Serbian foreign policy

Development of ‘16 + 1’ framework substantially depends on how Central and Eastern European countries understand their fast-evolving relationship with China. This article investigates and analyses related perceptions and discusses their implications for ‘16 + 1’. Focusing on the Sino-Serbian relationship, the study reveals that the understanding of China and its growing involvement in the region oscillates between the extremes, yet that both positive and negative evaluations are not supported by the available empirical evidence and informed by a proper understanding of the context within which the relationship takes place. This is likely to result in a sense of disillusionment, as well as heightened concerns about the relationship with China, casting shadow over the prospects of the China-CEE relations.

Водећи се теоријским основама музеологије и херитологије да предмет баштине представља извор информација, овај рад анализира употребу наслеђа у спољној политици Републике Србије кроз две студије случаја. Рад нуди преглед неких досадашњих употреба, попут употребе српског средњовековног наслеђа на Косову и Метохији ради спречавања уласка Косова у UNESCO 2015. године и активне употребе римског наслеђа ради представљања Србије као дела европског дискурса, али нуди и смернице за могућу даљу употребу, тј. практичне савете како приступити наслеђу и на који га начин најефикасније инкорпорирати у културну дипломатију и баштинску дипломатију ради постизања одређених спољнополитичких циљева.

This study aims to focus on Serbian and Turkish ties with the
Balkan states by analysing the issue at different levels of analysis. It will shed light on the two countries’ general approach toward regional politics, without looking at their relations with each and every country. It will start by concentrating on identity perceptions in both countries. The hypothesis of the study is that in order to understand any country’s international relations, we first need to grasp its identity perceptions. Second, it will look at how the global system affects both countries’ foreign policies.
Then, it will analyze the general state of affairs at the regional
level and its impact on both countries. Lastly, it will focus on
their foreign policy approaches at the national level. The study will conclude by explaining its main findings.

The paper argues that while the Serbian society and political elite are known for treating their country's accession to the EU in terms of pragmatic utility maximisation, they generally conceive of Serbian relations with Russia, contrariwise, as an identity-laden issue. To prove it, the author analyses Serbia's behaviour toward Russia along the features of emotion-driven cooperation, found in the literature on identity and emotions in foreign policy. In particular, the paper focuses on Serbians' especially strong friendliness vis-à-vis Russia, the parallel existence of the Other (the West) in their identity and the particularly strong intensity of their attraction to Russia during Serbia-West conflicts, the reinforcement of their affection to Russia by national traumas, the endurance of the affection's strength despite conflicting rational interests and negative experiences in bilateral interaction, the frequent occurrence of references to Russia in Serbia's domestic discourse and decisional justifications and a large use of historical analogies concerning Russia. Finally, the author ponders over the implications of the existent configuration of emotional and pragmatic forces in Serbian politics for the country's current and future conduct toward Russia and the EU

This paper will discuss the policy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Cold War period, and some of its repercussion for the current Serbian foreign policy. The SFR Yugoslavia, though a communist country, did not belong to the Eastern bloc (WTO). Due to its political orientation and geographical role it did not belong to the Western bloc (NATO) either. Therefore, Yugoslavia, with its president Josip Broz Tito, used this to its advantage to play an intermediary position and to cooperate with the both sides at different times. At the same time, Yugoslavia developed and implemented a non-aligned attitude towards international affairs with India, Egypt and Burma. Thus, the SFR Yugoslavia was one of the founding countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As a result, Yugoslavia was, at the beginning, the only European country in the Movement and was the host country of the first Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. In this respect, Yugoslavia propagated itself as a bridge between the Eastern and the Western bloc. The analysis of historical data will show that this non-aligned position was a consequence of Yugoslav balancing between the "two poles" and finding the best option for the country. Currently, the main goal of the Republic of Serbia's (RS) foreign policy is to enter the European Union. At the same time, Serbian politicians are simultaneously trying to influence the NAM in order to accomplish support against Kosovo independence. In other words, since the only European country in the NAM is currently Belarus, Serbian politicians exploit Serbia's European position and its Yugoslavian legacy. I will explore SFRY: NAM :: RS:NAM relationships in order to examine current Serbian foreign politics. Hence, this paper makes parallel between the non-aligned position of the SFRY as "a strategy of survival" during the Cold War and current foreign policies of the Republic of Serbia and its strategies for achieving the following goals: entering the European Union and gaining support against Kosovo's independence.

