ÁLMOS PÉTER KISS (ED.), "Asymmetric Warfare Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016, 2017
Israel has fought against non-state enemies almost constantly since its creation in 1948.
It exp... more Israel has fought against non-state enemies almost constantly since its creation in 1948.
It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and 2010s, and the so-called “uncoordinated attacks” wave of 2015–2016. Doing so, Israel has gained much experience and learned valuable lessons – but also made its fair shareof mistakes, and many times lessons were either ignored or forgotten.
This article will outline several lessons from the Israeli experience, lessons this author deems most important, both strategically and tactically.
The paper was published in , Álmos Péter Kiss (Ed.) "Asymmetric Warfare
Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference
in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016", Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017
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Papers by Yagil Henkin
https://quillette.com/2020/01/14/studying-the-links-between-white-supremacist-terrorists-and-school-shooters/
This is an edited English version of a Hebrew-language article which was published on "Between the Boundaries - the IDF's Operational Art Journal", 15 (2018), https://www.idf.il/media/32812/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F.pdf
Online at https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-egyptian-military-buildup-enigma/
Originally published in Hebrew as a series of essays on the "Mida" Website.
It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and 2010s, and the so-called “uncoordinated attacks” wave of 2015–2016. Doing so, Israel has gained much experience and learned valuable lessons – but also made its fair shareof mistakes, and many times lessons were either ignored or forgotten.
This article will outline several lessons from the Israeli experience, lessons this author deems most important, both strategically and tactically.
The paper was published in , Álmos Péter Kiss (Ed.) "Asymmetric Warfare
Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference
in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016", Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017
https://quillette.com/2020/01/14/studying-the-links-between-white-supremacist-terrorists-and-school-shooters/
This is an edited English version of a Hebrew-language article which was published on "Between the Boundaries - the IDF's Operational Art Journal", 15 (2018), https://www.idf.il/media/32812/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F.pdf
Online at https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-egyptian-military-buildup-enigma/
Originally published in Hebrew as a series of essays on the "Mida" Website.
It experienced, among others, the Fedayeen infiltrators of the 1950s, the PLO in the 1960s to the 1990s, Hezbollah and Hamas in the 2000s, and 2010s, and the so-called “uncoordinated attacks” wave of 2015–2016. Doing so, Israel has gained much experience and learned valuable lessons – but also made its fair shareof mistakes, and many times lessons were either ignored or forgotten.
This article will outline several lessons from the Israeli experience, lessons this author deems most important, both strategically and tactically.
The paper was published in , Álmos Péter Kiss (Ed.) "Asymmetric Warfare
Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future: Proceedings of the Conference
in Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016", Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017
"The work does give us—if unintentionally—an insider’s view into something no less disturbing: How the Israeli political and defense hierarchy behaves after a military failure; how the members of this hierarchy sink into recriminations, denial of accountability, and personal grudges and paybacks; how,
without doubt or hesitation, they are willing to leak operational orders, confidential military documents, andrecords of government meetings, all for the sole purpose of clearing themselves of responsibility"
(The review was published before the 2006 Lebanon war).
Link to Jerusalem Post article:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/How-to-effectively-sanction-Hamas
(An 2013 note: It seems that in the four years since writing this piece, Israeli policy vis-a-vis Gaza adopted much of the suggestions. Of course, I can't know if this article had any influence).
The file has been reformated to aid readability.
A link to the article in the Jerusalem Post:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/When-everything-is-a-crime
The Original NYT article can be found here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/03/opinion/the-best-way-into-baghdad.html
Despite the importance of the Suez conflict, almost no comprehensive military history of it exists. This book changes this by presenting a clear, comprehensive narrative of the conflict with a special emphasis on the military decisions and the short- and long-term results of the conflict, both tactical and strategic, military and political.
The bibiliography covers titles in several languages.
This is an ongoing project and would be updated periodically. Please make sure you are using the latest revision.
for additions and corrections please mail henkinyagil@gmail.com