EKEM-CSIS TASK FORCE: TRANSFORMING THE BALKANS “A New Page on Serbian-Croatian Bilateral Relations and the Danube Border Dispute” George Limantzakis Croatia will be the next candidate country to join the European Union (EU) as a full member, most probably at some point within 2012. Therefore, both Croatia’s European perspective in itself, as well as the border dispute with Slovenia which has arisen in late 2008, have increased international pressures on Croatia to settle all border disputes with its neighbors as soon as possible, so as to avoid the perspective of having a similar -as to what happened with Slovenia- domino effect at the expense of its eastern neighbors, notably Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, once Croatia becomes a full member of the Union. Serbia submitted its accession application to the European Commission on December 22nd 2009, proceeding into a symbolic move that expressed its will to follow a more pro-European orientation and to inaugurate a new period of cooperation with its neighbors in the broader area. Bilateral relations with Croatia could also be viewed in this perspective. Speaking at a press conference in Zagreb on May 14th, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković argued that Belgrade is ready to withdraw its genocide suit against Croatia, under the term that a mutual agreement is reached for genocide charges against one another to be dropped with no additional terms and prerequisites. Croatia had filed a lawsuit against Serbia at the International Court for Justice (ICJ) in 1999, to which Belgrade answered with a countersuit on January 4 th 2010. The atmosphere of conflict seems though to have scaled down lately, as the two leaders agreed last March in Opatija to work for an out-of-court settlement on the issue, as has also been proposed for other bilateral problems. Cvetković and Kosor also met on the sidelines of the Annual Assembly of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), an occasion during which the Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor gave Cvetković, in a show of goodwill, thousands of pages of translations of EU legislation (acquis) and other documents that might be helpful for the Serbian government and its accession process to the EU. Kosor stated on the occasion that “Our support [for Serbia’s accession prospect] is continuous, and I think it will be even stronger when Croatia becomes the 28th member of the EU”. Her Serbian counterpart stated that Belgrade is content with Croatia’s progress on its EU path, although there are still some unresolved issues between the two countries. “We cannot say that all problems have been solved, but there is interest and willingness to resolve them in a constructive manner and in the interest of both sides”, Cvetković said. During the same meeting, Kosor and Cvetković also discussed the matter of missing persons, issues related to refugees in the two countries and Bosnia, as well as the prospect of intensifying economic cooperation between their countries. Among others, they also discussed ways of settling their border dispute on the Danube, though without reaching any palpable result. The emergence of border disputes is a relatively new phenomenon in the area, which came about with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The reason for this phenomenon lay in the fact that defining “sovereignty” -to the extent that it could be defined as such- and demarcating the border(s) between the republics didn’t matter much for as long as Yugoslavia was united, since there were no exclusive rights to be recognized over any area of the former Socialist Federate Republic (SFRY) and borders were defined more in accordance to functional needs, than to historic and legal arguments. The lack of demarcation during those times resulted in a growing number of border disputes among former Yugoslav republics since the ’90s, as most new leaderships applied with enthusiasm policies of differentiation from their former comrades and often supported a selective interpretation of law, sometimes even proceeding to action accordingly. One of the most notable and recent disputes in the area is the one between Croatia and Slovenia over four settlements along the south bank of the Dragonja River and the territorial waters of the two countries in the Bay of Piran/Savudrija in the Adriatic Sea. Another similar land and sea border dispute that has also been debated recently is the one between Croatia and Montenegro over the Peninsula of Prevlaka, at the mouth of the Bay of Kotor, which has quite recently been referred to the ICJ, after the respective agreement by the leaders of the two countries, Ivo Sanader and Milo Djukanović, to do so. The border dispute between Serbia and Croatia over the Danube is more of an original case, as it concerns neither mountainous regions -where stakes are usually low- nor coastal areas -where implications on defining territorial waters are significant- but rather the control of navigation on the River Danube itself, which constitutes a lifeline, in economical terms, for most countries in the region and broader central Europe, but also one of the most important international waterways. However, the location and significance of the area in question is not the only thing that differentiates this