Hizbollah

ارتبط الاهتمام بدراسة الفاعلين العنيفين من غير الدول Violent Non State Actors (VNSAs بالتحولات التي شهدتها الدولة منذ نهاية الحرب الباردة، سواء من حيث طبيعة دورها، أو من حيث بنيتها، وعجزها عن ممارسة وظائفها التقليدية، علي النحو الذي صورها به هوبز حين رآها الليفياثان العظيم الذي سينهي حالة حرب الكل ضد الكل، كما لم تعد الدول كما رأي كينيث والتز "المحتكر الوحيد للقوة". ويعد الاهتمام بدراسة VNSAs، بصفة خاصة، والفاعلين من غير الدول بصفة عامة، في مجال العلاقات الدولية حديثا نسبيا، مقارنة بدراسة الدولة، كما أنه تال علي وجود هذا النمط من الفاعلين. ففي عهد الإمبراطورية الرومانية مثلا، انتشرت عصابات الجريمة، التي هي صورة من صور VNSAs، ودخلت مع الدولة في حروب. ومع القرن العشرين، انتشرت حركات التحرر الوطني، التي هي صورة أخري للفاعلين العنيفين، والتي نجحت في التأثير في سياسات الدول الاستعمارية الكبري حينها: فرنسا، وبريطانيا، وألمانيا.

In the years between 2004 and 2008, Lebanon’s political environment had witnessed various upheavals and turmoil, from internal as well as external sources. After the end of the civil war in Lebanon in 1991, no significant or crucial clashes occurred until the events of May 2008, which resulted in the Doha Accord. These clashes took place between two Lebanese factions, March 8 alliance, a pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian camp, and the March 14 coalition, an anti-Syrian and pro-Western camp. The withdrawal of the Syrian military in 2005 from Lebanon occurred at a time when the US foreign policy was determined to defeat Syria and Iran as they sought to increase their hegemony in the Middle-East region. However, without the US and Western support for the anti-Syrian factions in Lebanon, marked by the various UN resolutions that were issued in order to undermine the legitimacy of the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, this would not have been possible. Informed by the Democracy-Peace theory, this study investigates the failures of the US foreign policy in Lebanon, despite those achievements, as portrayed in their response to the clashes of May 2008. As a result, the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbollah axis was not a defeated player in Lebanon since these events. In fact, these clashes culminated in the establishment the Doha Accord, clearly indicating the shortcomings of the US foreign policy given their interest in promoting democracy.

This was the first-ever article to describe and analyze the possibility of a One-State Solution for Palestine/Israel from a Mizrahi positionality both in the Hebrew original and the English translation. Its composition -- like all of Lavie's writing about the Mizrahi feminist struggle in the context of the Question of Palestine -- has been fraught with all manner of relentless campaigns by those elements in academia that
would rather have Lavie and her research disappear. Needless to say that shortly after this article saw print in the Hebrew original in 2008 its analysis of the possibility for a one state solution for the Israel/Palestine conflict was appropriated and published without proper quotation or citation.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.

ran 1.648.195 kilometrekarelik yüz ölçümü
ile dünyanın en geniş 18. ülkesidir. Kuzeyden
Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve Türkmenistan, doğudan
Afganistan ve Pakistan, güneyden Basra ve
Umman körfezleri, batıdan da Irak ve Türkiye ile
çevrilidir. Hazar denizine 675 kilometre, Umman
Körfezi’ne 784 kilometre, Basra Körfezi’ne de
1.259 kilometre uzunluğunda sahili vardır.

T he political and military commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon has gone through the baptism of fire once again. The Syrian crisis has become a critical theatre of war for the three way alliance between Iran, Hizbullah and Syria, celebrated as the 'axis of resistance' in Tehran. The Iranian leadership has used the Syrian crisis to further consolidate its ties with Hizbullah and warn potential enemies of the risks in underestimating Iran's capacity to take the war to them. Iranian leaders call this a strategy of deterrence, warning Israel and the United States of massive retaliation in case they take any action against Iran. Hizbullah is key to that policy. This paper will explore relations between Iran and Hizbullah in the broader context of Iran's external relations and geo-strategic calculations. It notes the significance of Iran's revolutionary ideology and its version of Shia Islam in lubricating this relationship. Hizbullah adheres to the ideological principles advanced in Tehran and shares Iran's Manichean worldview which divides the world between the oppressors and the oppressed. In this perspective, the United States and Israel are seen as the principal oppressors of the Muslim world. This religious and ideological platform has facilitated a close strategic partnership between Iran and Hizbullah. The Syrian crisis has demonstrated that both parties place significant value in this partnership and are prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect it. This consideration has played a major role in Hizbullah's military steps to defend the Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. This paper will offer an analysis of the realpolitik dynamics of relations between Iran and Hizbullah. After examining the ideological context of this partnership, this paper will proceed to scrutinize how the Iranian leadership values the real and symbolic advantages offered by Hizbullah. It is argued here that Iran, even under the presidency of the mild-mannered Hassan Rouhani, sees Hizbullah as a significant strategic asset in its risk calculations. Hizbullah and the Assad regime are seen as Iran's leverage to curb attempts by the United States, Israel and anti-Iran Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf to stifle the

