The Role of Hamas in Palestinian Politics

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Politics – October 2021 – In memory of Neal Matthew Sher 1947-2021
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Reflections on Last Newsletter

MESG Programme 2021-2022

Invitation: Online Book Launches at Reading and UCL

Jordan's King Abdullah reiterates support for two-state solution

Twitter blocked the accounts of far-right Israeli political activists

Israel Considers Holding Facebook Liable for Content

Israeli Police Recruits Hundreds of People to Police Arab Towns

Hamas rejects the idea of municipal elections

Israel has agreed to a $520 million deal to sell air defense systems to the Czech Republic

Israel Signs an Agreement to Double Water Supply to Jordan

Nominations for the 2022 Hedley Bull Prize in International Relations!

Short Article: “The Future of the Internet”, Academia Letters, Article 1962 (2021).

Short Article: “Israel as an Ethnic Democracy: Palestinian Citizens and the Fight for Equal Rights”, Berkley Forum (August 6, 2021).

Interview about my new book, Just, Reasonable Multinationalism

LSE Blog on Just, Reasonable Multinationalism

New Book: Sherrow O. Pinder (ed.), Black Political Thought: From David Walker to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

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This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

What is the relationship between Mizrahi feminism and Israeli ultranationalism? What is the relevance of gender justice activism to the 2014 Gaza War and Israel’s foreign policy?

Wrapped in the Flag of Israel Second Edition examines neoliberal bureaucracy in the Global South using feminist critical race theories. It interrogates the relationship between the State of Israel and its Mizrahi single mothers who are at the forefront of Mizrahi feminism. It also presents a model of bureaucracy as divine cosmology that preempts the agency of disenfranchised Mizrahim who are Israel’s demographic majority. Mizrahi protests fall flat when the Israel-Palestine conflict dominates the headlines. While most studies of neoliberal bureaucracy employ a Foucauldian or Marxian lens, this book illustrates how Israeli bureaucracy draws on a theological essence that fuses religion, gender, and race into the foundations of citizenship. It sets out to understand why Mizrahi mothers remain loyal to a state that injures them though its bureaucratic system.

The extensive Afterword to the Second Edition connects intra-Jewish racial and gendered dynamics to the 2014 Gaza War. It tracks sequences that began with social protest and ended with elections that bolstered Israel’s political right. In between came bloodletting between the IDF, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel’s neighboring Arab states. The 2014 Gaza War was a watershed, but not only in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Under the smokescreen of war, Israel accelerated neoliberal economic reform. The first victims of this restructuring were Mizrahi single mothers. Palestinians, however, would pay the highest price for Israel’s Mizrahi-Ashkenazi rift.

This article investigates the reasons behind the EU reservations and boycott towards the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas. It examines how the EU ‘talked security’, in terms of framing the overall Israeli-Palestinian conflict (IPC). In this context, of particular interest is the reason behind the, EU decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization (analysed in relation to the specific security construct). With regards to the EU multilateral dimension in the IPC, it is important to find out how the EU has worked (or has been forced/pushed by external actors) to form a security governance, as well as a multilateral strategy vis-à-vis Hamas, and what references have been made towards the multilateralism. Furthermore, this article explores the policies that have been created in relation to the EU securitization of the conflict, as well as the impact it had on the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This study examines the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ and the transition of ‘terrorist’ groups to political parties through the lens of conflict resolution.  The aim of this research is to establish why Van Engeland and Rudolph argue that Hamas has successfully transitioned from ‘terrorist’ group to political party according to their framework, when the environment Hamas is operating within as of 2013 is hostile and constrained.  I hypothesized that a factor is missing from the framework to account for this misrepresentation of Hamas’ current position.  Having identified the missing variable, recommendations could be made for Hamas’ continued forward momentum.  In order to find the missing element, I undertook a comprehensive methodology that included reapplying the framework, using two comparative case studies, and supplementing the entirety with additional literature on the subject.  Three significant factors that are not emphasized in Van Engeland and Rudolph’s framework are drawn out and examined in greater detail to see if their addition might provide a different result.  However, this process produced the same conclusion as Van Engeland and Rudolph, mainly that Hamas is an example of a successful transition.  The disconnect I was trying to pinpoint stems from external factors -  relating to economic instability sustained by global politics.    Hamas has moved along the transition process according to Van Engeland and Rudolph’s framework, but their current position is stalled due to the dynamics of current global politics.  These results suggest that such transitions can be helped or hindered by external pressure from global powers.  Additionally, special attention needs to be paid to ripe points in protracted conflicts in order to encourage transition from terrorist group to political party.  Finally, this study concludes that if moves away from violence and towards politics are not recognized and affirmed, a group may regress back towards tactics that garner the desired attention.

