Spontaneous Orders

While still fragmented, we are witnessing the emergence of a global commercial legal order independent of any one national legal system. This process is unfolding both on the macro-level of state actors as well as that of private individuals and organizations. On the macro-level, the sources of this legal order are complex international agreements; on the micro-level, private contracts employing commercial customary practices and arbitration are driving this process forward. Yet there is no comparable evolution occurring (in any substantial sense) in non-commercial areas of law such as criminal, tort, or family law. There is an overall asymmetry in the development of transnational legal order. But why is this happening? This paper argues that the emergence of a global commercial legal order may be partially attributed to the unique structural nature of trade. The paper gives a structuralist account, positing that unlike legal order of a non-commercial nature, commercial legal order has built-in mechanisms that make it particularly suited to evolve in a transnational context—i.e. to evolve and sustain itself in the absence of a central legislative or coercive authority. The paper identifies and explores these built-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that because commercial legal order is uniquely predisposed to emerge without the State, we should expect this asymmetry to not only continue, but likely grow even more extreme.

A clear bridge connecting the theory of spontaneous order and the issue of beauty in and for cities has not yet been developed. After a general exploration of the concept of beauty, this article builds an alternative idea of beauty, namely, beauty as spontaneity. In particular, it argues that beauty in the urban realm greatly depends on forms and orders that can hardly be comprehensively designed but rather emerge as the result of the freedom granted to multiple urban agents to express themselves in space. In this article the works of Jacobs and Romano are analysed and explored. Starting from some of their main ideas, the paper suggests certain planning and design tactics to nurture this kind of beauty and provides some essential ethical principles.

Hayek is relatively silent on the issue of emotion. When he does discuss it, he critiques emotions in two main ways: the problematic desire to promote social justice, and the longing to return to tribal society. I argue that while Hayek seems to view emotions in a negative light, arguing that they have no place in political economy, his project depends on emotion. First, his references to the work of David Hume and Adam Smith, who discussed emotion extensively, suggest that there is space for emotion in his thought. Second, Hayek does not suffer from the pretense of reason. Finally, emotion is central for the kind of social coordination resulting in spontaneous order that Hayek praises. Arguing that emotions are non-rational processes, I position emotions as an important part of political economy more broadly because they facilitate relationships among individuals and therefore make social coordination through the market process possible. Understanding the complex nature of emotion in Hayek’s thought shows both that Hayek is not as strong a proponent of rationality as he is sometimes characterized, and that emotion is necessary for a free society and a robust political economy.

At first glance, Suzanne Simard's Finding the Mother Tree is an odd book to be reviewed in Cosmos and Taxis. It is largely about trees. Simard is a professor of Forest Ecology at UBC, Vancouver. She is best known for her initial extraordinary finding that many trees are connected together through mycorrhizal fungi, and these connections enable trees even of different species to support one another rather than simply existing as isolated individuals. Her Ph.D. dissertation detailing her research led to front page billing in Nature, one of the world's most prestigious scientific journals. It was there the term "wood wide web" was coined to describe her discovery. It caught on. Simard and others' subsequent discoveries demonstrate trees are far more interlinked with one another, and with other organisms, than scientists had ever imagined. In her research, Simard demonstrated trees, living side by side for hundreds of years, recognized neighbors,

In this article, I seek to compare two quite different social theorists: Friedrich August von Hayek and Niklas Luhmann. These two author’s theoretical approach seems to present more differences than similarities and indeed, it is not apparent that either reflected upon the other’s work. Society as a whole is, for Hayek, a self-organizing system of relations. Hayek uses the phrase „spontaneous order” to refer to the condition of dynamic equilibrium that results from the free operation of society. Without such freedom, the social system cannot achieve social benefits. It is through the Haykian idea of „spontaneous order” that I would like to connect his work with that of Luhmann. In Luhmann’s case, society is an assemblage of „functional systems”, self-organizing units that transform themselves and adapt to their environments. Unlike Hayek’s theory of society as a spontaneous order, in the Luhmannian framework social systems are self-organizing units independent of the intentionality of human agents. Social systems are „autopoietic”, meaning that they create and stabilize their own inner structures. In this article, I shall refrain from utilizing the entirety of Hayek and Luhmann’s substantial bibliography, an exacting task that would demand an entire monograph, and focus on two of their most systematic works: Hayek’s immense Law, Legislation and Liberty, first published in 1973, and Luhmann’s Soziale Systeme, originally published in 1983. Through the common thread of self-organization, I hope to connect these two important thinkers.

