Transboundary Water Management

The Uruguay River Basin (URB) that extends along Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay has been the hub of increasing pressures caused by the expansion of industrial agriculture, forestry and infrastructure projects in hydroenergy and transportation. There are growing concerns that the
fragmented institutional framework is inadequate to address the growing challenges. Interdisciplinary research networks can contribute to creating perspectives of the basin that are policy and governance relevant. In this paper, we set out to interrogate the potential scope of interdisciplinary research networks (IRNs) for the advancement of basin governance framework for the URB. We envision IRNs as knowledge actors that can open up opportunities to mediate and connect basin actors across different spaces – academic, policy, technical-administrative and social. We highlight a series of pathways to advance networks actions in creating opportunities to fill the gaps of transboundary basin governance, and acknowledge the challenges associated with doing this work in the URB and other basins around the world

In South America, water is at its heart, underpinning hydropower generation, agricultural production and industry. Transboundary water bodies cover almost half of South America territory. All countries in the region share transboundary waters, such as aquifers, basins and rivers that may create enough reason for political conflict among those countries. Therefore, there is a vital need to develop regional strategies to manage those shared water resources, especially with the continuous increase in population growth, climate change and the increase in demand for water. This chapter takes the La Plata basin and the Guarani Aquifer in South America as a representative example to discuss the management of transboundary water bodies situation and demonstrates how the countries are collaborating to face the challenge to achieve sustainable development on both sides of their borders.

Flood modelling and mapping typically entail flood frequency estimation, hydrodynamic modelling and inundation mapping, which require specific datasets that are often unavailable in developing regions due to financial, logistical, technical and organizational challenges. This review discusses fluvial (river) flood modelling and mapping processes and outlines the data requirements of these techniques. This paper explores how open-access remotely sensed and other geospatial datasets can supplement ground-based data and high-resolution commercial satellite imagery in data sparse regions of developing countries. The merits, demerits and uncertainties associated with the application of these datasets, including radar altimetry, digital elevation models, optical and radar images, are discussed. Nigeria, located within the Niger river basin of West Africa is a typical data-sparse country, and it is used as a case study in this review to evaluate the significance of open-access datasets for local and transboundary flood analysis. Hence, this review highlights the vital contribution that open access remotely sensed data can make to flood modelling and mapping and to support flood management strategies in developing regions.

The author argues in this paper that, in spite of the past performance and the lack of a permanent agreement among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris System, there is hope and reason for optimism for a mutually beneficial framework.
The paper starts with a brief historical account of riparian relations in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin and the efforts by external parties to mediate. The difficulties encountered are categorized in a broader perspective in the bilateral and multilateral relations of the riparian countries. Existing setting and recent developments are explained and potential modalities are elaborated. The paper concludes by describing a new, unofficial initiative of riparian scholars and professionals emphasizing the value of civil society involvement in the process.
Official mechanisms, or Track 1 avenue, include early talks among the riparians that eventually led to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee to discuss the issues regarding the flows in this river system. This Committee held 16 meetings until the First Gulf War and has not met since then. Although Track 1 efforts did not produce a permanent solution to the issue, they provided a channel for communication and offered a basis when the political climate would be opportune.
The ‘hydronationality’ in the riparian countries that can be ignited over relatively insignificant events also played a negative role.
The interdependence of water issues to broader problem areas and the failure to either resolve the latter or isolate the former delayed the discussion of alternatives with a potential of mutually acceptability. A lack of contact on water related issues ‘froze’ the positions of the parties and prevented new paradigms from being agenda items for consideration. These include benefit-sharing arrangements and cooperation around mutually acceptable broader frameworks, such as regional social and economic development.
In spite of an unfavorable setting for cooperation, the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris System have managed to stay away from violent conflict over water and have kept one another relatively informed.
The current conjuncture in the region also presents opportunities that can work for a renewed and improved dialogue over water and water related issues.
The author argues that once the ‘zero-sum’ nature of the current framework is properly recognized, Track 1 avenue could progress more smoothly than it has in the past. Both regional development at large, and benefits from water can be uniting as all of the riparian countries do need social and economic development which can bring about synergy, economies of scale, and external financing if and when planned, implemented and managed in a cooperative or joint manner.
Track 2 initiatives and other developments can substantially help enhance mutual understanding and dialogue, as well as help riparians see the broader picture and multi-faceted benefits that do not correspond to the zero-sum nature of water-sharing. These can potentially benefit from the recent progress in Turkish-Syrian relations and the developments in Iraq and the imminent return of Iraq to the international community as a fully functioning state.
The objective, program, and the activities of a recently established riparian Track 2 initiative, ETIC, or the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation, of which the author is a founder, are described in the final section. The initiative is unlike other, earlier unofficial initiatives in that it comes from inside the basin, does not focus on water, and is not prescriptive. It has, in its first year of existence, already catalyzed tri-lateral gatherings of unofficial nature, conducted multi-riparian training programs, and established linkages in the riparian countries of the basin. ETIC has benefited from partnership with UNESCO and cooperation protocols are pending with international and U.N. organizations.

