Jasmin Rupp
Jasmin Rupp is a researcher for the Middle East and North Africa region at the Austrian National Defence Academy. Her research areas include political transitions in North Africa and the Middle East, political Islam, extremism and terrorism with a current focus on Libya, Syria, Iraq and the international crisis and conflict management, as well as activities of Daesh/ISIS.
She holds a Master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies/Islamic studies as well as a Political Science degree from the University of Vienna and she is currently enrolled for a PhD programme. She held the positions of attaché at the permanent mission of Austria to UNESCO in Paris and the Austrian embassy in Algiers. She is board member of the Austro-Algerian society and has undertaken numerous study and research trips to North Africa and the Middle East. Jasmina is proficient in Arabic, English, French and German.
She holds a Master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies/Islamic studies as well as a Political Science degree from the University of Vienna and she is currently enrolled for a PhD programme. She held the positions of attaché at the permanent mission of Austria to UNESCO in Paris and the Austrian embassy in Algiers. She is board member of the Austro-Algerian society and has undertaken numerous study and research trips to North Africa and the Middle East. Jasmina is proficient in Arabic, English, French and German.
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and other jihadist groups refused to lay down their arms and leave the demilitarised zone. In addition, a recent chemical attack in Aleppo suspected to have been carried out by rebels, was answered with air strikes by Russia and the regime and could be used as a trigger to launch a limited offensive in Idlib.
The successes of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against ISIS in As-Safa, in the south of Syria, free further forces for an offensive in Idlib as well as against ISIS in Deir ez-Zour.
The last few weeks have been marked by a rapprochement between the Assad regime and its Arab neighbours. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt and others want to turn Syria back into an "Arab" issue and thus push back the growing influence of Tehran and Ankara in Syria. This led to the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria in September, the first Jordanian parliamentary delegation
to Damascus since 2011, and the planned reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus.
The shelling of Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria by Turkish forces can be understood as a warning message from Turkey to the US. Turkey sees the continued support of the US for the YPG, the joint Kurdish-American patrols and the planned US observation
posts along the border as a direct threat to Turkish security. Meanwhile, Turkish-American tensions are jeopardizing successes in the fight against ISIS at Abu Kamal. In recent weeks, the SDF has again suspended its offensive in protest against Turkish bombardments in northern Syria.
Erdogan's aim is to play for time, to separate "moderate" armed groups from Al-Qaeda linked groups, and ultimately to fragment and weaken the extremists.
After the accidental shooting down of a Russian reconnaissance plane by the Syrian regime, Russia indirectly accused Israel for the incident. Consequently, Russia is arming the Syrian regime with an S-300 missile system to secure the border with Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, causing discontent not only in Western states but also in Turkey and Israel.
Moreover, the new Syrian representative in the State Department, James Jeffrey, announced that the US troops' presence in Syria would be extended indefinitely. According to Jeffrey, Assad had no future as President of Syria, yet it was not the responsibility of the US to get rid of him.
Domestically, for the first time since 2011, local elections were held in regime-held areas. Even though the 12 million refugees and internally displaced persons could not vote, the regime signals strength andnormality through this step.
of the Iranian government to stop supplying electricity to Iraq due to unpaid bills resulted in local protests in Basra. Widespread protests resulted in Turkey and Kuwait issuing travel warnings to Iraq and hastened the return of Prime Minister Abadi from Brussels. An Iraqi delegation travelled to Saudi Arabia in search of a possible solution for the power
crisis. Turkey and Kuwait offered, at Iraq’s expense, to provide electricity to Iraq by means of mobile generators.
While several political parties have attempted to ally in order to form the largest bloc in parliament, Shiite clergy criticised the move setting that addressing the claims of the protesters should supersede such actions. Once the results of the manual count were announced by the IHEC and confirmed by the FSC, Ammar al-Hakim and Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi declared that they have formed a coalition and have a political majority in parliament. However, Nuri al-Maliki and Hadi al-Ameri also proclaimed to have such majority. President Fu’ad Masum then instructed the parliament to reconvene immediately.