We have histories of the term ‘invisible hand’, but less on the idea, which goes back to a) ancient Taoism (the Tao does nothing, yet it is the Way by which all things are done); b) the Hippocratic philosophy, that physicians should remove the impediment and then let nature takes its course (think of Smith’s ‘unknown principle of animal life’, which ‘frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution’ (Wealth of Nations 343); c) common law, a product of human action but not of human design; John Herschel’s 19th-century concept of ‘consilience’ (‘when verifications [of a theory] spring up… spontaneously…from quarters where they might be least expected…evidence of this kind is irresistible’); and the late-20th-century science of ‘self-organization’.

Procuraremos neste trabalho descobrir de que forma se articulam no pensamento de Friedrich August von Hayek as exigências morais e as exigências jurídicas que se colocam em relação a qualquer ordem social. Isto é, trata-se de saber se, na ordem liberal defendida por Hayek, há lugar nas regras de direito a considerações de ordem moral. O direito pode consagrar determinadas concepções morais? Se sim, quais? Se não, reduzir-se-á o campo da moral a uma esfera meramente privada, ou haverá ainda algum espaço para ela na esfera pública? Estas são algumas questões para as quais procurarei respostas no pensamento de Hayek.

DUE TO THE FINAL PUBLICATION OF THIS PAPER AS A CHAPTER IN THE NEW BOOK

Adam Ferguson and the Politics of Virtue Edited by Michael Brown and Jack A. Hill, Aberdeen University Press, 2023. (Chapter 4. pp.98-117)

I HAVE REMOVED THIS PAPER FROM GENERAL CIRCULATION.  TO READ THIS WORK, PLEASE REFER TO THE ABOVE BOOK AVAILABLE TO READ ONLINE, DOWNLOAD OR BUY FROM ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS - https://aberdeenunipress.org/site/books/e/10.57132/book23/


______Synopsis.

Adam Ferguson has been listed among those Scottish literati who stood against slavery, however his absence from any participation in, or even mention of the abolition debates argues for an alternative assessment of his anti-slavery credentials.
This paper examines Ferguson's philosophy of spontaneous order and its relationship to political change and how his belief in the providential nature of existing institutions argues for his opposition to reform movements. Ferguson contributed to the philosophical milieu that allowed for the Slave Trade's continuation rather than its abolition.

Cos’hanno in comune cristalli, esseri viventi, pianeti e atomi? Due secoli di progressi nelle scienze evolutive ci mostrano un filo rosso che unisce micro e macrocosmo, un nuovo paradigma che sta cambiando il volto dell’intera civiltà umana.

I reconstruct Adam Smith's theory of irony and its application. I illustrate how he defines it as a combination of something 'grand' with something 'mean' and how this is consistent with his anti-Cartesian and post-sceptic epistemology. I suggest that, for Smith, 'systems' of any kind, from Cartesian physics to philosophical monotheism, Stoic ethics, and the 'mercantile system' draw their apparent plausibility from some disease of human imagination. I argue that in every field, including political economy, in his view, the philosopher's task is partially sceptical and partially ironical. That is, it is the task to fight erroneous systems by showing how these arise from unwarranted associations of ideas between apparently 'grand' ideas – say, the public interest – with 'mean' ones, say, the merchants' self-interest. In this light, the phrase 'invisible hand' turns out to be both an ironic joke and one more application of Smith's post-sceptical theory of knowledge whose target is dismantling all kind of " invisible " entities that human imagination tends to create.