It has become a commonplace comment that the 20th century was about oil, while the 21st will be about water. As a complex and increasingly scarce resource, transboundary waters are both source of tensions and chance for enhanced cooperation among shareholding actors within a river basin. Decreasing water availability, compounded by the rising demands in areas which lack international cooperation on shared waters, is likely to increase tensions further.
Consequently, Water Diplomacy is on the rise to find measures to foster cooperation on, and joint management of common waters. Third-party actors such as the UN, NGOs and national organisations play a crucial role in enhancing technical abilities of local actors, and in promoting transboundary cooperation and coordination by supporting the establishment of joint international platforms: River Basin Organisations(RBOs).
This paper analyses the role of the European Union (EU) as a new emerging actor in the field of international Water Diplomacy. Since the Council declaration in July 2013, it has developed concrete strategies to foster transboundary water management in its priority areas: The Nile Basin and Central Asia, but also in the Lower Mekong region. Furthermore, the EU is supporting water related programs in the Sahel region and the Middle East. The EU strategy builds on the engagement and expertise of its member states, which the EU is closely cooperating with. Strategies and actions in EU Water Diplomacy are guided by UN-principles and its own experiences from European RBOs. Thus, the EU adopts the approach of the international community, calling for basin-wide organisation and collaboration to accompany international cooperation. The responsibility for establishing a functional framework among the shareholding parties of common waters rests in the hands of the riparian states, while third-party actors such as the EU aims to engage and enable local actors to overcome tensions over shared waters and collaborate.

Aside from the issues peace and stability, one of Afghanistan's most vital needs is safe and reliable supplies of water. But Afghanistan faces certain economic, political, institutional problems to develop water resources potential. These problems will increase as the years go by.

In 2015, the United Nations (UN) adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 6.5, which calls for the implementation of integrated water management through cooperation among transboundary states. In 2016, the UN began the task of identifying the metrics to monitor the implementation of SDG 6.5. Almost 50 percent of the world’s land surface (excluding Antarctica) is within a transboundary river basin (TFDD, 2016). Major population centres are dependent on shared waters for domestic, agricultural, and industrial uses. Water is central to sustainable development, making transboundary cooperation on water a core aspect of the SDGs. Under Target 6.5, SDG Indicator 6.5.2 is the “Proportion of transboundary basin area within an operational arrangement for water cooperation”. This indicator presents challenges in how to monitor and use the results. How transboundary area, operational and arrangement are defined can lead to significant variability in the measurement of transboundary cooperation, the reporting of results and, ultimately, the influence this indicator could play in supporting sustainable development. This GWP TEC Background Paper aims to provide guidance on SDG Indicator 6.5.2 as monitoring and implementation plans are being developed. To do this, we examine how operational arrangements can be defined by evaluating three methods for calculating the indicator through both a procedural and a substantive perspective, and identifying the limitations and advantages. The three methods are based on three alternative ways of defining an operational arrangement.
The first method, Method 1, is the UN-Water proposed methodology for SDG Indicator 6.5.2. In Method 1, operational is defined by four criteria: existence of a joint body, regular communication, a joint management plan, and regular data and information exchange (UN-Water, 2016b). Method 2 defines operational using the same set of criteria, but also defines levels of operational cooperation. For an arrangement to be operational, only one of the criteria needs to be satisfied; the more criteria fulfilled the higher the level of operational cooperation occurring in the transboundary area (Sindico, 2016). The final method, Method 3, establishes a typology of cooperation adapted from the GWP TEC Background Paper: Promoting Effective Water Management Cooperation among Riparians by D. Tarlock (GWP, 2015), where operationality is determined by substantive outcomes of cooperation. The three methods are demonstrated through three case studies: Bangladesh, Honduras, and Uganda.