dispute from others in the former Yugoslavia rather than the nature of the issue itself. The problem is not “artificial”, in the sense of having originated politically, but -strangely enough- more of a geological one, as it has been caused by natural phenomena, such as land erosion, floods and the gradual gathering of sediment from its upper flow. Similar phenomena have led many of the river’s curves and meanders to become shortened or blocked over time, influencing its main flow in being slightly transferred some tens or hundreds of meters westwards over the last 200 years. The disputed territory that resulted from this geological change extends today over to fewer than 11,000 hectares in Vojvodina and Baranija, east and west of the Danube respectively, from the Hungarian border up north, to Ilok and Bačka Palanka in the south. This area includes both plain fields and river islands, among which those of Vukovar and Šarengrad (Vukovarska ada and Šarengradska ada) outside the respectively called cities. Officially Croatia abides to follow the land registry, as it has been kept since Austrian-Hungarian rule until 1918, whereas Serbia claims that the border should follow the main flow of the river for mainly functional reasons, as well as for being in accordance with international practice. The situation easily becomes more complicated, once we also take into account that some 3,000 hectares of the disputed area are registered in the cadastral records of both countries. A delimitation of the border in accordance to Austrian records, as might seem most lawful and appropriate, would leave a number of enclaves controlled by the other part on both sides of the Danube, with Croatia obtaining a slightly larger part on the eastern bank. However, such an evolution might pose a serious functional problem in effectively managing international navigation in the river, as trade routes linking commercial centres of the upper basin with those in the lower one would be cut into many small non-contiguous zones of absolute control by one or the other country, during the whole length of the Croatian-Serbian river border. Zagreb insists that the law is on its side, arguing that the disputed territory had been recognized as part of the Socialist Federate Republic of Croatia since 1947 and that, according to the 1991 Opinion of the Badinter Commission, borders between former Yugoslav republics cannot change without their consent. In this context, Croatia considers the issue to retain a purely technical level, with no perspective of being dealt with as a political issue, and further less to be used against Serbia in the future. Belgrade, on the other hand, does not dispute being bound by the aforementioned treaties, but disputes the fact that the 1947 border delimitation designated the area to Croatia. In its attempt to annul Croatian claims over the disputed territory, Serbia argues that there are three main principles, which should be taken into account before a final settlement is agreed in relation to the river border delimitation: a) International practice; according to which rivers of strategic importance to broader geographical areas should constitute the border, b) Accommodation of the local populations; which are served fine with the present status quo and would face significant difficulties in case of border changes, and c) the principle of uti possidetis et de facto (as opposed to Croatia’s uti possidetis juris); according to which the situation on the ground (with each country controlling the territory on its side of the river) should be preserved and recognised as permanent. The issue has recently resurfaced in a way that has further highlighted the need for a permanent settlement, as Serbian authorities announced their intension to build a new river port within the disputed area southwest of the city of Apatin, on the eastern bank, about midway from the Hungarian border to the conjunction of the Drava with the Danube. Croatia has strongly opposed such plans, characterising such a move as potentially “inflammatory” and arguing that no such action should be taken by authorities of another country on its territory, much less without the consent of its own proper authorities (which were not, as implied, officially informed). As a reaction to the publication of similar plans, the governor of the district (županja) of Osijek, Vladimir Šišljagić, recently stated that “action has to be taken, so as to prevent Croatian territory being stolen”. In this context, it gradually becomes more evident that the dispute retains a potentially problematic dynamic, not only for Croatia’s accession in the immediate future, as has already been shown for the land and sea border dispute with Slovenia, but for the respective accession prospects of Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina and Montenegro as well, and therefore needs to be addressed as soon as possible in a way that is both proper and permanent. Note: This article is the first of a series of publications to follow in part of the joint EKEM-CSIS project, revolving around border disputes amongst former Yugoslav Republics. More extended articles on the disputes: a) between Croatia and Slovenia, b) between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and c) between Croatia and Montenegro are to follow suit.