use of the same global variables in several user programs.
Unpredictably long runtimes can occur in individual user programs if a limit is not configured
with Max Duration for Each Cycle.
The distribution of user program cycle over processor module cycles strongly affects the
user program response time and the response time of the variables written by the user
program!
A user program evaluates global variables written by another user program up to the number
of processor system cycles that was defined for the program with the Program's Maximum
Number of CPU Cycles system parameter. In the worst case, the following sequence is
possible:
- Program A writes global variables needed by program B.
- Program A stops its cycle in the same processor system cycle in which program B starts
its cycle.
- Program B is only able to read the values written by program A when its next cycle starts.
- The duration of the cycle just started by program B can be Program's Maximum Number
of CPU Cycles. Only at this point, program B adopts the values written by program A.
- It may take further Program's Maximum Number of CPU Cycles cycles of the processor
system until B reacts to these values!
NOTE
Reciprocal influence of user programs is possible!
The use of the same global variables in several user programs can lead to a variety of
consequences caused by the reciprocal influence among the user programs.
Carefully plan the use of the same global variables in several user programs.
Use the cross-references in SILworX to check the use of global data. Global data may
only be assigned values by one entity, either within a user program, from safety-
related inputs or through safety-related communication protocols!
The user is responsible to exclude any potential operation interferences due to
reciprocal influence of user programs!
Refer to the System Manual Compact Systems (HI 800 141 E) or the System Manual Modular
System F60 (HI 800 191 E) for details about multitasking.
9 Configuring Communication
In addition to using the physical input and output variables, variables can also be exchanged
with other system through a data connection. In this case, the variables of the corresponding
resource are declared in the Protocols Editor of the programming tool.
This data exchange can occur in either read-only or read/write mode.
CAUTION
Physical injury due to usage of unsafe import data
Do not use data imported from unsafe sources for the user program's safety functions.
Depending on the controller variant, the following standard protocols are available:
SNTP
Send/Receive TCP
Modbus (master/slave)
PROFIBUS DP (master/slave)
The Use Initial Data setting may only be used for safety-related functions implemented via
safeethernet.
NOTE
Unintentional transition to the safe state possible!
ReceiveTMO is a safety-related parameter!
If all values must be transferred, the value of a signal must either be present for longer than
ReceiveTMO or it must be monitored using a loop back.
9.2.1 ReceiveTMO
ReceiveTMO is the monitoring time in milliseconds (ms) within which a correct response from
the communication partner must be received.
If a correct response is not received from the communication partner within ReceiveTMO,
safety-related communication is terminated. The input variables of this safeethernet connection
react in accordance with the preset parameter Freeze Data on Lost Connection [ms].
The Use Initial Data setting may only be used for safety-related functions implemented via
safeethernet.
Since ReceiveTMO is a safety-relevant component of the Worst Case Reaction Time TR (see
Chapter 9.2.3 et seqq.), its value must be determined as described below and entered in the
safeethernet Editor.
NOTE
The maximum value permitted for ReceiveTMO depends on the application process and
is configured in the safeethernet Editor, along with the expected maximum response
time and the profile.
If this condition is met, the loss of at least one data packet can be intercepted without
interrupting the peer-to-peer connection.
If this condition is not met, the availability of a safeethernet connection can only be ensured in
i a collision and fault-free network. However, this is not a safety problem for the processor
module!
Make sure that the communication system complies with the configured response time!
i If this conditions cannot always be ensured, a corresponding connection system variable for
monitoring the response time is available. If more than on occasion the measured response
time exceeds the ReceiveTMO by more than a half, the configured response time must be
increased.
The receive timeout must be adjusted according to the new value configured for response time.
NOTE
In the following examples, the formulas for calculating the worst case reaction time only
apply for a connection with HIMatrix controllers if the parameter
safety time = 2 * watchdog time
has been set in the systems.
Input Controller 2
Controller 1 Output
Safety-Related Protocol
TR = t1 + t2 + t3
TR Worst case reaction time
t1 2 watchdog time of controller 1.
t2 ReceiveTMO
t3 2 watchdog time of controller 2
The TR time value is displayed in the Worst Case column of the peer-to-peer Editor.
The maximum worst case reaction time depends on the process and must be agreed upon
together with the responsible test authority.
9.2.5 Calculating the Worst Case Reaction Time with two Remote I/Os
The worst case reaction time TR is the time between a change in a field component input signal
(in) of the first remote I/O module and the reaction on the corresponding output (out) of the
second remote I/O module. It can be calculated as follows:
TR = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5
TR Worst case reaction time
t1 2 watchdog time of remote I/O 1
t2 ReceiveTMO1
t3 2 watchdog time of the controller
t4 ReceiveTMO2
t5 2 watchdog time of remote I/O 2
Note: The time values still apply if a HIMatrix controller is used instead of a remote I/O module.
9.2.6 Terms
ReceiveTMO Monitoring time of controller 1 within which a correct response from
controller 2 must be received. Once the time has expired, safety-
related communication is terminated.
ReceiveTMO1 Remote I/O 1 controller
ReceiveTMO2 Controller remote I/O 2
Watchdog time Maximum permissible duration of a PES RUN cycle (cycle time).