Establishment of the Albanian state under a crucial influence of the Austro-Hungary,
so that Serbia would be cut off from sea resources, forced the latter to find alternative
ways to achieve its interests. Because of permanent problems at its border and incursions of Albanian companies, Serbia called for the major powers to pay attention to the delimitation between the two countries and to focus on the need for a strategic security of Debar and Prizren. Also, according to the decisions of the London Conference of the Ambassadors, Serbia sought for a faster construction of ports on the Adriatic and the railway links with them. In this matters, Serbia had the support of Russia and France, and Italy in part, while United Kingdom showed a deceitful attitude towards the Serbian interests. Germany, and especially Austro-Hungary, would not hear of its wishes. Internal instability in Albania forced the Serbian authorities, in order to protect its own lands, to establish links with certain Albanian chiefs, the most important being Arif Hikmet, as well as with the leader of the uprising against the central government and the Vido Island Prince, Hajji Chamil Feysa. Besides the uprising, the situation was made worse by the rebels of Epirus, who were indirectly being supported by Greece. The international intervention in Albania, which was discussed in diplomatic circles, was not achieved due to a disagreement between the Great Powers. As a solution to the Albanian question, the Serbian side supported the internationalization, but at the same time, did not give up a possibility of dividing the Albanian lands with Greece, in a case it was an international decision. At the beginning of the war, complications with Albania harassed the Serbian government, especially because the Austro-Hungary planned to establish there an auxiliary front against the Serbian Kingdom.

На подлози новинских чланака и публикација објављених на немачком језику углавном у Аустроугарској и мањим делом у Немачкој, овај рад се посвећује политичким активностима Владана Ђорђевића везаним за аустроугарско-српске односе и концентрише се на његове зреле године проведене у Бечу у времену од 1900. до 1930. године. Од посебног значаја су чланци у водећим аустријским новинама у првој деценији 20. века, као и две публикације објављене 1913. у Немачкој: Quo vadis Austria? и Арбанаси и велике силе. У циљу анализе значаја који је у Аустрији придаван личности и делу Владана Ђорђевића, бечког студента, дипломате, политичара и књижевника, како у време његовог ”добровољног изгнанства у Бечу” од 1900–1905, потом као изасланика  Владе Србије 1912, дипломате, аутора политичких брошура у време Балканских ратова, заточеника у Првом светском рату, те становника Беча у задњој деценији живота, у приказ су укључени и текстови аустријских и немачких аутора о њему као политичару и аутору политичких и књижевних дела. У стваралаштву и животу Владана Ђорђевића јасно се огледају бурне године политичког односа Србије и Аустрије у другој половини 19. и почетка 20. века.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Wiener Jahre von Vladan Đorđević erstrecken sich, mit längeren Unterbrechungen, auf fast 70 Jahre. Als Medizinstudent mit dem serbischen staatlichen Stipendium kam der junge Đorđević 1863 in die Hauptstadt der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie und starb in der Republik Österreich 1930. Dieser Artikel legt den Schwerpunkt auf den Zeitraum zwischen 1900 und 1930 und analysiert die Veröffentlichungen von Đorđević in Österreich und Deutschland und die Berichterstattung über ihn und seine Publikationen. Die Wechselhaftigkeit in der politischen Kariere von Vladan Đorđević, wie auch das damalige ambivalente Verhältnis zwischen Österreich und Serbien, spiegelte sich durchaus in den Artikel über ihn in der österreichisch-ungarischen und später österreichischen Presse. Unabhängig davon, ob sein Agieren oder die veröffentlichte Schrift positiv oder negativ in dem jeweiligen Artikel dargestellt wurde, blieben einige Konstanten in der Beschreibung seiner Person. Zu den Prädikaten: ein „Austrophil“ und „ein Freund der Obrenowitsch Dynastie“ wurde insbesondere sein Bezug zu Wien hervorgehoben und er als „Wiener Student“ und „ein Mann, dessen Wahlheimat Wien“ sei beschrieben. Ab 1900 bis zu seiner Verhaftung 1916. wird Đorđević ausnahmslos „der serbischer Ministerpräsident a. D.“ und in der Zwischenkriegszeit als Dr. Vladan Đorđević betitelt.
Mit unterschiedlicher Intensität erscheinen die Artikel von und über Đorđević in der Zeit während er serbischer Ministerpräsident war (1897-1900), in den darauffolgenden Jahren seines „freiwilligen“ Aufenthaltes in Österreich (1900-1905) – ausgelöst durch die Heirat von Alexander Obrenivić mit Draga Mašin und dessen Ermordung nach drei Jahren, weiter in der Zeit der Balkankriege (1912-1913) – als er als Gesandter der Regierung Serbiens in Österreich und Deutschland Vorträge über die serbischen Ziele auf dem Balkan hält und die Publikationen „Albanesen und die Großmächte“ sowie „Quo vadis, Austria?“ veröffentlicht. Mit dem Kriegsausbruch wurde häufig aus diesen zwei, wie  auch aus seinen Publikationen über die Obrenowitsch-Dynastie, die Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts publiziert waren, zitiert. Über Đorđević selbst erschienen in Bezug auf seine Verhaftung im okkupierten Serbien 1915 nur einige telegraphische Pressemeldungen. Sein zweieinhalbjähriges Konfinieren in Österreich während des Estern Weltkrieges war kein Thema in der österreichisch-ungarischen Presse. Đorđević entschied sich das letzte Jahrzehnt seines Lebens in Wien zu verbringen. Er tritt selten auf und lebt fern der österreichischen Öffentlichkeit. Vergessen ist er dennoch nicht. Immer wieder wird aus seinen Werken zitiert. Als Đorđević in Baden bei Wien stirbt, erscheinen in mehreren Zeitungen Nachrufe. Ob Đorđević zeit seines Lebens immer wieder nach Wien oder nach Belgrad zurückehrte, kann nicht mit Sicherheit gesagt werden.  Serbien und Österreich waren und blieben für Đorđević’s politische Idee, wie auch für ihn privat, von gleicher Wichtigkeit.