Drawing from their history of pro-Lebanon military support and origins associated therein, their formal entrance into the Lebanese government in 1992 and subsequent political actions and policies, and their social welfare and infrastructure based programs; Hezbollah has been able to effectively establish itself as a significant and influential faction to become a force of moderate Islamic representation for the people of Lebanon.

The new Thirty Years War began in the Middle East. Until now it is limited in its hot version to Syria and Iraq. The Syrian civil war became a proxy regional conflict, which remembers us the first phase of the great European conflict in Bohemia (1618 to 1623). That confrontation is going to extend because it belong to a long-term confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites, between regional and international powers. A new territorial division of the Middle East will erase the former Sykes-Picot agreement.

This chapter reviews some of the key findings from case studies of ten protracted terrorist/insurgent conflicts including those involving the IRA, ETA, Hezbollah, Hamas, LTTE, PKK, FARC, GAM, and others. In considering these different conflicts, the chapter attempts to draw out important lessons and insights, and argues a case for some general propositions. To properly understand conflicts – and to properly assess what policies will and will not work – requires both good theories and reliable evidence. All of the case studies emphasize that understanding their conflict requires awareness of its particular political context, and time to immerse oneself in that context. It is dangerous to assume that a new conflict is similar to a familiar one, or that the patterns one has seen before will automatically be repeated again; but it is just as facile to assume that every case is sui generis. Governments and their advisors are notoriously quick to forget the lessons of history, but we must also be careful to emphasize that not all lessons work equally well everywhere, and that the wrong lessons can also be taken from the past.

Livro resultado da tese de doutorado em Ciência Política (UNICAMP) defendida em 2010 com orientação do Prof. Dr. Shiguenoli Miyamoto. Versão completa do livro disponível na Amazon pelo link: https://www.amazon.com.br/Terrorismo-Comparada-Pol%C3%ADticas-Tr%C3%ADplice-Fronteira/dp/8555072883/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1469123967&sr=8-1&keywords=combate+ao+terrorismo+na+Am%C3%A9rica+do+Sul

The current shape of the Syrian crisis derives from three key developments witnessed in 2013. Two of them directly strengthened the Assad regime after a succession of military setbacks: first, the growing in- volvement of foreign Shia militias such as the Leba- nese Hezbollah on the side of loyalist forces, starting with the battle for al-Qusayr in the spring; second, the United States’ decision to respond diplomati- cally, rather than militarily, to the chemical attack car- ried out in Damascus in August.

Nurtured by the Pasdaran since 1982, Hezbollah has become the most powerful group in Lebanon and a strategic element of Iran’s deterrence capabilities against Israel. It currently represents the gatekeeper of the Lebanese confessional governance against the anti-corruption popular protests. Indeed, this system serves, mostly through Hezbollah’s local alliances, as a shielding screen for its paramilitary vocation. Hezbollah has broadened its field of intervention beyond national scope (Syria, Iraq, Palestine), to such an extent that endangers the prerequisites for Lebanon’s stability and recovery.

This article argues that anti-Shi'ism is simply one component in a strategy to justify and enforce Egypt's security policies and regional leadership goals. An examination of Egyptian press coverage of the 2009 discovery of a Hizbullah cell in Egypt illustrates a process through which Shi'ism is initially identified as a sectarian threat, but then “de-Arabized” through linkage with Iran. Despite being an Arab organization, Egyptian media portray Hizbullah as a non-Arab challenge to the Arab world's stability, more than a Shi'i challenge to Sunnism or a security threat. This indicates that Egypt's traditional foreign policy of defending Arab interests is more important than sectarianism in conceptualizing threats to its security.