The three methods have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. The criteria for defining operational in Method 1 and Method 2 are based on provisions in international water law; however, they are procedural and normative. The binary nature of Method 1 – either operational or not – masks cooperation that is occurring, but does not meet all four criteria. Method 3’s alternative perspective allows for flexibility in acknowledging cooperative efforts that fit within place-based scenarios and meet socio-political needs; however, the categorical results do not meet the format for the data needed for global monitoring of the SDGs.

Through the demonstration and comparison of these three methods we present several recommendations and guidance in the hope of aiding better monitoring, understanding, and use of the SDG Indicator 6.5.2. In summary, the proposed methodology presented in Method 1 is the most appropriate for calculating the indicator when conducting global-scale monitoring, particularly if clarification in definitions for arrangement, operational, and transboundary areas are included. For local-scale monitoring, we recommend supplementing Method 1 with Method 3 to better reflect context-specific and alternative cooperative efforts that are occurring within a basin or aquifer.

Unpredictable and unsustainable access to water is a rapidly growing problem and one of the world’s greatest risks. We must learn to manage water more wisely, fairly and sustainably to avoid global crisis.
There are 310 transboundary river basins world-wide, home to 40 % of the global population. Establishing effective cooperation on the worlds’ shared basins is vital for securing a peaceful, sus-trainable and equitable future.
Transboundary waters are a pivotal but underappreciated issue in global politics. Water management in many transboundary basins is highly politicized and has a considerable impact on conflict prevention, regional stability, environmental peace-making and international governance. Therefore, transboundary water governance is a domain that should elicit great interest in the foreign policy community.
As consequence, the use and allocation of water in transboundary basins is both a source of tension and an opportunity to promote cooperative practice-es and build collaborative institutions.
The extent to which these conflict risks can be managed and the significant cooperative opportune-ties that can be realized will depend on the level of political engagement demonstrated by both the be-sin countries and the international community.
We need to focus on create mutually beneficial and integrated regional development projects
It is time to offer advice to the wider water community on how Water Diplomacy can be used as a trust building and conflict mitigation tool in sup-port of broader regional cooperation and develop-mint.
One of the main points to focus is discussing how shared water resources could be an entry point for dialogue among riparian states.

We need to put innovative Hydro-Diplomacy into action. It requires paradigm shift from classical hydro diplomacy and try to focus on how to create;
• Shared Vision
• Shared Goal
• Unity of Effort among riparian states.
We need to focus on create mutually beneficial and integrated regional development projects.
We can see innovative alternatives in sight if we are really willing to find them.

Gas-politics and Hydro-politics in 21st century have been incorporated into Petro-politics which defined the policies in the cold war period. That state highlights the Hydro-geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
First and foremost, step to render regional stability sustainable is building confidence, and implementing policies which are to ratchet up international co-operation and interdependency.
Single country oriented management of water resources does not solve the problems of the transboundary water resource management in the South Caucasus region. It needs an innovative water-politics at the basin level can address the environmental and social-economic development needs in the region.
The region’s economic, political, and security dynamics are closely tied to its hydropolitics. The Kura-Aras River Basin is the largest in the South Caucasus, and its water resources underpin the development of all sectors of the economy. Freshwater shortages are characteristic of the South Caucasus. Additionally, the quality of water in the Kura and Aras Rivers is low due to pollution. A significant lack of trust and technical know-how in the region, as well as an asymmetry in resources available for environmental protection, are main obstacles to cooperation.
We wish that this report would contribute to regional peace and stability.
Respectfully 
  Executive Board of Hydropolitics Academy