In this chapter we will examine the politics of Hamas in relation to its commitment to
the formula of Qur’anic Jihad.  The ideology of Hamas (1988) was a synthesis of pan
Arab Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism. Hamas emphasizes that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in reality, a struggle between Islam and Judaism. It is along
these lines that Article15 of the Hamas Charter states: “When our enemies usurp some
Islamic lands, Jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the
usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad.
This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all
local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic]
Umma, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of the Jihad fighters”.1 This view was
reinforced in a booklet distributed by Hamas in early 1990 which stated: “Our struggle
with the Jews is a struggle between truth and emptiness- between Islam and Judaism”.2

This article addresses two main questions. First, how have regional dynamics and domestic pathologies since 2010 affected (i.e., constrained or delimited) Palestinian reconciliation and rapprochement? Second, can the realist theory of international relations (IR) help us understand the differences or similarities observed in Hamas's and Fatah's preferences for reconciliation and rapprochement? Since the turn of the decade, dominant states in the Middle East have become reactive (and proactive) toward state and non-state actors; they have become inclined to react to power magnitude and forces of competition beyond their calculations and control. The differential reactions of both non-state actors, Fatah and Hamas, is due in substantial measure to marked differences in the windows of opportunity, and constraints on regional dynamics that have affected their policy preferences and strategies. This article concludes that the interplay of systemic and domestic factors has notably set the two rival movements on distinctly different trajectories of national unity. In this sense, both streams of realism (neorealism and neoclassical realism) seem appropriate as theoretical frameworks, albeit with different explanatory power/opportunities.

The mothers’ discourse is a reflection of the culture of martyrdom as present in modern Palestinian society. The armed groups that wage war foster this culture and actively infuse themes of martyrdom and religio-nationalist duty to the youths. When the mothers relay this culture via representation in the media, and when they teach it to their children, they are acting within a traditionally female role as a repository and transmitter of culture. These communicative roles are both public and private, yet they remain within a feminine sphere of involvement as they are reactionary in nature, and inseparable from the actions of the children. Within the roles adopted by the mothers of Palestine, they are positioned to reproduce the nation in both sexual reproduction and discourse reproduction. In this role, the mother is positioned as a dual reproducer—birthing both future fighters and the dominant narrative that serves to continue the intifada until nationhood is achieved

In our previous chapters we have analyzed the theory of jihad and its process of
evolution since the times of the Prophet Muhammad. In this chapter our aim is to analyze
the concept as a religio-political tool of Hamas (a Sunni Muslim jihadist organisation)
committed to the setting up of an Islamic state in Palestine.  The ideology of Hamas
(f.1988) is based on pan-Arab Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism.
Hamas emphasizes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in reality, a struggle between
Islam and Zionism (i.e. the upbuilding of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine). It is
along these lines that Article15 of the Hamas Charter states: 
        When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of jihad. This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic] Umma, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of the jihadist fighters.1

This chapter explores the concept of informality by analysing the organisation of
Hamas’ mode of conduct, in relation to tunnel trade between the Gaza Strip and the
Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. The chapter is divided into three analytical parts, which
discuss respectively Hamas as a legitimate government and development actor; the
relationship between illicit, illegal and informal; and whether Hamas’ management of
the tunnel trade can be characterised as a formalisation process or a normalisation
process. The analysis reveals that the concept of informality contains a conceptual
elasticity, which entails a fluidity in the definition of what is formal/informal,
licit/illicit, and legal/illegal in the case of tunnel trade in Gaza. This fluidity is
directly transmissible to the normalisation/formalisation continuum, and
consequently Hamas’ management contains elements of both normalising and
formalising nature. Whether Hamas can be viewed as a formal or informal state- and
development actor, depends on the perspective of the observer.

Keywords: informal, illicit, illegal, Hamas, tunnel trade.