According to Searle's theory of collective intentionality, the fundamental structure of any society can be accounted for in terms of cooperative mechanisms that create deontic relations. This paper criticizes Searle's standpoint on the ground that, while his social ontology can make sense of simple systems of interaction like symphony orchestras and football teams, the whole coordinative structure of the modern market society cannot be explained solely in terms of we-intentional collaboration and deontic relations. As clarified by Hayek, because of its complexity, this society is a self-organizing system. It results not only from micro-level agreed constraints, but also from an unintended cybernetic mechanism that affects and shapes both its micro and macro dynamics via a circular causality. Searle ignores the coordination problem posed by complexity and provides strawman arguments against the theory of action underpinning the invisible hand explanation of social phenomena.

The ‘open city’ has recently been theorised as the urban condition that best accommodates diversity, incorporates change, and fosters adaptation. In this respect, the open city can be framed as a complex system, the overall form of which cannot be predicted in advance as it is in a constant state of becoming. Although the open city,
as an emergent system, cannot be designed from the top down, it needs some direction as it can also spontaneously veer towards its decline and turn into a closed system. What, then, is the role of (spatial) design in setting the conditions for the emergence of the open city and in preventing its self-destruction? By presenting two case studies, the present paper attempts to frame a design approach that can direct emergent changes without trying to formally predetermine their outcome.

Adam Smith has been lauded as a friend of the Abolition of Slavery due to his widely regarded criticisms in The Wealth of Nations, however his expressions of political conservatism added to the 1790 edition of Theory of Moral Sentiments cast doubts on his approbation of Abolitionism. By examining Smith’s idea of social change and how his words were used against the Abolitionists in the 1792 Parliamentary debates, this article questions whether Smith can truly be an antislavery thinker. By comparing Smith’s warnings against radical social change and the arguments used by Wilberforce’s opponents to thwart the popularly-supported Slave Trade bill in parliament, it is argued that Smith contributed to the continuance of the Slave Trade for a further fifteen years.

Kendiliğinden doğan düzen anlayışı ve insani gelişimin kendiligindenligi uzerine olan bu çalışma bir dönem ödevi olarak hazırlanmasına rağmen genis bir yelpazenin ürünüdür. Üzerine çalışmaya devam etmeyi düşündüğüm bu çalışma konusu anarşist yaklaşımın felsefi temelleriyle kendisinden daha geniş bir kitleye sahip olan ideolojilere bir armağanıdır.

Czy porządek społeczny wymaga istnienia świadomego kreatora? Teoria spontanicznego porządku odpowiada przecząco na to pytanie. Wiele zjawisk społecznych, które wydają się być realizacją jakiegoś planu, są w rzeczywistości niezamierzonym efektem oddolnych działań jednostek. Co więcej, powstania złożonych struktur nie da się zaplanować. Ze względu na ograniczenia poznawcze człowieka mogą one zaistnieć tylko w sposób spontaniczny. Jednocześnie podejście to nie jest powszechnie obecne w naukach społecznych. W szczególności dotyczy to nauk politycznych. Autor pokazuje, że teoria ta może jednak znaleźć szerokie zastosowanie w opisie i wyjaśnianiu zjawisk politycznych.

Książka przedstawia propozycję nowego podejścia do badania zjawisk politycznych oraz uzupełnia lukę, jaką jest brak w naukach społecznych, w szczególności politologii, szerszej refleksji nad zagadnieniem nieplanowanego porządku.

Classical liberals  defend their interpretation of the liberal tradition arguing the market order is the most successful institution for facilitating creative and voluntary exchanges among equals. In addition, they argue that because any given distribution of resources within the market is the unintended result of countless individuals making voluntary transactions with one another, whatever pattern of distribution that arises is beyond fundamental criticism. In a spontaneous order just means do not generate unjust ends. Consequently, , “social justice” is a meaningless concept in the liberal spontaneous order. This paper uses the work of one such theorist, F. A. Hayek, to show this conclusion is mistaken and the classical liberal tradition seriously deficient as a social theory.

This article studies the difficulties of the argument that Hayekian spontaneous orders can be modeled using game theory and thus help integrate the Austrian School of economics with more mainstream economic schools of thought. I posit that there are central aspects of Hayekian spontaneous orders that cannot be fully incorporated into game theory.