Citation.YILDIZ.D.,2017 Transboundary Rivers and Water Diplomacy in the South Caucasus. Report No: 10 Hydropolitics Association Ankara-Turkey

This paper assesses five major transboundary-related problems currently troubling the Bengal region and bedeviling, in particular, the relationship between Bangladesh and India. These problems relate to settlement of the land boundary (enclaves and adverse possessions), facilitation of transboundary transit (road, rail, and waterway), curbing of transboundary illicit activity (smuggling, human trafficking, and covert support for radical Islamist groups and separatist militants), sharing of transboundary river resources, and control of transboundary migration. The paper’s focus is on the potential and capacity of the political entities sharing the Bengal region to identify, agree upon, and implement effective and sustainable solutions to these problems. It argues that such solutions, to be sustainable, would have to prioritize cross-border cooperation and mutual benefit—objectives that have thus far neither been aggressively nor consistently pursued in this region. The authors observe that the transboundary problems troubling the Bengal region vary substantially in the extent of their intractability and that some of them will persist far into the future. Nevertheless, they conclude that the present scale as well as the severity of the consequences of these problems are not permanent fixtures and will vary enormously with the political will, perseverance, and skill of those charged with determining the political destiny of this hugely important region.

The aim of this thesis is to explain the effects of water governance on policy effectiveness. Specifically, I propose the multi-­zoom steering concept as a tool to understand water governance. Besides, I propose the concept of public effectiveness as a tool to understand policy effectiveness. Moreover, the main research question is how water governance affects policy effectiveness. Or in other words; how multi-­zoom steering affects public effectiveness. Here, I posit to use big and operational concepts as synonyms. In addition, a clear advantage of the present research is the possibility to have public and dark sides to see through both lenses.
The present research strategy is based on the case study approach. I chose the Tijuana-­San Diego transboundary urban region as it is a paradigmatic case presenting the three conventional modes of water governance in one specific geographical region: water governance by hierarchies, by markets, and by networks, present in Tijuana, San Diego, and Tijuana-­San Diego, respectively. I chose in particularly, water supply and sanitation as the main issues to analyze. This is because it is one of the most pressuring water issues in these cities and also in the transboundary urban region of Tijuana-­San Diego.
The main findings of the present research are shown through 24 effects of water governance on policy effectiveness. Overall, those effects of water governance affect the policy effectiveness through delayed effects; whether public or dark ones. Public delayed effects are the product of collective intelligence, while dark delayed effects are the product of collective ignorance. In synthesis, this collective ignorance is the product of decision-making processes based on preconceptions and non-­professional mechanisms. Meanwhile, collective intelligence is the product of the evidence use; a system of knowledge management, institutionalized boards of directors and leaders who connect different organizations and projects in order to achieve inter-­organizational objectives.

The Water Cooperation Quotient was first introduced in a report released by Strategic Foresight Group in November 2013. This publication presents a refined version of it, which was created as a tool to measure intensity of cooperation in shared river basins.

As estimations and predictability of water supply in basins around the globe become difficult under a changing global climate, the need for new transboundary water management arises. To avoid international tensions related to water, traditional water agreements between states need to be transformed into more sophisticated and flexible
arrangements of water governance. Designing and implementing such arrangements is a huge challenge since they must involve multiple stakeholders, must take into consideration the accelerating global water scarcity, and are dependent on the risks and unknowns of global climate change. Following an exploration of the core literature on the topic and the theoretical underpinnings of how to govern future risks, this chapter takes a closer look at the status of three important transboundary basins: the Meuse, the Mekong, and the Teesta basin. These basins all experience water stress with riparian states at different stages of agreeing on transboundary institutions and institutional cooperation.