Early meetings between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have been supported by the US in the fight against ISIS, and the Assad regime in Damascus also caused a stir. The talks should be seen in the context of Trump’s announcement in April that the US will withdraw its soldiers from Syria. The extent to which the SDF will succeed in achieving its goal of establishing a Syrian-Kurdish autonomous region in a decentralized state remains to be seen. A Kurdish autonomous area (similar to the one in Iraq) is inconceivable for the Assad regime. The Kurds, supported by the US, currently control about a third of Syria's territory, including major oil and water sources, and are likely to use them as a bargaining chips in future negotiations.
these voices was former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who said, that the elections have to be annulled, because of the humanitarian situation of the Internally Displaced People. Another heavy setback to the eclectoral process was the attack on the headquarter of the Kurdish party Gorran in Sulaymaniyya by a group loyal to the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The frauds led to a first request to the parliament to recount the votes. The Iraqi parliament voted for a manual recount of 10 percent of the ballots. Further the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) rejected the complaint to cancel the election results. This was followed by a statement of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) that there is no legal obligation to recount the votes. The parliament afterwards amended the election law, which said to annul the work and result of the Independent High Commission for Elections (IHEC) and dissolve it. The HCJ therefore appointed nine new judges to observe the work of the IHEC. At the same time Turkey started to fill up the Ilisu dam in Anatolia causing a water reduction of the Tigris by 50 percent. After protests of the Iraqi par- liament Turkey declared to postpone the filling up until July. Turkey also started a new offensive against PKK bases in the Qandil region in northern Iraq, which was followed by heavy protests of the government in Baghdad and Kurdish parties.
The coordinated joint operation by the US, France and Britain on April, 14 was limited to the destruction of chemical weapons producing and storing facilities of the regime and did not provoke the feared confrontation with Russia. The purpose of the proportional military strike was to dissuade the Assad regime from using chemical weapons.
Numerous evacuation agreements, predominantly brokered by Russia, resulted in the capture of longstanding rebel-controlled territories around Damascus, thus, further consolidated the regime’s leadership.
The US-State Department and the Pentagon remain deeply split over their future Syria strategy. Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters that
the US are unlikely to pull out troops from Syria until diplomats have achieved peace. His remarks came after President Trump announced to pull US soldiers out of the war-torn country in the near future.
of the security situation, creation of new job opportunities and rebuilding of destroyed regions.
ISIS declared that it will fight the elections by conducting suicide bombings. The Iraqi security forces reacted with two major offensives against ISIS in Anbar and Diyala province.
Turkey also started a major campaign against PKK fighters, who are believed to be hiding in Northern Iraq. The announcement of the Turkish offensive was followed by protests of the high cleric Muqtada al- Sadr and Kurdish MPs.
West, besonders vor dem Hintergrund, dass Khalifa Haftar Anfang April zur medizinischen Behandlung nach Paris gebracht wurde und sein Gesundheitszustand ungewiss bleibt.
Die ersten US-Luftschläge in Libyen seit Jänner 2018 zielten laut AFRICOM auf zwei hochrangige Kommandanten der al-Qaida ab und sind ein Ausdruck der US-Strategie in Libyen, da sich die USA bis auf gezielte Schläge gegen terroristische Netzwerke in Libyen kaum engagieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund
ist auch der laufende Bau einer US-Drohnenbasis nahe Agadez, in Niger, zu sehen, die Anfang 2019 fertiggestellt wird.
Die wochenlangen Zusammenstöße am südlichen Stadtrand von Sebha, der Hauptstadt des Fezzan, bei denen bereits Dutzende Menschen ums Leben
kamen, dauern trotz zahlreicher Schlichtungsversuche an. Parallel dazu begann Haftars Libyan National Army (LNA) die Operation „Law Enforcement“ im
Süden Libyens gegen “ausländische Milizen”.
Die Zahl der Migranten, die über Libyen nach Europa kamen, ist in den ersten drei Monaten von 2018 im Vergleich zum Vorjahreszeitraum um drei Viertel zurückgegangen, dennoch starben Dutzende Menschen bei der Überfahrt.
current health status. Haftar has not been seen in public in the last few weeks.
The killing of two high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders in an US-airstrike in the southern city of Ubari is an expression of the US strategy in Libya, which does merely go beyond isolated air strikes against terror networks. The ongoing construction of a US drone base in Agadez, Niger, can be explained in
this context, particularly due to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda establishing a permanent foothold in southern Libya.
The clashes in the outskirts of the capital of the Fezzan, Sebha, are continuing since several weeks, causing dozens of victims. Numerous attempts to establish a sustainable ceasefire failed. Simultaneously, the LNA launched Operation Law Enforcement in southern Libya, which is directed against foreign militias, and deployed troops to Kufra and the surroundings of Sebha.
The number of migrants passing Libya decreased significantly since February 2018. Nevertheless, dozens died trying to reach Europe.