Saudi Arabia and Lebanon have been in a complex relationship for many years. Since Lebanon's civil war in 1975, Saudi Arabia intervened as a mediator. Saudi Arabia was the sponsor of the Taif Agreement in 1989, which regulated the fabric of the power relations between the different ethnic groups, granted Syria status in Lebanon, and left Hezbollah's weapons in its hands. Saudi Arabia also helped in the reconstruction of Lebanon through huge financial investments. The rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 led Saudi Arabia to strongly support the Sunnis in Lebanon to prevent Iranian influence. Hezbollah's growth under Iranian auspices and its dominance in the Lebanese political system have increased tensions with the Sunni parties. The assassination of Rafik al-Hariri, prime minister of Lebanon, in February 2005 led to a significant change. Saudi Arabia blamed the murder of its protégé on Syria and Hezbollah. A situation was created in which Lebanon began to serve as the basis for the struggle for hegemony in the Islamic world: between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran. This struggle expanded crossing borders, such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain.

البرنامج العملي الذي يسير عليه الحزب يعطي أولوية أساسية للأمان السياسي والاجتماعي الذي يُعَدّ المقدمة التي لا مفرّ منها لأي تقدم أو تطور لأي بلد أو وطن، وهو الشرط الضروري للوصول إلى مرحلة تعود فيها طموحات وأحلام بناء دولة ذات شخصية معنوية فعلية أمراً ممكناً، ويحاول تحقيق هذا الشرط من خلال الاستجابة لمجموعة من التحديات أهمها: 1) الأمان الوجودي 2) حياد السلاح 3) الخطاب السياسي 4) عقلانية الحلول 5) نموذج النزاهة 6) خصوصية الهوية 7) توازن الحلفاء والشركاء.

نحن أمام تنظيم عسكري حديدي، تتفاعل في داخله نزعات الثأر الفارسي، والتشبّه بمهمِّشه السني من ناحية الخلافة، والرغبة في تسوية الوتر معه، وتصدير حكم الولاية للفقيه العادل الجامع للشرائط على مساحة "الأمّة"، والثورة الجهادية على المجتمع الجاهلي الحالي والسعي لأسلمته باعتماد الجهاد والإسلام الحركي، واستعباد الطائفة-الطبقة المارونية والسعي لتحويل الشيعة إلى طائفة-طبقة لحكم الأرض اللبنانية تحت سلطتها، تارةً بشرعية القوة وطورًا بشرعية الاستشهاد.
هذا ما تشتمل عليه العقيدة المهدويّة إذ تجمع التطلع الشيعي نحو الشرعيّة الدينيّة والسياسيّة وإمتلاكهم كشيعة لنظريّة في الحكم. وتُعدّ العقيدة العمليّة في حركيّة الفكر الإسلامي، سندًا لتحقّق النظرية في المدى اللبناني، من حكمهم لهذا البلد واستصغار دولته في ظلّ ولايتهم، من خلال تنظيم حديدي يجعل من التوق للسلطة والإستناد للقوّة، معيارًا للعمل السياسي، في فكرة ماويّة صافية، تستبدل التناقض الإقتصادي بالتناقض السلطوي. فتجعل تلك العقيدة المهدويّة والمسندة بالعقيدة العملية، من حزب الله، وتحت ختم الوليّ الفقيه، "جيش المهدي"، ولا فرق في ذلك إذا ما انتقل من مقارعة الخصم اليهوديّ تحصيلًا لشرف، أو الاستماتة في قتل العدو السوري الأموي ردًا لثأر، أو في استتباع الكافر الماروني كعلامة على التخلص من الحرمان...

The consensus in Israel is that Hizbollah was deterred as a result of the Second Lebanon War, that because of the damage sustained by the group and its supporters, it refrained from fighting against Israel, and that quiet that has reigned on the northern border was a result of the war. In fact, most of the arguments supposedly proving that Hizbollah was deterred are less clear-cut than they appear. The majority of Hizbollah’s actions, both before and after the war, can be explained by other factors—domestic Lebanese and international—over which Israel has a very limited degree of control or influence. It is thus necessary to carefully examine the assumption of deterrence, and in particular, to avoid complacency based on this assumption.