Unpredictable and unsustainable access to water is a rapidly growing problem and one of the world’s greatest risks. We must learn to manage water more wisely, fairly and sustainably to avoid global crisis.
There are 310 transboundary river basins world-wide, home to 40 % of the global population. Establishing effective cooperation on the worlds’ shared basins is vital for securing a peaceful, sus-trainable and equitable future.
Transboundary waters are a pivotal but underappreciated issue in global politics. Water management in many transboundary basins is highly politicized and has a considerable impact on conflict prevention, regional stability, environmental peace-making and international governance. Therefore, transboundary water governance is a domain that should elicit great interest in the foreign policy community.
As consequence, the use and allocation of water in transboundary basins is both a source of tension and an opportunity to promote cooperative practice-es and build collaborative institutions.
The extent to which these conflict risks can be managed and the significant cooperative opportune-ties that can be realized will depend on the level of political engagement demonstrated by both the be-sin countries and the international community.
We need to focus on create mutually beneficial and integrated regional development projects
It is time to offer advice to the wider water community on how Water Diplomacy can be used as a trust building and conflict mitigation tool in sup-port of broader regional cooperation and develop-mint.
One of the main points to focus is discussing how shared water resources could be an entry point for dialogue among riparian states.

We need to put innovative Hydro-Diplomacy into action. It requires paradigm shift from classical hydro diplomacy and try to focus on how to create;
• Shared Vision
• Shared Goal
• Unity of Effort among riparian states.
We need to focus on create mutually beneficial and integrated regional development projects.
We can see innovative alternatives in sight if we are really willing to find them.

This paper discusses how an upper riparian country can establish its water right of fulfilling own water needs through development of a transboundary river in a contested terrain of water management. Citing the case of the development of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and adoption of the Declaration of the Principles by the Eastern Nile Basin States, this paper highlights the major lessons that South Asia need to learn to achieve water security in the region through cooperation. This paper further argues that if, economically weak upstream riparian country, Ethiopia can initiate such an important and strategic project, then Nepal must also be in similar position to fulfill own demand without causing significant harm, rather benefiting the downstream countries. Like Egypt and Sudan, the lower riparian countries Bangladesh and more importantly India need to be in a position to acknowledge the downstream benefit principle. This paper states that without cooperation among riparian states of the Ganges basin, the sustainable development of the region seems limited.

Central Asia and Afghanistan are abundant in natural resources, including land, water, and energy. However, in the Amu Darya Basin, there is an imbalanced use of water resources between the different economic and livelihoods needs of all basin countries.

The major characteristics of the Amu Darya River include its transboundary nature, its division between hydropower use and irrigation use, and most importantly, the extent to which these two uses can be regulated. The lack of inclusive management and the lack of mutually agreed regulatory regimes of the Amu Darya Basin lead to challenges related to the balance of water usage between energy production and agriculture in the upstream and downstream of the Amu Darya Basin.

This policy brief reviews the major issues of balancing water usage in the Amu Darya Basin as well as the challenges to equitable water governance. It is the result of the collaborative work of the Amu Darya Basin Network.

W ubiegłym roku nakładem Wydawnictwa KEW ukazała się książka o Odrze, jakiej  od lat brakowało. Jest to pozycja wyjątkowa, która z wielu względów powinna zwrócić uwagę czytelników zainteresowanych „księżną polskich rzek”. Niestety, niewątpliwą wartość tej unikatowej publikacji obniżają błędy, których nie mogę pozostawić  bez komentarza.

Surface water access in northern Montana and southern Alberta is an historic political and economic concern that continues to spark contentious debate. It has however also led to several innovative attempts to reconcile differences through regional cooperation in management of transboundary rivers. One attempt—the formation of a Joint Initiative Team (JIT) in 2008 (to 2011) to investigate opportunities for each jurisdiction to improve shared water access of the St. Mary and Milk River systems—failed in its efforts to rescale the Alberta-Montana borderlands water management model. This paper explores this development, and adds to the literature by presenting a study evaluating the JIT’s attempt, and the factors leading to its demise. These lessons will be of interest to scholars interested in similar issues in other border areas.