The publication of a new Charter in 2017 was Hamas’s latest move to integrate a political facet to its resistance to Israeli occupation, and Fatah’s hegemony of the narrative for Palestinian self-determination.  Since 2004 Hamas had recognised that its unilateral strategy of armed resistance had failed, and that a flexible political approach, and discourse was required to further its objective of realising an independent Palestine.  To advance this agenda, Hamas has deployed a dual resistance strategy that incorporates political and armed resistance components.  The flexible dual resistance strategy is mutually reinforcing and is geared towards ensuring Hamas’s continued viability as it seeks an independent Palestinian state.

In December 1992, Israel deported hundreds of Hamas activists to Lebanon. The deportees ensconced themselves at a camp near the village of Marj al-Zuhur, close to the Israeli border. Their sojourn there bolstered Hamas and became a milestone in its development. This article shows how the deportees’ success in running the camp as an exemplary Islamic society turned the deportation into a foundational myth for the movement, one centered on nonviolent resistance in the spirit of Islamic values.

Is it reasonable to label State institutions as a "terrorist organizations"? This study is aimed to establish if a political party represented in a national parliament – or even a State or a Government as a whole – can be considered a "terror organization", and therefore proscribed as such. Through the analysis of some cases stories, this research assesses the legitimacy – or the lawfulness – of some political institutions in the Middle East. The essay scrutinizes, inter alia, the case of Hezbollah ("Party of Allah" or "Party of God"), a radical Islamic Shiite organization based in Lebanon, and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), a Sunni movement based in Gaza, both backed by the Government of Tehran – Iran as a whole is also taken into account. To have a broader framework in the region, this analysis touches also on: Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Hamas es, junto con Hezbolá, el único movimiento islamista armado de masas que ha alcanzado y conserva cuotas relevantes de poder. Los pilares estratégicos del islamismo palestino y del movimiento Hamas hunden sus raíces en sus orígenes históricos. Para su análisis resultan importantes la incidencia de las dinámicas del conflicto y la identidad nacional palestina que han condicionado su desarrollo doctrinal y sus posiciones estratégicas. Cualquier iniciativa que busque a una solución negociada definitiva necesitará tener en cuenta este factor y, por tanto, los límites y escenarios que plantea. Documento publicado en el Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE)

Brenner’s book departs from the conventional discussion about the group’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and treats Hamas as an instance of Islamic governance. Moreover, the reading not only contains information that helps one reconstruct the conditions leading to the status quo in the Gaza Strip, but also provides the full picture of incidents that made headlines yet soon fell into oblivion.

One problem caused by the shallow mainstream media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that most people are unaware of the causal relationship between this conflict and intra-Jewish racism.
In Israel, racism exists between Jews of European origin (also known as Ashkenazim) and Jews from North Africa and the Middle East (also known as “Mizrahim”, the Hebrew for “Easterners”). Even though the Mizrahim form the majority of the Israeli Jewish population, they do not control the policies of the Israeli state, which are still driven by a ruling elite which comes from the Ashkenazi minority. It is worth noting that it was this Ashkenazi elite, rather than the Mizrahim, who planned and executed the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
This talk will suggest that the 2014 Israeli War on Gaza was partly motivated by a desire among the ruling elite to pre-empt a summer outbreak of violent protests, mainly by Mizrahim, against the effects of the neo-liberal economic policies introduced by the Ashkenazi elite.
In striving to prove themselves to be just as Israeli as the Ashkenazi elite, many Mizrahim have become the strongest supporters of Israeli ultra-nationalism and, therefore, of the 2014 war. Thus, there is the paradox that a war which was partly intended to squelch Mizrahi protest, a war in which most of the Israeli casualties, both civilian and military, are Mizrahim, is a war that is strongly supported by most Mizrahim.
The tragedy is that the Palestinians are, yet again, paying the price of these intra-Jewish ethnic tensions: in this war, the main victims are the people of Gaza, who have suffered a man-made disaster worse than anything else that has happened to the Palestinians since the Nakba in 1948.
Prof. Smadar Lavie is a Mizrahi Jewish anthropologist who was a co-founder of Ahoti, the feminist-of-colour movement in Israel. A winner of several prominent prizes in the disciplines of Anthropology and Women’s Studies, she is affiliated with both University College Cork and the University of California at Berkeley. Her most recent book deals with the predicament of Mizrahi women in Israel; it is called “Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture”.