This chapter discusses and analyses the roles that Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia, and Hamas, a Palestinian militia, played in the Syrian conflict. The fast pace of events in the first year of the conflict, along with the collapse of effective governance in large parts of Syria, created a political vacuum that quickly drew external powers into the Syrian arena. Since the beginning of clashes between the Syrian government and Syrian rebels, vast numbers of militia groups, armed forces, and military experts poured into Syria. These groups represented different agendas, effectively turning Syria into the battlefield of a multi-faceted proxy conflict. Hezbollah and Hamas represent different sets of interests and different stakeholders and consequently had different attitudes towards the crisis, explored in this chapter.

The 'Cedar Revolution' in Lebanon, which was sparked by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005, was seen by many as an opportunity for Lebanon's fragile political system to move towards a more stable form of democracy. But contrary to these expectations, in the years since Syrian military withdrawal in April 2005, Lebanon has been plagued with sectarian and political unrest and conflict. Abbas Assi here explores the obstacles that impeded the democratic transition process and how subsequent events since 2005 (such as the passing of UNSCR 1559, the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel war and the Syrian conflict) have bolstered this trend. By looking at these, Assi examines how the intersection of the influence of external factors and powers with domestic conflicts has shaped the behaviour of political parties and has had implications on their ability to reach compromises and initiate democratic reforms. By analysing the impact of the intersection of domestic and external factors on democracy, this book is a vital reference for those studying politics of Lebanon and the Middle East more broadly.

During the last week of August 2017, the Lebanese government completed its largest counterterrorism operation in years, pushing Islamic State (IS) militants from the group’s stronghold along the Lebanese border with Syria. The offensive underscored Lebanon’s contribution to the global counter-IS coalition and the key role that its military and security services have played in blocking the expansion of Sunni militant groups in the region.

None of this would be possible without the long-term support of the United States, which has quietly bolstered Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities over the course of a decade. However, reports of coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah—Iran’s most important nonstate ally—during the August operation will raise vexing questions for policymakers regarding the utility of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon.

Despite real limitations and frustrations, however, it would be a mistake to abandon more than a decade of investment in a military the U.S. State Department considers “one of the most effective counterterrorism forces in the region.” In fact, weakening the LAF would only allow Hezbollah to claim a greater role in the country’s security. The result could threaten the country’s delicate sectarian political balance and destabilize the country. This would be a far worse outcome than the current status quo, as unpalatable as it may be.

To better understand the value of U.S. counterterrorism and security assistance to Lebanon, a Center for American Progress research team visited Lebanon in May 2017, interviewing a broad range of officials to assess the threat landscape, identify strengths and weaknesses in counterterrorism capabilities, and explore the implications for U.S. counterterrorism strategy and operations.

Informed by these interviews, this report argues against proposed cuts to the LAF and suggests additional steps that it and Congress can take to strengthen Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities.

في الأسابيع القليلة التي سبقت استقالة رئيس الوزراء اللبناني سعد الحريري، كان الإصرار واضحاً في سعي العديد من أعضاء الكونغرس الأمريكي إلى تمرير مشاريع قرارات لمعاقبة حزب الله وإيران، والدفع إلى خطوات عاجلة وقوية توقف تغلغل سلطة حزب الله على حساب مؤسسات الدولة اللبنانية. نتج عن ذلك قرار لجنة العلاقات الخارجية في مجلس الشيوخ تمرير مشروعي قانونين، الأول يهدف لتشديد العقوبات المفروضة على حزب الله، والثاني يستهدف البرنامج الصاروخي الإيراني. كما عرضت وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية في أكتوبر الماضي مكافأة مالية للمساعدة في القبض على اثنين من مسؤولي الحزب.

This chapter discusses and analyses the roles that Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia, and Hamas, a Palestinian militia, played in the Syrian conflict. The fast pace of events in the first year of the conflict, along with the collapse of effective governance in large parts of Syria, created a political vacuum that quickly drew external powers into the Syrian arena. Since the beginning of clashes between the Syrian government and Syrian rebels, vast numbers of militia groups, armed forces, and military experts poured into Syria. These groups represented different agendas, effectively turning Syria into the battlefield of a multi-faceted proxy conflict. Hezbollah and Hamas represent different sets of interests and different stakeholders and consequently had different attitudes towards the crisis, explored in this chapter

Au fil de quelque 360 pages, les 17 auteurs réunis autour de Sabrina Mervin, dans le cadre de l'Institut Français du Proche-Orient, s' attachent à présenter objectivement le Hezbollah et ses constituants sous des angles historique, anthropologique et politique. De quoi donner ...