The ―Arab Spring‖—a wave of pro-democracy demonstrations that began in Tunisia in late 2010 and swept across Libya and Egypt—finally reached Syria in early March 2011. The unrest resulted from a combination of socio-economic and political problems that had been building for years and that affect especially Syria‘s large rural population. One of the things that preceded the failure of the nation-state of Syria and the rise of ISIS have been considered the effect of climate change and the mega-drought that affected that region. However, four years after the conflict began, it has degenerated into a civil war with more than 200,000 deaths and about 4 million registered refugees. And it has put Syria at the center of nasty geopolitical struggles. In most evaluations of the Syrian civil war an future, the most neglected analysis is: How water resources will affect the ongoing civil war and how changing situation will affect hydropolitics relations between countries after the war. A far m...

Abstract
Current planetary rates of population growth and associated industrial, military and agricultural development already exceed what the natural environment, changing weather patterns and clean water supply can sustain (Stockholm Resilience Centre: Nine Planetary Boundaries). This is both a global and local (g/local) issue that requires critical and collaborative policy review. This paper examines transformations in water management and policy and how that has been understood and enacted in Australia within its own borders, as an intra and trans boundary issue. It also provokes questions and possibilities about how effective international collaboration might create new currents of sustainability logic for water, through engagement with a variety of actors from everyday citizens to policy makers and management. Understanding water as the vital component to all life is not a new thought in dry landscapes such as Australia (or Israel), but it is one that needs expanding through a biosocial resilience optic that addresses economic, environmental and socio-cultural values of water in more sustainable measure.
This research and practice is invested in exploring innovative and inclusive ways to enact water management that values water as something other than just a commodity with use and exchange value, and that invokes a new ‘water literacy’ (Hawke 2012). According to cross cultural collaborators Moggridge (2012) and Acret, Bragg and Gordon (2012) while water is a commodity, it is also an ancestor with tangible and intangible spiritual properties containing customary values. Indigenous Australia has an historical and current reverence for water that sustained Aborigines for 40,000 years. This is less obvious in Australia’s 200 year old ‘settler descended’ economy and western science that has seen Australia overdraw the water account through unsuitable agricultural practices. Recent reforms in policy and collaborative management to ensure waters flow and distributive sharing are now evident in some sectors of Australian policy. This paper offers further methods of re-thinking and collaborating on water policy reform at the intra and transboundary level, locally and globally.

Biographical Information
Dr Shé Hawke is a transdisciplinary scholar invested in necessary entanglements between disciplinary fields, elements and genres in her environmental, philosophical and poetic work. She currently teaches at the Australian National University in the School of Sociology and is an Honorary Associate in the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry at the University of Sydney. Her latest book Aquamorphia: Falling for Water (Interactive Press) appeared in 2014 and maps the genealogy of water from divine beginnings to present times. She is engaged in appreciating and re-mapping what and how water means across disciplines, and how inclusivity of cross cultural values, literacy and diplomacy towards a new sustainability logic might be actualized.

UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Mun pointed out extremely important and extraordinary points in his remark at Opening of the 7th World Water Forum held in Daegu, Gyeongbuk, The Republic of Korea in 12 April 2015. He said that; “Instead of seeing scarce water as a reason for competition or conflict, we have to treat it as a challenge to collaborate, a challenge to engage in innovative hydrodiplomacy. In today‟s world, we must be more aware of the risks of water conflict.” It is important to note the emphasis on “collaboration and innovative hydro-diplomacy” in his remarks. While speaking on the occasion of World Water Day 2013, the Secretary General had also said, “Water scarcity threatens economic and social gains ... And it is a potent fuel for wars and conflict.” Secretary General Ban Ki-moon‟s warnings were reflected in the offcial definition of water security provided by the United Nations UniversityIWEH, which says. “The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to a...