The trilateral cooperation among Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Turkey, and Serbia is a unique mechanism of Ankara’s foreign policy created in 2009, which at first aimed at improving the political relations of Sarajevo and Belgrade, with Turkey as a facilitator in the trilateral dialogue. After initial political achievements, this multilateral forum established its economic dimension, while the political layer experienced growing difficulties. In order to anticipate the future of the trilateral
cooperation, the author of this paper will compare the state of
affairs before the creation of this multilateral forum, and after
the first five years of its existence. The mechanisms that initiated and propelled the trilateral cooperation are also presented, singling out the greatest barriers to mutual collaboration. The paper concludes with a determining of the main factors that have influenced the prospects of the trilateral cooperation, and makes suggestions for improving both the political and economic aspects of this multilateral format.

Le 23 décembre 2000, en Serbie, l’ère Milosevic finissait dans les urnes par un scrutin sans appel en faveur de l’opposition démocrate. Après quatre guerres yougoslaves successives contre les Républiques de Slovénie, de Croatie et de Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Province de Kosovo, le leader tombait par une volonté populaire désireuse de changements radicaux devant le bilan catastrophique sur tous les tableaux de ses onze années à la tête du pays. Durant cette période, la Serbie aura créé et subi une des pires situations de son histoire : en 2000 les indicateurs économiques atteignent des niveaux plus bas qu’à la fin des années 1980, les infrastructures sont détruites, la liberté de la presse n’existe quasiment pas, la vie politique oscille entre titisme et ultranationalisme, les mythes nationaux sont invoqués pour chacune des décisions politiques, les mouvements de populations (notamment serbes) se sont multipliés avec les conflits, le niveau de vie de la population a considérablement diminué. A l’extérieur du pays, les conséquences de son intériorisation et de ses tentatives répétées d’expansion territoriales directe par la force (annexion de la Voïvodine et du Kosovo autonomes) et indirecte (défense de la Krajina et de la Slavonie croate, établissement de la République Serbe de Bosnie, ainsi que des enclaves et exclaves serbes de Kosovo-Métochie) a relégué la Serbie au rang d’« Etat-bandit ».

Alors que la Serbie affirme extérieurement l’inscription de ses politiques intérieures dans la voie européenne, les rhétoriques internes diffèrent souvent de ce dessein, entre vœu pieu et double langage. La Serbie oscille ainsi entre un avenir naturellement européen en tant que puissance régionale incluse dans les ensembles internationaux, et les aspirations passéistes du projet grand-serbe par la défense stricte des intérêts nationaux limités par un Etat fort. Or la conduite de ces deux projets antagoniques, entre réformisme et conservatisme –entre mouvement et inertie–, se révèle passablement improductif, autant en terme de définition nationale que d’améliorations fonctionnelles. Résulte donc de ce ‘grand écart’ stratégique un flottement évolutif dont les conséquences sont désastreuses pour la Serbie.