This papers discusses the tactics and facts surrounding the combination of criminal organizations and International terrorist organizations in the Triple Frontier area of Ciudad Del Este, Paraguay, Foz do Iguazu, Brazil, and Puerto Iguazu, Argentina. It discusses the criminal ties that terrorists groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have in the region as well the varieties of illegal activities that these organization use to fund terrorist networks. Ultimately the goal of this paper is to bring to light the fact that this "triple frontier" is a threat in the war on terror, one that many Americans ignore or are not aware that it exists. My paper brings to light the fact that while the United States fights in Afghanistan or Iraq that it disregards the very real threats in its own backyard.

"In dieser Arbeit wird geprüft, ob der Zweite Libanonkrieg mit der dyadischen Hypothese der Theorie des demokratischen Friedens vereinbar ist, wonach Demokratien keine Kriege gegen andere Demokratien führen. Es wird gezeigt, dass, wenn man lediglich die in quantitativen Studien zur Theorie des demokratischen Friedens
verwendeten Kriterien zugrunde legt, durchaus ein Widerspruch besteht. Schränkt man hingegen die Definition der Variablen durch zusätzliche Kriterien ein oder versteht man den militärischen Arm der Hisbollah im Libanon als autonom vom libanesischen Staat agierenden Akteur, so ist die notwendige Bedingung einer dyadischen Konstellation nicht mehr gegeben und die Antinomie hebt sich auf. Die Analyse verweist darauf, dass letztere Antwort nicht aus Willkür erfolgt, sondern durch gute Argumente begründbar ist. Während der Zweite Libanonkrieg somit keinen eindeutigen Widerspruch zur dyadischen Hypothese darstellt, bestätigt diese Arbeit den lange monierten Mangel an Spezifizität der Theorie des demokratischen Friedens, der es ermöglicht, jeweils jene Kriterien zugrunde zu legen, die die gewünschten Ergebnisse herbeiführen. Sie verweist außerdem darauf, dass die Theorie vor der Aufgabe steht, neue Aussagen und Theoreme über Zusammenhänge zwischen Demokratie und Krieg in einer Welt multipler, sich überlappender Souveränität unter Einbezug parastaatlicher Entitäten zu entwickeln, will sie in einer sich wandelnden Welt nicht obsolet werden."

This research understands and explains the dynamics of Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian Conflict following their victory in the parliamentary elections in Lebanon in 2018. Hezbollah is a Shia-affiliated Islamic organization based in South Lebanon. Since the fighting of Qusayr in 2013, Hezbollah has played an important role in defending the al-Assad regime and preventing Syria from falling into a failed state, or controlled by extremist groups. Hezbollah has 7,000 to 10,000 fighters in Syria, their largest deployment in the world outside Lebanon. As well as having a mission to maintain the stability of Bashar al-Assad's government, Hezbollah uses propaganda and intensive media campaigns to portray itself as a protector of the Shia community on the Lebanon-Syria border. Hezbollah has also pledged to protect Shiite holy sites in Syria, such as the tomb of Sayyidah Zainab in southern Damascus. Hezbollah has also trained, advised and assisted the community and other Shia proxies in Syria.

In May 2018 amid their involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah and its coalition party, March 8, participated in elections in Lebanon and won a majority of seats in parliament. Also in May, Putin raised a discourse about withdrawing all foreign troops from Syria, including Hezbollah and the Iran alliance. The discourse on the troop withdrawal colors the dynamics of Hezbollah's involvement in Syria, amid the increasingly stable conditions of Bashar al-Assad's government, and Hezbollah's victory in their domestic politics, plus the security threat posed by Israel's increasing presence in Syria. This raises the question of what factors have made Hezbollah continue its presence amid the Syrian conflict. This research can be categorized as qualitative research and the data were collected by studying the literature. The results of this study indicate that the decision of Hezbollah to remain involved in the Syrian Conflict is motivated by the geopolitical relationship between Hezbollah, Iran and Syria who are members of the Resistance Axis in the Middle East. In addition, the factor of Hezbollah's loyalty to Iran in the Wilayatul Faqih system is also a strengthening factor for this decision.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Syrian Conflict, Wilayatul Faqih, Iran, Axis of Resistance, March 8 Alliance