ABSTRACT Indicator 6.5.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals is defined as the ‘proportion of transboundary basin area with an operational arrangement for water cooperation’. While the establishment of such an indicator is most opportune and promising, its formulation and calculation raise technical, scientific and legal questions. This article primarily focuses on these legal issues. This manuscript assesses the indicator, addresses some of its key shortcomings, and offers a concrete and detailed proposal for an adjustment of its methodology and reporting mechanism, ahead of the 2020 revision of the SDG indicators by the Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators.

SUMMARY

Turkey has stopped filling the Ilisu dam on the Tigris River to help Iraq overcome water shortages, but it will resume filling the dam on July Turkey stated that once the filling starts again, water will still flow into Iraq in accordance with agreements between the two countries. Turkey had previously delayed the date to start filling the dam from March until June on Iraq's request. The Ilisu Dam is located on Tigris river and it is about 45 km from the Syrian-Turkish border. It will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) with a hydropower capacity of 1,200 MW, producing an expected 3,800 GWh/yr. With a planned height of 135 m, the dam will have a 10.4 BCM reservoir. The controversial Ilisu Dam Project has raised concerns among a wide range of stakeholders including the main Tigris riparians, local residents and international nongovernmental organizationsInternational consortium of export credit agencies were heavily criticized by several environmental and human rights groups to stop financial support to the Ilısu Dam.

A New International Hydro-diplomacy; need for a shift from water cooperation to collaboration in the fields of both 'Water and Energy' simultaneously. This article demonstrates why 'A New Hydro-diplomacy; from "cooperation" to "collaboration"in the fields of both 'Water and Energy' simultaneously is essential. It is also focused on why a new paradigm in transboundary hydro-political interactions in the 21 st Century is needed? The introduction of cooperation through both'Water and Energy'can change the nature of international relations from a zero-sum game based on resource grasps to a platform of mutually beneficial interrelations. This study analyses the possible implications of "collaboration" in the fields of both 'Water and Energy' simultaneously in water scarce but oil/gas rich areas aftermath of the new world order and new geopolitics. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a revised analytical approach for analysis of hydro-politics relations in light of the development of international collaboration in the areas of both Water and Energy issues in relationship with transboundary hydro-politics

Various critiques of transboundary natural resource governance in southern Africa have questioned the efficacy and social equity dimensions of prevailing strategies for protecting transnational ecosystems, highlighting the importance of sociological research on the potentially 'other-ing' impacts of mainstream conservation policy discourse. We draw on research in the Chimanimani Trans-Frontier Conservation Area (TFCA) on both sides of the Zim-babwe–Mozambique border, scrutinizing simplifications inherent in terms such as ''illegal foreigners'' that obfuscate histories and contemporary realities of cross-border social ties. Engaging perspectives of park authorities and chiefs as well as people who have taken up artisanal mining, we explore two related themes—how 'belonging' is negotiated as well as how conservation agendas are instrumentalized by state and non-state actors. Bringing attention to gaps between policy discourses surrounding TFCAs and territorialized practices of exclusion, the article concludes by calling for greater attention to the mutating significance of colonially established boundaries as well as the dynamic influences of social networks in borderland spaces.

Transboundary river basins of the World provide vital resources for nearly half of the world’s population. This assessment shows existing and increasing risks in the majority of these basins. But there are still many controversies about ideal policies to balance water allocation or sharing benefit. Therefore, it is still an important issue that transforming potential tensions into partnerships for regional development in potential water conflicted regions. The UN Security Council recently turned its attention to the relationship between water risks and conflict within and between countries4. The pressure on the resource is increasing, many transboundary streams are still left without frameworks for joint management. Climate variability also adds a new, complicating, dimension to these dynamics.
Past experiences showed that there is a significant paradigm shift need in transboundary rivers management from classical hydro diplomacy to an innovative one.
In this article, we aim to clarify that why we need a new strategy with new language to share, new approaches, methods, new mechanisms and innovative tools to apply? To put innovative water diplomacy into action.
Keywords: Water,Diplomacy,Innovation

Discussions over transboundary freshwater resources management have raged over the years with advocates of interstate cooperation expressing moderate optimism against those who claim conflict to be on the loop in the years to come. Water scarcity has been identified by many as a crucial factor capable of triggering interstate conflicts. However, history has revealed that convincing evidence linking water scarcity to interstate conflicts is missing. Despite numerous tensions concerning the management of transboundary river basins, there are no examples of direct and extended conflict related to scarcity. Nevertheless, future projections seem to be quite alarming. This
paper, based on a thorough literature review, aims to present the two sides of the discussion over water scarcity and transboundary freshwater management and the likelihood of cooperation versus conflict in the future.