Worst case The worst case reaction time is the time between a change in a
physical input (in) signal of controller 1 and a reaction in the
corresponding output (out) of controller 2.
The operator is responsible for ensuring that the Ethernet used for peer-to-peer communication
i is sufficiently protected against manipulations (e.g., from hackers).
The type and extent of the measures must be agreed upon together with the responsible test
authority.
Appendix
Glossary
Term Description
ARP Address resolution protocol: Network protocol for assigning the network addresses to
hardware addresses
AI Analog input
AO Analog output
COM Communication module
CRC Cyclic redundancy check
DI Digital input
DO Digital output
ELOP II Factory Programming tool for HIMatrix systems
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
EN European norm
ESD Electrostatic discharge
FB Fieldbus
FBD Function block diagrams
FTT Fault tolerance time
ICMP Internet control message protocol: Network protocol for status or error messages
IEC International electrotechnical commission
MAC address Media access control address: Hardware address of one network connection
PADT Programming and debugging tool (in accordance with IEC 61131-3),
PC with SILworX or ELOP II Factory
PE Protective earth
PELV Protective extra low voltage
PES Programmable electronic system
R Read: The system variable or signal provides value, e.g., to the user program
Rack ID Base plate identification (number)
Interference-free Supposing that two input circuits are connected to the same source (e.g., a
transmitter). An input circuit is termed interference-free if it does not distort the signals
of the other input circuit.
R/W Read/Write (column title for system variable/signal type)
SELV Safety extra low voltage
SFF Safe failure fraction, portion of faults that can be safely controlled
SIL Safety integrity level (in accordance with IEC 61508)
SILworX Programming tool for HIMatrix systems
SNTP Simple network time protocol (RFC 1769)
SRS System.rack.slot addressing of a module
SW Software
TMO Timeout
W Write: System variable/signal is provided with value, e.g., from the user program
rPP Peak-to-peak value of a total AC component
Watchdog (WD) Time monitoring for modules or programs. If the watchdog time is exceeded, the
module or program enters the ERROR STOP state.
WDT Watchdog time
Index of Figures
Figure 1: Function Blocks of the F60 CPU 03 25
Figure 2: Line Control 31
Figure 3: Pulsed Signal T1, T2 31
Figure 4: Reaction Time with Interconnection of Two HIMatrix Controllers 66
Figure 5: Reaction Time with Remote I/Os 67
Index of Tables
Table 1: HIMatrix System Variants 8
Table 2: Standards for EMC, Climatic and Environmental Requirements 12
Table 3: General Requirements 12
Table 4: Climatic Requirements 12
Table 5: Mechanical Tests 13
Table 6: Interference Immunity Tests 13
Table 7: Noise Emission Tests 13
Table 8: Verification of the DC Supply Characteristics 14
Table 9: HIMatrix Variants Available for Railway Applications 15
Table 10: Climatic Requirements with HIMatrix Variants for Railway Applications 15
Table 11: Mechanical Requirements with HIMatrix Variants for Signaling 16
Table 12: EMC Requirements with HIMatrix Variants for Signaling 16
Table 13: EMC Requirements with HIMatrix Variants for Rolling Stocks 17
Table 14: Additional Valid Manuals 18
Table 15: Range of Values for the Safety Time 21
Table 16: Range of Values for the Watchdog Time 22
Table 17: Overview of the Inputs 28
Table 18: Value of Safety-Related Analog Inputs 32
Table 19: Analog Inputs of the F35 Controller 32
Table 20: Analog Inputs of the F3 AIO 8/4 01 Remote I/O 32
Table 21: Analog Inputs of the F60 Controller 33
Table 22: Configuration of Unused Inputs 33
Table 23: Error Codes with Counter Inputs 35
Table 24: Overview of the Outputs 37
Table 25: System Parameters of the Resource - CPU OS V7 and Higher 48
Table 26: Effect of Target Cycle Time Mode 49
Table 27: Hardware System Variables - CPU OS V7 and Higher 50
Table 28: Resource Parameter - CPU OS up to V6.x 51
Table 29: Length for the Name of the Variable 54
Table 30: System Variables for Locking and Unlocking the PES 56
Table 31: Number of User Programs in a PES 58
Table 32: Online Changeable Parameters 60
Index
de-energize to trip principle.........................11 operating requirements
energize to trip principle..............................11 climatic.................................................... 12
fault reaction EMC........................................................ 13
analog outputs...................................41, 42 ESD protection........................................ 14
relay outputs............................................40 mechanical.............................................. 13
fault reactions power supply........................................... 14
2-pole digital outputs ...............................40 safety time .................................................. 21
analog inputs ...........................................34 test conditions ............................................ 12
counter inputs..........................................35 to lock the controller - CPU OS up to V6.x . 57
digital inputs ............................................29 to make a controller lockable - CPU OS V7
digital outputs ..........................................38 and higher............................................... 56
fault torerance time .....................................21 to unlock the controller - CPU OS up to V6.x
functional test of the controller ....................44 ................................................................ 57
Hardware Editor ..........................................50 watchdog time ............................................ 22
Multitasking .................................................61 user program .......................................... 22