(2018/09/04)
The Kuwait conference for rebuilding Iraq brought about $33 billion in foreign investments, instead of an expected $100 billion. That can account for the aforementioned budgetary cuts. Prime Minister Abadi acted on his campaign promise to fight against corruption. These actions may constitute an attempt to weaken the rival Badr party and to raise public support.
and other jihadist groups refused to lay down their arms and leave the demilitarised zone. In addition, a recent chemical attack in Aleppo suspected to have been carried out by rebels, was answered with air strikes by Russia and the regime and could be used as a trigger to launch a limited offensive in Idlib.
The successes of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against ISIS in As-Safa, in the south of Syria, free further forces for an offensive in Idlib as well as against ISIS in Deir ez-Zour.
The last few weeks have been marked by a rapprochement between the Assad regime and its Arab neighbours. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt and others want to turn Syria back into an "Arab" issue and thus push back the growing influence of Tehran and Ankara in Syria. This led to the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria in September, the first Jordanian parliamentary delegation
to Damascus since 2011, and the planned reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus.
The shelling of Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria by Turkish forces can be understood as a warning message from Turkey to the US. Turkey sees the continued support of the US for the YPG, the joint Kurdish-American patrols and the planned US observation
posts along the border as a direct threat to Turkish security. Meanwhile, Turkish-American tensions are jeopardizing successes in the fight against ISIS at Abu Kamal. In recent weeks, the SDF has again suspended its offensive in protest against Turkish bombardments in northern Syria.
Erdogan's aim is to play for time, to separate "moderate" armed groups from Al-Qaeda linked groups, and ultimately to fragment and weaken the extremists.
After the accidental shooting down of a Russian reconnaissance plane by the Syrian regime, Russia indirectly accused Israel for the incident. Consequently, Russia is arming the Syrian regime with an S-300 missile system to secure the border with Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, causing discontent not only in Western states but also in Turkey and Israel.
Moreover, the new Syrian representative in the State Department, James Jeffrey, announced that the US troops' presence in Syria would be extended indefinitely. According to Jeffrey, Assad had no future as President of Syria, yet it was not the responsibility of the US to get rid of him.
Domestically, for the first time since 2011, local elections were held in regime-held areas. Even though the 12 million refugees and internally displaced persons could not vote, the regime signals strength andnormality through this step.
of the Iranian government to stop supplying electricity to Iraq due to unpaid bills resulted in local protests in Basra. Widespread protests resulted in Turkey and Kuwait issuing travel warnings to Iraq and hastened the return of Prime Minister Abadi from Brussels. An Iraqi delegation travelled to Saudi Arabia in search of a possible solution for the power
crisis. Turkey and Kuwait offered, at Iraq’s expense, to provide electricity to Iraq by means of mobile generators.
While several political parties have attempted to ally in order to form the largest bloc in parliament, Shiite clergy criticised the move setting that addressing the claims of the protesters should supersede such actions. Once the results of the manual count were announced by the IHEC and confirmed by the FSC, Ammar al-Hakim and Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi declared that they have formed a coalition and have a political majority in parliament. However, Nuri al-Maliki and Hadi al-Ameri also proclaimed to have such majority. President Fu’ad Masum then instructed the parliament to reconvene immediately.
Early meetings between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have been supported by the US in the fight against ISIS, and the Assad regime in Damascus also caused a stir. The talks should be seen in the context of Trump’s announcement in April that the US will withdraw its soldiers from Syria. The extent to which the SDF will succeed in achieving its goal of establishing a Syrian-Kurdish autonomous region in a decentralized state remains to be seen. A Kurdish autonomous area (similar to the one in Iraq) is inconceivable for the Assad regime. The Kurds, supported by the US, currently control about a third of Syria's territory, including major oil and water sources, and are likely to use them as a bargaining chips in future negotiations.
these voices was former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who said, that the elections have to be annulled, because of the humanitarian situation of the Internally Displaced People. Another heavy setback to the eclectoral process was the attack on the headquarter of the Kurdish party Gorran in Sulaymaniyya by a group loyal to the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The frauds led to a first request to the parliament to recount the votes. The Iraqi parliament voted for a manual recount of 10 percent of the ballots. Further the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) rejected the complaint to cancel the election results. This was followed by a statement of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) that there is no legal obligation to recount the votes. The parliament afterwards amended the election law, which said to annul the work and result of the Independent High Commission for Elections (IHEC) and dissolve it. The HCJ therefore appointed nine new judges to observe the work of the IHEC. At the same time Turkey started to fill up the Ilisu dam in Anatolia causing a water reduction of the Tigris by 50 percent. After protests of the Iraqi par- liament Turkey declared to postpone the filling up until July. Turkey also started a new offensive against PKK bases in the Qandil region in northern Iraq, which was followed by heavy protests of the government in Baghdad and Kurdish parties.