[English below] O trabalho tem como objeto a perspectiva da Rússia sobre a neutralidade da Sérvia, isto é, a política do país balcânico de não entrada em alianças militares como a OTAN e seu não alinhamento às políticas ocidentais contrárias à Rússia, como sanções e outras resoluções de caráter oficial, que implicam a potencial limitação da integração da Sérvia à União Europeia. Precisamente, objetiva-se compreender: as motivações de tal postura por parte da Rússia com respeito à Sérvia; as razões pelas quais Rússia e Sérvia não desenvolveram uma aliança militar e os motivos pelos quais Moscou não buscou incluir o país dos Bálcãs de forma plena nos projetos de integração política, econômica e securitária liderados pela Rússia; e a maneira como a pauta da neutralidade evoluiu nas relações bilaterais. Nesse sentido, o trabalho avança três argumentos principais. Em primeiro lugar, a defesa russa da neutralidade sérvia se deve primariamente a considerações políticas-ideacionais: ainda que o peso da Sérvia em termos geopolíticos e militares possua significado periférico para Moscou, o posicionamento externo do país balcânico implica uma convergência com as concepções russas sobre a arquitetura de segurança na Europa no Pós-Guerra Fria. Em segundo lugar, a opção pela defesa da neutralidade se impôs sobre a de uma aliança militar e da inclusão plena da Sérvia em projetos de integração russos em virtude, além da indisposição sérvia para tanto, da percepção de repercussões periféricas do posicionamento da Sérvia para a segurança da Rússia na rivalidade desta última com as potências ocidentais. Soma-se a isso, por fim, a percepção de que os Bálcãs, para a Rússia, não constituem uma fonte de interesses da mesma ordem que o espaço pós-soviético. Finalmente, no que diz respeito à assertividade e aos meios utilizados pela Rússia na defesa da neutralidade sérvia, a atuação de Moscou refletiu as mudanças no padrão de relações com os EUA e a União Europeia, bem como o alcance de capacidades e interesses russos nos Bálcãs. A pesquisa fundamenta-se na revisão de literatura e na análise de documentos, declarações, decisões de políticas e da cobertura jornalística pertinente aos assuntos discutidos.

The object of this work is Russia’s perspective on Serbia’s neutrality, that is, the Balkan country’s policy of non-accession to military alliances such as NATO and its non alignment with Western policies contrary to Russia, such as sanctions and other official resolutions, which imply the potential limitation of Serbia’s integration into the European Union. Precisely, this study aims to understand: the reasons behind such positioning by Russia regarding Serbia; the reasons why Russia and Serbia did not develop a military alliance, as well as the reasons why Moscow did not seek to fully include Serbia in political, security and economic integration projects led by Russia; and the way the neutrality agenda evolved in bilateral relations. In this connection, this study advances three main arguments. First, Russia’s defense of Serbian neutrality owes primarily to political-ideational considerations: even if Serbia’s weight in geopolitical and military terms has peripheral meaning for Moscow, the Balkan country’s external positioning implies a convergence with Russian conceptions of the post-Cold War European security architecture. Second, the option for the defense of neutrality has imposed itself over those of a military alliance and the full inclusion of Serbia in Russian integration projects because of, besides Serbia’s own unwillingness to do so, the perception of peripheral repercussions of Serbia’s positioning to Russia’s security in its rivalry with the Western powers. To this, finally, can be added the perception that the Balkans, for Russia, are not seen as a source of interests to the same degree as the post-Soviet space is seen. Finally, concerning Russia’s assertiveness and means used in the defense of Serbian neutrality, Moscow’s behavior has reflected the changes in the patterns of its relations with the USA and the European Union, as well as the reach of its capacities and interests in the Balkans. The research is based on literature review and on the analysis of official documents, declarations, policy decisions and the journalistic coverage related to the themes discussed.

I wrote for Orthodoxy in Dialogue about Montenegro - Serbian Orthodox Church clash over the freedom of religion law but more importantly what it shows us about Moscow & Constantinople interests in this part of the Balkans and Đukanović autocephaly aspirations.

The study Serbian-German Relations: the Real and the Possible is an overview of Serbian-German relations from the point of view of the two countries’ historical, political and economic relations. The authors of the study address the issues from the past, suggesting that a misinterpreted past reflecting on the present threatens to block the resolution of current issues. The study highlights a positive element from the past which can act as a ‘signpost’ at this point, namely, the German-German treaty of 1972, which, despite all the differences, could serve as a model for the normalisation of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo. The authors discard the archaic structure dividing peoples into eternal enemies or friends, highlighting among other things the pace of German-Serbian economic relations as regards e.g. foreign trade, Germany’s direct investment in Serbia or cooperation in the sphere of development policy.

This thesis examines the paradigm, the conceptual framework and the use and
implementation of Swiss foreign policy on an example of its international
development cooperation (IDC) – the Education2Empolyment (E2E) programme with
Serbia as partner.