Is it reasonable to label State institutions as a "terrorist organizations"? This study is aimed to establish if a political party represented in a national parliament – or even a State or a Government as a whole – can be considered a "terror organization", and therefore proscribed as such. Through the analysis of some cases stories, this research assesses the legitimacy – or the lawfulness – of some political institutions in the Middle East. The essay scrutinizes, inter alia, the case of Hezbollah ("Party of Allah" or "Party of God"), a radical Islamic Shiite organization based in Lebanon, and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), a Sunni movement based in Gaza, both backed by the Government of Tehran – Iran as a whole is also taken into account. To have a broader framework in the region, this analysis touches also on: Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Стаття присвячена філософському дослідженню релігійного виміру в ідеології ХАМАС та впливу релігійного чинника на розвиток арабо-ізраїльського конфлікту. В статті проводиться ціннісний та функціональний аналіз головного програмного ідеологічного тексту ХАМАС: виокремлено ті тези з цього тексту, які напряму стосуються релігійних питань, продемонстровано широке залучення релігії до ідеологічних основ ХАМАС. Також у статті аналізується місце ХАМАС в подіях під час Першої інтифади та роль руху на початку Другої інтифади.

Ключові слова: релігійний конфлікт, ХАМАС, іслам, іудаїзм, арабо-ізраїльський конфлікт, палестино-ізраїльський конфлікт.

Faced with a multi-level dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip, Hamas might choose to respond to Egypt’s efforts to broker a settlement and move toward an acceptance of Israeli terms, in order to bring about a swift improvement in the humanitarian situation and present this to the Gaza population as a substantive achievement. In the cost-benefit analysis that compares this with a toppling of the Hamas government or a reoccupation of Gaza, Israel should accept the existence of a hostile state entity controlled by Hamas on its southern border - although ironically in that case it would itself be the element that saves Hamas from disintegration, just as the PLO was saved from disintegration following the Oslo process. The more this hostile entity is prepared to adopt logical political conduct, the easier it will be for Israel to deal with it. The option of dealing with a hostile state entity in Gaza while maintaining military deterrence on the one hand, and developing essential cooperation in civilian fields and allowing life in the Gaza Strip under reasonable conditions on the other hand, is the least worst option for Israel, even when it is clear that this future reality will also involve violent crises from time to time.

The publication of a new Charter in 2017 was Hamas's latest move to integrate a political facet to its resistance to Israeli occupation, and Fatah's hegemony of the narrative for Palestinian self-determination. Since 2004 Hamas had recognised that its unilateral strategy of armed resistance had failed, and that a flexible political approach, and discourse was required to further its objective of realising an independent Palestine. To advance this agenda, Hamas has deployed a dual resistance strategy that incorporates political and armed resistance components. The flexible dual resistance strategy is mutually reinforcing and is geared towards ensuring Hamas's continued viability as it seeks an independent Palestinian state.

Listen to this Israel's Moment of Truth in Dealing with Hamas? Hamas's strategic position seven months after Operation Guardian of the Walls is better than before, and the terrorist organization has become a more dangerous enemy. Hamas is now driven by a "dual resistance strategy" that seeks to preserve quiet in the Gaza Strip while consolidating a military infrastructure in the West Bank and southern Lebanon and organizing terrorist activity against Israel. Therefore, now is the time for Israel to take the initiative, at a moment that from its perspective is most auspicious, to wage an ongoing, critical attack on Hamas's military infrastructures in all its theaters of activityeven if this undermines the chances of reaching an arrangement

In an earlier article titled 'What Egypt needs now – Part I, Sinai', I suggested a series of measures that the Egyptian government must take immediately to make sure that civil order and concord will prevail in the area and nationwide. These measures are expected to thwart an existential threat against Egypt's national integrity. The existing threat is very real and the dangers tremendous. In the present article, I will reveal covert insinuations made by a key Israeli minister, proceeding through textual analysis. These hints do not augur well for Egypt's territorial integrity and must therefore be taken very seriously.
First published on 27th October 2014 here:
https://megalommatis.wordpress.com/2014/10/27/what-egypt-needs-now-part-ii-an-existential-threat-must-be-thwarted/

عند النظر إلي أهمية الفاعلين من غير الدول في منطقة الشرق الأوسط بصفة عامة، وفي المنطقة العربية بصفة خاصة، يمكن القول إنه كما كان لهذا النمط من الفاعلين دور في تطور المنطقة والتأثير في قضاياها الرئيسية، فقد أثرت هذه التطورات أيضا في شكل وطبيعة أدوار هؤلاء الفاعلين.