The coordinated joint operation by the US, France and Britain on April, 14 was limited to the destruction of chemical weapons producing and storing facilities of the regime and did not provoke the feared confrontation with Russia. The purpose of the proportional military strike was to dissuade the Assad regime from using chemical weapons.
Numerous evacuation agreements, predominantly brokered by Russia, resulted in the capture of longstanding rebel-controlled territories around Damascus, thus, further consolidated the regime’s leadership.
The US-State Department and the Pentagon remain deeply split over their future Syria strategy. Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters that
the US are unlikely to pull out troops from Syria until diplomats have achieved peace. His remarks came after President Trump announced to pull US soldiers out of the war-torn country in the near future.
of the security situation, creation of new job opportunities and rebuilding of destroyed regions.
ISIS declared that it will fight the elections by conducting suicide bombings. The Iraqi security forces reacted with two major offensives against ISIS in Anbar and Diyala province.
Turkey also started a major campaign against PKK fighters, who are believed to be hiding in Northern Iraq. The announcement of the Turkish offensive was followed by protests of the high cleric Muqtada al- Sadr and Kurdish MPs.
West, besonders vor dem Hintergrund, dass Khalifa Haftar Anfang April zur medizinischen Behandlung nach Paris gebracht wurde und sein Gesundheitszustand ungewiss bleibt.
Die ersten US-Luftschläge in Libyen seit Jänner 2018 zielten laut AFRICOM auf zwei hochrangige Kommandanten der al-Qaida ab und sind ein Ausdruck der US-Strategie in Libyen, da sich die USA bis auf gezielte Schläge gegen terroristische Netzwerke in Libyen kaum engagieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund
ist auch der laufende Bau einer US-Drohnenbasis nahe Agadez, in Niger, zu sehen, die Anfang 2019 fertiggestellt wird.
Die wochenlangen Zusammenstöße am südlichen Stadtrand von Sebha, der Hauptstadt des Fezzan, bei denen bereits Dutzende Menschen ums Leben
kamen, dauern trotz zahlreicher Schlichtungsversuche an. Parallel dazu begann Haftars Libyan National Army (LNA) die Operation „Law Enforcement“ im
Süden Libyens gegen “ausländische Milizen”.
Die Zahl der Migranten, die über Libyen nach Europa kamen, ist in den ersten drei Monaten von 2018 im Vergleich zum Vorjahreszeitraum um drei Viertel zurückgegangen, dennoch starben Dutzende Menschen bei der Überfahrt.
current health status. Haftar has not been seen in public in the last few weeks.
The killing of two high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders in an US-airstrike in the southern city of Ubari is an expression of the US strategy in Libya, which does merely go beyond isolated air strikes against terror networks. The ongoing construction of a US drone base in Agadez, Niger, can be explained in
this context, particularly due to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda establishing a permanent foothold in southern Libya.
The clashes in the outskirts of the capital of the Fezzan, Sebha, are continuing since several weeks, causing dozens of victims. Numerous attempts to establish a sustainable ceasefire failed. Simultaneously, the LNA launched Operation Law Enforcement in southern Libya, which is directed against foreign militias, and deployed troops to Kufra and the surroundings of Sebha.
The number of migrants passing Libya decreased significantly since February 2018. Nevertheless, dozens died trying to reach Europe.
(2018/09/04)
The Kuwait conference for rebuilding Iraq brought about $33 billion in foreign investments, instead of an expected $100 billion. That can account for the aforementioned budgetary cuts. Prime Minister Abadi acted on his campaign promise to fight against corruption. These actions may constitute an attempt to weaken the rival Badr party and to raise public support.
https://books.google.at/books?id=R5EwDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=der+albtraum+vom+kalifat&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjj6oag3K_ZAhWksKQKHWVqB1IQ6AEIUzAI#v=onepage&q&f=false
erschienen im Böhlau Verlag, 2016
Auf Grundlage der Erfahrungswerte im Umgang mit Extremismus in muslimischen und westlichen Ländern wird der Versuch unternommen, effektive Maßnahmen und Instrumente zur Prävention von Radikalisierung, insbesondere in Europa, zu finden.