To achieve flood protection in the Maritsa River Basin, Greece and Turkey have been forced to take preventative measures. However, these actions have been taken unilaterally making the Maritsa River Basin an example of poor international and transboundary water management. As a transboundary river, water development and management issues in the basin require regional collaboration between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.

Bangladesh and India share 54 transboundary rivers. Despite that, the transboundary water management between these two countries is heavily concentrated on the Ganges river basin, in which, mode of cooperation is still based on physical sharing of water. The study is developed on the argument that Bangladesh and India need a shift of focus in their current mode of transboundary water management from physical sharing of water to sharing of benefits derived from the use (and non-use) water in order to foster transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges river basin. Based on a single-case study, the research work aims to explore the scope of benefit-sharing in the transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges river basin and how benefit-sharing can be facilitated between these two countries. The findings show that the water negotiation in the Ganges basin would become much more complicated in the future, primarily due to the growing gap between the demand and the availability of water. The adverse impact of climate change will further deteriorate the situation. Besides, the changing nature of India’s domestic politics and the growing internal conflict between its provincial states will weaken the Indian central government’s authority to manage transboundary water resources jointly. Therefore, in the future, Bangladesh and India would find it difficult to elicit a positive-sum outcome from any water negotiation in Ganges river if they still focus on the volumetric allocation of water. The study suggests that inland navigation and water transit, multipurpose storage dam projects and joint management of the Sundarbans can be the potential areas for benefit-sharing in the Ganges basin. The study stresses the importance of shifting the policy outlook and developing institutional arrangements between Bangladesh and India to introduce and facilitate benefit-sharing in the Ganges river basin that will help to share benefits equitably, hence foster cooperation.

Iran has recently started a well-planned project, called Tropical Water Project (TWP), to build more dams, tunnels, and canals on the main tributaries of the Diyala River (Sirwan and Zmkan) to irrigate agricultural areas inside and outside the Diyala River basin. One task in the TWP project is diverting a large volume of the water flowing through the Sirwan and Zmkan rivers through a series of tunnels. The largest one, called Nowsud water conveyance tunnel, transports water from Hirwa dam to Azgala dam to irrigate millions of hectares of new agricultural areas extending from Kermanshah province in the AL Ahwaz province. This research aims to identify the different features and the size of this project as well as the extent of its impact on the Diyala River and Darbandikhan dam. From the results, it was found that the TWP project consists of 14 dams constructed on Sirwan and Zmkan rivers and their tributaries with a total storage capacity of 1.9 Milliard cubic meters and of about 150 km long tunnels to divert more than one Milliard m 3 of water to another basin. In addition, it has been found that after the full operation of the TWP project, the catchment area of Darbandikhan dam will lose 77% of its original one.

The Southwest coastal region of Bangladesh is located in the Ganges delta's central portion with the Sundarbans, between the inhabited and the Bay of Bengal. Around 405 rivers pass through the country, out of which 57 rivers are shared with other riparian countries and known as transboundary rivers. The upper riparian countries take their geographical advantage and construct obstacles, divert natural river flow or increase water usage from these sources. Another significant issue across all the riparian countries is that the centralized institutions follow a top-down method in the decision-making on transboundary water issues with almost no community participation. As the main rivers Kholpetua, Kalindi, Madar, Kopotakkho are interlinked with neighboring country India, the backwater flow effect of the Ganges river is one of the main reasons behind the low streamflow in the region. Transboundary river impacts, lack of good governance, salinity intrusion, deltaic sedimentation, and...