** Very early Draft -- Non citabile **
Gli obiettivi di questo articolo sono (a) rilevare l'importanza all'intero dell'opera di Hayek di concetti attinenti alla cibernetica 1 e all'analisi di sistemi complessi 2 e (b) mostrare la natura del legame tra le posizioni filosofiche, politiche ed economiche di Hayek e l'adozione di tale apparato teorico. Inoltre (c) sarà proposta una lettura di Adam Smith come precursore ante litteram dell'approccio cibernetico alla scienza economica e sociale, come Hayek stesso considera lo scozzese. Outline 1. Hayek, la cibernetica, i sistemi complessi. 2. Adam Smith precursore della cibernetica nella scienza economico-sociale. 3. Conseguenze filosofiche e politiche di un approccio cibernetico. 4. Bibliografia.

Published in GLOBALIZATIONS, special issue on Polanyi/Hayek.

ABSTRACT
This article explores the concepts of spontaneity and spontaneous order, in particular their deployment by Friedrich Hayek and Karl Polanyi. Although in many respects these thinkers were poles apart, the article identifies a point of convergence. They both mobilize the concept of spontaneity in a manner that naturalizes a particular social process: for Hayek, the market economy, for Polanyi, society’s protective movement that arises in reaction against the market economy. To contextualize the uses of spontaneity by Hayek and Polanyi, I trace its evolution, with reference to Leibniz, Mandeville, and the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Having sketched the ways in which earlier thinkers understood spontaneity, I turn finally to Hayek and Polanyi. I argue that their invocations of spontaneity and spontaneous order contribute
to a downplaying of relations of domination and exploitation. While Hayek sees the market system as the exemplar of spontaneous order, for Polanyi, the concept of spontaneity underpins his belief that the protective countermovement is a ‘natural’ reaction to the evils of market society; as such, power relations pass beneath the radar.

In this paper I contrast Hayek's and Luhmann's treatment of law as a complex social system. Through a detailed examination of Hayek's account of law, I criticize the explanatory power of his central distinction between spontaneous order and organization. Furthermore, I conclude that its application to law leads to different results from the ones derived by Hayek. The central failure of Hayek's position, however, lies in his identification of complex systems with systems of liberal content maximizing individual freedom. Indeed, in this way, he can only account for systems-individuals and not systems-systems interactions. I introduce Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems, which I submit, can solve all the mentioned problems and seems a much more promising conceptual architecture to grasp social systems in the context of a complex society.

Methodological individualism provides important insights into spontaneous orders, but is inadequate to probe their reciprocal impact upon the individuals whose actions generate the system, or their mutual relationships. When spontaneous orders such as science and the market interact, the interacting emergent properties arising from different spontaneous orders, combined with systemically generated values detached from the values of those whose actions produce them lead to phenomena inaccessible to analysis by methodological individualist approaches. better studied within an ecological framework. This paper integrates Paul Lewis's exploration of emergent qualities in complex orders with Gus diZerega's exploration of interactions between multiple such orders, and argues such an approach enriches the number of issues open for examination as well as providing a foundation for a theory of civil society. __________ A scientific methodology is only as useful as the light it sheds on phenomena that interest us. Methodologies are tools for studying reality, and like any tool, incorporate an ontology, assumptions about the reality they are supposed to investigate. Based on these assumptions, scientific methodologies select what matters most in understanding something from the enormous number of phenomena in the world. In doing so, each methodology necessarily

This article explores two propositions in the literature on rules of possession. The first is that rules of first possession may form the basis for “spontaneous order.” The article argues that this Hayekian proposition must take into account the relationship between property and authority, including the potential for social disorder when competition for possession combines with competition for public authority. The second is that simple rules of possession provide a baseline response to the problem of social order because of the information costs of property in a large audience context. The article argues that this proposition must take into account correlations between interpretive complexity in rules of possession and the reproduction of authority and social order in circumstances of threatened social disorder. The analysis highlights the significance of authority and enforcement for the design of rules of possession and their relationship with social order.